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I N T ROD U C T ION 
INTRODUCTION 
The Chilean Medical Association 
burst into the world's headlines at the time 
of the military coup on September 11th,1973 . 
This military intervention signalled the end 
of the "Chilean road to socialism" and 
launched throughout the world discussions on 
the reasons for Popular Unity's demise. Within 
this extensive debate,discussions about the 
role of the Colegio Medico in the overthrow 
of Allende and in the subsequent imprisonment, 
torture and murder of Chilean doctors, formed 
a distinct and important element. 
In general, the world's 
response to events in the Chilean health 
sector during Popular Unity was to vi~lify 
the Colegio Medico. In an unprecedented act, 
the Panamerican Health Association demanded 
that the Colegio Medico ensure life,liberty 
and the right to practise for all Chilean 
doctors. Various groups of doctors throughout 
the world rebuked the Colegio for failing 
to abide by the humanitarian principles 
which ought to govern the sacred duty of 
doctors' work. In 1974 a special team of U.S. 
doctors having visited Chile in order to 
examine the accusations which had been 
2 . 
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levelled at the College,published a highly critical 
report of the Colegio Medico. Several Governments 
took steps to isolate the Chilean medical profession 
from international doctors' bodies. The Mexican 
Government for example refused to give visas to 
Chilean doctors wishing to attend an international 
conference in its country. Not surprisingly,the 
response of the Colegio Medico was to deny all the 
accusation that were made against it . 
Moreover,in response to the 
Colegio Medico's activities during Popular Unity, 
several studies were published which examined in 
greater detail the role of Chilean doctors. For 
instance, one work by Vincente Navarro and another 
by Hilary Modell and Howard Waitzkin both argued 
that doctors' opposition to the Allende Government 
d t th · b h . f th b . . 1 , 2 . was ue 0 elr mem ers lp 0 e ourgeolsle. 
Doctors private practices and status within the 
health sector as well as their class position were 
threatened by socialist changes in the health sector 
and in society as a whole. Similarly Diane Chanfreau 
explained doctors' support for the abolition of free 
medical care and a return to fee-for-service 
treatment in terms of their middle class ideology. 
This ideology represented the traditional bourgeois 
values of self interest and individualism. It replaced 
a more professi~nal ideology which had underlined 
doctors' support of socialized medicine in the first 
half of the twentieth century. 3 
All these writers took for 
granted Chilean doctors' membership of the dominant 
classes. Their analyses supported the argu~ents_of 
Jose Valenzuala Feijoo,published in "Punto Final" a 
~ 
few months before the coup in which he concluded, 
"ij e~to- aunque po~ ~upue~to no 
~ige mec&nicamente pa~a toda ~ 
o~den,pue~ no exi~ten eo~ tatae-
-../ 
i~mo~ cea~i~ta~ - te~mina po~ 
~eteeja~~e en un compa~tamiento 
poertico con~e~vado~.pod~ra ha~ea~~e 
en con~ecuencia,de un e~t~ato gu~gue~ . 
o ~ien- y e~to tae vez ~e~[a ma~ 
ju~to y p~eci~o- de un e~t~ato 
pequeno-~u~gue~ COn niveee~ de ing~e~o, 
ideoeog[a y compo~tamiento poe1tico 
~u~gue.~. 
These writers' analyses however,overlook the 
"contradictory" class behaviour of Chilean doctors. 
Firstly,not all doctors during Popular Unity supported 
the Colegio Medico's opposition to the Government's 
health policy. Almost a third of the profession, 
particularly in the early months of the Allende 
Government supported Popular Unity's aim of establishing 
a complete State service which abolished private 
practice. Secondly,in the period after the coup,many 
Chilean doctors opposed the Right wing Government 
and supported the role of the State in the Chilean 
health sector. 
These writers are unable to 
account for these contradictory aspects of doctors' 
behaviour because they straight-jacket doctors in a 
4. 
middle class ideology which makes them behave in a 
consistently narrow and reactionary way. In reality, 
the class position of doctors is much more complex. 
The hetrogenity of doctors' class positions accounts 
for the diversity of their political responses. 
We shall examine doctors as a 
group which occupies a contradictory class location 
between the 2 main classes in capitalist societ~ the 
bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Our aim is to assess 
the relevance of recent theoretical developments in 
class analysis to a study of Chilean doctors. 
While an analysis of class theory 
remains our underlying goal in this thesis we have 
tried to project the complexity and intricacy of 
doctors' politics during this period in Chilean history. 
The decade of the 70's was momentous. The shift in 
political background from a Socialist Government to a 
military dictatorship offers the social scientist a 
rich perspective from which to examine doctors' politics. 
Because of this background,politics 
was of special importance within the Colegio Medico. 
It is for this reason that we offer no excuse for 
describing politics within that institution in great 
detail;even if we risk of being accused of overlooking 
"underlying class causes". Class cannot explain 
everything. On the contrary,doctors' political actions 
were often independent of class positions. 
5 . 
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6. 
ORGANIZING PRINCIPLES OF CHAPTERS 
For most of the following 
chapters we have chosen to look at politics 
inside the Colegio Medico in terms of the 
struggle between various groupings inside 
the College. 
In this study,] main political 
groupings have been indentified:the Left and 
Popular Unity;Christian Democracy and the 
Centre;and finally, the Right. The latter 
group rarely associated itself with Chile's 
main conservative party, the Nationalist 
Party, preferring in the Colegio Medico 
elections of 1972 to call themselves 
Independents. The term TlNational Party doctorsTl 
therefore is not used. The Christian Democrat 
doctors have been identified with the Centre. 
After 1971,many members of the Radical Party 
left the Popular Unity coalition and joined the 
political Centre. Rather than referring to them 
as an individual grouping we have chosen to 
bracket them wi th the TlChristian Democrats TI • 
Thus,when we discuss the behaviour of TlChristian 
DemocratsTl during the Popular Unity period,we 
also include some doctors who were members of 
the Radical Party. 
This categorization should not 
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imply that there were 3 rigid groupings. There 
were countless shifts in political alliances 
between these groups and between groups within 
each of these categories. The plethora of 
political parties and their tendency to fragment 
shows the complexity of the political landscape 
inside the Colegio Medico. 
These caveats should be borne in 
mind when the terms Popular Unity,Christian 
Democrat and Right wing are used. 
QUOTES 
When the quote was originally 
spoken or written in Spanish,we have chosen to 
place the quote in the text in the same 
language. We have used the same procedure for 
English quotes. The reason is that many of the 
quotes can be considered controversial. They 
refer to incidents which are still regarded as 
highly sensitive. Rather than being accused of 
misrepresenting any individual,we have chosen 
not to translate from the original language. 
Moreover,many of the quotes appear in the 
third person,and not in the first person.For 
example,one consejero said, 
"el pen~onalmente de~ean[a que 
el pnote~ional,.", '" "," 
8 . 
The reason is that the minutes of meetings of the 
Colegio Medico were often recorded in the third 
person. Discussions were taperecorded and then 
transcribed. In this process,a consejero 1 s 
statement was often put into the third person. 
9 . 
C HAP T E R 1 
VARIOUS APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF 
POLITICS INSIDE THE CHILEAN MEDICAL 
ASSOCIATION. 
10. 
In this chapter we will examine 
the validity of certain approaches for studying 
the Chilean Medical Association. We will 
examine in particular, the relevance of Marxist 
class categories in explaining the behaviour 
of this middle class group. 
1.1 THE INADEQUACIES OF THE "PROFESSIONAL APPROACH." 
The tools normally used to 
understand the political behaviour of medical 
associations are derived from an assumption 
that doctors' primary interests are their 
professional ones. It is these professional 
in tere sts whi ch their 12rofes si on8.1 organi za tion 
protects in its relations with the State, 
capital and the general public. 
Much of the literature on the 
professions has tended to support the profession's 
conceptions of itself as an autonomous body 
which dispenses high level skills according to 
the dictates of a strong service ethic • 
Members of the profession are typically seen 
as being motivated by altruism. T.Parsons 
pointed out that while business and the professions 
shared much in common in industrial societies, the 
11 • 
12. 
professions were still to be distinguished 
by their collective-ori~ntation rather 
than by self-orientation. 1 Accompanying this 
view of the profession are the automatic 
"rights" of the profession to determine 
inte~ agia, its own code of conduct, 
standards of education and fee fixing. 
Altruism,an ethos of service and high level 
skills are embodied into an ideology 
of professionalism which legitimizes the 
exercise of occupational influence and 
monopoly. 
However a radical critique 
has emerged which questions this ideology of 
f 0 1 0 2 pro eSS10na 1sm. These studies argue that 
professionalism is highly advantageous to 
the practitioners.It insulates the profession 
from external scrutiny and assessment and 
supplies a power basis for client control. 
The service ethic and altruism are myths 
propagated by the professions themselves to 
justify their power. 
In this view, professionalism 
becomes re-defined as a particular type of 
occupational control rather than an 
expression of the inherent nature of a 
particular occupation. Thus,in referring to 
the medical profession, the controls of fee-
fixing, entry into the profession etc. do 
not somehow emerge from say, the intrinsic 
expertise of the physician but are gains 
won by the profession or awarded to it 
for other reasons. As T.Johnson states, 
".4 p Il. 0 ;l.e.6.6 ion i .6 not th.en, 
an occupation, Rut a m.ean.6 
ot contll.oiiing an 
oc.cupation. 3 
To achieve this control 
doctors have sought recourse to the State to 
have their rights protected by law.In Chile, 
these powers were given to the profession 
through the creation of the Colegio Medico 
in 1948. Doctors,through their professional 
college were empowered to fix fees, control 
the ethical behaviour of its members,define 
the specialization of the profession,and 
establish rules of conduct between the 
profession and public and private corporations. 
All practising doctors were also legally 
required to become members of the Colegio. 
This approach to professional-
ism offers us a way of understanding the 
politics of the Colegio Medico in terms of 
the protection and expansion of these 
professional powers of control which 
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secured doctors' privileged status. 
However within the Colegio 
Medico from 1970- 1 980 the professional 
considerations of doctors were not as 
important in determining their behaviour 
as a combination of political and class 
considerations. The dominance of political 
and class considerations might not always 
be the case. Factors such as professi9nal 
control and monopoly weighed heavily on 
Colegio Medico poli tics during the periods of l"G.latlve 
political calm ,for instance from 1952-
1 968, bu t during periods of poli ti cal cri se s 
such as that of 1970-1973,these professional 
considerations were only viewed by doctors 
in terms of the general political circumstances 
of the country;to be defended,or indeed given up 
according to the tactical consideration of the 
political group(s) inside the Colegio .This 
assertion that politics itself under certain 
circumstances was the main determinant of 
Colegio Medico behaviour cannot be extended 
to include other medical associations 
throughout the world.As will be shown in 
the next section,the political background 
in Chile was unique. 
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1.2 POLITICS IN CHILE 
In comparison to any European 
or even any other Latin American country, 
Chile was highly politicized. There was a 
strong tendency for social groups such as 
workers,ptudents and professionals to 
organize themselves through political parties. 
Moreover,the important role of politics in 
Chile was expressed by the following 
characteristics : 
1. Chilean politics covered the whole 
political spectrum,from the extreme 
Right to the far Left.Moreover, 
politics covered the whole country. 
Despite its vast geographical size, 
Chile had no regional parties. 
2. Chilean political parties were 
generally ideological.The political 
centre in Chile,home of most 
pragmatic parties,became dominated 
by an ideological party, Christian 
Democracy during the 60's.Moreover, 
the Chilean Left was strongly 
Marxist-oriented.Both the main 
Chilean Left wing parties, the 
Communists and the Socialists were 
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committed to the class struggle.Social 
Democrat parties had never succeeded 
in achieving any prominence in Chile. 
3. Chilets political system was extremely 
rigid.There was little possibility of 
compromise between Right, Left and 
Christian Democrat parties.Each group 
in its own right offered the Chilean 
electorate a radically different type 
of government. The unity of the Right 
wing, the ideological commitment of the 
Christian Democrats and the integration 
of the Chilean Left into the political 
spectrum without any ideological 
compromise contributed to the rigidity 
of Chile's political system. 
What accounted for this total 
spread,the strong ideological orientation and 
rigidity of politics in Chilean society? Why 
were political parties so important for 
Chil eans? 
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE STATE IN CHILE 
The Chilean state had to some 
extent "poli ticized" society because of its 
dominant role in the economy. This dominance 
derived from its control over Chile's few 
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mineral exports. The State drew its revenue 
from the taxation of these minerals and 
became the most powerful economic force in 
Chile. Both the economy and society carne to 
depend on State revenue. When the revenue 
dropped, the whole economy went into decline. 
Before the Second World War, the State was 
a major employer in areas such as defence, 
education and public works. After 1945,it 
also became a major investor in local 
industry. The State's predominence in 
industrial investment was revealed in a 
study in 1969 which showed that 50% of 
supposedly" private" investment was in 
fact subsidized by the State and that total 
State expenditure in the same year 
amounted to 44% of the Gross National Product. 4 
Because the State has played 
such a key role in the economy monopolizing 
most of Chile's resources,groups were 
forced to compete with each other in order 
to obtain State benefits. This competition 
to obtain access to the State increased the 
political stakes in Chile and contributed 
to the remarkable importance of Chilean 
political life. 
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THE WEAKNESS OF CIVIL SOCIETY 
A second inter-related reason 
for the importance of politics in Chile was 
the use made by social groups of political 
parties in order to compete for State 
benefits. Their own organizations had proved 
too weak to be effective. 
Because political parties 
were used as vehicles for the aspirations of 
weak societal groups a unique system was 
created in Chile. Manuel Garreton describes 
it thus 
"12..f -6i.!>i12..ma poft'tico pa/l.tida/l.io 
12../l.a 12..f modo p/l.ivif12..giado d12.. 
con-6tituci6n d12.. -6uj12..ctO-6 y 
acto/l.12..-6 -6ociaf12..-6. Hay una 
cofumna v12../l.t12..i/l.af d12.. fa -6oci12..dad 
chif12..na qU12.. figa fa ia-612.. -6ociaf 
af /l.12..t12../l.12..nt12.. 12..-6tataf, dond12.. .612-
in-612../l.ta fa imi/l.icacion d12.. fa 
o/l.ganizacion -6ociaf con fa 
o/l.ganizaci6n pofrtico pa/l.tida/l.ia 
a t/l.ave-6 d12.. una ampfia y 
div12../l.-6iticada cfa-612.. pofitica. 
La pO-6iiifidad pa/l.a un -612..ctO/l. 
dctc/l.minado d12.. conv12../l.ti/l.-612.. 12..n 
acto/l. nacionaf pa-6a pO/l. 12..-6ta 
columna v12../l.t12..i/l.af." 5 
Of course not all social groups 
were dependent on this socio-political 
structure. Groups such as employers' 
organizations were strong enough to make 
their demands on the State without the aid 
of political parties. 
1 8. 
Moreover,certain social movements 
did not need political parties in order to 
become significant national actors. Gremialismo 
in 1972-73 for instance,which represented 
mainly middle class groups made its demands 
directly to the State and independently of the 
two opposition parties,the Christian Democrats 
and the National Party. 
We should also bear in mind 
that the Pinochet dictatorship,by repressing 
political ~arties has dismantled this socio -
political system. Even although political 
parties may still be active in Chile they have 
lost their central purpose.It is probable 
therefore,that in the long run Chilean society's 
dependence on political parties will decline. 
1 .3 POLITICS AND THE COLEGIO MEDICO 
The Colegio Medico displayed the 
same type of politicization as other intermed-
iate groups. While it is true to say that 
doctors were more socially powerful than 
workers,they still looked to political parties 
and the State for much needed protection.Indeed, 
historically the doctors' unions have been 
surprisingly weak.Not until 1948 did the 
1 9. 
profession manage to form a united gremio 
when the State required all doctors to 
become members of the Colegio Medico by 
law. 
The reason for this weakness 
prior to 1948 was the variegated nature of 
doctors! work. This worked against doctors 
forming a clear group consciousness. In 
this early period doctors operated more as 
independent practitioners and their outlook 
was consequently more individualistic. Only 
when the State took over the health service 
in 1952 did doctors lose this mentality and 
become more conscious of themselves as a 
collective group. 
Despite a legal requirement 
compelling doctors to be members, the Colegio 
Medico remained weak after 1948. During 
this period the role of the Colegio Medico 
was a perfect example of a social gruup 
being forced to become politicized in order 
to obtain benefits from the State. From 
1948-50,a series of social gains were won 
by the profession from the then Radical 
Party Government,a prime feature of which 
was the distribution of State patronage 
amongst middle class groups. The Colegio 
20. 
Medico leaders,were almost to a man,members of 
the Radical Party.Indeed,the Radical Party 
dominated the Colegio Medico throughout the 
50 t s and 60 t s. 
Despite being overtly 
IIpoli ticized ll , the Colegio operated more as a 
professional organization protecting the 
interests of its members,than as a battleground 
for competing political groups. Thus,elections 
inside the Colegio Medico were poorly attended. 
Political groups saw little need to try and 
take over the Colegio for their purposes . 
Nationally,this was a period of political 
consensus since the State was in a position to 
satisfy the demands of most social groups . 
This period of calm gradually broke down 
however,and a crisis developed. During the 
Christian Democrat administration,the State 
plagued by inflation and growing debt lost 
\. 
its capacity to play its almost IIclientelistic II 
role. Social groups competed with each other 
in the struggle for the decreasing State 
patronage. At the same time political parties 
proposed wide-ranging transformations of 
society to solve the economic crisis. In this 
period of difficulty,the Colegio Medico 
ceased to be principally a representative 
organ of the medical profession. 
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Indeed,towards the end of the 60's, 
the Colegio Medico became a microcosm of national 
political life. The Colegio Medico was riven 
with conflict between ~olitical groups aligned 
to Popular Unity, the National Party and Christian 
Democracy. 
During the decade of the 70's a 
number of distinct political groupings could be 
identified inside the Colegio Medico.Although 
never openly articulated inside the governing 
body of the Colegio,the General Council,it was 
obvious which consejeros represented which 
political groups. Until the coup in 1973,Popular 
Unity had its own consejeros in the General and 
Regional Councils. They were outnumbered by 
Christian Democrat and National Party groupings. 
The struggle between these groups shattered the 
almost club-like atmosphere which had previously 
existed when the Radical Party had been in 
control of the Colegio Medico. Ultimately, 
doctors' loyalties to these party groupings 
during crises was greater than their loyalty 
to their professional interests. 
The dominance of politics 
over professional interests carried on after 
the coup in 1973 even though politics were 
officially banned. Between 1973 and 1975,an 
ultra-Right wing group was in control of the 
22. 
Colegio Medico. In an effort to make sacrifices 
for the new Government,it decided to forego 
wage increases in order to lower inflationary 
pressure on the economy. The same disregard 
for "professional interests" was displayed after 
1975. During this period the professional 
powers of the Colegio Medico were under the 
gravest threat in the history of the college, 
since under the prevailing free market 
ideology,these powers had been described as 
"monopolistic" and hence unjustifiable. 
Nonetheless, pro -Government doctors wi thin the 
Colegio Medico in order to avoid weakening 
the profession's support for the Government 
chose to defend the Junta's position rather 
than defend their own professional status. This 
was not simply a small group of doctors taking 
orders from the Government and imposing its 
will on the profession. The action of these 
doctors reflected solid support from within 
the profession for this course of action. 
We have described the general 
reasons for the politicized nature of Chilean 
society and how the Colegio Medico reflects 
this unique socio-political system and 
becomes itself equally politicized. This 
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politicization of the Colegio Medico during 
periods of crises almost eclipses the role 
of the Colegio as an organization defending 
professional interests. 
We have not yet considered why 
certain groups within the profession chose 
to join particular political groupings. The 
defence of professional interests may have 
been one of the reasons determining such a 
decision. This might have been especially 
appropriate during periods of political calm, 
but we have seen that in moments of crises 
political groups readily sacrificed their 
Tlprofes sional in tere sts TI for the well being 
of their political group as a whole. 
We will now examine the class 
position of doctors to discover in what ways, 
if any,it accounted for the choice of 
political options during the period of 
crisis from 1970-1980. 
24. 
1.4. nCONTRADICTORY CLASS LOCATIOl~ n 
The middle classes pose severe 
theoretical problems for the Marxian model of 
society. Marx's model is basically dichotomous. 
Capitalist society is riven in two by the 
struggle between the owners of the means of 
production, the bourgeoisie on the one hand 
and the non-owners,the proletariat from whose 
labour_power the bourgeoisie extracts a 
surplus value,on the other. The problem for 
Marx was locating these middle class groups 
within this exploitative relationship. 
Marx's analysis was unsatis-
factory. It was suggested that these groups 
would be subsumed into the two main class 
groupings as society became increasingly 
polarized. Yet the continuing permanence of 
the traditional Petite Bourgeosie(small 
employers,artisans etc.)coupled with the 
emergence of what is called the new middle 
class(technicians,white collar workers etc.) 
gravely damaged Marx's prediction. 6 
It has been concluded therefore 
that the ambitiousness and abstraction of 
Marx's framework does not provide a useful or 
applicable model for the analysis of the 
apparently highly differentiated class 
25. 
t t f t d . t 1· 7 s ruc ure 0 presen - ay capl a lsm. 
Marxists however have accepted 
that the categories of owner/non owner are 
inadequate as a basis for understanding the 
empirical complexity of class structures. 
Various refinements and sub-categories have 
been proposed. A body of Marxist thought has 
emerged which is specifically geared to 
understanding the middle classes in t~rms of 
the function and position of these groups 
within the capitalist mode of production. 
Writers such as Carchedi,Eric Olin Wright,Hunt 
and Crompton have offered us ways of understand-
ing how these groups are involved in,and 
affected by,the surplus-value producing 
8 process. 
A major theme of these writings 
focuses on the development of the capi talist 
function and the agents who perform this 
function,from the historical beginnings of 
capitalism to the present day. Over this 
time,the division of labour has been transformed 
as the capitalist system has developed. The 
product is no longer that of an individual 
but the outcome of what Marx refers to 
as Itcollective labour. 1t The fragmentation 
of work is a measure of the increasing 
extent to which the labour process is bent 
towards the requirements of capital;for 
26. 
~LaRou~ powe~,capaRle ot pe~to~ming 
a p~oce66 may Re pu~cha6ed and 
~ep~oduced mo~e cheaply a6 a 
di660ciated element than a6 a 
capacity integ~ated in a 6ingle 
wo~ke~. n 9 
Under monopoly capitalism, the 
functions of capital are similarly collectivized; 
tha t is, subdi vided into fractional oper-a ti ons. 
Different agents carry out the various aspects of 
the capitalist function(for example, the split 
between "financial"and "production" management) 
and furthermore, these aspects of the capitalist 
function have themselves been broken down into 
specific circumscribed "task elements". 1 0 
From this analysis of the 
pattern of capitalist development a perspective 
on the "middle class" has emerged which is common 
to a range of authors such as Wright,Johnson, 
Crompton, Braverman and others. This analysis can 
be summarized in the following terms:the"middle 
class" may be distinguished by the fact that: 
(a) they are,in some cases property-
less employees. 
(b) they carry out the function of 
capital 
(c) but this function is carried out 
as a labour process~that is, the 
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work itself is fragmented with little 
autonomy, and is subject to direction 
from above. 
As Braverman says, 
"7he development ot capital ha~ 
t~an~to~med the ope~ating tunction 
ot the capitali~t t~om a pe~~onal 
activity into the wo~k ot a ma~~ 
ot people ...... the management 
tunction~ ot cont~ol and 
app~op~iation have in them~elve~ 
Lecome laLou~ p~oce~~e~." 11 
Or,as Johnson argues, 
"7he new petty Lou~geo~ie a~e 
cha~acte~ized Ly po~ition~ 
within the ~ocial divi~ion ot 
laLou~ .... which ope~ationalize 
a tunction ot capital Lut do ~o 
a~ pa~t ot an inc~ea~ingly 
t~agmented and ~outinized 
p~oce~~." 12 
Thus,the class situation of the 
white collar worker is essentially ambiguous. 
In terms of the relations of production these 
workers carry out the function of capital, but 
they may lack ownership and in many cases, 
control;and they themselves are often 
subjected to extensive controls within the 
work situation. 
E.Olin Wright has described 
these groups as having contradictory class 
locations with the bourgeoisie and the 
proletariat. They do not constitute a 
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specific class as such,since they are not 
separated from the functions of the global 
capitalist or the collective worker. 13 
1.5 THi!: AMBIGUOUS caARACTE8.ISTICS OF DOCTORS '"WORK: 
DOCTORS'CONTROL FUNCTIONS. 
In terms of this class paradigm, 
doctors' work has a dual role:it operationalizes 
a function of capital,but does so as part of an 
increasingly fragmented and routinized labour 
process. In this section we will examine doctors' 
role in its first aspect,that is to say,the 
carrying out of a fUnction of capital. 
Before analysing this aspect of 
doctors' work and how it acts as a function of 
capitalist control,it is necessary to outline 
three processes which can be identified in 
Marx's analysis of capital: 
1. At the level of relations of production 
we can identify the dual processes of 
surplus value production and labour, 
with the former being determined as a 
mode of appropriation. At this level of 
production middle class groups take on 
the global function of capital by 
providing surveillance over the direct 
producers.Concretely,we are talking about 
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the various levels of management,foremen 
etc. involved in the production 
enterprise. 
2. Secondly there is the level of the 
production process which included that 
aspect of the realization of the capital 
associated with its accounting,allocation 
and distribution. This function may be 
carried out by complex organizations 
external to the productive enterprise. 
For example,insurance firms are increas-
in~lv involved in the process of 
investment and in so doin~,while not 
directly entering into productive activity, 
may channel the flow of capital in certain 
directions rather than others and preside 
over the allocation of surplus . Whereas 
at the level of production relations the 
appropriation of surplus value involves 
direct surveillance and coercion of 
productive labour in the effort to increase 
productivity and lower costs,the process of 
realization int~oduces new mechanisms of 
control which have the function of 
"watching ove~ capital, ot 
checking and cont~ollina the 
p~og~e~~ ot it~ enla~qement." 14 
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3. Finally,there is the process of reproduction. 
This new set of control mechanisms is not 
directly relevant to the appropriation of 
surplus value or its realization, but oper-
ates ·to reproduce the social conditions 
for the maintenance of such relationships. 
In the processes of reproduction both the 
"profession" and the State playa major 
role. This is largely due to their 
involvement in the reproduction of labour 
power,including health and educational 
services and the institutionalization of 
knowledge, and those ideological processes 
consistent with the underlying relations 
of production. 15 
Doctors perform the function of capital during the 
reproduction of the labour force. Their role is to 
provide a "healthy" work force able to produce 
surplus value for the capitalist. To oil the 
wheels of production they define "heal th" in terms 
of whether a worker is able to produce for the 
capitalist. Without doctors' definitions of "health" 
which fits the needs of the capitalist mode of 
production, "sickness"(however defined),could act 
as an impediment to the surplus value producing 
process .16 
It is wrong to argue that doctors 
in helping to define the ideological superstructures 
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in which capital exploits labour,themselves 
become the exploiters of labour. 17 Often 
doctors' own ideology can contradict 
dominant capitalist values. The notion that 
collective forms of care are best suited to 
cure mass health problems underlines the 
concept of social medicine. This belief in 
social medicine is held strongly by many 
medical professions throughout the world. 
This concept conflicts with certain capitalist 
assumptions about ill health,for example,the 
belief that illness is a result of individual 
breakdown rather than possible social and 
economic factors. Thus the doctor's 
ideological role in supporting the capitalist 
system can be full of contradictions. 
If doctors simply buttressed 
the capitalist system as ideological workers 
or as "production intellectuals" using 
Gramsci's terms,then their work situation 
would scarcely be ambiguously situated between 
proletarian and capitalist classes. They 
would be squarely located within the capitalist 
class. However,for those doctors who carry 
out the capitalist functions as a labour 
process their class location is extremely 
ambiguous. The extent to which doctors carry 
out the capitalist function as a labour 
process determines their location in the 
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capitalist structure. The less their work is 
carried out as a labour process, the more 
they can be located towards the capitalist 
class. 
1.6 THE DEGRADATION OF WORK:SKILL AND DESKILLING 
AND THE LABOUR PROCESS. 
According to Braverman in 
Labour and Monopoly Capital,there has been 
a general and progressive deskilling of jobs 
1 8 in the twentieth century. Jobs have 
become increasingly devoid of intrinsic 
content, routinized and mechanized. 
The cause of this trend 
Braverman argues is management's control over 
the labour process. Control of the worker is 
necessary since the extraction of profit which 
characterizes capitalism necessarily entails 
a conflict of interest between capitalists 
and workers. While the labour process requires 
some degree of co-ordination, the dynamic 
operation of capital,its constant drive 
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for accumulation,gives rise to greater need 
for control of the labour process. This 
feature of capitalism resulted in Braverman's 
view in constant attempts throughout the 
nineteenth century to develop a specifically 
capitalist mode of management which could 
exercise control over the labour process. 
Eventually Taylorism provided management with 
the basis on which to control the labour 
process. Braverman argues that the dominance 
of the ideas that Taylor espoused was due to 
the fact that Taylor was the first management 
theorist to recognize the vital importance 
of control. 19 
Braverman argues that the main 
feature of this type of scientific management 
is its divorce of conception from execution, 
so that management is completely responsible 
for designing and planning work tasks. Workers 
under this type of management are restricted to 
simple manual operations. Mental and manual 
labour are separated and all autonomy,discretion 
and brain work removed from the shop floor 
and monopolized by management. This results in 
deskilling as work is progressively degraded. 
All elements of knowledge,judgement and 
responsibility are taken away from the worker. 
His work becomes programmed, routinized and 
specialized. 
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Braverman argues that this trend is 
making the working class more homogenous. The 
divisions caused by differences and levels of 
skills are quickly evaporating in the face of 
capital's imperative to control the labour process. 
Control of the labour process to 
ensure the realization of surplus value contributes 
to falling skill levels amongst workers,which in turn 
alters their class situation. In diagrammatic form 
Bravermann1s view may be represented thus: 
c/l...e.ai i on 01-
/.>u/l..plu/.> valu.e. 
in ih.e. laRou/l.. 
C la-6 -6 /.>i/l..u ciu/l...e. 
(p/l..ol.e.ia/l..ianizaiion) 
20 P/l..oc.e.-6-6. 
Braverman IS assertion that proletar-
ianization is the result of deskilling which 
itself is the result of the implementation of 
modern management techniques challenges conventional 
thinking which claims that the last 30 years have 
ieen an upgrading of work. 
Using this framework one can define 
proletarianization thus:it is a process whereby the 
worker is forced into a closer relationship with 
capital,which removes the skill(the conception and 
execution of work)and therefore his relative 
21 
autonomy. 
Braverman's thesis has come 
under attack from many sources.Several of 
his critics focus on his assumption that 
all capitalist managers adopt Taylor's 
"scientific management n. For instance, 
Tomlinson argues that managements ' 
strategies have other aspects to them 
than simple control. 22 Managers,he argues 
try to integrate the work force and this 
may mean providing workers with some autonomy. 
Braverman also appears to 
neglect the way in which workers may resist 
management initiatives. The working class 
is seen as passive in his analysis,living 
"in acco~darce with the to~ceh 
which act upon it." 23 
As Schwarz remarks, 
"B~ave~man 'h app~oach taif-h 
to ~ecognize the wo~king 
cf-ahh ah an active and 
p~oRf-ematic p~ehence 
within the mechanihm ot 
accumuf-ation." 24 
In contrast the power of capital is treated 
as omnipotent,united and unstoppable. 
These criticisms notwithstanding 
Braverman's framework is useful in describing 
the way in which certain doctors in Chile 
have undergone changes in their class 
situation as a result of new forms of labour 
con trol. 
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It seems too bold a step to 
examine doctors' work in the light of 
Braverman's assertion on "deskilling". 
Doctors' work is one of the most highly 
skilled jobs in modern society. Braverman 
however, emphasized the extensive process 
of deskilling. It is not confined to the 
"working class" occupations such as clerical 
work and retail trade occupations. Rather, 
traditional middle class occupations have 
begun to exhibit the characteristics of 
other mass occupations:rationalization and 
the development of the division of labour, 
the simplification of tasks,the application 
of mechanization,a downward drift in 
relative wage levels and some unionization. 
However,despite commendable 
boldness,Braverman is guilty of a 
sweeping generalisation in assuming a 
steady trend of deskilling in those middle 
class occupations. Capital in introducing 
new forms of machinery in order to simplify 
tasks,and thereby to increase the rate of 
extraction of surplus value,has also created 
new skills. 25 
Moreover,in the case of doctors 
it seems more sensible to make a distinction 
between the deskilling of certain jobs and 
the deskilling of individual workers . 
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Braverman focuses on the deskilling of 
certain jobs. The job of a doctor 
cannot meaningfully be deskilled without 
becoming a different job. However, 
instances may arise whereby the individuals 
who are doctors ~ deskilled. By making 
this distinction we can move from a general 
analysis to an examination of particular 
instances of deskilling. 
Finally,deskilling through 
changes in the labour process should not be 
isolated and divorced from the totality of 
workers 1 experience. Recession,the existence 
of mass unemployment, even military dictator-
ships creates deskilling. For example, 
unemployment separates the worker from 
practising his skill;it may lead him to 
adopting another job which makes it difficult 
for him to revert to his previous skilled 
job. 
These refinements to Braverman IS 
position i.e. to examine workers in particular 
instances of deskilling and to see deskilling 
as part of the totality of economic 
experiences should be borne in mind when we 
discuss the case of Chilean doctors. 
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1.7 THE DEGRADATION OF WORK:.J)ESKILLING AND THE 
PROLETARIANIZATION OF DOCTORS. 
Few studies using Bravermann's 
thesis have looked at doctors. However,one 
study of British G.P. 's does use such a 
framework and to a certain extent 
anticipated Braverman's more recent 
publications.Julian Tudor Hart has argued 
that these G.P. 's 
"~till wo~k in a cottage indu~t~y 
on the line~ ot ~mall ~hopkeepe~~. 
~edicine can no longe~ Re done Ry 
~hopkeepe~~ and docto~~ a~e ~ipe, 
not only to ally them~elve~ with 
the wo~king cla~~,Rut to join 
it. 26 
Perhaps aware of the scepticism with which a 
statement of this type might be greeted,Hart 
added, 
"Ot cou~~e that ~equi~e~ a little 
imagination, Rut do not 
~evolutiona~ie~ ~equi~e imagination." 27 
Even for revolutionaries 
however, the notion of British proletarian 
doctors stretches the imagination. In Chile 
however, the notion is more plausible. 
We shall argue in this thesis 
that several of the characteristics which 
Braverman saw as resulting from the change 
in the capital labour process i.e. degradation, 
deskilling and proletarianization were 
manifested in the changing work patterns of 
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certain doctors in Chile. 
1.3 THE DEGRADATION OF CHILEAN DOCTORS' WORK 
In Chile, those doctors who 
worked in the State sector faced a demoral-
izing experience. The State service in 
Chile was set up to provide care for the 
70% of the population who could not afford 
to pay for their health treatment. Despite 
having to treat the vast majority of 
Chileans,it was never given sufficient 
funds to carry out this task. Doctors 
were faced with huge numbers of patients 
to treat with inadequte resources. The 
State service moreover paid doctors very 
low wages. Since its creation in 1952 it 
became over centralised and bureaucratic. 
Under these working constraints doctors 
have tended to lose their control and 
autonomy in the work place to this State 
authority. Also unlike doctors in Britain 
who work under a per capita system,doctors 
in Chile had no list of patients to treat 
whom they knew well and saw regularly. The 
Chilean State health system prevented the 
building up of doctor/patient relationships. 
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The most important factor to bear 
in mind when assessing the work situation of 
Chilean doctors is that many doctors had their 
own private practices which they combined with 
their State work. 
Traditionally, working in the 
private sector compensated for the deprivation 
of the public sector. Private work supplemented 
doctors' small incomes from the State. In their 
relationships with their private patients 
doctors enjoyed full autonomy and control and 
were not confined to the bureaucratic routines 
and management controls which plagued the 
State sector. 
The degradation of doctors' work 
in Chile had only effected those who practised 
predominantly within the State sector i.e. the 
young doctors. These young doctors were 
required to work full time for the State for at 
least 7 years after graduating. Thus,they were 
the group least able to protect themselves 
and their work from the degrading and deskilling 
tendencies of the State health service. 
While these young doctors could 
still exert power and control when diagnosing 
illness they could not escape the intrinsic 
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constraints within their workplace. These 
constraints occurred as a result of the 
limited time and inadequate medical facilities 
for diagnosis and in the scarcity of resources 
for treating patients. 
The work situation of State 
service doctors had been the subject of 
several studies in the 60's.28 One doctor 
considered that this work was proletarianizing 
young doctors. In this period young doctors 
often adopted radical Left wing positions. In 
early 1962 they organized a long and bitter 
strike against the Right wing Allessandri 
Government for higher wages and better working 
conditions. 
Since the coup in 1973,a new 
factor had emerged to accelerate this proletar-
ianization tendency. State subsidies were cut 
in the Junta's attempt to privatize the health 
service. This increased the constraints doctors 
had encountered in their State work. For the 
first time since the 50's,young doctors became 
unemployed on a large scale. 
More significant however, was 
the effect of the Junta's policy of encouraging 
private capital interests to take over parts of 
the Chilean health sector to operate them for 
profit. Doctors who in their previous private 
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work owned their own small clinics and were paid 
a fee directly from the patient now faced the 
prospect of working for employers,many of whom 
were not doctors themselves. The patients paid 
these employers, who after deducting a percentage 
paid the doctors a wage. These operations were 
run essentially as businesses. Doctors' work 
became geared for profit. The old control and 
autonomy which doctors possessed in their 
private sector work were now under threat from 
the insurance companies,private hospitals and 
clinics. 
These changes in the private 
sector had their effect on the public sector . 
Cost-effectiveness became the watchword in 
State hospital management. Control of the work 
process through new management styles were 
suddenly introduced in Chilean hospitals. The 
influence of the Chicago School economists was 
the perfect background in which ruthless 
management techniques were applied. Opposition 
to the application of these practices could 
easily be crushed by the military regime. Even 
Right wing doctors in the late 70's objected 
to the new power of the business managers in 
Chile's state hospitals. 29 
In this way,profit,competitive-
ness and effiency became the rules of thumb 
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in deciding the success of State and private 
health enterprises. The old concept of "need" 
had given away to strictly market criteria. 
In the new Chile,certain doctors tended to 
face proletarianization both by the State 
and by capital. 
These processes have not 
effected all members of the profession equally. 
The more established doctors with their private 
practices have retained their control in their 
place of work. Their work has not become part 
of a labour process. Indeed,they have benefited 
from greater private medicine opportunities. 
They have,either individually or in partnership 
with financiers ,set up larger private clinics 
employing often junior medical personnel. These 
younger doctors have been most vulnerable to 
these processes. 
We shall argue that these young 
doctors faced a process of proletarianization 
which was accelerated considerably by the 
changes in health policy and in Chilean society 
after the coup. 
1.9 THE CLASS LOCATION OF CHILEAN DOCTORS 
We have argued that the relation 
a doctor has with either the bourgeoisie or the 
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proletariat depends on the nature of a doctor's 
work and the extent to which his work becomes 
part of a labour process. This type of analysis 
contrasts with the Weberian class framework. 
Under this approach,doctors would be categorized 
according to their status and income. In the 
Marxian analysis,doctors are located in class 
terms according to their role within the mode 
of production. 
From our previous analysis of 
the dual form of doctors work i.e. State and 
private medicine,it appears then that doctors 
in the State sectorin performing their 
capitalist functions of reproduction do so as 
part of a labour process. They are,to some 
extent,controlled,organized and regimented in 
the same way as worker groups. In contrast, 
doctors in private clinics maintained a degree 
of control and autonomy. In these clinics 
doctors performed their capitalist functions 
free from the constraints of the labour process. 
What complicated the location of 
Chilean doctors in the class structure was the 
fact that most doctors spent part of the time 
working for the State and part of the time in 
their own private clinics. The hours spent in 
each sector varied considerably throughout the 
the profession. However,one can try to 
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categorize the profession in terms of the 
constraints they faced in their work 
situation. Three rather broad groups may 
be identified: 
1 . Those doctors who relied predominantly 
on private work or spent less than 4 
hours a day working for the State 
service. These doctors faced few,if any 
constraints in their workplace. As a 
class grouping they were much closer to 
the bourgeoisie than to the proletariat. 
In numerical terms(using 1973 statistics) 
they constituted almost 1000 doctors(out 
of 5777)or 18% of the profession. 30 
2. Those doctors who divided their time 
equally between State and private work, 
spending at least 6 hours a day in the 
State health service. Unlike the previous 
group they were much more effected by 
constraints on their workplace. To some 
extent however, these effects were 
mitigated by their private work where 
they enjoyed full autonomy and control. 
In Chile, this group numbered around 
2,700,representing 46% of the profession. 
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3. Those doctors who relied totally on the 
State for employment and income. These 
doctors were most effected by the nature 
of the State health service. This group 
was most likely to be composed of young 
doctors serving a very long apprentice-
ship during which they trained to 
become specialists. On leaving University, 
in return for receiving a grant from the 
State to train to become specialists they 
committed themselves to working at least 
7 years full time in the State sector. 
This commitment often meant working in 
poorly equipped, small and outlying hospitals. 
Moreover,it could be as long as 11 or 12 
years after graduation before a doctor 
became a specialist and thereby able to 
treat private patients. The number of 
doctors who fell into this category was 
approximately 2700,out of the total 
medical population of 5777,which represented 
36% of the profession. 
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1 .10 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CLASS AND POLITICS 
AND THE "PROLETARIANIZATION" OF DOCTORS 
There was some evidence which 
pointed to these segments of the profession 
adopting a particular political perspective. 
It could be suggested that these class 
groupings were at the basis of political 
competition between groups inside theColegio 
Medico. During the Popular Unity period the 
three main political groups, the National Party, 
Christian Democracy and Popular Unity most 
probably received the bulk of doctors' support 
from groups 1,2 and 3 respectively. As we 
shall see there was evidence to suggest that 
doctors working mostly in the private sector 
tended to support the Right whereas those 
working in the State sector, the younger 
doctors tended to be on the Left. 
What does seem to be unquestion-
able was the effects of the class situation of 
the younger doctors on their political 
behaviour. Historically,they were often very 
radical, but this was especially true during 
1970-80. These effects were much more 
pronounced than on doctors who did not have 
full time State work. Such were the effects 
of full time State work that this group of 
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young doctors almost underwent a process of 
proletarianization. 
The main question to be 
answered was how far these class positions 
of the various groups inside the profession 
actually determined the often very complex 
and intricate political struggle inside the 
Colegio Medico. 
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C HAP T E R 2 
THE COLEGIO MEDICO AND THE 
CHILEAN MEDICAL PROFESSION 
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The Distribution of Power inside the 
Colegio Medico. 
TAKES DECISIONS 
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MESA DIRECT IVA WHICH ARE BINDING 
ON ALL DOCTORS 
t ELECTS 
G ENE R A L C 0 U N C I L 
t APPOINTS 
R E G I 0 N A L C 0 U N C I 
l' INFORMS 
CAP I T U LOS 
N.B. 
1. Elections after 1973 were prohibited. 
2. Doctors do not elect either General Councilor 
the Executive Committee of the Colegio Medico. 
3. The capitulos resolutions are not binding on 
L 
either the Regional Councilor the GBneral Council. 
S 
ELECTS 
2.1 THE COLEGIO MEDICO DE CHILE 
The Colegio Medico was created in 
1948 through an act of Parliament. Its structure and 
powers were fixed by law and any alteration in its 
character required a change in legislation. 
The Colegio was composed of a 
ruling Consejo General(General Council)based in Santiago, 
and by Consejos Regionales(Regional Councils) whose 
headquarters were in Santiago, Puerto Montt,Punta Arenas, 
Temuco,Talca,Concepcion,Valdivia,Valparaiso,La Serena, 
Antofagasta,Rancagua and Tarapaca.(See Table 1) 
The most important characteristic 
of the Colegio Medico was that every doctor was 
legally required to be a member. 
2.2 THE GENERAL COUNCIL 
The ruling council of the Colegio 
Medico was the General Council which was composed of 
20 members. Of these 20 members,6 were appointed by 
the Regional Council of Santiago;] by the Regional 
Council of Valparaiso;2 by Concepcion and 1 each from 
the remaining Regional Councils. Members of the General 
Council were not elected by the profession but were 
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nominated by the Regional Councils. In practice, 
most of the consejeros on the General Council 
were Santiago doctors. In a country as large as 
Chile, doctors from as far apart as Puerto 
Montt or Punto Arenas were not able to come to 
Santiago to attend weekly meetings. The only 
consejeros apart from those of the Regional 
Council of Santiago who lived in the region 
which they represented were those from the 
Regional Council of Valparaiso. The port of 
Valparaiso was only 2 hours from Santiago by 
car. 
The consejeros on the General 
Council elected a President, Secretary General, 
Vice-President and Treasurer from amongst 
themselves. Those 4 doctors formed the Executive 
Committee of the Colegio Medico. Doctors in the 
regions did not elect any of the posts in the 
Executive Committee. 
Each member of the General Council 
was appointed for a term of office of 4 years. 
There was no limit on the number of times a 
consejero was re-elected,nor on the number of 
times a doctor held any of the posts on the 
Executive Committee. 
To be appointed as a General 
Consejero,a doctor was required to have practised 
for at least 5 years. In effect this ruling 
meant that most of the consejeros were 
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established,older doctors. These doctors were not 
paid for serving on the General Council. 
2.3 REGIONAL COUNCILS 
The Regional Councils were composed 
of 5 members except in the case of Santiago, Valparaiso 
and Concepcion which had 9,7 and 7 members 
respectively. 
In contrast to the General Council, 
Regional Councils were elected by the doctors within 
their jurisdiction. Candidates however,must still 
have been doctors for at least 5 years. 
TABLE 1 :THE REGIONAL LOCATION OF DOCTORS. 
REGION DOCTORS REGION % 
TARAPACA 144 1 .70 
ANTOFAGASTA 201 2.35 
LA SERENA 209 2.45 
VALPARAISO 813 9.52 
SANTIAGO 5053 59.16 
RANCAGUA 264 3.09 
TALCA 249 2.92 
CONCEPCION 826 9.67 
TEl-mco 256 2.99 
VALDIVIA 195 2.28 
PUERTO MONTT 247 2.89 
PUNTO ARENAS 84 0.98 
TOTAL 8541 1 00.00 
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2.4 
The Regional Council of Santiago had 
the largest number of doctors in its jurisdiction 
5053 and almost 60% of the total medical profession. 
Next largest was Concepcion with 826 doctors and 
Valparaiso with 813. Punta Arenas was the smallest 
having only 84 doctors in its area,representing barely 
1% of the profession. 
AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS 
According to the law of the Colegio 
Medico, the only legally recognized' affiliated 
organizations to the Colegio were the Federations. 
These Federations gradually lost importance and were 
supercededin the 70's by the Capitulos. 
Capitulos were hospital based 
organizations consisting of a minimum of 50 doctors. 
Each capitulo had its own elected Executive 
Committee which sent representatives to the National 
Association of the Capitulos. The relationship between 
the capitulos and the Colegio Medico was never strictly 
defined. ( See Appendix) Capitulos played an important 
role in both informing doctors at grass roots level of 
Colegio Medico policy and in turn,advising the Colegio 
of doctors' opinions. Decisions made in the capitulos 
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however,were not binding on the Regional 
Council nor on the General Coun cil of the 
Chilean Medical Association. 
In practice, the capitulos 
became the industrial weapon of the Colegio. 
The capitulos organized strikes. Groups also 
used the capitulos to put pressure on the 
Colegio Medico to change its policy. This 
was the case in 1971-73 when the capitulos 
forced the Cole~io Medico to take a political 
stand against the Government. As Rene Merino 
President of the Associacion de los Capitulos 
during Popular Unity said, 
"capituto~ a~~ u~~d in tim~~ ot 
wa;z.. " 1 
2.5 ROLE AND POWERS 
According to Article 9(b) of 
the law which established the Colegio Medico, 
the General Council of the Colegio was to: 
"Con~id~~a~ ta~ condicion~~ de 
t~aRajo y economica~,tanto de 
to~ S~~vicio~ ~edico~ d~ ta~ 
in~tituci6n~~ ti~cate~,~~mi­
ti~cate~,autonoma~ y pa~ticut­
a~~~ de acue~do~~on ta~ 
modatidade~ y nec~~idade~ de 
cada ~egi;ft,como de to~ cot~giado~ 
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qu~ p~~~tan tuncion~~ ~n ~eea~, 
y p~opon~~ a ea~ auto~idad~~ 
co~~~~pondi~nt~~ ea~ m~dida~ 
t~ndi~nt~~ a qu~ ~~a~ condicion~~ 
~~an ad~cuada~,~quitativa~ y 
ju~ta~ ." 
The General Council therefore acted as a union 
negotiator to promote the material well being 
of the profession. Unlike Britain where wage 
negotiation between doctors and the State was 
often devolved to an independent Revie~ Body, 
bargaining over pay and conditions of doctors 
in Chile was conducted directly between the 
Colegio M~dico and the Government. In this 
role the Colegio M~dico de Chile acted 
quintessentially as a trade union. 
SUPERVISION OF THE ETHICAL BEHAVIOUR OF THE 
PROFESSION 
According to Article 9(a),the 
General Council of the Colegio M~dico was 
req uired to 
"v~ea~ po~ ~e p~og~~~o,p~~~tigo y 
p~~~~ogativa~ d~ ga p~ot~~i6n y 
po~ ~u ~~guea~ y co~~~cto 
~j~~cicio;mant~n~~ ea di~cipeina 
p~ot~~ionae,p~~~ta~ p~ot~cci6n a 
eo~ medico~-ci~ujano~ ~ impon~~ 
eo~ p~~c~pto~ d~ ea etica 
P • I!" p~01-~~l...ona,,-. 
All Chilean doctors had their 
field of specialization and their professional 
experience recorded in the Colegio M~dico 
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register. This register ensured that doctors 
only specialized in the medicine for which 
they had been trained. All doctors were required 
to be inscribed on this register in order to 
practise. 
In Britain, the General Council 
kept a register of all doctors. This body was 
completely separate from the British Medical 
Association which was the doctors' main union. In 
Chile, both the tasks of the General Council and 
the British Medical Association were combined in 
a single organization - the Colegio Medico. 
The Colegio Medico investig-
ated all charges brought against doctors on 
the grounds of malpractice. If the Colegio found 
a doctor guilty, iOt could sanction, fine or 
suspend the doctor for up to 6 months. Such was the 
the power of the Colegio Medico in this matter 
that a doctor could not appeal to the Chilean 
courts on a sentence he had received from 
his Association. Only when a doctor was struck 
off the Colegio Medico register and was 
unable therefore to practise medicine could 
he appeal to the Supreme Court. 
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FEE FIXING 
Apart from negotiating with the 
State on the wages of its members, the Colegio 
Medico fixed the fees a doctor could charge 
in his private work. These fees were subject 
to Government ratification. 
The Colegio Medico did not fix 
the maximum fee a doctor could charge a patient. 
The Colegio was more concerned that doctors 
should not undercut each other when charging 
a fee. Thus,the Colegio,at least until 1979 
when the law was changed fixed the minimum 
fee under which a doctor was not permitted to 
charge. 
The Colegio Medico's power in 
this matter did not impose any great discipline 
on doctors' fee fixing. Doctors had considerable 
freedom to charge above the minimum fee for 
such extras as night work or home visits. 
2.6 THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CHILEAN MEDICAL 
PROFESSION 
Number 
According to the 1979 Colegio 
Medico census there were 6972 practising 
doctors. The figure in 1968 was 5027,thus 
the medical population had increased by over 
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35% in 10 years. 
This increase would have been 
substantially higher had it not been for the 
large number of doctors(1125)registered as having 
emigrated. In 1968,only 329 doctors emigrated. 
The reason for the large increase in the number 
leaving the country was political. Many doctors 
left Chile after the coup as a result of political 
persecution. In normal times,Chile,unlike many 
other Third World countries did not face the 
problem of doctors emigrating to developed countries 
such as the U.S. 
TABLE 2:THE NATIONAL MEDICAL REGISTER UP TO 30th 
JUNE 1979. 
Source:Colegio Medico de Chile. 
ACTIVE 
In active service ......•...•.•...••...• 5881 
Retired doctors but working ...•..•..•••• 333 
Retired doctors working unpaid •.........• 19 
Only in pri va te practi ce ..•..........••• 236 
Retired doctors in private medicine .•..• 503 
PASSIVE 
Doctors abroad •..•..•.•...••..•.....•.. 1125 
R'etired ................................. 421 
Retired without information .•.•.....•.•. 222 
Non-practising •.••••••••..•••..•.•..•.••. 18 
Without a post ••••...•......•.......••.•. 57 
Unpaid employee .•.......•.•.••.••.••.... :1 
No information .....•..••............... 1490 
10306 
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~EMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CHILEAN 
MEDICAL PROFESSION 
The Chilean medical profession 
was predominantly young,overwhelmingly male 
and almost totally composed of Chilean 
na tional s. 
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TABLE 3.DISTRIBUTION OF DOCTORS ACCORDING TO DATE OF BIRTH 
Source:Colegio Medico de Chile 1980 
Year of Birth N° of Doctors As a % of the 
profession 
1900 or before 151 1 .77 
1901-1905 240 2.81 
1906-1910 444 5 . 1 9 
1911-1915 522 6. 11 
1916-1920 524 6.14 
1921-1925 441 5. 16 
1926-1930 623 7.30 
1931-1935 621 7.27 
1936-1940 904 10.58 
1941-1945 1216 14.24 
1946-1950 1621 18.98 
1951-1955 1230 14.40 
1 956 or la ter 4 0.05 
TOT A L 851.1 1 00.00 
Almost 45% of the profession in 
1979 were under 40 years if age. This was due 
to the increased intake of medical students in 
the late 60's and early 70's. It was a 
percentage which is likely to increase until 
1984,when the numbers leaving University will 
be reduced. 
TABLE 4.DISTRIBUTION OF DOCTORS ACCORDING TO SEX 
Source:Golegio M~dico de Chile 
SEX N° OF DOCT OR S AS A % OF THE 
PROFESSION 
male 7462 81 .37 
femal e 1709 18.63 
TOTAL 9171 1 00.00 
Wi thout 1 0 
details 
Chilean society was even more 
male-dominated than Europe or America. Thus, 
very few doctors in Chile were women. There 
is some evidence however,which pointed to a 
slight increase in women among medical 
students. Nonetheless,the dominance of the 
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male doctors was formidable. It is worth pointing 
out that in May 1980,not a single Regional or 
General Councillor in the Colegio Medico i.e. 
amongst almost 100 representatives,was a woman. 
TABLE 5. NATIONALITY OF DOCTORS 
Nationality N° of doctors As a % of 
the profession 
Chilean 8938 97.46 
Others 233 2.54 
TOTAL 9171 1 00.00 
Source:Colegio Medico de Chile 1980 
Class 
Chilean doctors were predominantly 
from the upper and middle classes. Claudio 
Sepulveda studying the occupations of fathers of 
the 264 first year students in the School of Medicine 
in the Universidad de Chile in 1970 found that 70% 
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were managers and professionals and white collar 
collar workers. Very few had a father who 
was a manual worker and not a single one 
2 was a peasant. 
DISTRIBUTION OF DOCTORS WITHIN CHILE 
TABLE 6.WORKING LOCATION OF DOCTORS 
Source:Colegio Medico de Chile 
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WORKPLACE BY REGION N° OF DOCTORS AS A % OF THE 
PROFESSION 
I 141 1 .64 
II 206 2.40 
III 73 0.85 
IV 143 1 .67 
V 837 9.75 
VI 282 3.28 
VII 248 2.89 
VIII 827 9.63 
IX 260 3.03 
X 393 4.58 
XI 34 0.39 
XII 78 0.91 
Metropolitan Area 5064 58.98 
TOTAL 8586 1 00.00 
Without details 595 
Table 6 shows that most Chilean doctors worked in 
the main conurbations of Santiago,Valparaiso and 
Concepcion i.e. Regions V and VI and the Metropolitan 
Area. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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The effect of this concentration of 
doctors in Chile's conurbations was that rural 
populations had less access to doctors. While in 
Santiago the doctor:patient ratio was 1 :810 in some 
regions of Chile,the ratio was as high as 1:3040. 
Some attempts had been made to alleviate 
this uneven distribution of doctors. For example after 
1952 the post of medico general de la zona was created 
which required newly graduated doctors to practise 
general medicine in the outlying regions of Chile 
for several jears. Moreover,it was forbidden to recruit 
doctors for the Santiago,Valparaiso or Concepcion 
areas if they had less than 5 years experience . 
Furthermore ,a higher wages scale was introduced for 
doctors who were prepared to work en provincia. 
This scheme was widely recognized as 
insufficient. Studies revealed that in the poorly 
populated areas of Chile,many people had their health 
care needs unmet or engaged in self medication. 3 
Specialization 
A high degree of specialization existed 
within the Chilean medical profession. 4 Unlike 
Britain,there were very few general practitioners. 
The only comparable medical job in Chile to the British 
G.P. was the aforementioned Medico General de Zona. 
This however,was a job used by young doctors as 
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a stepping stone to their chosen speciality. 
The reason for this high degree of special-
ization was that many doctors adopted a 
speciality in order to be able to practise 
privately. The money earned from private 
patients compensated Chilean doctors for 
their generally low State wages. 
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF CHILEAN DOCTORS'WORK 
There were 3 main areas in 
which doctors worked: 
1. The State sector 
2. The completely private sector 
3. Part private and part State sector 
In Chile a tiny fraction of the medical 
population worked completely in the private 
sector. The vast majority worked either 
totally as State employees or as part State 
employees and part liberal professionals. 
Doctors working in the private sector 
In 1968,55% of the total 
practisin~ members of the profession worked 
5 
privately. Thus,45% of the profession were 
full time State employees . It is safe to 
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assume similar percentages for the 70's. 
The older a doctor was, the more 
likely he was to practise privately. Almost 
all of the doctors who were full time State 
employees were young doctors who from the 
time they left university until they became 
specialists were generally unable to treat 
private patients. 
Doctors' private work consisted 
of treating private patients or SERMENA 
patients in their own clinics. SERMENA patients, 
unlike private ones only paid part of the fee 
to the doctors. The rest of the cost of the 
treatment came to the doctor from a State 
supervised fund. Private work of this kind was 
normally carried out after their work was 
completed in the State sector. Normally the 
State work was performed in the morning,leaving 
the rest of the day for private patients. 
Some private work was undertaken 
in hospitals but the majority of work consisted 
in treating ambulatory cases or visiting 
patients in their homes. 
Hours worked in the private sector. 
Taking 1973 as a typical year 
2,668 doctors spent 6 hours a day in the State 
6 
sector. Less than 1,000 doctors spent less 
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than 5 hours a day in the State sector. For the rest 
of the day's working hours these doctors were in 
their private clinics. 
In contrast, 2,072 doctors worked 
8 hours a day in the Servi ci 0 Na ci onal de Salud. The se 
doctors did not practise privately. They were mainly 
young doctors in the process of specialization.(See 
Table 7) 
TABLE 7.THE NUMBER OF HOURS DOCTORS WORKED THROUGHOUT 
THE COUNTRY IN DECEMBER 1973 INSIDE THE STATE HEALTH 
SERVICE. 
Number of total Number of Number of 
medical hours medical hours doctors 
pel' day 
1 1 1 
460 2 230 
30 3 10 
2920 4 730 
70 5 14 
14008 6 2668 
77 7 1 1 
16576 8 2072 
328 8 and more~~ 41 
rOTAL:34,470 5777 
72. 
* This group refers to full time Servicio Nacional de 
Salud doctors who worked as State health administrators. 
Source:Servicio Nacional de Salud 1973. 
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Income differential between publicRnd private work 
Table 8 reveals that the income 
a professional derived from his private practice 
was much greater than that from his public work. 
In 1972 for example, the percentage of total 
income derived from the State which went to the 
profession as a whole was only 28.3%. Thus,71.7% 
of total income was derived from private work. 
This figure slightly underestimates the income 
from the State sector. A small increase needs to 
be made in order to take account of certain 
State incentives which accrued to the doctor . 
Taking this into consideration,on average only 
30% of doctors' income came from the State. 
TABLE 8.MINIMUM TOTAL DAILY INCOME OF DOCTORS 
( EO =ESCUDOS OF MAY-JUNE 1968) 
YEAR STATE % OF PR IVATE % OF 
MEDIC INE TOTAL CONSULT - TOTAL 
AT ION S 
1966 EO 61, 4 11 .5 EO 470,4 88.5 
1967 62.2 14.6 363.6 85.4 
1968 76.4 22.6 262.3 77.4 
1969 68.0 1 9.7 277.4 80.3 
1970 98.4 20.7 377.4 79.3 
1 971 113.7 20.2 451 .3 79.8 
1972 1 09.4 28.3 277.4 71 .7 
1973 63.6 1 9. 9 256.5 80. 1 
Source:Sprvicio NRcionRl de Salud 1973 
---
TOTAL 
EO 531 .8 
425.8 
338.7 
345.4 
476.1 
565.0 
386.8 
320. 1 
It must be emphasized that these 
figures applied only to total doctors' incomes. 
They do show however, that the distribution of 
income between doctors who worked in the public 
and private sector was very unequal. 
Distribution of total private income 
The distribution of pr~vate 
income amongst the 55% of the profession who 
worked partly in the private sector was not 
precisely known. "Private income" can be 
defined as income derived either from treating 
private or SERMENA patients. Taking SERMENA 
patients alone,it was clear that private 
income was distributed unevenly. In 1971 of 
the 2,631 doctors working in SERMENA only 144 
doctors earned more than EO 399,000 while 1,822 
earned less than EO 100,000. These figures 
pointed to a highly paid professional elite 
earning high salaries through this semi-
private source. The existence of this medical 
elite however cannot be accurately determined 
since no statistics were available for the 
distribution of income in private medicine. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Chilean medical profession 
was extremely heterogeneous. It was divided in 
terms of income and specialization. Taking 
income alone,the profession appeared to be 
split between a young,poorly paid State 
employed segment ,and an older,better paid 
and more private medicine-oriented group . 
However,even the latter groups which received 
most of their income from private patients 
worked predominantly in the State sector. 
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NOTES 
1. Interview 6. 
2. Quoted in Chanfreau,D.(1976). 'The ideology of the 
Chilean medical profession and its influence on 
the health care system of Chilean society.' M.Sc. 
Bedford College.London~ 
3. Amongst the huge interaction on the unequal 
distribution of health resources in Chile see Goic,A. 
(1979). 'Fundamentos Medicos de una Organizacion 
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social de la Medicina.' in Montes,H.L.(ed)(1979). 
Desarrollo Social y Salud in Chile.Corporacion de 
Promocion Universitaria.Santiago and DeKadt,E. (1973). 
'The Distribution of Health in Chile.' Institute of 
Development Studies, University of Sussex,and Hall,T. 
(1970) .Recursos Humanos de Salud en Chile:un modelo 
de analisis.Ministerio de Salud Publica,Santiago. 
4. On overspecialiation of Chilean doctors see Venturini, 
G. and Palma,C.(1979). 'Caracteristicas de la 
Formacion Medica Chilena y su Relacion con el Sistema 
de Salud.' in Montes,E.(ed)(1979).op cit pp197-216. 
5. Hall,T. op cit pp180-186. 
6. Tables 7 and 8 are reproduced from Jeftanovic,P.(1974). 
'Estudio sobre la Determinacion del Arancel de 
Honorarios del Colegio Medico de Chile.' .Colegio 
Medico de Chile,Depto.de Salud Publica. 
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C HAP T E R 3 
THE HISTORY OF THE MEDICAL PROFESSION 
. I 
THE HISTORY OF THE MEDICAL PROFESSION 
3.1 THE CHILEAN PROFESSION AND THE STATE 
Unlike other medical professions 
throughout the world,the Chilean medical 
profession welcomed the extension of the 
State's role in the country's health 
service. In 1936.a medical convention of AMECH, 
the main doctors' association at that time, 
approved a plan to establish a national State 
health service,which would provide free 
health treatment from State employed physicians. 
Throughout the 40's AMECH consistently pursued 
this policy; The setting up of the Servicio 
Nacional de Salud(S.N.S.) in 1952 was largely 
the result of its endeavours. In this new 
State organization,over 70% of the population 
qualified to receive free health care. The 
establishment of this huge State organization 
transformed Chilean doctors from liberal 
professionals into predominantly State 
employees. From 1952 only a minute fraction of 
the profession did not devote some time to 
Servicio Nacional de Salud work. 
The profession supported the 
Servicio Nacional de Salud for several 
reasons. Doctors saw the service as a 
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solution to Chile's chronic health problems 
as represented by a relatively low life 
expectancy and a high infant mortality 
rate. The profession had a reputation of 
being progressive at this time. Doctors were 
often at the forefront of all reform in 
Chile in the 1920's and 30's. The 
radicalization of the profession was 
undoubtedly caused by the nature of their 
medical work. Doctors at first hand could 
see the link between poverty and illness. 
Prior to commencing their medical training 
students with their middle class backgrounds 
had little first hand knowledge of the 
deprivation of the Chilean lower classes . 
These experiences did much to radicalize 
young doctors. Indeed,this experience of the 
living conditions of the poor converted 
Salvador Allende as a young medical student 
t . 1· 1 o so Cla l sm. 
The Servicio Nacional de Salud 
was also attractive to doctors from a 
technical point of view. In the 30's and 40's 
Chilean private he~lth establishments failed 
to keep pace with the latest developments in 
medical science. These private establishments 
could not afford the costlv and highly 
sophisticated machinery now necessary to 
provide the most efficient health care. 
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Only the State possessed the necessary finance 
to create a highly technical service which 
could provide doctors with the most up to 
date scientific techniques. 
Moreover,the Servicio Nacional de 
Salud by fusing the various private and semi-
private agencies of the period would bring a 
welcome co-ordination and planning to the 
health sector. Both patients and doctors 
were haphazardly dispersed in a wide variety 
of establishments. For instance,many doctors 
worked part time in the Beneficencia Publica 
originally a Church run charity which was now 
controlled by the State. In the Beneficencia 
doctors would treat insured workers who 
obtained free treatment in the scheme. Their 
families however,received treatment from a 
different scheme in a different health 
establishment. The doctors had to leave the 
Benificencia to go to the other establishments 
in order to treat these patients. This meant 
that the doctor's working day was chaotically 
spent in several different locations for a 
few hours each day. The travelling involved 
was so great that the medical profession were 
2 
called the "taxi-doctors". 
By offering grants to students the 
Servicio Nacional de Salud additionally 
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provided the conditions in which doctors on 
leaving university could develop their 
scientific knowledge. These grants gave 
students the opportunity to become specialists. 
Money too,for doctors to attend scientific 
conferences abroad,or to work in foreign 
hospitals learning from the top doctors in 
the world,was to come from the Servicio 
Nacional de Salud. 
In material terms too,doctors 
benefited from the Servicio Nacional de Salud. 
First,and as a condition for AMECH accepting 
the new service,doctors were given their own 
professional college. By law all doctors 
were required to belong to this college in 
order to practise medicine. It was felt that 
without a strong gremio,doctors would be 
defenseless against the new huge State 
organization. Doctors had previously suffered 
financially in the face of mul tiple employer'S 
because there was no united medical union to 
protect the interests of the profession a8 a 
whole. ThArA was onJy a whole group of 
VOlllll tarv federa ti ons, the mo st powerful of 
which,but by no means all powerful was AMECH 
(Asociacion Medicos de Chile). Thus the 
Colegio Medico,set up in 1948 prior to the 
Servicio Nacional de Salud represented a 
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considerable victory for the profession. At 
last,united in their own gremio, the medical 
profession would be able to improve its 
standard of living. 
The most notable victory for 
the doctors however,prior to the Servicio 
Nacional de Salud was the Estatuto Medico 
funcionario. This was a type of State contract 
which gave the doctors not only a job on 
leaving University, but a professional career. 
Previously doctors left University with no 
guarantee of a job. In desperation to find 
work, they were employed by private or 
charitable hospitals for miserable wages. This 
contract enrled the prospect of unemployment 
and low wages. The wage for this scheme was 
considered to be so high that the Estatuto 
became nicknamed as the Estatuto de Medico 
M·l· . 3 l lonarlO. Moreover,the Estatuto gave 
doctors the incentive of the asignaciones; 
that is,doctors' wages would automatically 
increase with the number of years that they 
belonged to the Servicio Nacional de Salud. 
Finally,the Servicio Nacional 
de Salud did not commit the doctor to 
relinquish his private practice altogether. 
Doctors were given 6 hours a day contracts 
in the Servicio paciopal de Salud. Once 
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they had completed this work, they could practise 
privately. The official reasoning behind giving 
doctors only 6 hours work in the Servicio 
Nacional de Salud was that doctors needed the 
remainder of the day to study. 
From all these perspectives,the 
Servicio Nacional de Salud represented a victory 
for the profession. It defended the profession 
against exploitation by both private capital 
interests and its new State employers. 
3.2 THE MEDICAL REACTION TO THE STATE 
The Statist tendency inside the 
profession as typified by Allende,was dominant 
throughout the first half of the century. But 
in the 60's a reaction to this tendency began 
to develop.4 Instead of seeing "medicina 
funcionaria" as the solution to heal th problems 
or to problems afflicting the profession,groups 
of doctors canvassed support for the principle 
of "Ii bre elecci bn i. e. the freedom for the 
patient to choose his doctor and pay a fee 
for his treatment directly to the physician. 
This new ideology challenging 
for the first time the dominant socialist one, 
reflected changing modes in health treatment. 
A new approach emerged in health care as more 
doctors were trained in the U.S. This stressed 
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the need for high technology equipment moving 
the pendulum away from preventative care to a 
more costly curative style of treatment. In 
1959,the Servicio Nacional de Salud was 
reorganized. The base of its operations became 
the hospital complex rather than,as had 
existed since 1952,the local health clinic. 
With these changes came different assumptions 
about collective and public health treatment. 
A more private and individualist form of care 
was emphasised. The independent doctor/patient 
relationship was the foundation of this new 
model. This thinking threatened the dominant 
notions about the role of the State in health 
organization. For in this "libre eleccion " the 
State was not to interfere in the transaction 
between patient and doctor. 
3.3 CRISIS IN THE SERVICIO NACIONAL DE SALUD 
The struggle between the 
"Statist" and this "libre eleccion" tendency 
in the 60's was conducted in the context of 
a crisis in the Servicio Nacional de Salud. 
Initial optimism that the service would be 
modern, efficient and capable of providing 
the best possible treatment for the patient 
as well as giving the doctor excellent job 
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opportunities began to evaporate. Fiscal crises 
caused by high inflation led to chronic under-
budgeting of the State health service. Servicio 
Nacional de Salud patients received good 
treatment when they could get it;but access to 
consultations was difficult. Demand outstripped 
supply. Patients waited hours to see doctors. 
Many were turned away. There were never 
sufficient doctors,nurses,beds etc. to cope with 
the health needs of an ever increasing pop~lation. 
There were 19.5% more doctors in 1962(3,161) than 
there had been in 1952(2,645). 5 However, taking 
alone the number of consultations for pregnant 
mothers,there were 283,000 in 1952,but a 
staggering 937,000 in 1961,an increase of 231% 
in 9 years (see table 9) 
f-
TABLE 9:INCREASE IN CONTULTATIONS INSIDE THE 
SERVICIO NACIONAL DE SALUD. 
Source:Servicio Nacional de Salud 1962. 
Treat"lent 1952 1 961 ~ 
increase 
in the 
9 years 
,; 
Consul ta tions 
for pregnant 283,000 937,000 231 
mothers 
Li tres of 
milk 14;100,00J 67,818,090 380 
distributed 
Child 
con sul ta ti on 1,065,366 3,169,894 198 
Total medical 4,617,763 7,446,000 62 
con sul ta ti on s 
Hospi tal 360,879 593,779 63 admissions 
Prescriptions 15,239,000 20,568,000 35 
X -Rays 571,980 854,416 49 
Laboratory 1,130,500 1,788,907 58 
exam ina tion s 
Number of 2,645 3,161 19.5 doctors 
(in 1954 ) (in 1962) (in 8 yearsl 
avera£~· 
>1>1ual 
ncrease 
25.7 
42.2 
22. c) 
6.5 
7.C 
11.7 
5.4 
6.5 
2.4 
I 
I 
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Doctors had to treat huge numbers 
of patients with inadequate facilities. There 
was no per capita list system as in Britain. 
Patients came to the hospitals or clinics to 
be treated by any doctor who happened to be on 
duty. Doctors,thus,were as anonymous to their 
patients as their patients were to them. 
Deteriorating working conditions 
were matched by falling wages. Doctors 'salaries 
never kept pace with inflation. Governments in 
the 50's resolved many of their fiscal crises 
by paying doctors less than their contracts 
demanded. 
The Regional Council of the Colegio 
Medico of Valparaiso calculated that the value 
of a doctor's wage in 1961 was onlv 38.52% of its 
6 1951 value. The State assumed that these wages 
were supplemented by private work so that a wage 
cut for doctors was not so serious as it would 
have been for groups such as nurses who had no 
private income source. Many of these decisions 
were political,trying to place the burden of 
health care away from the State onto the private 
sector. 
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3.4 THE PROLETARIANIZATION OF YOUNG DOCTORS 
Government policies towards the 
Servicio Nacional de Salud and payment of its 
personnel created much discontent amongst the 
younger members of the profession who had no 
private income. They had to wait at least 8 
years after graduating before they were able 
to practise as specialists and offer their 
services for a fee. 
Their reaction was not one 
hostile to the State service,but rather one 
which favoured its extension. They did not 
want a Servicio Nacional de Salud for only the 
poorer members of Chilean society for that 
would have mean t a third rate type of medi cine. 
Rather,they sought a unified service which would 
cover all income groups. These doctors,the 
products of an impoverished State sector,were 
becoming "professional proletarians" . Many 
scientific studies in the 60 l s were devoted to 
7 the plight of these doctors. They were the 
heirs of the Statist generation of Allende, 
Jiron and Sotero del Rio,the \~~~\s 
of the Colegio Medico in the 50's. 
This grouD was opposed by the 
more established doctors who had utilized the 
Servicio Nacional de Salud to develop 
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themselves into specialists and who were now 
profiting by working in their private clinics. 
These doctors saw that this extension of the 
Servicio Nacional de Salud to incorporate 
sectors of the population who would normally 
go to the private sector would greatly 
threaten their incomes. Thus,a split developed 
within the profession:on the one hand,the 
mostly young doctors supporting medicina 
funcionaria and the dominance of the State in 
Chilean medicine;and on the other,the more 
established members of the profession arguing 
for greater opportuni ti e s for "li bre ele c ci on. " 
This struggle engulfed the 
Colegio Medico,particularly in the 60's. 
Until then the Colegio was controlled by the 
"Statist" tendency but gradually,it became 
more ambiguous in its support of the Servicio 
Nacional de Salud and by early 1960,its 
Department of Public Health was tentatively 
sugge sting the deve lopmen t of "li bre ele c ci on II 
in other private organizations to alleviate 
the effects on doctors' wages of the financial 
squeeze in the Servicio Nacional de Salud. 
Politically,the leadership of 
the Colegio Medico moved to the Right. Its 
President,Ruperto Vargas Molinare(1957-63) 
supported Alessandri the conservative 
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President of Chile. It was this stance and 
refusal to use the Colegio to put pressure 
on the Government for an increase in wages 
and conditions that produced the impetus 
for the formation of FEMECH(Federacion 
Medica de Chile). 
FEMECH represented the interests 
of Servico Nacional de Salud oriented doctors. 
Their struggle with the Government was to 
achieve higher wages and better workin~ 
conditions inside the Servicio Nacional de ~alud. 
Tbe President of FEMECH Has a member of the 
Socialist Party,W.Inostroza and the Secretary 
Generalwas a Christian Democrat,A.Goic. This 
alliance between Socialists,Communists and 
Christian Democrats reflected the socialist 
orientation of the mainly young doctors. Their 
movement began with regional and national 
elections,after which a list of demands was 
submitted to the Alessandri Government. This 
was rejected and the doctors began protest 
action. Initially this took the form of 
doctors refusing to sign birth and death 
certificates or sick lines. It thus became 
known as the "pen strike". But with the 
Government remaining intransigent,action was 
stepped up and a strike(which was to last for 
6 weeks)began. In these actions they received 
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the support of the Health Workers' Union, 
FENATS,and the solidarity of the CUT,the 
8 Chilean Trades Union Congress. 
The Colegio Medico refused to 
endorse the strike. It claimed that it was 
politically motivated. Its relations with 
FEl'1ECH. became strained. 9 In "Accion Medica" 
the official journal of FEMECH many of 'the 
articlE:S were openly cri tical of the Colegio 
Medico. In this journal grave doubts were 
expressed about the Colegio's capacity to 
fight for doctors' interests. As Raul Vicencio 
Lopez argued: 
"How could a g~oup ot ageinQ men 
in the gene~al Council, who ~till 
add~e~~ed each othe~ a~ "honou~aRfd 
councillo~",Re in the vangua~d ot 
a ~t~uggle to~ Rette~ wage~ and 
condition~." 10 
The leaders of the Colegio 
Medico thus felt threatened. FEMECH was a 
rival which had strong support within the 
medical profession. Its leaders were directly 
elected,whereas the consejeros in the General 
Council were only elected indirectly through 
their Regional Councils. 
FEMECH's action however,proved 
to be a total failure. None of FEMECH's 
demands were met. The press and radio had been 
largely unsympathetic. The reaction of the 
public was hostile. 11 More importantly the 
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Alessandri Government was completely unmoved. 
The effects of the struggle 
inside the profession were considerable. The 
failure of FEMECH's strike action strengthened 
the hand of the anti-"Statist" tendency. Many 
doctors who had gone on this fruitless strike 
felt bitter towards the Servicio Nacional de 
Salud,and began to feel that they would never 
receive the income they deserved from their 
State employers. This group began to feel that 
their material situation would only be 
o d bot °d the State. 12 lmprove y movlng ou Sl e 
At the same time the ~EMECH 
strike had come as a shock to the anti-
"Statist" tendency. One of its leaders, 
Patricio Silva had refused to go out on strike. 
He was concerned that the State health service 
was having a "proletarianizing" effect on the 
profession. 13 He believed that FEMECH had 
chosen strike action,normally the weapon of 
the working class ,because doctors,and 
especially young doctors,were becoming more 
like proletarians. Unless this process was 
halted,he argued,the profession would become 
dominated by the Left. However,as Silva 
admitted,the chances of halting the State's 
advance in the Chilean health service appeared 
slim. The growing costs of seeking a 
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consultation in the private sector meant that 
fewer people would be able to afford to pay 
for their own health treatment and would thus 
be compelled into the State system. 14 
Throughout the 60Is~P.Silva, 
now the Director General of the Servicio 
Nacional de Salud and his colleagues worked 
on a plan which amongst o~her things would 
defuse the Left wing militancy of the young 
doctors~5This scheme involved providing 
health care for empleados who until now 
had gone privately for health treatment but 
were now finding it increasingly difficult 
to pay for such care. Instead of incorporating 
this group into the State system,this plan 
allowed empleados and their families to receive 
treatment under their own separate scheme, 
receiving better and quicker care in the 
"pensionado" ward,rather than in the "sala 
comun" of the working class. When they went 
for treatment part of the cost was met by 
the empleado but the substantial proportion 
was paid from the common fund. Empleado~ 
contributed one per cent of their salary 
to this fund. Instead of paying the Servici2 
Nacional de Salud institution or even the 
whole hospital staff,the fee went only to the 
doctor. Thus SERMENA provided the doctor with 
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an additional income. Doctors could benefit 
from SERMENA almost immediately on leaving 
University(2 years after graduation)instead 
of having to wait until they were specialists 
before they could supplement their meagre 
Servicio Nacional de Salud wa~e. 
How far this prevented the 
"proletarianization" of the profession and 
subdued the demands for an extension of the 
State's role in medicine amongst the young 
doctors of the profession is debatable. 
SERMENA was grossly under-financed and the 
fees given to the doctors were considerably 
less than they would have received privately. 
Moreover,SERMENA patients only represented 
1 in 5 of every potential patient i.e. 20% 
of the population. Doctors were still 
predominantly involved with Servicio Nacional 
de Salud patients. Unlike Servicio Nacional 
de Salud patients,SERMENA patients could 
choose their doctor,and naturally they tended 
to pick the more established doctors. 
Nevertheless,SERMENA represented the victory 
of "libre eleccion" over the ITStatist" 
tendency in the struggle inside the profession. 
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CONCLUSION 
The miserable working 
conditions of practising first in a plethora 
of private and semi-private agencies prior 
to the setting up of the Servicio Nacional 
de Salud in 1952,and the continuation of 
these conditions even with the Servicio 
Nacional de Salud through the 50's and 60's 
tended to "proletarianize " a large segment 
of the profession. 
This group consisted of mainly 
young doctors who had no access to private 
medicine and thus ,no defence against the 
constraints of both private and State capital. 
These constraints signified a deteriorating 
work situation for young doctors. Faced with 
the lack of instruments and materials to 
utilize their scientific skills on the one 
hand, and the huge demand placed on these 
skills on the other, these young doctors became 
increasingly resentful. 
This was the "class" base for 
the formation and ultimately the strike action 
of FEMECH in the early 60's. This group was 
overtly Left wing,demanding militant action 
to extend the State service and to end its 
financial dependence on the vagaries of the 
capitalist system. 
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The other side of the profession, 
the established doctors who received the 
substantial part of their income from their 
private practices,who were under the constraints 
of neither capitalist nor State capitalist 
institutions,developed an opposing response to 
the problem. They urged the reduction of the 
State's role in health care,which they 
condemned as inefficient and over-bureaucratic, 
and advocated the opening up of the private 
sector to tap this newly released population. 
In the short term,they proposed increasing 
the scope of SERMENA to bring more groups 
under its protective wing and in the process, 
give doctors greater opportunities to work 
under a "libre eleccion tl system. 
The Colegio Medic~ could not 
support either side for fear of alienating 
one group. The General Council consejeros in 
the late 60's tended to represent the "Statist" 
view on health care but they believed SERMENA 
to be a worthwhile experiment which did not 
jeopardize the leading role of the Servicio 
Nacional de Salud. 
In a sense the Colegio Medico 
reflected the ambiguity on SERMENA itself: 
was it to be a temporary measure to be 
discarded once the Servicio Nacional de 
95. 
Salud was able to absorb more groups like the 
empleados,or was SERMENA the beginning of a 
gradual privatization which would extend to 
the working class when it became more able 
to pay for its own health treatment? 
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C HAP T E R 4 
DOCTORS UNDER THE SCALPEL:THE ANTI-DOCTOR 
CAMPAIGN DURING POPULAR UNITY. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Popular Unity Government 
was not revolutionary. From 1970 until the 
coup in September 1973 Popular Unity's political 
and economic strategy was consistently reformist. 
This strategy assumed that socialism would not be 
achieved during the lifetime of Popular Unity. 
As Salvador Allende stated when choosing his 
first cabinet, 
"7h~ tutu~~ gov~~nm~nt ot Chil~ 
will not i~ a ~ociali~t 
gov~~nm~nt:it i~ un~ci~ntit~c 
to maintain th~ cont~a~y." 1 
Lilcewise,Popular Unity's health 
policy was not revolutionary. It marked a 
continuation of nrevious Christian Democrat 
policy in the health service. Private medecine 
was not to be outlawed. The existing health 
structuresCaside from some extension and 
improvement)were to remain the same. 2 
However,even though Popular 
Uni ty was an apparently reformi st Governm-en t 
pursuing little more than a progressive health 
policy,the bulk of the Chilean medical 
profession became opposed to the Government. 
As early as September 1971,only one year after 
Allende's triumph,the majority of the 
profession had rejected the Government's 
health policy. It was puzzling that a group 
1 01 • 
occupying a contradictory class location should 
display considerable unity,not to mention speed 
in opposing the Popular Unity Government. Why 
did a profession which,according to a visiting 
American physician,had always been in the 
vanguard of social change,now oppose a progress-
. 3 ive Government? 
One of the answers to this 
puzzle lay in the behaviour and actions of the 
more radical groups within the Popular Unity 
coalition. While the utterances of Allende 
himself and the Popular Unity programmes could 
never be interpreted as anything but reformist, 
the behaviour of other groups within the coalition 
was much more radical. These more radical groups 
never succeeded in winning over the rest of 
Popular Unity to their positions but they,with 
the support of the Movimiento Izguierda 
Revolucionaria outwith the Popular Unity coalition 
continuously pushed the Unidad Popular 
Government to adopt more radical policies. 
This radical group's behaviour 
was at odds with the official posture displayed 
towards the medical profession which emphasized 
dialogue and compromise. This behaviour did not 
emerge in the last few months of Popular Unity 
as the Chile2n Left generally became radicalized; 
from the very beginning these radical groups 
were influential and highly vocal. 
The relationship between these 
radical groups and the medical profession was 
crucial in understanding why the majority of 
the medical profession moved against Popular 
Unity as early as the first year of the new 
Governmen t. 
In this chapter we will examine 
the behaviour of these radical qroups within 
Popular Unity towards Chilean doctors and 
assess how far their behaviour explained why 
the majority of the profession became Government 
opponents. In the final year of Popular Unity 
doctors' reactions to the Government have to be 
set in the context of the economic cri si s 
which began to effect the heal th service. In 
the final section of this chapter we will 
examine the effect of this cri si s on the 
health service itself and on doctors' incomes. 
102. 
4.1 ~OPULAR UNITY STRATEGY TOWARDS THE MIDDL~ 
CLASSES AND THE MEDICAL PROFESSION 
Official Popular Unity strategy 
saw the middle classes as a crucial factor in 
the "Chilean Road to Socialism" .4 This road 
was to be peaceful. Instead of smashing the 
bourgeois State,socialism was to be achieved 
by working within the existing bourgeois 
institutions and practices. All the legalistic 
and constitutional norms,parliamentary democracy, 
the Armed Forces and the judiciary were to be 
respected and safeguarded. Bourgeois institutions 
were to be transformed by creating mass 
opposition. Faced with overwhelming numbers,the 
capitalist class would refrain from using 
violence. It was this need for mass support that 
made the winning over of the middle classes to 
socialism so crucial for the success of this 
strategy. The working class by itself,did not 
constitute more than 50% of the electorate. 
Thus,this strategy stressed the importance of 
alliances between the working and middle classes. 
Popular Unity's multi-class 
programme was not the preserve of the prolet~ 
ariat. It identified the enemies as the 
monopolists,latifundists and large owners of 
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wealth. Sharing no objective interests with these 
groups, the middle classes would benefit from the 
expropriation of their wealth. 
The medical profession,like other 
middle class groups had to be offered material 
incentives to encourage it to accept the changes 
in the health service. Doctors had to be assured 
that the new revolution would not affect their 
financial position. They had to be brought into 
line with the revolutionary process through 
alliances with the working class and encouraged 
to be involved in health policy decisions. 
4.2 POPULAR UNITY HEALTH POLICY 
Despite the setting up of a State 
health service in 1952,the Chilean service at the 
time of Popular Unity was still charac~erized by 
gross inequality. Only 40% of total health 
expenditure went into the public sector despite 
between 80 and 90% of the population being 
dependent on the State. All the other expenditures 
were in the private sector. As a result,many of 
the poor, the rural dwellers who lived outside 
the few large towns in Chile and those without 
social security provision had their health needs 
unmet. 5 Gross discrimination also existed 
between workers and empleados. Because they 
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paid for part of their treatment,empleados with 
the setting up of SERMENA in 1968 received 
swifter and better health care. Meanwhile 'those 
members of the Chilean upper classes who paid 
the full cost of their treatment privately 
received the most modern and best health care. 
The paradox was that those 80-90% of the population 
who had difficulty in obtaining health treatment 
were those in most need of health care. 
The Servicio Nacional de Salud 
had also not developed the most appropriate type 
of health system. The original Servicio Nacional 
de Salud project had envisaged that the local 
health centres would be the principal vehicles 
for supplying health care to the population. 
However, a law passed in 1959 replaced these 
health centres with hospitals. The dominant 
philosophy moved from preventative to curative 
medicine as medical care became concentrated in 
capital and skill intensive modern hospitals. 
However,the weapons the Western capitalist form 
of medicine forged were inappropriate in 
combatting the main causes of Chile's high 
mortality rate such as diarrhoea and pneumonia. 
Moreover,the State service,the 
Servicio Nacional de Salud,was under severe 
pressure to cope with a constantly rising 
1 05. 
demand. For instance,from 1955 to 1970 the 
number of consulting hours available had 
increased by 30%. However,the number of 
patients seeking consultations and treatment 
6 had increased by 120%. 
The result was that Servicio 
Nacional de Salud patients had great difficulty 
in receiving treatment. Queuing was normal 
practice. This process would begin at 6 in the 
morning for a surgery which commenced two hours 
later. Patients had no oDportunity to choose 
their doctors;they simply had to see the doctor 
who happened to be in charge on that day. It 
was commonplace for Servicio Nacional de Salud 
patients to be turned away without receiving 
treatment,or to be given appointments months 
or even years in the future. 
Popular Unity's solution to the 
problem was an enlarged Servicio Nacional de 
Salud which would provide health care to 
SERMENA patients too. This Servicio Unicio de 
Salud would be more generously financed than 
the Servicio Nacional de Salud in order to 
incorporate these additional patients. It was 
hoped that the Servicio Unico de Salud would 
reap the benefit of greater economic growth 
and the higher income levels of the working 
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class. For these reasons it remained a long term 
goal. 
Allende emphasized that the 
Servicio Unico de Salud was not to be imposed 
overnight. As he declared, 
nHe dicho que el hocialihmo no 
he impone po~ dec~etoh,ni he 
p~opicia po~ un d[a,ni vamOh 
a empeza~ po~ la medicina .Hay 
p~oglema~ mah u~genteh en la 
economla,que degemoh ~eholve~ 
p~ime~o y que hon mucho mah 
decihivoh,y oue van a pe~miti~ 
hace~ medicina. No haca~[amo~ 
nada con c~ea~ una m~dicina 
anica hi no hau ing~e~oh,hi 
nO haJ elemento~ ni De~honal, 
he~!a aghu~do. _ ._. _ .. n 7 
In the meantime,democratization 
was put into effect inside the Servicio Nacional 
de Salud to improve patient access,to discuss 
how campaigns for better health care and health 
education be made more effective,and to 
generally impress on the population the need 
for preventative medicine. Seasonal campaigns 
against pneumonia ~nd diarrhoea were started. 
Also more emphasis was put on health centres in 
an attempt to decentralize health care away 
from the large capital intensive hospitals and 
in the words of Allende, 
nto g.fLing health 
doo~~teD 01 the 
h i ~ /--am i l y • n 
to the 
wo~ke~ and 
8 
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Attempts were begun to utilize 
existing state resources to the maximum. State 
hospitals and clinics which had previously 
closed at 2pm,were now kept open. Some clinics 
offered a 24 hour service. This meant increasing 
Servicio Nacional de Salud personnel. Doctors 
were offered material incentives to give up 
their private practicBs and to work longer 
hours in the ServiciQ Nacional de Salud. 
Contracts were offered to overseas doctors to 
work in Chile. More responsibility was given to 
final year students .Retired doctors were 
reincorporated into the Servicio Nacional de 
Salud. 9 
The important point was that 
these health plans were not revolutionary. 
Indeed,they were almost identical to Christian 
Democrat health policy. The major change 
affecting doctors was the gradual elimination 
of their SERMENA patients. In December 1972 
a new relationship was formed between the 
Servicio Nacional de Salud and SERMENA 
institutions. As a result the SERMENA fund, 
which had previously been separate,was 
gradually pooled into a common fund with the 
Servicio Nacional de Salud budget. This 
change favoured the Servicio Nacional de 
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Salud since tne latter's budget in per capita 
terms was much lower than SERMENA . The new 
relationship between the Servicio Nacional de 
Salud and SERMENA represented the first step 
towards the Servicio Unico de Salud. 
4.3 DOCTORS'REACTIONS TO THE POPULAR UNITY GOVERNMENT 
As a group located in a 
contradictory class location between the 
bourgeoisie and the proletariat, doctors could 
be expected to have responded ambiguously to 
Popular Unity. That Government's policy to 
improve and increase the role of the State in 
health care could benefit that segment of the 
profession which had little or no private 
interests and was committed to the State sector. 
On the other hand ,that segment which derived 
the bulk of its income from private medicine 
would suffer unless suitably compensated for 
the loss of its private patients 
This class division within the 
profession was immediately apparent. In 
Santiago in March 1971,500 doctors attended a 
conference at which they gave their full 
support to the Goverment and to the Servicio 
_U_n_i __ c_o ____ ~d~e~~S~a~l~u~d. This was a sizeable number 
109. 
given that the profession numbered around 5,000 
at this time. This Left wing grouping consisted 
of those who earned the bulk of their income 
from the Servicio Nacional de Salud. Predominantly 
young doctors they declared tha.t they represented 
the younger generation of the profession who 
relied on the State for their income and 
scientific training . They claimed that the 
Colegio Medico had ignored this group's 
interests. As they said, 
"El Colegio ~ep~e~enta inte~e~e~ 
e~pecLtico~ de pequeno~ g~upo~ 
de medico~,ma~ginando de hecho 
a g~ande~ ~ecto~e~ como lo~ que 
~ep~e~entan la~ gene~acione~ 
jovene~,gene~ale~ de zona y 
gecado~. " 10 
The evidence that Left wing doctors came 
principally from this sector of the profession 
comes from a detailed examination of the background 
of refu.~ee doctors after the coup. This study found 
that these refuqee doctors were mostly young and 
non-specialists. 1 1 
Paralleled to this movement was a 
meeting held in Valparaiso in Januarv 1971 at 
which 300 doctors rejected the 'Servicio Unico 
de Salud. These doctors declared that they would 
never become funcionarios unicos. Speaking for 
this group, one doctor declared, 
"Que~emo~ ~e~ lig~e~,que~emo~ 
tene~ independencia pol[tica, 
que~emo~ tene~ lige~tad de 
pen~amiento,que~emo~ 
11 O. 
autodi/Liqi..l1.no/.) y auto-dete/Lmin-
a/Lno/.). Sin Independencia 
oeconomica no hay independencia 
polItica." 12 
This group drew their support from those members 
of the profession who had large practices or who 
received the bulk of their income from private 
medicine. Not surprisingly,the majority of them 
came from Vina del Mar where private practice 
was more widespread than in Santiago. 
There was little doubt which 
political position these class groupings would 
adopt. What was less certain was the political 
response of those groups who were more ambiguously 
placed in the social structure,that is to say, 
those who earned a large part of their income from 
private practice but who at the same time,received 
benefits from their Servicio Nacional de Salud 
work. As if representing this ambiguity,the 
President of the Colegio M~di.co tentatively came 
out in favour of the Servicio Unico de Salud. As 
he said, 
"Sagemo/.) que e/.)u(Se/Lvicio LLnico 
de Salud) e/.) la con/.)ecuencia 
l6qica y natu/Lal de la/.) t/Lan/.)-
to/Lmacione/.) que pe/Lmiti/Lan 
ent/Leqa/L una atencion de /.)alud 
unive/L/.)al y de un mi/.)mo contenido 
a todo la poglaci6n,anhelo ju/.)to 
que dege /.)e/L /.)ati/.)techo .••••• ••• 
/.)agemo/.) con /Leali/.)mo que la 
tu~nte de inq/Le/.)o/.) de lo/.) 
o/Lole/.)ionale/.) iamgiin /.)e/Ld 
tn/ca." 13 
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He conditioned this support for the Servicio 
Nacional de Salud by arguing that the Servicio 
was a long term goal following an increase in 
SeTvicio Nacional de Salud resources. The 
President was probably speaking for the 
middle range doctor who had some private 
patients but who was more reliant on the Servicio 
Nacional de Salud for his main livelihood. 
Politically, this group was most likely to have 
been supporters of the Christian Democrats or 
the Radical Party. 
This ambiguity of the vacillating 
centre of the profession gradually resolved 
itself in favour of the Right. In the National 
Doctors' Convention of September 1971,the 
majority of doctors showed less than whole 
hearted support for the Servicio Unico de Salud 
and democratization. Instead of a Servicio 
Unico de Salud,the Conference proposed a Servicio 
Estatal de Salud,significantly dropping the 
term Tlunico Tl . This implied that some sort of 
private medicine was still to exist alongside 
a State service. Throughout Popular Unity this 
positioned hardened. In 1972 the majority of 
doctors campaigned to prevent any change in 
the semi-private scheme SERMENA • After 1973 
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and until the coup defence of private practice, 
libre eleccion,the tenets of the Right wing 
doctors, generally became the dominant goals of 
the profession. 
A centrist position within the 
profession which saw the Servicio Unico de 
Salud as a lon~ term goal, and which broadly 
represented the position of the Christian 
Democrats and the Radicals,became eclipsed by 
the Right wing stance. The picture of events 
inside the medical profession during Popular 
Unity,is of a consistent 25-30% of the profession 
supporting Popular Unity on the one hand,and on 
the other an increasingly dominant Right wing 
position opposed to the Servicio Unico de Salud 
and pursuing extremist politic~l nolicies 
against the Government. What has to be explained 
was not why the Right and Left acted in the way 
they did but rather, the reasons why the floating 
Centre joined the Right. These Centrists,mostly 
Christian Democrats and Radicals,were the 
crucial groups not only within the profession 
but in the whole of Chilean society. 
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4.4 THE BEHAVIOUR OF RADICAL GROUPS WITHIN POPULAR UNITY 
These radical groups,instead of 
treating doctors as allies in line with official 
Popular Unity strategy acted as if doctors were 
their class enemies. It is important to realise 
that these groups treated doctors in this way 
before the Colegio Medico's strike action and 
before the profession's open opposition to the 
Government;in other words,before there were 
legitimate reasons for treating them in this 
way. 
The theoretical basis for this 
behaviour was the revolutionary line of groups 
such as the Movimiento Izquierda Revolucionaria 
(M.I.R.). These groups saw the revolution in 
terms of a violent rupture with the old order 
and the smashing of the bourgeois state. In this 
struggle,the success of the revolution rested on 
the revolutionary purpose of the working class who 
needed to be mobilized for combat. They argued 
that the middle classes had no revolutionary 
potential. They would vacillate between the 
bourgeoisie and the proletariat,eventually 
joining with the class which was on the point of 
winning. Middle class groups such as doctors ,it was 
argued,had to be confronted with working class 
power,not bought off,appeased or mollified. As 
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Altimirano ,leader of the Left wing of the 
Socialist Party declared after the coup, 
"Dialogu~ ib only m~aningtul 
I-/Lom pObitioi7.b 01- bt/LZngt.~. 
In o/Ld~/L to .e..~ ~tt~cii.v~,a 
policy(towa/Ldb th~ middl~ 
clabb~b) mUbt Ub~ bt/LOng 
cO~/Lciv~ m~abU/L~b/.'. 14-
This more radical,overtly 
revolutionary strategy had been proposed by the 
Left wing of the Socialist Party and the MIR in 
1969,when negotiations took place to determine 
Popular Unity strategy. However,this position 
was defeated by R moderate "reformist" stratee-y 
nroposed by the Communists and the Right wing 
Socialists. The latter became official Ponular 
Unity Rtratee-y and as a result/enticed middle 
class parties such as the Radicals into the 
PopuJar Unity coalition 
In this chapter we will identify 
in narticular 4 radical groups:the Director 
General of the Servicio Nacional de Salud and his 
Socialist advisers;Health Workers;the Left wing 
Popular Unity Media;and Shanty town dwellers 
and Peasants. All these groups' relations with 
doctors were crucial and it will be argued,their 
actions embittered relations between doctors and 
Popular Unity as a whole. 
Of course,not all groups within 
the Popular Unity health authorities,not all 
health workers, shanty town dwellers,peasants 
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or the Popular Unity media were hostile towards 
doctors. The radical segments within these 
groups often represented minority positions. 
Nonetheless,they were vocal and their influence 
was crucial. 
(a) THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE SERVICIO NACIONAL 
DE. SALUD AND HIS ADVISERS 
Official Popular Unity health 
plans closely resembled health policy in the 
previous Christian Democrat administration. 
Steps to create a Servicio Unico de Salud and 
to democratize the Servicio Nacional de Salud 
had been begun by the previous Chri stian 
Democrat Government. Popular Unity policy 
appeared merely to carryon these processes 
moving gradually to a Servicio Unico de Salud 
and a fully democratic health service. 
However,groups within the Popular 
Unity health authorities interpreted Popular 
Unity health policy in a more radical way. These 
radicals mostly belonged to the Socialist Party. 
They became the advisers of the Socialist Party 
Director General of the Servicio Nacional de 
Salud,Dr.Sergio Infante. 
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The Socialist Party through 
Infante and his advisers had much more 
influence on health policy than the other Popular 
Unity parties because the position of Director 
General of the Servicio Nacional de Salud 
carried with it control of the service's 
finances. Thus,although the Communist Party 
through Mariano Requena had control of the 
post of Technical Chief of the Servicio 
Nacional de Salud and although the posts of 
Minister of Health during Popular Unity were 
given to parties like the Social Democrats, 
MAPU and the Radical Party,all the health 
posts were dependent on the Director General 
and consequently the Socialist Party.15 
The most pressing goal of this 
Socialist Party group was the creation of the 
Servicio Unico de Salud. In contrast,Allende, 
the Communists and more moderate members of the 
Popular Unity coalition argued that the Servicio 
Unico de Salud could not be achieved within the 
lifetime of the Government. Throughout Popular 
Unity this issue remained unresolved,driving 
a wedge between these groups. By the beginning 
of 1973 the Director General of the Servicio 
Nacional de Salud,Sergio Infante announced that 
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the coming year would mark the creation of the 
Servicio Unico de Salud. This contradicted his 
more moderate partners in Popular Unity who 
continued to maintain that the Servicio was 
a long term goal. 
It has to be pointed out that 
by the time Popular Unity was overthrown a 
Servicio Unico de Salud had still not material-
ized. However, the medical frofession widely 
recognized that this conflict over when the 
Servicio Unico de Salud was to be introduced 
was taking place inside the health authorities. 
As a result,they could not be sure that the 
prevailing moderate line would not suddenly be 
overthrown and substituted by a more revolution-
ary position. 
There was little attempt by 
Infante and his group of advisers to create 
confidence within the profession about their 
goals. They considered that the profession's 
resistance was probably inevitable. There 
was little point in trying to persuade doctors 
of the validity of their policies. Thus,the 
group's statements about the future of the 
health service were made with little consider-
ation about the effect that they would have on 
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the profession. Infante in May 1971,for example 
called the Servicio Nacional de Salud corrupt. 16 
Shortly after this a statement by the public 
relations department of the Servicio Nacional 
de' Sal_ud whi ch was controlled by the Sociali st 
Party declared that the Servicio Unico de 
Salud would mean the end of private medicine. 
This statement c.oncluded by stating that 
"la democ~aiizaci5n con~i~ie 
en eni~ega~ la ~alud a 
la communidad ~eneticia~ia pa~a 
di~igi~ la~ accione~;con 
democ~aiizaci6n ~e aca~a~a el 
~einado de lo~ medico~ con iodo~ 
~u~ p~ivilegio~." 17 
These statements contradicted "offical II health 
poli cy. 
Underlying the strategy of this 
more radical group within the health suthorities 
was a different conception of how the revolution 
would be won. Rather than persuading opponents to 
accept their policies, they believed that any form 
of resistance had to be confronted from positions 
of strength. They argued that doctors should not 
be enticed into accepting the Servicio Unico de 
Salud. Rather ,the Servicio Un~co de Salud 
should be presented to them as a taii accomoli 
thus convincing the profession that its 
opposition would be useless. Thus,this group's 
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essential goal was to try and establish 
administrative control of the Servicio Nacional 
de Salud. With this power behind them,few 
groups within the health sector would be able 
to prevent the implementation of their policies. 
The Servicio Nacional de Salud 
with over 70,000 employees was the largest 
public employer in Chile. It covered the length 
and breadth of the country. Its nationwide 
network of communications were only matched 
by those of the Armed Forces. The Servicio 
Nacional de Salud even had its own aircraft. 
The Socialist Party group within the health 
authorities believed that total control of this 
organization would give them the power to 
implement their policies. 
This implicit strategy was not 
welcomed by the more moderate sections of Popular 
Unity. For instance Allende had to personally 
intervene to prevent the sacking of several 
hospital directors. The Socialist Party wanted 
these personnel to be replaced by their own 
18 
members. Allende,although himself a member 
of the Socialist Party attracted much opposition 
within his own party for his moderate stance. 
Jiron,Minister of Health in the 
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final year of the Government was another of the 
Popular Unity moderates who objected to this 
implicit Socialist Party strategy. His 
objections reached their height during the 
strike at the Hospital Salvador in June 1973. 
The determination by Socialist Party members 
to take over the administration of Hospital 
Salvador in Santiago had caused a strike of the 
hospital's doctors. These doctors objected to 
the sacking of several hospital staff in order 
to accommodate certain Socialist Party members. 
Jiron could not end the strike by reinstating 
these personnel because the Socialists demanded 
that this,the most Right wing of hospitals,be 
brought under Popular Unity control. This 
Socialist Party intransigence occurred when the 
Right was looking for every opportunity to 
trigger another national gremial movement,the 
object of which was to force the military to 
stage a coup. This intransigence on the part 
of the Socialist Party finally caused Jiron 
t . 19 o reslgn. 
It is clear that these actions 
by the radical group undermined the moderate 
Popular Unity policy of assuring the medical 
profession that it had nothing to fear from 
the Government's health plans. 
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(b) HEALTH WORKERS AND FENATS 
FENATS represented the interests 
of health workers in the Servicio Nacional de 
Salud. These workers performed the ancillary 
tasks inside the hospitals acting as cooks, 
cleaners,porters,auxiliaries etc. The nurses 
and white collar workers had their own unions. 
Politically,FENATS were dominated 
by the Communist and Socialist Parties. During 
Popular Unity,Mario Merino ,a Communist was 
the President of FENATS. His deputy,Sergio 
Freihoffer,was a Socialist. The Christian 
Democrats also had support mainly among women 
health workers but it never threatened the 
Left's majority. 
Health workers'hostility towards 
doctors did not begin with Popular Unity's 
victory. Health workers had always resented 
doctors' high salaries within the Servicio 
Nacional de Salud. However,two events occurred 
towards the end of the 60's which heightened 
workers' hostility towards doctors. 
The first event was the creation 
of SERMENA in 1968. Health workers resented the 
new scheme. Unlike doctors. they received no extra 
fee for treating SERMENA patients. Health 
workers objected to being excluded from 
negotiations,between the Colegio Medico and 
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the Christian Democrat authorities when this 
b · d' d 20 scheme was elng eSlgne. 
The second event was a long 
and bitter health workers' strike which occurred 
in August 1970,months before the Popular Unity 
victory. During this strike the Colegio Medico 
had offered neither material nor moral support 
to the strikers. It was true however that some 
doctors had staged a 24 hour sympathy strike 
in support of their demands for higher wages. 21 
These sympathetic doctors had organized 
collections in order to provide financial help 
to strikers' families. But this support was 
sporadic. The General Council of the Colegio 
Medico did not act. When the General Council 
debated whether to give support to FENATS 
several consejeros argued that the strike was 
political,aiming to discredit the present 
Christian Democrat Government. 22 The eventual 
failure of the strike soured relations between 
FENATS and the Colegio Medico even further. 
The strike too,had taught 
FENATS a powerful lesson which was to be 
significant for Popular Unity:the Christian 
Democrats who had remained intransigent 
during the strike should never be treated as 
allies;they were essentially reactionary. 
Thus on the eve of Popular 
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Unity many health workers ,radicalized after a 
fruitless strike were anxious to settle old 
scores:first with a Colegio Medico which had 
offered them no support;and secondly with the 
Christian Democrats who had not accepted any 
of their economic demands. 
Because of the radicalization 
of this group FENATS approached the Minister of 
Health immediately after the Allende victory 
to demand that he begin, 
"Un lucha conlna lo~ m~dico~ 
~n lLnmino~ g~n~nal~~." 23 
Furthermore,workers campaigned 
for the removal of those hospital doctors 
and heads of departments who had treated them 
miserably in the previous Government. In some 
cases FENATS occupied hospitals to put pressure 
on the Unidad Popular Government to agree to 
their desired changes in personnel. 24 The 
Director General of the Servicio Nacional de 
Salud was beseiged with demands from health 
workers to sack certain doctors. 25 The Director 
General received a letter from FENATS in 
Valparaiso demanding that on account of their 
past records the hospital chiefs of the area 
should be replaced by Socialist Party doctors. 26 
This desire for revenge was 
clearly demonstrated in their demands on health 
policy which were made during the first months 
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of Popular Unity. First FENATS demanded that 
health policy should be determined not by the 
Health Minister but by Commissions on which 
they would have majority representation. Thus 
when Popular Unity set up Commissions to 
study democratization schemes,FF.NATS objected 
to the fact that these Commissions were only 
acting in an advisory capacity;FENATS wanted 
these Commissions to have the power to determine 
health policy. They complained too, that the 
Colegio Medico had the same representation as 
FENATS. They believed that FENATS should 
become the most influential gremio in fbrmul-
ating health policy thus adopting the role once 
played by the Colegio Medico. As Mario Lagos, 
Secretary General of the Colegio Medico and 
himself a supporter of Popular Unity,declared, 
"~i imp~e~i6n e~ que lo~ inieg~anie~ 
de la lENA7S E~ian en e~ie momenio 
en una po~ici6n de Relige~ancia 
t~enie al g~emio medico,con~ide~ando 
que ello~,como yoRie~no ~on lo~ que 
iienen que maneja~ el Se~vicio. 27 
Secondly,FENATS believing that 
doctors had received higher wage increases than 
workers in the past,pressed the Health Minister 
not to increase doctors' wages in 1971. As 
Dr. Titelman reported to the General Council 
on 24th November 1970, 
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"£l ~ini~t~o l~~ dijo qu~ la T£NA7S 
l~ hatfa p~dido ~n to~ma t~~minant~ 
qu~ no ~~ ~~aju~ta~on lo~ ~u~ldo~ 
d~ lo~ medico~ ~n ~l ana 1971 y 
qu~ COn ~~o~ din~~o~ ~~ m~jo~a~on 
la~ ~~nta~ d~l ~~~to d~l p~~~onal. 28 
Moreover, FENATS demanded that the 
future method for dividing the wage budget for the 
SNS's employees should be collective negotiations 
between Governments and all health workers, including 
doctors. If this scheme had been implemented, doctors 
who had previously bargained separately with Govern-
ments would for the first time have been treated 
in exactly the same way as other health workers. 
Furthermore FENATS recommended that representatives of 
the "bases medicos" and not the Colegio Medico should 
be present at these collective negotiations. 
FENATS believed that the Colegio Medico represented 
bourgeois private doctors and ignored the interests 
of "los bases". The term bases was used to include not 
only doctors at the grass root level, but more 
importantly, those doctors at the lower levels 
of the medical hierarchy i.e. the State-oriented 
members of the profession. 
These requests were made by FENATS 
in the context of a larger demand:the immediate 
implementation of the Servicio Unico de Salud. In 
the early months of Popular Unity, several FENATS 
leaders declared that doctors in the Seryicio Nacional 
de Salud would have to work in the State clinics from 
8am to 8pm, treating patients free of charge. FENATS 
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declaration,if implemented, would have ended 
SERMENA and private medicine at a stroke. 
These declarations were supported 
by direct action. Again in the first year of Popular 
Unity,FENATS workers in hospitals in Santiago and 
Concepcion occupied the SERMENA wards to demonstrate 
their hostility to this service. 
Many doctors interpreted these 
actions as a clear attempt by elements of Popular 
Unity to turn the stratagy and programme of the 
Government into a revolutionary one. Villarroel, 
President of the Colegio Medico,who as a member of 
Popular Unity himself was hardly likely to exaggerate 
the coalition's difficulties declared that FENATS 
were trying to, 
"impon~~ la~ co~a~;qu~ ~i la~ 
co~a~ no caminagan d~ ~~a man~~a, 
~ ~llo~ ~aca~~an ~u q~ni~ a la call~." 29 
This statement was made barely two months after 
Allende became President. Clearly in this case,a 
revolutionary position was not dormant within Popular 
Unity. It emerged almost immediately after the Leftts 
triumph. 
This is not to argue that this 
radical group belonging in the main to the Socialist 
Party was all powerful within FENATS. The Communist 
health workers were trying their best to create a 
di~logue between FENATS and the Colegio Medico 
They came and discussed health policy 
with the Colegio in March 1971 and succeeded in 
dra~.g;ing, al bei t reI uctan t-ly, So ciali s t repres en t-
atives of FENATS .with them. 
Moreover,the radicals within 
FENATS were not successful in persuading the 
Government to accept their anti-doctors 
demands. Wage increases were given to doctors 
in the first year of Popular Unity. Moreover, 
Allende himself told the FENATS that the Colegio 
Medico was the sole representative of the doctors. 
There was no question of the Government bypassing 
the Colegio and conducting negotiations with 
the "ga~e~ m~dico~". The influence of the 
radicals,in short should not be exaggerated. 
Moreover,the early months of 
Popular Unity saw a radicalization of some 
groups who were attempting to continue the 
momentum begun by Popular Unity's electoral 
victory. But this radicalization quickly 
declined when it was apparent that Popular Unity 
was not going to be a revolutionary Government. 
It is true that FENATS' barrage of demands to 
the Health Minister subsided slightly after the 
first months of PODular Unity. 
Nonetheless,the more moderate 
members of the Government were thoroughly 
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alarmed at the damage done by the radicals to 
their attempts to co-onerate with the Colegio 
Medico. Dr.Dagnino a Communist warned the 
workers in a book publjshed in December 1971 
not to treat the doctors as their class enemies. 
As he elaborated, 
"Con l06 p~ot~6ional~6 y iecnico6 
~6 P~~Ci60 aciua~ con jU6iicta y 
d~6ie~~a~ vi~jo6 p~~juicio6 anii-
medico6 y anii-iecnico6 qu~ po~ 
d~6g~acia,iodavra 60n tu~ni~6 
~ni~~ va6i06 6~cio~~6 d~ i~ata­
jado~~6 d~ 6alud. L06 p~ot~6ional~6 
y lo 6 i1.. en i CO 6 , no 60 n ~n ~m i go 6 d ~ 
l06 i~atajado~~6,no 60n n lacaY06 
d~ la tu~gu~6[a" como a m~nudo 6e 
dic~,60n i~atajado~~6 d~ la culiu~a 
y 6U6 inie~~6~6 p~otund06 no 60n 
coni~adicio~io6 con l06 ini€~e6e6 
d~ l06 i~agajado~~6 ni de la 
~~voluci6n. [6 n~ce6a~io i~aia~l06 
con ateciO,~~6p~cio y taciliia~le6 
6u i~agajo haci£ndolo6 ma6 g~aio y 
tacil. " 30 
These remarks were well received 
by the Colegio Medico which devoted an editorial 
in its magazj ne "Vida Medi ca" to prai se Dagnino. 
As the editorial stated, 
"Si ~l ditlogo coniinua y ~6i06 
concepio6 60n llevad06 a la 
~ealidad e6ia~[a ma6 tavo~ec­
i~ndo ~l camino qu~ n06 p~~miia 
ac~~ca~n06 a la 60lucion d~ l06 
p~ogl~ma6 de 6alud de nue6i~o 
pa[6." 31 
In the same vein as Dagnino,the 
Minister of Health Jimenez carne to the Colegio 
Medico to try and soothe doctors' fears about 
the extremist statements made by some members 
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of FENATS. Pointing out that workers had been 
exploited and badly treated in the past,he 
argued that it was natural that they should 
regard doctors as being part of the "cla~e 
pat~onal." 
Thus,these moderate doctors 
like Jimenez and Dagnino were fully aware of 
the damage inflicted by FENATS to their 
attempts to create a dialogue with the Colegio 
Medico 
(c) THE MEDIA 
Throughout Popular Unity, the press 
and television played a crucial role in the 
political struggle. The influence of the Right 
wing papers,notably El Mercurio in whipping up 
protes~ accentuating Government difficulties and 
operating as the mouthpiece of the opposition 
gremio movement was well known. 
Equally important,too was the 
media which supported Popular Unity. Unlike some 
capitalist countries,the Left in Chile had 
substantial control of the press and television. 
The Communist Party owned El Siglo and the Govern-
m~nt Use1!, La Nacion. Other papers su6h as 
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Puro Chile, Las Noticias de las UI timas Horas 
and Clarin supported. Po,ou.Io.-r Ur1~tJ' albeLt en. 
0... serLsa..ti.oQQlist wCI,-y • The Left too, had con trol 
of some television channels like Channel 14 
and several radio stations. This extensive 
Left wing controlled media was important in 
informing the Chilean public of Popular Unity 
policy and in mobilizing support. 
In early 1971 this Left wing 
controlled media began to critically question 
the role of the doctor in the Chilean health 
service. At this time Salvador Allende had 
brought several scandals involving the medical 
profession to the public's attention. In April 
1971 he had condemned some doctors for issuing 
false sick lines to dock workers in Valparaiso, 
and for carrying out more caesarians on female 
SERMENA patients than on S~rvicio Nacional de 
Salud patients. 
Allende claimed that in order to 
gain extra fees these doctors had broken their 
Code of Ethics. Moreover,he criticised some 
professionals for failing to work their required 
number of hours. Allende was not criticising the 
profession as a whole but the media seized 
on these statements to launch a full scale 
campaign against doctors in general. 
This Left wing media campaign 
conveyed an image of doctors as being solely 
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concerned with their private practices or 
SERMENA patients. For instance a cartoon in 
Ahora of 11 th May,1971 showed a fat,gruesome 
doctors called "El ~atanico D~.No" looking at 
his watch while examining a line of 4,very ill 
looking male patients with his stethescope. 
Under the caption,is his command to the 
patients, 
nAho~a to~an todo~ junto~ - p~~o 
~apido qu~ t~ngo qu~ i~m~ a m~ 
con~ulto~io pa~ticula~." 32 
When two young children tragic-
ally died while awaiting medical treatment, the 
Leftist press accused the doctors of devoting 
their time to private patients instead of 
treating the poorer members of Chilean society 
who were in real need of care. It argued that 
the existence of SERMENA and private medicine 
had commercialized Chilean health care turning 
doctors into businessmen, who used their 
scientific training in some cases illegally 
and unethically,for private profit. 
As a leading article in La 
Nacion stated on 14th March 1971, 
"E~ incu~~tionagl~ qu~ qui~n 
ag~aza la p~ot~~ion medica 
lo hac~ al~ntado po~ un 
p~opo~ito alt~ui~ta. Lam~nt­
agl~m~nt~ con ~l co~~~~ d~ 
lo~ ano~ y po~ la ~ituacion 
d~ p~ivil~gio qu~ implica 
el eje~ciSio de la p~ot~~i6n) 
~l alt~ui~mo o~iginal e~ 
~eemplazado po~ el apetito 
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de con~umo,po~ ~aqpnanc[a taci~, 
y po~ e~ o~vido ~apido de ~a 
mi~i6n encomendada a~ agandona~ 
~a unive~~idad. 33 
These attacks predominantly 
appeared in the radical Left media. The more 
moderate sections of Popular Unity, such as 
the Communists' EI Siglo refrained from 
joining this anti-doctor campaign. 
It has to be said that the 
scandals which the Left wing media brought to 
light were true. Some doctors did write false 
sick notes in the port of Valparaiso. Some 
doctors were guilty of malpractice in SERMENA. 
In a sense then,this Left wing media campaign 
was publicising Hthe facts H. However ,this 
reporting was done in such a way as to cast 
doubts on the morals of the entire medical 
profe s sion, 
Why did this anti-doctor 
campaign begin almost immediately after the 
victory of Popular Unity? The campaign 
occurred at the same time as the Governemnt 
was proposing to democratize the health 
service. The Right argued that Popular Unity 
was trying to discredit the old Servicio 
Nacional de Salud doctor dominated hierarchy 
through its campaign to lower the prestige 
of the physician. In this way democratization 
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plans could be implemented more easily.34 
Also the emphasis on the 
corrupting effects of the profession of 
private medicine and SERMENA were designed 
to remind the more moderate sections of 
Popular Unity that these institutions had 
to be eliminated if the Government's intention 
of establishing a Servicio Unico de Salud 
was to be realised. The more radical sections 
of Popular Unity were worried that the 
appointment of Jimenez as Minister of Health 
(a moderate and Social Democrat)represented a 
softening 8f the Government's desire to 
change the Servicio Nacional de Salud and 
SERMENA into a Servicio Unico de Salud. Thus, 
the campaign was to put pressure on the 
moderates in the Government to act in a more 
radical way. 
The more moderate Left wing 
doctors totally supported the Colegio Medico 
in denouncing these attacks. Villarroel,the 
President,and at this time still a supporter 
of Popular Unity complained to Allende, 
de 
"fa campana en coni~aafa p~ote~ion 
y ef Cofeqio ~edico)con ef tin de 
minimiza~,ai~fa~ 0 deja~ ~in 
ninquna e~te~a de intfuencia af 
Cofeqio ~edico (y que e~o)e~a fo 
peo~ que fe pod~[a ocu~~i~ af 
1 34. 
R~ime~ medico que hag[a a~canzado 
ea P~e~idencia de ~a Repug~ica, 
que tue~a e~ quien pu~ie~a ~a 
e&pida ejecutiva a~ Coeegio que 
hagla cont~igu[do c~ea~. que 
hagta p~e~idido, y en e~ cua~ 
hagta t~agajado.'" 35 
Allende,dismayed that his remarks 
had been used to whip up a campaign against the 
profession/was keen to discuss this whole issue 
by coming to the Colegio Medico personally. Other 
moderate members amongst the health authorities 
also supported the Colegio;for instance,Requena 
a Communist Party member refused 
to attend a live Channel 14 debate on doctors 
since the Chairman J.Goic had made some derogatory 
remarks about the profession. 
The Colegio Medico itself took 
immediate steps to counter this anti-doctor 
campaign. It warned doctors that it would ensure 
that the ethical standards of the profession were 
to be maintained. Ethical control became the 
priority task of the Colegio Medico in this 
period. A public relations officer was employed-
to try and improve the image of the Colegio and 
the profession. The Colegio Medico began a 
campaign of its own warning the public that 
tragedies such as those that had recently 
occurred were likely to occur in the future if 
the resources of the Servicio Nacional de Salud 
were not increased. 
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Despite this Colegio Medico 
response and despite moderate members of Popular 
Unity condemning this media campaign, the more 
radical sections of the media were not silenced. 
Their campaign continued and created much 
consternation within the profession. The Ri~ht 
wing doctors were delighted. They used every 
slanderous word uttered by a Popular Unity 
supporter against the profession in their own 
campaign to undermine the Government. This in 
turn evoked a further response from the Popular 
Unity faction. Thus,once started, the campaign 
developed a momentum of its own,leading to an 
ever increasing violence in rhetoric from both 
Left and Right. It was abundantly clear that 
this background of an anti-doctor camapaign 
was unhelpful to the Government which was 
trying to create a spirit of dialogue between 
itself and doctors, as with all middle class 
groups. 
(d) SHANTY TOWN DWELLERS AND PEASANTS 
The Constitutional Guarantees made 
to the Christian Democrats by Popular Unity in 
order to obtain the former group's backin~ for 
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Salvador Allende as President, reaffirmed that 
change could only be brought about by legislative 
means. However,some radical sections of Popular 
Unity and other revolutionary groups such as the 
MIR,argued that the only successful route to 
change was by workin~ class direct action. Inside 
the health sector, this tactic was used by the 
revolutionary Left. It mobilized many marginal 
groups such as shanty town dwellers or pea"sants 
and with their help occupied several clinics 
and hospi tal s. 
These actions aimed to force the 
authorities to provide medical resources and 
personnel for outlying clinics and rural hospitals 
which had always suffered from a lack of 
essential supplies. The new Government gave 
priority to these establishments and organized 
health educational campaigns amongst the marginal 
groups. However, Popular Unity failed to meet 
the expectations these campaigns had raised. 
Medical resources devoted to the periphery 
remained poor. These marginal groups, encouraged 
by the revolutionary Left began to take the law 
into their own hands and occupied local clinics 
and small hospitals. 
Many of the targets of these 
popular grievances were doctors. These marginal 
groups felt that doctors were the main 
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obstacles to receiving a better supply of medical 
resources in their rural hospitals and shanty 
town clinics. 
In May,1972,in a shanty town near 
Valparaiso a group of over 30 adults and 60 
schoolchildren, some armed with sticks and stones, 
and others carrying banners declaring 
"paned6n pana lo~ mddico~ 
momio~ ." 
occupied their local clinic 
36 These 
groups demanded that doctors leave their private 
clinics,large hospitals and, 
"vaya a aienden a la 
potlaci6n . " 
A similar demand was made in Santiago. These 
groups resented the fact that doctors would not 
come to the areas in which they lived to treat 
them. As one of the pojnts in their manifesto 
read, 
"exigin la ~alida de lo~ 
medico~ de adulio~ de~de 
el J.J.Aguinne a iodo~ 
lo~ con~ulionio~ penit-
lnico~ del Anea,ponque 
hay necun~o~ de ~otna 
pana hacenlo ~in penjudican 
ni la en~enanza ni la 
inve~iigaci6n. " 37 
Doctors were injured in several of 
these attacks. Dra.Oriana Sepulveda was hurt 
when the consultoria in Los Andes in which 
she worked was occupied by angry shantytown 
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dwellers. Dr.Alejandro Casals in Fresia in the 
south of Chile had to be hospitalized after a 
group of some 200 peasants entered his hospital 
armed with sticks. 
After these occupations and 
attacks,most Popular Unity members were quick 
to denounce the perpetrators. If they had not 
done so,doctors would have called a strike. After 
the occupations of the hospitals in Fresia and 
Lautera,the Communist Party publicly declared, 
"Et ~IR ~£ toma £t Ho~pltat d£ 
l~£~jn. Con £tto p~ovoca una 
am£naza d£ hu£tga medIca. Et 
~IR ~£ toma £t Ho~pltat d£ 
Laut~~o .Qu£ gu~can? Una 
nu£va hu£tqa medIca? Un 
£nt~£ntami£nto ~ang~i£nto? 
Ningun ~£votuclona~lo ~£ 
d£j£~a contundi~: La p~ovoc­
acion £~ cont~a-~£votuci5n. /I 38 
The Right wing doctors used these 
events to fuel their protest against the 
Government. They placed the blame for these 
actions on the Government which had,they claimed, 
through its media campaigns against doctors 
provoked these groups to take direct action 
against the profession. 
The doctors who were the targets 
of these attacks and occupations in the outlying 
clinics and hospitals began to find their 
working conditions intolerable. One doctor 
demanded, 
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"una en;~gica p~ote~ta def Cofegio 
~edico po~ fa tafta de ~e~peto, 
at~opeffo e in~ufto~ y tafta de 
~egu~idad que ef medico tiene 
pa~a t~a~aja~. exige ~egu~idad 
pe~~onaf pa~a t~a~aja~ ~o~~e 
todo ~i ca~a~ine~o~ no actua. 
~anitie~ta que ~u tamifia no ~e 
at~eve a vivi~ ma~ en Chife en 
e~ta~ condicione~." 39 
It is important to realise that this statement 
was made in a private meeting among opposition 
doctors. It was not uttered as part of Right 
wing propaganda. We can thus,assume that the 
sentiments behind the remarks were genuine. 
Although the bulk of Popular 
Unity supporters were quick to condemn these 
illegal acts the Government was unable to 
sufficiently distance itself from its revolution-
ary wing. These actions of radicalized groups of 
pobladores and campesinos ta~nished its image of 
a non-revolutionary Government,proceeding to 
socialism through peace and order. 
For the Right,actions such as 
these were to be welcomed. It gave it excellent 
ammunition to attack the Government which it 
would have opposed whatever its failings. For 
the moderate Left,the actions of these groups 
irreparably damaged its attempt to wjn over 
the majority of the nrofession to the Popular 
Unity Government. 
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4.5 THE MEDTCAL PROFESSION AND THE POLARIZATION 
OF CHILEAN SOCIETY 
1) The Polarization of the Health Service 
The last 12 months of Popular 
Unity were characterized by a growing 
polarization of Popular Unity and opposition 
forces. The resulting spirit of crisis did not 
leave the profession untouched. In the first 
year of Popular Unity,despite the rhetoric of 
radical groups within the Government,the work 
situation of the doctor had not altered 
radically. His income from private and public 
medicine had risen with the cost of living. 
Democratization had not overturned the power 
of the doctor inside the health hierarchy. His 
way of life, his mode of working were much the 
same as in the beginning of Popular Unity. The 
picture however began to change. 
The development of the opposition 
Right wing movement called gremialismo took the 
battle against Popular Unity out of the 
constitutional framework onto the streets. Its 
organization of massive strikes in October 1972 
and August 1973,its mobilization of erstwhile 
napoli ti caIn group s like women and profe ssi onal s 
received a spirited defence from working class 
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organizations. The conflict between these two 
forces led to an even sharper politicization 
in Chilean society. 
The health service consequently 
in the last year of Popular Unity became even 
more politicized. The Community Health Councils 
set up as part of Popular Unity's democratization 
plan,became transformed into outlets for this 
heightened political activity. These health 
councils began to demand a greater say in 
running hospitals and some directors of hospitals 
complained of having to seek "advice" from the 
representatives of workers' unions. In the words 
of a Popular Unity opponent at this time, 
"di~cipline,o~de~ and p~ote~~ional 
o~ganization we~e ~n tact 
annihilated." 40 
Politicization inside the health 
service began to lead to the breakdown of the 
old hierarchy founded on the technical 
superiority of the physician. Doctors incessantly 
complained at this time of juniors and aides 
refusing to carry out orders. Moreover,after the 
strike of October 1972,some Popular Unity groups 
organized "shock" brigades inside the hospitals. 
The main purpose of these militia was to 
provide health care in the wake of a sudden 
strike-call by doctors. Several of these 
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groups were accused of personally attacking 
physicians. 
In this highly charged politic-
ized atmosphere doctors complained that the 
standards of health care they were able to 
offer to their patients declined. 
No Hay Sueros 
The Servicio Nacional de Salud 
had always suffered from shortages of supplies, 
but in the final months of Popular Unity real 
shortages as opposed to the age old inadequacies 
of the Servicio Nacional de Salud,occurred. This 
was caused by difficulties in importing certain 
medical supplies, the beginnings of hyper-inflation 
and the rising demand for health care. 
Shortages were first felt in the 
highly specialized medical centres. Major 
surgical operations had to be suspended and some 
intensive care units were closed. Sophisticated 
pharmaceutical products could not be prescribed 
and blood bank security regulations slackened 
owing to the absence of disposable equipment. 
This state of affairs moved one Popular Unity 
opponent to declare, 
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"Chilean medicine ~ta~ted to 
~ecede to the medical ~tanda~d~ 
ot gene~ation~ ea~lie~." 41 
In 1973,shqrtages of basic supplies 
began to be felt. There was diffuculty in obtaining 
cotton wool,alcohol,blankets and nutritional diets 
in some hospitals. 
The propaganda department of the 
Colegio Medico had a field day. Almost every 
day from August until the coup, the Colegio 
published dramatic statements of the shortages 
that were arising in hospitals. The following 
was a typical example: 
"Chileno: 7u m~dico te hagl~. 
Yo qui~ie~a da~te la mejo~ 
atencion pe~o ~olo cuento con 
mi voluntad y la de nue~t~o 
pe~~onal de colago~aci6n que 
~ut~e igual que tu y que yo 
Pe~O: 
_ nO hay cama~ ~uticiente~ 
en lo~ ho~pitale~. 
- no hay medicamento~ 
_ nO hay ~opa pa~a ope~a~ 
- nO hay alg odon 
in~t~umental 
- no hay leche 
- nO hay ~ue~o~ 
- no hay alimento~ 
Pe~o hay: 
- politique~!.a 
- ~ecta~i$f10 
odio,in~ulto~ y ag~e~ione~. 42 
There was no doubt that the 
opposition was exaggerating these shortages 
to make political capital. But the health 
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authorities themselves did admit that certain 
inadequacies existed. 43 
It has to be concluded that the 
crisis in society which in turn, affected the 
health service,led to a decline in medical 
standards. The profession certainly held the 
Government responsible for the almost 
breakdown situation that existed in some 
hospitals towards the end of Popular Unity. 
The effect of the economic crisis during 
Popular Unity on the income of doctors. 
During 1971 doctors' incomes 
from both public and private medicine increased. 
On average a doctors in 1971 received E0113.7 
a day working in the State sector,an increase of 
almost E015 from the previous yea~(see Table 10) 
A doctor's average daily income through private 
consultations had increased from its 1970 
figure of E0377.7 a day,to E0451.3 in 1971. This 
increase in doctors' incomes from private 
medicine,more than any other statistic disproved 
the belief that Popular Unity was outlawing 
private medicine. 
In 1973 with the crisis in the 
economy getting worse. the trends that had begun 
in 1972 had accelerated to the clear 
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disadvantage of the doctor. For instance in 1971 
an average of 4.19 hours a day were worked in 
private medicine. In 1973 this figure had dropped 
to 3 hours a day,a loss of over an hour a day 
treating private patients in just 2 years. This 
fall affected doctors' private income. Whereas 
in 1971 daily income from private consultations 
was E0451.3 ,in 1973 doctors' daily income from 
private consultations had slumped to E0256.5 
Doctors' fall in income between 1971 and 1973 
was not matched by an increase through their 
State work. In 1971 their daily total income 
from State work was E0113.7 . This had fallen 
to Eo63.6 in 1973 . EVAn taking into account the 
drop in income in 1973 after the coup,the fall 
in doctors' income between 1971 and the end of 
Popular Uni ty is considerable. For example,the 
value of an hour worked by a doctor in State 
medi cine in July 1 971 was E0503.5 . In the same 
month two years later the val ue had dropped to 
E0268(see Table 11) . 
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The effect of the Economic Crisis during Popular Unity on the Income of Chilean Doctors 
TABLE ',0 :DOCTORS DAILY PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INCOME (IN ESCUDOS = EO ) 
~(;V('c e : Esfvd/o JOV:Jl'e L.".. 
Pedro VCI.. fitV'!. 0 V;c.) 
DQ.fu"W1,'V/Q.C;C'I} del f)oI'Ciflce../ ole NoytlJl'ar/o! old (()/e:Jt'o Heol./cttJ d.e. dt.;/e 
Defto de S~d Publ/cC{ J {t>/eJ/o l1~d/,o de (A.de I SCi. ,.d·'·~bo/ (://tc<"O (<1'7'0 
S T A T E I N C 0 M E P R I V A T ~ I N C 0 J'.1 E 
1 ,!.. a 4 b 1otcJ, :> ,o~iy' Jt')'drne Year N° of state adj ustments N° of hours Value of % ()t-hours worked in the hours fC<..'j %01 worked in fee jl'ofY\ p,..; vaJe . {!fi-
e QIl.5!.' /I-Q.h~~s tofJ. on average worked in the S·h.l:f,e.. t()ta.L private charged , I fl (Of1)e. • 
by do ctor per state /1eel t(/lle JflC~ m edi cine pe" 
'c. ciQ.y d-C1.'1 
1966 4.55 5.2 E~l,'r II,S 4.77 33.1 E0410) It 18~) ~ 
1967 5.15 5.9 6~)a. ',~11o 4.08 29.7 -o,{P3) ~ 15~4-
1968 5.93 6.8 rb,4 ~." 3.18 27.5 ~(2)3 1-tiLt 
1969 5.74 6.6 ('8, () I~~'T 3.40 27.2 ~:YT, 4 SO) 3 
1970 5.21 6.0 ~s,4 ~f)'1 4.01 31. 4 3:r7./f· , t-q,3 
1971 5.05 5.8 113)7- ~()~ 4.19 35.9 ~5J >3 1?J~ 
1972 5.53 6.4 109, I(, .1.,8'3 3.64 25.4 :2'11, ft. 1'1) 7-
1973 5.21 6.0 '3)0' (ct-, 3.00 17 . 1 ,1;~b1.! SO) i, 
L_ 
a the adjustment is obtained by adding 15% to the total in column 1 to include the hours worked 
in institutions other then the Servicio Nacional de Salud. 
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TABLE 11 :THE MONTHLY VALUE OF AN HOUR WORKED IN STATE MEDICINE 
MONTH 1968 1969 1970 1 971 1972 1973 
J 328.3 308.6 491 .9 553.4 541 .1 324.9 
F 227.4 292.7 468.3 549.3 508.2 333.0 
i'1 318.4 283.9 452.3 543.1 494.6 293.5 
A 307.2 275.5 441 .7 529.8 468.3 428.4 
M 300.3 268.4 432.5 515.4 449.2 358.7 
J 291 .7 262.2 442.1 507.4 439.9 310.2 
A 280.3 255.2 405.7 495.9 343.2 229.8 
S 276.6 254.1 395.4 493.8 280.7 196.7 
0 272.6 253.2 392.0 482.7 487.4 209.7 
N 272.9 251 .0 389.3 472.1 461 .5 198.4 
D 271 .1 250.3 389.3 481 .7 426.1 189.4 
Average 
hourly 293.2 267.9 426.4 510.8 443.5 274.3 
value 
Daily 
average 11 .2 10.3 1 6.4 19.6 17 .1 10.6 
(26 days) 
'sovrce: ESfvcll't;) Sobre Lo. De t (,l"m"JI\Hiol1 de ( Ara..'I-1.(ej de. 
HOI'lDrc<f'I'OS oI.eJ u,&~u fvle,L',0 d.a CJu'le I Pedro Jeft-a.nD u;c 
Depfo c1Q sJAJ P v.. bt" Cl I [DlPB -i v H ed/co d@ C~/Ie I Jet n. h~ 0 I 
t:.V1ef'E) I ,Q14, 
These statistics show a sharp 
fall in doctors' income from both private and 
public work in the final months of Popular 
Unity. 
The reasons behind this fall in 
income are numerous. Inflation during the 1972-
1973 period must have eroded the private and 
public incomes of doctors. The decrease in 
private income was caused by doctors spending 
more time in State medicine. This-itself was 
the result of Popular Unity's promotion of the 
State sector. 
Patients could see the efforts 
that were being made by the new Government 
to improve and expand the State health sector. 
Many patients must have chosen to be treated 
by the State sector ,who in the past,had 
normally paid for their own treatment 
privately. 
These statistics should not be 
interpreted in a determinist fashion. Doctors 
did not just oppose Popular Unity in the final 
months of 1972 and 1973 because of this fall 
in income. As we have argued in the preceding 
sections, the profession moved against the 
Goverment before the economic crisis began 
to effect their incomes, and during the anti-
doctor campaign stirred up by Left wing 
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groups in Popular Unity. We have argued that 
this anti-doctor campaign was a main contributory 
factor in turning the centrist group within the 
profession against Popular Unity during Allende's 
first year as President. 
However,it would be foolish to 
ignore these statistics. Quite clearly any 
Government which was responsible for causing 
doctors' incomes to drop so sharply during two 
years would attract opposition from the medical 
profession. It could be argued that this fall 
in doctors' income merely reinforced the already 
hostile attitudes held by some doctors towards 
the Marxists. 
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CONCLUSION 
It was not inevitable that doctors 
should finally oppose Popular Unity in such 
substantial numbers. The younger doctors with 
greater commitment to the State than to the 
private sector,or those members of the profession 
in poorly equipped health regions,all had a 
class interest in the preservation and development 
of the State health sector. Better jobs,higher 
wages and an increase in resources could have 
been the basis of a common platform between the 
Popular Unity Government and the Colegio Medico. 
An alliance between a progressive Government and 
a profession which prided itself in its history 
of promoting the role of the State in the health 
service, was entirely conceivable. 
Indeed,early on such an alliance 
began to take shape. Co-operation between the 
Colegio Medico and the new Goverment on special 
health campaigns and on plans for the future 
Servicio Nacional de Salud took place. 500 
doctors attended a Popular Unity conference to 
support the Servicio Nacional de Salud. As if 
to cement this co-operation the mainspeakers 
were Salvador Allende and the President of the 
Colegio Medico Emilio Villarroel,himself a 
member of Popular Unity. At this time the 
General Council of the Colegio Medico 
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published a document which in principle agreed 
with the need for a Servicio Unico de Salud . 
The Right mobilized itself in Valparaiso to 
try and disrupt this co-operation. 
But the strategy of the radical 
groups towards the medical profession in general 
and the Colegio Medico in particular,put strains 
on this co-operation. Barely six months after 
the victory of Popular Unity the radical Left 
initiated a specific anti-medico cRmpaign to 
increase penple!s awareness of the need for 
revolutionary change in the health service. 
After this had run its course the Colegio Medico's 
own policy changed. It now objected to any 
policy which led to doctors receiving their 
income from one single source i.e. total State 
medicine. This shift could be directly attributed 
to Popular Unity's "unoffical" strategy. 
It should not be forgotten that 
in early 1971 an alliance was formed between the 
National Party and the Christian Democrats. 
Obviously,this alliance accounted to some extent 
for doctors of the Centre moving against the 
Government in the first months of Popular Unity. 
However,rather than arguing in some determinist 
fashion that centrist doctors opposed Popular 
Unity because of their own party's opposition 
152. 
to the Government,it could be argued that because 
of the tactics employed against the profession 
by sections of Popular Unity,centrist doctors 
more readily accepted this alliance between 
Christian Democracy and the National Party,or 
indeed,influenced its creation. 
In the final year of Popular 
Unity,the politicization of the health service, 
shortages of medical supplies and a fall in 
income reinforced the feeling of discontent 
which most of the profession had towards 
Popular Unity. 
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CHAPTER 5 
ERRORS AND D I V ISO N S 
THE STRATEGY OF POPULAR UNITY DOCTORS 
TOWARDS THE COLEGIO MEDICO . 
158. 
In this chapter we will examine 
the strategy of the Popular Unity doctors 
towards the medical profession and its Colegio 
Medico. We will discover why their strategy 
became revolutionary and the effect this had 
on relations between the Left and other 
groups inside the Colegio Medico,from Popular 
Unity's triumph in September 1970 until the 
Colegio Medico Convention in September 1971. 
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5.1 THE LEFT INSIDE THE COLEGIO MEDICO ON THE EVE 
OF POPULAR UNITY'S VICTORY. 
Seen from the perspective of the 
two major Colegio Medico strikes in 1972 and 
1973,the Left was suprisingly strong inside the 
Colegio Medico on the eve of Popular Unity's 
victory. Both the President of the Colegio 
Medico,Emilio Villarroel and its Secretary 
General, Mario Lagos were open supporters of the 
Govern~ent. As members of the Radical Party, 
they belonged to the Popular Unity coalition. 
Of the remaining 18 members of the General Council 
probably 5 others were Radicals,making 7 in total; 
6 were supporters of the Popular Unity Government; 
4 were centrists or Christian Democrats,and only 
3 could be identified with the Right. Thus, 
Popular Unity had a 13 to 7 majority inside the 
General Council. 
This figure however,has to be 
treated vith caution. Firstly,the Radical Party 
was a very ambiguous member of the Popular Unity 
coalition. After only a few months it split into 
two with the majority going into opposition to 
Popular Unity. Thus,the 7 Radicals could not be 
relied upon as certain Popular Unity supporters, 
even a1: thi s early stage. Se condly. the General 
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Council did not accurately reflect the mood of 
the profession. General consejeros were indirectly 
elected by the 12 Colegio Medico Regional Councils. 
Nonetheless,despi te these qualifications the Left 
was in a fairly strong position inside the Colegio 
Medico. 
In the early months of the new 
Government the Colegio Medico showed its support 
for Popular Unity. The Executive Committee of the 
Colegio went to Allende's house immediately after 
the election to offer its personal congratulations. 
This infuriated the Right inside the Colegio which 
complained that Allende could only be regarded as 
President after his electoral victory was ratified 
by Congress. Again before his appointment had been 
confirmed AJlende was invited to a meeting of the 
General Counci1 at which he was given a hero's 
welcome. At this meeting the President~ Villarroel 
actually told Allende how much his electoral 
victory had pleased the Colegio Medico.Addressing 
Allende,Villarroel declared, 
"el ag~ado con que nue~t~a O~den 
CoLegiada ha vi~to el de~a~~ollo 
del p~oce~o electo~al." 1 
This support for Allende was publicly confirmed 
by the Colegio when on 1st December,Allende 
received a gold medal,the highest Colegio Medico 
award for his services to the profession. 
Undoubtedly the support shown 
towards Popular Unity could be attributed to the 
prestige in which Allende was held by most of the 
profession. Salvador Allende had been one of the 
founders of the Colegio Medico. He had been 
President from 1951 to 1953,while at the same 
time sitting as a Socialist Senator. Through his 
political influencehe obtained for doctors not 
only their professional college but also a contract 
of employment between them and their new State 
employers. This gave the profession much needed 
employment and financial security. As President 
he set up an insurance fund which protected 
doctors and their families in times of mishap and 
retirement. FinalJy.AJlende was a mason. The 
ma6on~~ia had great influence in Chile in the 
40's and 50's. It more or less controlled the 
Colegio Medico at this time. The first three 
Presidents,Sotero del Rio,Gustavo Jiron and 
Allende himself,were all masons. And even in 1970 
many masons were in positions of authority inside 
the Colegio Medico. Out of 20 members of the 
General Council,7 were masons. Thus,for all these 
reasons,Allende had good relations with the 
leaders of the Colegio. And although himself 
not a mason, Emilio Villarroel was a close 
personal friend of Allende. 
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5.2 THE COLEGIO MEDICO ELECTIONS -MAY 1971 
Despite these early advantages, 
barely eight months after the victory of Popular 
Unity, the Left suffered grave reverses in the 
Colegio Medico elections. The Left had hoped 
that these would give it control inside the 
Colegio . The Communists in particular had 
pointed to the possibility that Left wing doctors 
could still control the General Council even 
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without securing a majority of the votes cast. The 
elections for the 20 posts in the General Cnun~il 
were indire~t . Doctors voted councillors(con~eje~o~) 
onto the 12 Regional Councils who then appointed 
consejeros to represent their view in the General 
Council in Santiago. Although the Regional Council 
with the largest number of doctors in its 
jurisdiction could send more representatives than 
the smallest Regional Council, the system still 
discriminated against the largest. In 1971 the 
largest Regional CouncihSantiago had 4,072 
doctors within its jurisdiction which entitled it 
to send 4 consejeros to the General Council. 
However,Puerto Montt which had just 145 doctors 
in its area was entitled to 1 consejero;as were 
Punto Arenas and Valdivia with 58 and 100 
doctors respectively. Moreover,doctors in these 
outlying areas tended to vote for Left wing 
candidates. The majority of these doctors were 
recent University ~~aduates on Serivico Nacional 
de Salud grants working full time in the State 
sector before returning to Santiago to specialize. 
Nonetheless,despite Communist Party 
hopes the results of the elections were a 
resounding defeat for the Left in terms of the 
number of votes it received and the number of 
Re~ional Councils that it won. In effect,it put 
an end to any hope of gaining control of the 
Colegio Medico. In Santiago the Christian Democrats 
received 944 votes(40% of the vote)the Right(33%) 
and the Left 644(26%) . In the second most 
important Regional Council - Valparaiso,the 
combined Christian Democrat/Right wing list polled 
419 votes to only 94 for the Popular Unity list. 
These Regional Councils appointed consejeros 
who reflected this Right wing/Christian Democrat 
leanings onto the General Council. 
Antogagasta,Temuc~,Valdivia,Puerto 
Montt and Punto Arenas still retained Popular 
Unity majorities but in the other Regions ,the 
Left was defeated. In Talca for instance,the 
Christian Democrats and the Right co-operated 
to prevent Popular Unity from appointing its 
own consejero to the General Council. They 
combined to nominate a joint candidate in order 
to ensure that the Popular Unity candidate did not win 
through the splitting of votes. This co-operation 
between the Christian Democrats and the Right was 
not confined to Talca. In Santiago,depite the 
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Regional Council having 4 places on the General Council 
and the Left receiving 25% of the total vote, the Right 
and Christian Democrats reached an electoral pact and 
shared the 4 places between themselves. 
Inside the General Council the balance 
of forces had shifted dramatically against the Left. 
Emilio Villarroel was re-elected as President but only 
because he had now become a member of the opposition 
to Popular Unity. The Right and Christian Democrats 
had-supported him rather than the ex-Secretary 
General,Mario Lagos,another Radical who was the Left 
wing candidate. Of the remaining 19 members of the 
General Council,6 were on the Right;7 were either 
centrist or Christian Democrats and only 6 were now 
on the Left. 
5.3 TWO COMPETING STRATEGIES 
The defeat of Popular Unity doctors 
at these Colegio Medico elections intensified a 
debate amongst their ranks about which strategy to 
adopt towards the Colegio. A split developed which' 
reflected the division inside Popular Unity between 
the Communists,Radicals and the more moderate wing of 
the Socialist Party on the one hand;and the Altimirano 
wing of the Socialist Party along with the ultra 
Left groups such as the MIR on the other. The doctors 
who belonged to the former groups i.e. Communists, 
Radicals and the Allendistas within the Socialist 
Party could be termed Ilmoderates ll • The latter group 
could be termed Ilradicals ll • 
These doctors could not agree on whether 
to view the medical profession as a progressive force 
which could be included in the socialist process or 
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as a reactionary one which should be treated as an 
enemy. The Il radicals ll tended to interpret the elections 
within the Colegio Medico as proof that the majority 
of Chilean doctors were reactionary. In contrast 
the Ilmoderates ll believed that the elections offered 
hope that a progressive alliance between Popular Unity 
and certain Christian Democrat doctors could be 
formed within the Colegio Medico. 
These doctors saw the Chilean medical 
profession in opposing terms. The Ilmoderates ll argued 
that the profession had always had a strong commitment 
to public medicine . Even if some doctors had become 
opposed to State medicine they argued, the majority 
of the profession was loyal to the State service 
ideal. These Ilmoderate ll doctors always stressed the 
social progressiveness of the profession ..... . 
flEl g~emio m~dico en ~u conjunio 
e~ ~e~peia~le,un ve~dade~o valo~ 
mo~al de la ~ociedad chilena ." 2 
They were optimistic that all doctors in time could 
become recon~iled to the changes in the health 
service which Popular Unity was proposing. 
However,the more "radical" doctors 
believed that the medical profession had retreated 
from its earlier progressive position and was using 
its skills for the sake of profit. Money had become 
the driving force of these doctors,turning a noble 
profession into a club of businessmen. 
The "moderatesll disputed this: 
"Sa~emo~ que el g~emio m~dico no 
~e mueve exclu~ivamenie po~ 
di~e~o • lundamenialmenie ~e 
mV.eve po~ la cau~a de la 
m ~dicina ." 3 
They argued that doctors' work in private medicine 
was a direct result of the frustrations caused by 
working in poorly equipped State hospitals. Improve 
the conditions in which they worked they arg~ed, 
and the resentment to State medicine would disappear. 
The "radicals" believed that this 
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resentment had less to do with doctors being frustrated 
"po~ la cau~a de la medicina" but everything to do 
with the State system preventing the tapping of 
highly lucrative private medical schemes. As these 
"radicals" argued,doctors could not be won over to 
progressive position; they were inextricably tied 
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to the unequal bourgeois system which gave them consid-
erable material rewards. The only group of the profession 
who could be incorporated into the socialist transformation 
was the young doctors. Those who worked in the private 
sector could not be won over to the socialist revolution. 
Thus,they argued the division in the profession between 
on the one hand the young doctors committed to medicina 
tunciona~ia and on the other,the more established doctors 
with their private clientele,intent on defending fit~e 
efeccion was unbreachable. 
Moreover,these Itradicals lt were against 
any compromise with the Colegio Medico which they believed 
represented the private -oriented doctors. Through its 
rece~t actions they argued,the Colegio had shown itself 
opposed to the demands for a more just society. Moreover, 
it had come to completely ignore the interests of young 
doctors and had devoted itself to representing those 
doctors, 
"afienado~ con una ~ociedad me~cantif­
i~ta que vafo~a excfu~ivamente ef 
vafo~ economico y ~ociaf. cf Cofegio 
~edico e~ un o~gani~mo p~otundamente 
~eacciona~io." 
From this divergent analysis two 
opposing strategies emerged. The more Itradical lt doctors 
wanted to destroy the influence of the reactionary wing 
of the profession manifested in their Right wing Colegio 
Medico by ending the legal requirement that all Chilean 
doctors be Colegio members. As a rival to the now 
emasculated Colegio these doctors proposed to form a 
Sindicato Unico which would incl ude the 
progressive members of the profession along with 
other health workers i.e. all Servicio Nacional de 
Salud staff. To achieve this they needed to force 
a split within the profession. 
The more "moderate" doctors 
on the other hand wanted to prevent this split. 
They wished to protect the status of the Colegio 
Medico as the legitimate and sole representative 
of the profession. The Colegio Medico, they 
believed, could playa progressive role in the 
building of socialism. What was important was to 
win over the Colegio through the election of Left-
wing representatives to positions of power in 
its organization. With left-wing influence in the 
Colegio Medico the more moderate members of the 
profession would be won over to the Popular Unity 
position. During the first year of Popular Unity 
this struggle took place between the "moderates" 
and the "radicals" over these competing strategies. 
One of the main effects of 
this infighting was that politically nonaligned 
doctors were not attracted to the Popular Unity 
organization. In contrast, the anti-Popular Unity 
fronts which the Right wing doctors had set up 
were successfUl in recruiting these types of 
independents amongst the profession. 
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5.4 THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE RADICALS"KND THE REFORMIST 
DOCTORS:SEPTEMBER 1970-SEPTEMBER 1971. 
The split between the two Left wing 
tendencies was obvious at the Convention of Popular 
Unity doctors which was held before the Colegio 
M~dico elections in May 1971. Some 500 participants 
attended. Debates were acrimonious and the Conference 
ended with no basis of agreement between the rival 
factions. Thereafter,these doctors retreated back 
into the narrow confines of their own political 
parties. This was the first and last Convention of 
Popular Unity doctors. 
The resolutions of this Conference 
in May 1971 were widely publicised and badly 
damaged the "moderates" attempt to appease the 
medical profession and attract it towards Popular 
Unity. One of the resolutions demanded the immediate 
elimination of private medicine thus contradicting 
Popular Unity's official line which declared that 
the Servicio Unico de Salud was a distant goal of a 
future Left wing Government. Thus,the action and 
utterances of these "radicals" gravely damaged the 
"moderates" , case particularly in the eyes of 
those doctors in the political centre. 
Typical of this group of centrist 
doctors was Emilio Villarroel, President of the 
Colegio M~dico. His political behaviour mirrors the 
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response of large sections of the profession . 
Villarroel argued that the Servicio Nacional de 
Salud was inevitable and desirable. He believed 
that doctors could be in the forefront of such 
changes in health policy. However,they had to 
prove that they were able to accept this challenge. 
They needed to fulfil their obligations to the 
State sector and work the full hours they were 
contracted for in the Servicio Nacional de Salud 
hospitals. Villarroel was thus,fully in agreement 
with Popular Unity that SERMENA had led to grave 
breaches of ethics. He pointed to the case in his 
own hospital,J.J.Aguirre where although not 
contracted to treat SERMENA patients,some doctors 
had done surgical operations on SERMENA patients in 
the hours in which they were contracted to work in 
the Servicio Nacional de Salud. Thus,Villarroel 
was not a defender of thesepractices;he objected 
to them publicly and saw Popular Unity as a vehicle 
to end such malpractice through the gradual 
setting up of the Servicio Unico de Salud. 
Yet some of the more "radical" Popular 
Unity doctors saw Villarroel as an enemy. Even if 
intellectually he might be generally in agreement 
with the revolution his behaviour in practice was 
reactionary. As a Radical Party member,Villarroel 
adopted a "gradualisttl position,arguing that the 
revolution was an evolutionary process. In his 
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defence of the Colegio Medico he came into conflict 
with those revolutionary doctors who wanted to see the 
power of the Colegio smashed. 
Villarroel and those doctors who 
shared his position became the butt of fierce 
a ttacks from the young "radi cal" doctors . Attending 
the Convention of Popular Unity doctors,Villarroel 
was attacked for defending the Colegio Medico . 
Wild accusations were thrown at him. He was accused 
of sedition. Slogans were daubed on the walls of 
the hospitals where he worked denouncing him as an 
agent of American imperialism. Clearly shaken by 
these attacks,Villarroel defended himself by replying 
that he had always been a socialist. 5 But in one 
fiery debate inside the General Council of the 
Colegio Medico one Socialist consejero shouted at 
him, 
"ll~ted,~eho~ P~e~ldente,que ~e dIce 
un hom~~e de ea llnidad popuea~, yo 
no ~e donde ni como,po~que Vd. 
~Iemp~e ha ~Ido un hom~~e que en 
toda~ ea~ eucha~ poettlca~,en todo~ 
ea~ eucha~ doct~lna~la~, aqu[ y 
tue~a dee Coeeglo ~edIco ••.• ha ~Ido 
~Iemp~e unido a ea ~eaccI6n." 6 
Perhaps, not surprisingly Villarroal became a member 
of the opposition to Popular Unity. 
These collisions between these 
"radical" doctors and the centrist members of the 
profession damaged the "moderates" cause. Popular 
Unity had to win over the"Villarroels" of the 
profession in order to be successful. But as the 
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revolutionary voice grew more strident,so the chances 
of capturing the middle ground in medical politics 
receded . Men such as Villarroel were not being 
attracted to the position of the Right but were 
being pushed towards this position by the tactics of 
some elements of the Left. 
From May to September 1971,between 
the elections of the Colegio and its first Convention, 
the challenge of the "radicals" grew stronger as 
events inside the Colegio Medico illustrated the 
cementing of ties between the Right and Christian 
Democracy. The creation at the national level of an 
alliance between the Christian Democrat and National 
parties in opposition to the Popular Unity Government 
reinforced those ties. 
In June elections were held inside 
the General Council to appoint new leaders to the 
Executive Committee of the Colegio Medico. These 
elections bore all the characteristics of a pre-
arranged agreement between Christian Democrat and 
Right wing doctors to exclude all Left wing consejeros 
from positions of authority. The Executive Committee 
positions of President,Vice President, Secretary 
General and Treasurer were all won for the Right 
wing and Christian Democrat doctors by a margin of 
13 to 6. Moreover,the Left was defeated by the same 
proportion in the elections to posts in the 
Departments of the Colegio Medico as well as in the 
Popular Unity Health Commissions to which the Colegio 
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could elect representatives. 7 All these posts went to 
Christian Democrat or Right wing doctors. 
In response the Left wing consejeros 
in the General Council tried to establish a 
different system of voting which would permit some 
Left wing representation .But their proposal was 
defeated in the General Council by the now familiar 
13 to 6-~ajority. In protest at this very effective 
carve up the Popular Unity consejeros staged a walk 
out at a meeting of the General Council. As Dr. 
Rebolledo declared, 
"Tundamenia ~u voio diciendo que ea 
r , 
ap~ogaci6n de ga ponencia a) ~ign;~ca 
que ee Con~ejo ~egui~a manejado 
exceu~ivamenie po~ ea~ mayo~[a~ y 
que en e~a~ ci~cun~iancia~ no 
iienen nada que hace~ en ea ~euni6n 
y que dege~ ~eii~a~~e." 8 
The Left which had been so influential a few short 
months ago was now almost powerless within the Colegio 
Medico organization. The only concession to the 
Popular Unity doctors was a single voice on the 4 man 
editorial board of "Vida Medica",the Colegio's 
professional journal. 
The Left however,was being eclipsed in 
even more crucial areas than the General Council. The 
grass roots members of the Colegio Medico,the doctors 
in their hospitals and clinics,had in the past been 
organized into Federations. The history of these 
organizations was solidly Left wing,representing the 
views of the State medicine oriented physician as 
opposed to the private medicine oriented one. In the 
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late 60.s still with Left wing leadership, these 
Federations had become inactive. Doctors had won 
much more financial respectability with SERMENA. 
This had defused demands for higher State wages 
for which purpose the Federations had been originally 
formed. The Federations were replaced by the 
capitulos which were set up in the doctors' workplace 
to provide information on SERMENA. These were. firmly 
in the hands of the Right. 
The Left wing consejeros now began a 
rear guard action to get the Colegio Medico to 
preserve the status of the Federations and not to 
recognize these new organizations. The arguments 
they presented to several General Council meetings 
were unconvincing. It was clear to everyone that 
the doctors at the grass roots were completely 
committed to the capitulos. The Federations had had 
their day. Elections for the leadership of FEMESENAS 
(lede~aci6n de ~edico~ dee Se~vicio Nacionae de Saeud) 
were last held in 1968,and not since September 1968 
had an actual meeting of this organization taken 
place. The same was true of the other important 
Federation FEMEUCH(Tede~aci6n de ~edico~ de ea 
linive~~idad de Chiee). In this period de /acio 
recognition by the Colegio Medico of their grass 
roots' representatives went to the capitulos. 
By the end of the first year of Popular 
Unity the strains between the two tendencies inside 
the Popular Unity's doctors' organization were 
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acute. The lImoderates ll blamed the tactics of the 
lIradicals ll for creating the conditions by which they 
were faced with a solid majority against them inside 
the Colegio Medico. The lIradicals ll blamed the 
lImoderates ll for pinning their hopes both on centrist 
members of the profession inside the Colegio Medico 
and on the Colegio Medico itself as an institution. 
All the reverses,the exclusion of the Left from 
positions of power inside the Colegio Medico,as well 
as the emergence of the capitulos showed the dangers 
of trying to work with the Colegio Medico. 
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A few days before the Colegio Medico 
Convention,an attempt was made in the General Council 
to have more Left wing representatives attend the 
Convention by inviting student leaders and represent-
atives of FENATS . This motion was defeated. Without this 
additional Left wi~~ support the Popular Unity 
delegates would be in a firm minority. Elections for 
Conference delegates held in the previous month had 
resulted in Popular Unity receiving only 25% of the 
vote. Only a quarter of delegates therefore,would 
be Popular Unity supporters. The Left had hoped to 
get the Convention to reverse a General Council 
decision to preserve the Colegio's electoral system. 
Since this system did not allow for the representation 
of minority groups,it gave full control of the 
Colegio to the majority Christian Democrat/Right 
wing alliance. The Left's minority position among 
Conference delegates however would prevent it from 
changing this electoral system. Thus,for the 
militant Left wing doctors the Conference was going 
to be a complete disaster. 
Moderates hoped that they could re-
establish a dialogue with the centrist members of 
the profession at this Convention. However,the 
bitter experiences of the reversals following the 
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May elections increased the lIradicals ll resolve to 
force a split inside the profession between the Left 
and the young doctors on the one hand;and the privately 
practising doctors and their reactionary Colegio 
Medico on the other. 
5.5 THE COLEGIO MEDICO CONVENTION OF SEPTEMBER 1971 
AND THE VICTORY OF THE lIRADICALSlI 
The Colegio Medico Convention in 
September 1971 marked the victory of the t1 radical" 
Left wing doctors against their more moderate" 
colleagues .Realising that the Left was going to lose 
all the crucial votes at this conference,the "radical" 
Left resolved to disrupt proceedings by staging a 
mass walk-out of the entire Left wing delegation. 
Its tactic was to form a Sindicato 
Unico of all health workers inside the Servicio 
Nacional de Salud which would include 25-30% of 
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Chilean doctors . It proposed to pressurize the Popular 
Unity Government into ending the Colegio Medico's 
monopoly status as the sole legitimate organization 
of all doctors . It was confident that once doctors 
no longer needed to be Colegio Medico members, the 
Colegiols power would diminish~ 9 
The more moderate doctors argued that 
if the Government ceased to recognize the Colegio 
Medico as the sole representative of the medical 
profession it would have broken its promise to 
respect the constitutional guarantees it had promised 
to adhere to. Also these doctors felt that to 
emasculate the Colegio in this way would be counter-
productive. Instead of sinking into oblivion,the 
Colegio Medico would be reinvigorated by the cementing 
of ties between moderate members of the profession and 
extremist Right wing forces. Left wing doctors would 
lose once and for all a point of contact with these 
moderate doctors. However,despite their warnings, the 
more "moderate" Popular Unity doctors could not 
persuade their colleagues to carryon working within 
the Colegio Medico. 
Because the more IImo derate" doctors 
were a minority amongst Popular Unity doctors as a 
whole,a decision was taken against the wishes of 
these doctors to withdraw the entire Left delegation 
from the Conference . What appeared to the public 
to be a spontaneous act inflamed by the passions of 
the proceedings was in fact a cOOl~ taken,tactical 
decision which had culminated a process begun with the 
electoral defeat of Popular Unity in the Colegio 
Medico elections in May 1971. 
When the retiral of the Left delegation 
came abou4it_appeared almost farcical. Television 
crews, reporters and pressmen were called by the Left 
to attend the Conference just at the point of the 
retiral so as to give maximum publicity to the break 
with the Colegio Medico. The Left's delegate who was 
speaking at the appointed time began to run out of 
things to say and had to waste time pouring countless 
glasses of water until the press arrived. 
In the following days the Left wing 
doctors publicly denounced the Colegio Medico as 
being responsible for their walk out. These doctors 
claimed that the Convention had been orchestrated 
by Patria y Libertad,the ultra Right wing grouping. 
They argu~ that not only were resolutions on the 
Servicio Unico de Salud and democratization carried 
which opposed Popular Unity health policy but also 
several were openly seditious. These denied the 
right of the President of the Republic to change 
the health service. The Convention they continued, 
had given support to 4 doctors imprisoned for 
declaring an illegal strike in protest at the 
nationalization of the copper mines in El 'feniente 
and Chuquicamata where they worked. Pedro Santander, 
the Socialist Party leader of the Popular Unity 
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doctors appearing on national television to attack 
the Convention and the leaders of the Colegio Medico 
had no doubts that the Convention had been used by 
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the extreme Right to undermine the Allende Government. 10 
These charges however were grossly 
over-stated. There was no doubt as we shall see,that 
elements of the Right were plotting to overthrow 
Popular Unity by any means possible,but the majority 
of doctors at this time could righ~ly object to being 
called seditious. Moreover,the Convention did not 
totally oppose Popular Unity health policy. The 
principle of democratization was accepted and the 
Servicio Unico de Salud was approved by the 
Convention as a long term goal based on the increase 
of resources in the Servicio Nacional de Salud . The 
Convention could scarcely be declared seditious when 
some of the Left delegation, notably two consejeros 
Oscar Roman and Mario Lagos,had carried on 
participating in discussions after the other 
delegates had walked out. 
The reverberations of this Convention 
carried on long after the event. Santander was 
charged to appear before the Commission of Ethics of 
the Colegio Medico to give an account of his remarks. 
A group of oppositionljoctors held a meeting which 
attracted an audience of 500 in support of Emilio 
Vilarroel and the Colegio Medico . A counter 
demonstration was held in Fortin Prat in Valparaiso 
where Left wing doctors and medical students along 
with the representatives of FENATS and FEPRDTEC 
condemned the actions of the Colegio Medico in 
forcing the Left to walk out of the Convention . 
Tempers were enflamed after these speakers accused 
Colegio Medico leaders of neclaring that the 
working class had insufficient intelligence to 
1 1 participate in the democratization schemes. 
Meanwhile,two Left wing consejeros staged another 
walk out from a General Council meeting in protest 
at the majority's refusal to give publicity to 
resolutions which the minority Left wing delegation 
had passed at the Convention. In short,the effect 
of the Convention was to polarize forces inside the 
Colegio Medico,cutting away the area for compromise 
between the reformist Left and the moderate members 
of the profession. 
For completely different reasons,the 
Right and the "radical" Left had both been successful. 
The Right had as a result of the tactics of the Left, 
gained ground in attracting the moderates in the 
profession to its position. The Left could offer 
the further cementing of relations between Christian 
Democracy and the Right as evidence to the "moderate" 
Left for the need to replace the Colegio Medico with 
a new Socialist organization. 
For the Left as a whole,the Convention 
represented a watershed . It saw the end of attempts 
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to collaborate with the moderates inside the Colegio 
Medico and the turning away from the Colegio to new 
forms of organization. In the months after the 
Convention sizeable numbers of doctors joined 
FENATS,the health workers' union. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is one of the arguments of this 
thesis that the contradictory class position of 
the profession implied that it was not automatically 
predisposed to supporting either the Left or the 
Right. Much depended on the organizational ability 
of each political group to win over the profession 
to its position. 
Pre~isely because the Left failed 
to develop an effective political strategy,the 
uncommitted members of the profession failed to 
support Popular Unity. Instead of having one 
coherent strtagy,the Left,in effect had two totally 
contradictory ones. For a group which only numbered 
25-30% of the medical profession such a split was 
an ill-afforded luxury. 
Secondly,the dominant revolutionary 
strategy was not appropriate given that the Popular 
Unity Government was committed to respecting 
existing constitutional practices. 
Thus,the victory of the revolutionary 
strategy inside the Left wing doctors' organization 
was a pyrrhic one. The profession had been successfully 
split by the tactics of the Left .Meanwhile the Left 
gave up its attempt to win over the Colegio M~dico . 
However,the final phase of the Left's strategy,the 
formation of a Sindicato Unico was not achieved. 
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Throughout Popular Unity, the nearest this scheme came 
to fruition was a few days before the coup when its 
statutes were drawn up. 
One of the problems was that Allende 
and the "moderates" in the Government refused to work 
with any body other than the COlegio Medico. For 
them, the Colegio remained the only legitimate 
representative of the doctors. Allende's relations 
with the moderate/Christian Democrat leaders of the 
Colegio Medico were always good. After the breakdown 
of the Convention, and much to the distress of the 
"radicals",Allende re-established cordial relations 
with the Colegio assuring the leaders of his 
Government's continuing desire to work with them. 
Moreover,by implication ,he criticized the Left 
for abandoning the Convention and openly attacked 
its lack of respect ~r Emilio Villarroel,the Colegio's 
President. 
In the Left wing doctors' organization 
the revolutionaries who sought to exclude the COlegio 
Medico from the revolutionary process were dominant. 
While,on the other hand in the Government,Allende's 
strategy of recognizing it as the legitimate 
representative of the profession continued. 
After September 1971 the Left wing 
doctors stopped a ttempting to win over the Colegio 
Medico. For the remainder of Popular Unity, they were 
in a no-man's land between the Colegio Medico they 
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had deserted and the Sindicato to which they aspired. 
Their tactics had opened up the Colegio for the 
infiltration by the Right. 
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NOTES 
1. Minutes of the Cons.Gen.Col.Med. Acta N° 62. 22 de 
Septiembre 1970.Visita del H.Senador Dr.S.Allende. 
2. See the open letter of doctors supporting Popular 
Unity to the medical profession.Quoted in 'La Via 
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de la Calumna y la Violencia.' Consejo Regional -de 
Valparaiso del Colegio Medico. March 1973. According 
to interviewees "moderate" Popular Unity doctors 
drafted this letter. 
J. Ibid. 
4. 'Poli ti ca Gremial de los m edi cos de la Uni dad Popular.' 
Formulated by the Conference of Popular Unity doctors 
in May 1971.Published in Vida Medica.May 1971,pp22-25. 
5. As Villarroel stated to Ercilla,8th-14th September 1971, 
"Soy radical,socialista democratica. En 1947,fui 
fichado como comunista y borrado de los registros 
electorales. Tuve que demonstrar legalmente que pertenecia 
al mismo partido que el Presidente de la Republica. Ahora 
desdeque triunfo la Reforma Universitaria y llego la U.P. 
al Gobierno,me califican de momio." 
6. Minutes of the Cons.Gen.Col.Med. 14 de Septiembre 1971. 
Dr.Olivares,pp22-23. 
7. The results of the elections inside the General Council 
were as follows:for President ,Dr.Villarroel,11 votes, 
Dr.Lagos,5 votes,abstentions 1;for Vice President,Dr. 
Ruben Acuna,11 votes,Dr.Olivares 5 votes,abstentions 2; 
for Secretary General,Dr.Cruz Mena,12 votes,Dr.Oscar 
Roman 6 votes,abstentions 1;Treasurer Dr.S.Morales 12 
votes,Dr.V.Retamal 4 votes,abstentions 3.Results for 
the elections for the Departments of the Colegio Medico: 
President del Fondo de Solidaridad Gremial,Dr.Ruben 
Acuna 13 votes,abstentions 6;Department de Fondo de 
Solidaridad y Bienestar Dr.Ruben Acuna 12 votes, 
abstentions 7;Department fr Salud Publica,Dr.P.Silva 
12 votes,Dr.Gallo 4;Department de Trabajo M~dico Dr.S. 
Reyes 12 votes,Dr.V.Retamal 5 votes,abstentions 2; 
Department de Etica y Aranceles,Dr.J.Chiorrini 15, 
abstentions 4;Department of Perfeccionamiento 
Cientifico y Docente Dr.S.Morales 10 votes,Dr.Roman 
6,abstentions 3;Department of Relaciones Exteriores 
Dr.G.Velasco 13,abstentions 6;Department de Accion 
Gremial,Dr.G.Morales S. 12 votes,Dr.H. Rebolledo 4, 
abstentions 3. 
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8. Minutes of the Cons.Gen.Col.Med. Acta N° 7,6 de Agosto 
1 971 . 
9. The Right wing Dr.Herrera was quite sure this was 
indeed the tactic of the radical Left wing doctors. 
As he de clared, 
ItTengo la impression de que 10 que se pretende 
en el fonda es quebrar al Colegio Medico y llevar 
a un grupo de medicos a un sindicato medico, junto 
con los trabajadores de FENATS y FEPROTEC,ese es 
el fondo del problema. It 
10. IDenuncio Presidente de la C.U.T.:Patria y Libertad 
inspir~ Manejas de Convencion Medica. I La Nacion . 
5 de Septiember 1971. Santiago. 
11. Speech of Alberto Duarte, President of FEPROTEC, 
Valparaiso.14 de Septiembre 1971 . Quoted in I Itinario 
de la Calumnia y la Violencia. 1 p 57. 
Itpero esa era 10 que decian de adentro pero afuera 
cuando estaban a solas - voy a citar algunas 
frases para que las sepan,companeros- la gente 
quiere democratizacion;serla posible si estuvier-
amos en Suecia,porque los de aca,son unos natos, 
y unas ignorantes y incapaces. 1t 
C HAP T E R 6 
THE ORIGINS OF GREMIALISMO INSIDE THE 
COLEGIO MEDICO 
1 88. 
In this chapter we will examine the 
role of doctors in the opposition movement to 
Popular Unity,known as gremialismo,from the 
beginning of the Allende Government until the end 
of the gremiosl strike in October 1972. 
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6. 1 THE NATURE OF GREMIALISMO:1970-1973 
The term gremio refers to the interest 
gr~&ps,professional associations and representative 
institutions of the Chilean lower-middle,middle and 
and business classes. 
The term gremialismo was first used in 
1967 when Jaime Guzman stood as a "gremial" candidate 
in student elections at the Universidad Catolica in 
Santiago. Guzman was later to become a close advisor 
of Allessandri,the Right wing President of Chile from 
1958-64. Until then,student elections had always 
been fought on party political tickets. Guzman was the 
first student leader to stand as a so-called non-
political candidate. 
To its ideologue Guzman and to its 
supporters gremialismo was a movement of independently 
minded persons untarnished by class or political 
labels and free from manipulation by either political 
parties or the State. Its only "interest" was the 
defense of the dignity of their work. As Guzman 
described gremialismo during Popular Unity, 
eL 
"En <2. e. to ndo , <2. /.> (tg.ll.<2.m i a e. i /.>m 0 )un anh<2. e.o 
d<2. e.a pa.ll.iicipacion .Il.<2.ae. y no 
d<2.ce.a.ll.ada d<2.e. hom~.Il.<2. d<2. i.ll.a~ajo <2.n 
/.>U p.ll.opio d<2./.>iino. y digo .Il.<2.ae., 
pO.ll.qU<2. e.a e.e.amada "pa.ll.iicipaci6n" d<2. 
e.o/.> p/.>iiuao-g.ll.<2.mio/.> coni.ll.oe.ado/.> 
poe.£iicam<2.ni<2.,no <2./.> m~/.> qU<2. una ~u.ll.da 
ta.ll./.>a;una tunci6n d<2. i{i<2..Il.<2./.>,<2.n qU<2. 
muy poco/.> m .;J.v<2.n e.o/.> hie.o/.> d<2. una 
g.ll.an caniidad d<2. ma.ll.ion<2.ia/.>." 1 
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Gremialismo during Popular Unity 
however was not as independent from the political 
struggle as Guzman suggests. True,there must have 
been many supporters of gremialismo who genuinely 
found the ideology appealing and who in welcoming 
the end of political manipulation saw greater 
possibilities of satisfaction from their work. But 
gremialismo,perhaps inevitably in such a politicized 
country as Chile, was politically inspired. It was 
in fact controlled, organized and even financed by 
the Chilean bourgeoisie. 
As we now know, the movement to a large 
extent was co-ordinated and financed by a group of 
businessmen known as the "Monday Club"(so called 
because its members met almost every Monday to 
co-ordinate activities). The key members of this 
group were Hernan Cubillos later to become the 
Junta's Minister of Foreign Relations and owner of 
a firm specializing in arms deals for the Chilean 
Armed Forces pan ex-Navy officer(and commonly 
supposed to be one of the key CIA contacts in Chile) 
who managed "El Mercurio" in the absence of Edwards, 
throughout the Allende period;Emilio Sanfuentes,an 
associate of Cubillos,owner of the weekly Right 
wing "Que Pasa?" and a University of Chicago 
economics graduate;Javier Vial and Manuel Cruzat, 
later to emerge as the heads of the largest economic 
groups in Chile;Jorge Ross,leader of yet another 
economic group closely associated with Cruzat;and 
Orlando Saenz, President of the Chilean Manufacturers' 
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Association SOFOFA .2 As Sanfuentes one of the 
members of this group declared, 
"/;)R.. mR..t /l..oughe.y on a WR..R..ke.y /La.6i.6 
t/l..om thR.. midde.R.. ot 1971 onwa/l..d.6 
to pe.an thR.. mR..dia campaign, 
o/l..ganizR.. and co-o/l..dinatR.. action.6, 
pa/l..ticue.a/l..e.y ot thR.. g/l..R..mio.6 and 
to di.6t/l..i/LutR.. monR..y,much ot 
which camR.. t/l..om a/L/l..oad." 3 
The "front men" for thi s group were 
Leon Vilarin,leader of the Truckers' Union and 
President of the National Command of the Gremios 
and Raphael Cumsille,leader of the Shopkeepers. 
It was important for business that it personally 
should not be seen in the vanguard of the struggle. 
Business kept its distance in an effort to show 
that the initiative was corning from populist 
figures like Vilarin. Although men like Vilarin 
were quite genuinely opposed to the Allende 
Government,they were the led,not the leaders,of 
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gremialismo ~ which was essentially a businessman's 
organization. 
6.2 THE AIMS OF GREMIALISMO 
There was no shortage of groups 
plotting to bring down the Government. These ranged 
from P.Rodriguez's Patria y Libertad,to the President 
of the United States of America and his Foreign 
Secretary. The major difficulty was in co-ordinating 
these groups into a large civilian movement to 
encourage the Armed Forces to intervene. This was no 
mean task. As a leading businessman and a key 
organizer of the plot put it, 
"7hl2. civif.ian-b madl2. ihl2. COup:OU/l.. 
p/l..ogf.l2.m wa-b how io gl2.i ihl2. A/l..ml2.d 
10/l..cl2.-b io I2.xl2.cuil2. ii • 7h12. 
p/l..ogf.l2.m wa-b ihai ihl2. Chif.l2.an 
A/l..ml2.d 10/l..cl2.-b WI2./l..12. VI2./l..y gackwa/l..d 
pof.iiicaf.f.y- no oihl2./l.. A/l..ml2.d 
10/l..CI2.-b in Laiin Aml2./l..ica wouf.d 
havl2. af.f.owl2.d Af.f.l2.ndl2. io f.a-bi 
ih/l..12.12. yl2.a/l..-6 - and ii /l..l2.qui/l..l2.d 
a ma-b-b civif.ian movl2.ml2.ni io gl2.i 
ihl2. A/l..ml2.d 10/l..cl2.-b io aci." 4 
Thus,the task of these conspirators was to build 
a strong oppositional civilian base around the 
gremios in order to convince the Army that its 
intervention was necessary. 
Of course,this is not to say that 
these groups would not have welcomed the constitutional 
collapse of the Allende Government. The military coup 
might conceivably have been unnecessary. However,it 
is remarkable how little faith these groups had in 
constitutional mechanisms to bring down the Allende 
Government. They were all fiercely anti-Marxist 
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and believed that like any Marxist group,Popular 
Unity's promise to respect the Constitutional 
would ultimately be broken. The Marxists they 
believed wanted to establish a totalitarian state. 
Thus a p~io~i constitutional means were inadequate 
to bring down the Government. 
The Right recognizing the lack of 
constitutionals means by which to oppose Popular 
Unity substituted Chile's normal mechanism of 
opposition - political parties £or the gremios. It 
was envisaged that through the use of these extra-
constitutional forces,the Allende Government would 
be defeated. 
Doctors 
How then were doctors involved with 
this national campaign to build this civilian 
opposition base? 
6.3 "CONSPIRATORS" INSIDE THE COLEGIO MEDICO 
Social scientists often view 
conspiracy theories as over-simplistic. However, 
within the medical profession groups of doctors did 
conspire to use the Colegio Medico in alliance with 
other gremios as part of a national plan to bring 
down the Government. 
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These doctors came mainly from 
Valparaiso. They were Drs. J.Alvayay,Ernesto Mundt, 
Gonzalo Garcla and Jaime Veneziano Doctors from 
Rancagua and four doctors from Santiago,Drs. Darwin 
Arriagada,Rene Merino,Osvaldo Artaza and Raul 
Donckaster made up this cabal. 
This group shared the political aims 
of the Monday Club. Ernesto Mundt in a private letter 
argued that his task in May 1971 as a General 
Councillor was to unite with the other civilian groups 
in opposition to Salvador Allende and by so doing 
create the conditions which would force the military 
to intervene. As he wrote, 
"Tul al H.Con~ejo gene~al a t~ataja~ 
po~ la carda del ~egimen ma~xi~ta 
de Allende . en e~e ~entido ~ep~e~ent~ 
~iemp~e,tielmente,el ~enti~ de nue~t~o 
Regional. La acci6n mancomunada de 
todo~ lo~ ~ecto~e~ civile~ involuc~ado~ 
en la lucha pe~mit~6 c~ea~ el amRiente 
nece~a~io pa~a que la~ Tue~za~ A~mada~ 
die~an el pa~o que liR~o a Chile del 
~a~xi~mo Inte~nacional. Dent~o de e~ta 
accion el g~emio medico puede hon~a~~e 
de haRe~ e~tado en la~ p~ime~a~ tila~." 5 
It is interesting to note that in May 1971 J.Alvayay 
argued that opposition to the Allende Government 
shon1d be organi zed through the gremios and not 
the political parties. This was his essential message 
to doctors when he declared in early 1971, 
"el pal~ e~ta ~iendo ~ometido a un 
p~oce~o de camRio~,lo~ cuale~ no~ 
tocan como ciudadano~ y como medico~. 
Nada de lo que ocu~~a no~ e~ 
indite~ente. Hay do~ camino~:o at~ontamo~ 
la ~ituacion ai~lada y de~o~denadamente, 
Rajo la p~e~ion de impe~ativa~ pa~tida~io~ 
que ope~an tue~temente) 0 lo hacemo~ 
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coi~giadam~nt~ unido6,~6t~~chando 
tiia6,~n to~no a id~ai~6 y p~actica6 
qu~ 6i~mp~~ han con6titu[do nU~6t~o 
(Ei 9~~mio ~.dico)timt~~ d~ o~guiio •.. " 6 
There was no direct evidence to link these doctors with 
the Monday Club. However,in many ways their actions 
were so similar that is was reasonable to assume that 
such links must have existed. For example, beginning 
in 1971 like the Monday Club,the four doctors in 
Santiago met each week in the offices of the Colegio 
Medico to plan their political project. 7 One of the 
doctors Osvaldo Artaza was to become one of the main 
spokesmen of gremialismo when the movement was 
formally launched in October 1972 at the time of its 
first strike. 
Two remarkable features characterized 
these conspirators. The first was the speed in 
beginning operations ;Popular Unity had barely begun 
when doctors in Santiago were meeting on a regular 
basis to plan its downfall(early 1971) . In Valparaiso, 
doctors had organized their first assembly by 
December 1970 . By April 1971 they published their 
manifesto stressing the importance of gremial 
opposition. Mundt was a General Councillor by May 
1971 and as he proudly declared, 
"rut ae Con6~jo 9~n~~ai a t~~taja~ 
po~ ea carda d~i ~egim~n ma~xi6ta 
d~ Aee~nd~." 8 
These groups began their activities during Popular 
Unity's honeymoon period when the Christian Democrats 
were supporting President Allende and when even a 
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leading Employers' Representative J.Fontaine was 
publicly expressing his personal admiration for the 
new President. 9 All the so-called" crimes" of the 
Popular Unity Government which they declared was the 
reason for their opposition were still to take place. 
The second noticeable feature was that 
none of these conspirators had been prominent in 
gremio politics before 1970. But on the morning of 
the 11th September 1973,E.Mundt was President of the 
Colegio Medico,D.Arriagada was Treasurer,O.Artaza was 
Secretary General,R.Donakaster was Vice President, and 
J.Alvayay was President of the Regional Council of 
Valparaiso. Their climb from relative obscurity 
before Popular Unity to outright control of the Colegio 
Medico in September 1973 was truly remarkable. 
These conspirators integrated themselves 
with the Right inside the Colegio Medico and in the 
following sections we shall refer to them by this 
label. 
ClEIGIN,s ClF THE RIGHT'S STRUGGLE IN VALPARAISO 
The Right's attempts to win over the 
Colegio Medico began immediately after the electoral 
victory of Popular Unity in Valparaiso. Its first 
public demonstration occurred 3 months later, again 
in Valparaiso. This demonstration was held in 
response to a document prepared by the General Council 
of the Colegio Medico on Popular Unity's proposed 
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Servicio Unico de Salud. 
This document in general terms gave 
its approval to this planned change in the health 
service. The overwhelming majority of the 126 doctors 
attending this special assembly on December 30th 
rejected the General Council's stance on the Servicio 
Unico de Salud. The main fear expressed at this 
meeting was that the Servicio Unico de Salud would 
lead to the elimination of private medicine. As one 
of the resolutions read: 
"El p~oyeclo p~og~ehlvamenle ehlaglece 
un Se~vlclo linlco de Salud,que 
allenda a lodo la poglaclon,en to~ma 
19uallla~la,lndependienlemenle de hu 
lng~eho econ6mlco,dehapa~eclendo en 
conhecuencla lodoh lOh he~vlcloh 
medlcoh de lah dlve~hah lnhlllucioneh, 
y dando 19ual de~echo a alenclon 
lncluho a lOh g~upOh de mayo~eh 
~eCU~hOh economlcoh. 
C~eemoh,que hi glen el 
Coleglo ~edlco dele vela~ po~ da~ 
halud a la poglacl5n lo que glen 
pudle~a hace~he pe~tecllonando lo 
exlhlenle,no puede p~oplclQA y dege 
~echaza~ lodo p~oyeclo que pe~judlque 
lOh lng~ehoh de hUh ahocladoh." 10 
The Assembly agreed to repudiate the General Council 
for deciding the position of the Colegio Medico 
towards the Servicio Unico de Salud without 
counsulting its Regional Councils. 
These Valparaiso doctors' criticisms 
of the General Council extended to their own Regional 
Council of Valparaiso. The Right wing group which 
had organized the assembly tabled a vote of censure 
against its Regional Council. 
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Members of the Valparaiso Regional 
Council although objecting to the way the censure 
motion was tabled tendered their resignations. In 
the subsequent elections, the Right wing of Alvayay, 
Venezian and,Garcia were elected by an overwhelming 
majority to the Colegio Medico. The old guard of 
moderates and Radicals had been effectively forced 
out of the Regional Council of Valparaiso. 
Similarly 2 of the 3 consejeros of the 
Regional Council on the Santiago General Council 
were uncerimoniously thrown out. Gueselaga,an 
elderly Right winger was re-elected but Rios and 
Gr6ssman were replaced by 2 Right wingers,Mundt and 
Bruzzone. Rios in particular, a distinguished figure 
in gremio politics in the 50's and 60's objected to 
the way in which he had been treated. 
"nada ha .bido ma.6 de.6i{u.bionante. e 
inju.6io que conoce~ iodavta po~ 
v£a indi~ecia,.bin que nunca .6e me 
{{amado a conve~.6a~,no a exp{ica~ ..• " 11 
Alvayay,the new President of the Regional Council 
replied that someone "m~.6 li~me" was needed to 
act as its consejero. 
The old Colegio Medico doctors in the 
Regional Council of Valparaiso and ~hose in the 
General Council in Santiago objected to the very 
sudden and well organized take-over of the Colegio 
by doctors who had previously shown little interest 
in the Colegio's affairs. This Right wing group of 
Alvayay,Venezian and Mundt,had within a few short 
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months installed themselves inside the Regional 
Council. They immediately elected their own 
supporters to all Regional Council posts. They 
increased the union subscriptions in Valparaiso 
to finance a public relations officer to combat 
the anti-doctor campaign whipped up by elements of 
Popular Unity. In May they published a manifesto. 
In this way a quietly run Regional Council which 
had previously attracted little attention from 
doctors was suddenly transformed into an important 
centre of activity. The springboard for the Right 
wing's successful seizure of the Regional Council 
of Valparaiso had been formed by fear of the 
Servicio Unico de Salud ,distrust of the General 
Council in Santiago and anger at the Popular Unity's 
actions which had lowered the prestige of the 
profession. 
VALPARAISO:THE CENTRE OF RIGHT WING DOCTORS'OPERATIONS 
Why did this openly hostile response 
to Popular Unity occur so quickly in Valparaiso and 
not in other Colegio M~dico regions? 
The main reason was that Valparaiso 
harboured the most Right wing doctors in Chile. 
Firstly,the district of Valparaiso included the 
most affluent area of Chile,Vina del Mar. Most of the 
doctors in the region had their homes in Vina. Nearby 
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in their private clinics,they treated the wealthy 
of Vina and tourists,many from Argentina who 
flocked to the seaside resort in the summer season. 
Because of the considerable income they obtained 
from this work,their commitment to private practice 
was stronger and hence,their fear of Socialist 
Governments greater. 
Moreover, many of these doctors had 
retired to Vifia from their Servicio Nacional de Salud 
work in Santiago. They had therefore,already received 
all the benefits which the service had to offer them 
e.g. study grants. Thus,by threatening to extend the 
State service,Popular Unity alarmed these doctors to 
a greater degree than those who divided their time 
more evenly between public and private work. 
Also,the speed by which these doctors 
in the port responded was due to their group 
consciousness and solidarity. In Santiago doctors 
were relatively isolated in the huge hospitals of the 
capital and were thus relatively anonymous to one 
another. In contrast, in the port of Valparaiso 
doctors existed in a close knit communi ty .Geograph-
ically,they were very densely concentrated. In the 
Vina city centre hundreds of doctors' private clinics 
were located. Thus,mobilization of this group by the 
Right was much easier. 
Also,Vina produced an indiw.idual 
doctor whose immense character shaped the ferocious 
challenge of the Right. This man was Jorge Alvayay . 
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He became the most important figure in gremial 
politics throughout Popular Unity and assumed the 
leadership of the Right wing doctors throughout 
the length and breadth of Chile. Alvayay had 
ironically been a close friend of Allende(who had 
begun his medical career in Valparaiso)and had 
been a leader of the Socialist Party of the port. 
With the victory of Popular Unity he moved violently 
to the Right and turned all his ora tori€;CLI powers 
and organizational skills against Popular Unity. As 
President of the Regional Council of Valparaiso, 
Alvayay worked tirelessly and successfully to 
mobilize the Right and turn the Colegio Medico 
into an anti-Popular Unity front. 
Another reason for the strength of 
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the Right in Valparaiso was the nature of Christian 
Democracy at the port.In general the Christian Democrats' 
political orientation was more to the Right than in 
other regions. In Valparaiso, Oscar Marin,was the 
first joint Christian Democrat/National Party Deputy 
elected in 1971 during Popular Unity. Moreover, 
unlike Santiago the Christian Democrats were in a 
minority to the Right inside the Colegio Medico. 
Finally,Valparaiso was Chile's main 
port and the Navy had its base there. The Marines 
were the most Right wing of the Services;some of 
Popular Uni ty believed that while .they could 
neutralize the threat posed to their Government 
from the Army and the Air Force,the Navy would 
remain an intractable problem. In such a small 
community as Vina,most doctors had either friends 
or relations serving as Marine officers. Moreover, 
doctors and Navy officers were in permanent contact 
with each other in the Navy hospital in Valparaiso. 
For all these reasons,Valparaiso 
evolved as the Right wing doctors' headquarters. 
6.6 ORGANIZATION AND INITIAL STRATEGY OF RIGHT WING 
DOCTORS IN VALPARAISO 
The Right's immediate aim was to reduce 
the Left wing's effectiveness in the district of 
Valparaiso. The problem was not simply to win control 
but to maintain it. Thus,the opposition doctors 
formed a highly effective organization which operated 
behind the formal structure of the Regional Council. 12 
They created a central committee of 10 doctors. Each 
of these individuals was President of another 
committee of 5 doctors. Thus,at every election they 
cou~d assign so many votes to each of their candidates, 
preventing any dispersal which could let in a Popular 
Unity candidate. Moreover, before each election,every 
voter had been canvassed to determine his vote, 
Thus,even before theBlection took place,they knew how 
many votes their candidate would win by.13 This was 
a good example of the thoroughness of these Right 
wing organizers. 
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Alvayay realised the need to mobilise 
doctors behind his ideas. Thus,4 Departments were 
added to the Regional Council. This -involved more 
doctors in the work of the Colegio. Moreover,Alvayay 
staged doctors' assemblies in local hospitals. At these 
doctors could take decisions that were binding on 
their Regional Council,as well as being given inform-
ation on the latest Popular Unity outrage towards the 
profession. The doctors in Vina and Valparaiso were 
the most informed in Chile during Popular Unity. 
These assemblies needed a more 
regular and formal structure. Thus,to cement the link 
between the Regional Council and the doctors in the 
hospitals(a link which had only existed haphazardly 
in the past)Alvayay had the idea of forming local 
hospital chapters (capitulos) . The capitulos were 
democractically elected by the doctors in each hospital. 
Capitulo representatives regularly attended 
meetings of the Regional Council. The Regional Council, 
in turn, sent matters to be discussed to these capitulos 
to find out the consensus view of all doctors in the 
area and thus,determine the position of the Regional 
Council. The Regional Council of Valparaiso could 
never be faulted for its lack of democracy during 
Popular Unity. 
The capitulos in this region defended 
their members against verbal and physical attacks 
by other health workers. After such occurrences they 
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published condemnations in the press as well as 
sending details to other capitulos. They organized 
doctors at times of Colegio Medico strikes so as to 
ensure maximum support. Through this network Alvayay 
could take the pulse of all the doctors of the region 
ensuring that his strategy was in tune with the mood 
of the doctors. 
Moreover,Alvayay suggested to Artaza, 
Arriagada,Mundt and Donckaster in Santiago that 
capitulos could be used to put pressure on the old 
style consejeros in Santiago to act more belligerently 
against Popular Unity.14 Throughout 1971,the Santiago 
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conspirators set about organizing the capitulos and like 
their colleagues in Valparaiso drew up lists of all 
the doctors in the capital(over 4,000)to establish 
their political positions. 
However} in the first year of Popular 
Unity, the Right could not take over the General Council 
as it had done in Valparaiso. Men such as Villarroel 
and Acuna, President and Vice President respectively 
could not be disposed of easily. The Right understood 
the danger of alienating them and their supporters. 
It therefore hoped to use them as front men while 
holding the real power in the new doctors' organizations. 
Aside from setting in motion the 
capitulo movement in Santiago and Valparaiso,Alvayay 
established links with other Regional Councils, 
particularly Rancagua. The Valparaiso and Rancagua 
Regional Councils and the e.mbryo capitulo movement 
were to steadily gain in power and reach their 
height at the time of the coup. 
The Right's organizational base 
underpinned the waging of a shrewd campaign to 
attract doctors to its position. This campaign 
through exploiting doctors' fears about the Servicio 
Unico de Salud and the end of their private practices 
was highly successful. It was the only group quite 
openly to discuss the need to protect doctors' private 
practices. The Christian. Democrats were too timid to 
openly come out and defend doctors' privileges in 
this way. But the Right in its manifesto which was 
prepared for the Colegio Medico Convention of September 
1971,argued that without the economic independence of 
private practices it could have no political 
independence: 
"RQducldo~ a la Qxclu~lvldad dQ 
tunclona~lo~anlco~ dQl [~tado 
(T.ll.[.),~l la~ ~Qgla~ dQl 
jUQgo dQjan dQ ~Q~ dQmoc~atlca~ 
y tQnQmo~ un ColQglo ~edlco 
Qnt~Qgul~ta y capltulado~, 
PQ~dQ~Qmo~ Ql "HagQa~AnlmaQ· 
Ql dQ~Qcho a dl~ponQ~ dQ nUQ~t~a 
alma,a PQn~a~ llg~QmQntQ Qn 
to~ma plu~all~ta:llQga~Qmo~ a la 
Q~clavltud mQntal." 15 
Thus,as early as 8 months after the 
election of Popular Unity, the Right inside the Colegio 
Medico had recovered from its initial setbacks and 
was beginning a campaign to align the Colegio with 
other gremios opposed to Popular Unity. 
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Nonetheless,the Right was still well 
short of total control of the doctors' gremio. The 
Colegio Medico and the General Council in particular 
were still in the hands of the centrists and Christian 
Democrats. Doctors such as Villarroel,Silva and Acuna 
while infuriated at the tactics of the Left wing 
doctors ,were still unwilling to join the Right in a 
whole hearted campaign against the new Government . 
Moreover,while these men were politically active, 
there was a stubborn belief that the role of the 
Colegio was gremial i.e. that the political task the 
Right had set for the Colegio was inappropriate for 
an organization exclusively concerned with matters 
pertaining to the profession of doctors. It was this 
"gremialist " position that the Right was to attack 
during the Popular Unity years and beyond. 
6.7 FRESIA AND THE BATTLE FOR A NATIONAL DOCTORS'STRIKE 
On the 4th of April 1972, a Dr. A. 
Casals who worked in the hospital of Fresia in the 
south of Chile was attacked and severely injured 
by a group of peasants. Almost a fortnight later, 
this event burst into the headlines in Santiago and 
Valparaiso. The Right used this incident to declare 
the first strike against Popular Unity. It argued 
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that the attack was the result of the anti-medico 
campaign orchestrated by Popular Unity. The strike 
was confined to Valparaiso and lasted for a day. 
This action followed similar attempts 
by Valparaiso to escalate the protest against Popular 
Unity. As early as December 1971 following an attack 
on a doctor in the district,discussions took place 
inside the Regional Council to determine whether the 
time was ripe to call a strike. But the Christian 
Democrats were reluctant. As Dr. Ascorra ~rgued, 
"[l Colegio ~~dico no puede e~ia~ 
p~opiciando una huelga y que 
deRe e~pe~a~~e que eo~ cap£iulo~ 
e~i~ncon~iiiuid~~~ pa~a que ello~ 
iomen lo~ acue~do~ que co~~e~pondan." 16 
Privately some consejeros recognized that the doctors 
who had been attacked had behaved arrogantly towards 
their patients and hence had got what they had 
deserved. The real reason however,why the Right had 
stopped short of calling a strike then was that it 
was the height of the summer season and many doctors 
were away on holiday. 
Prior to the Fresia strike,the Right 
had suffered reverses inside the General Council. It 
was true that the September Convention had been a 
resounding success for the Right but it had failed 
to bring out the Colegio Medico in direct opposition 
to Popular Unity's health policies. For instance,the 
Right wing consejeros in the General Council argued 
that it was illegal to amend the legislation passed 
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in 1968 to democratise the Servicio Nacional de 
Salud and the Colegio Medico therefore should not 
participate in Government Health Commissions to 
discuss Popular Unity's health schemes. But Silva, 
one of the leading Christian Democrat consejeros 
replied that it was perfectly legal and that doctors 
had a duty to participate. The Right's subsequent 
motion that the Colegio should not participate was 
defeated by 8 v.otes to 5 with the Christian Democrats 
joining with the Left. On the subject of democratization 
the Christian Democrats who themselves had introduced 
similar schemes in 1968 were closer to the Left than 
to the Right. 
Moreover,the Right failed to obtain 
Colegio Medico support for ANSCO (A~ociacion Nacionae 
SU8e~vi~o~e~ dee CoR~e) which formed the first Front 
against Popular Unity in May 1971. This white collar 
group organized a strike at the mines of Chuquicamata 
in protest at the appointment of Popular Unity 
officials. Fourteen of these supervisors were arrested 
including 3 doctors. The Regional Council of 
Valparaiso supported the action of these doctors and 
the supervisors in general. It wanted the General 
Council to appeal to the Government to have these 
doctors reinstated and to condemn Popular Unity for 
its abuse of professional workers. But the Christian 
Democrats refused,arguing that it was wrong for a 
professional college to criticize a Government for 
simply abiding by the law. 
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Thus,the strike action was also an 
attempt by the Right to persuade the Christian 
Democrats in the General Council that their position 
of dialogue and compromise with the Government was 
losing support amongst the majority of the profession. 
These attempts however,were largely unsuccessful. The 
Christian Democrats opposed the Regional Council of 
Valparaiso's strike action. As one of their members 
said, 
"7odo-1 f.O-1 ani€.c€..d€.ni€.-1 qu€. ha 
~€.ciRido €.f. Con-1€.jo,ianio d€.f. 
Con-1€.jo R€.gionaf. Pu€.~io ~onii, 
como d€.f. D~.Lago-1 y d€. f..a-1 
auio~idad€'-1 d€. -1af.ud,-1on 
coincid€.ni€.-1;iodo-1 dic€.n qu€. 
f..O-1 h€.cho-1 €.xi-1ii€.~on y qu€. 
no f.€.-1 d€.R€. admi~a~ qu€. la-1 
!a-1€.-1 medica-1 ~€.accion€.~ como 
€.-1ian ~€.accionando €.n €.-1i€. 
mom€.nio ." 17 
The majority of the General Council realised that the 
strike was political and would not contemplate the 
request of the Valparaiso consejeros on the General 
Council to make the strike national. Some Christian 
Democrat consejeros supported the Popular Unity 
Government's handling of the affair arguing that the 
authorities had not been slow to take action against 
those responsible for the assault. As Silva declared, 
"Ef.. a-1unio ha €.-1iado Ri€.n di~igido 
y €.-1iima qu€. f.a ~€.-1pu€'-1ia d€. f.a-1 
auio~idad€.-1,-1i Ri€.n han i€.nido 
d€.i€.~minado-1_diticuf.iad€'-1 ini€.~na-1, 
€.-1 qu€. -1€. han oRi€.nido ~€.-1uf..iad~-1 
y c~€.€. qu€. €.f.. Con-1€.jo 9€.n€.~af.. a-1£ 
d€.R€. manit€'-1ia~f.o a f.O-1 medico-1." 18 
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The Christian Democrats were also 
furious that Valpariaso had taken this action without 
first consulting the General Council. As Silva 
argued,it was the General Council's reponsibility to 
take the lead in gremial affairs . He noted that 
Valparaiso's declaration implied criticism of the 
General Council and he warned of the danger to gremial 
unity when the General Council and a Regional Council 
mistrusted each other. As Silva said, 
"[l Colegio ~~dico tiene la ~e~pon~a!ilidad 
de conduci~ g~emialmente a toda ga 6~den 
m ~di ca, no ~e puede pe~miti~ qu~ algun 
o~gani~mo de !a~e,o Con~ejo Hegional en 
un momento coloque ol Con~ejo qene~al en 
~ituacione~ que lo o!liguen a toma~ un 
camino dete~minado y que,lo p~e~ione a 
actua~ en dete~minado ~entido . No hay 
niguna duda que en la decla~aci6n de 
Valpa~a[~oi~ta imp l[ cita una c~[ti ca 
impo~tante a la~ auto~idade~ del Con~ejo 
qene~al y c~ee que,no e~ el momento de 
e~ta~ polemizando pu!licamente ni toma~ 
actitude~ que p~oduzcan una quie!~a de 
unidad g~emial." 19 
The Regional Council of Santiago,under 
pressure from its capitulos led by Artaza,Arriagada, 
Merino and Donckaster announced a 24 hour strike on 
9th May. All the Popular Unity workers mobilized 
themselves in readiness,but 24bours before it was 
due to take place,the Regional Council postponed it. 
It realised that there was insufficient support for 
the strike amongst the profession. 
The Right's action in Valparaiso was 
a failure. Nonetheless,its strike had given it good 
practice;the difficulties involved in calling a 
strike were now apparent. The aim of the strike -
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to create confusion and chaos had only been partly 
realised despite 70% of doctors supporting it. 
Popular Unity doctors had increased their workload 
to cover for striking colleagues. Moreover, in an 
effort to retain public sympathy, striking doctors 
kept emergency services running normally. The 
standard of hospital service therefore offered during 
the strike was similar to that provided at weekends 
or on holidays. Moreover,the difficulty involved in 
launching strike actions in other Regions of Chile 
became apparent. In remote Regions, information of 
events in Santiago and Valparaiso was sparse. Finally, 
many of the doctors who had not gone out on strike had 
not done so through support for Popular Unity but 
rather,for ethical reasons. The Right realised that 
these problems would have to be solved in order to 
make its next strike action more effective. 
Furthermore,hatred towards the Popular 
Unity doctors who had refused to join the mov.ement 
increased after the strike. This was the start of 
the witch-hunt of Unidad Popular doctors which reached 
its height after the coup. On 17th May 1972,Alvayay 
wrote to the 9 capitulo Presidents asking them to 
urgently supply the names of those who had not 
obeyed the order to strike so that these might be 
published in the press and the magazine of the 
20 Regional Council of Valparaiso. 
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6.8 PREPARATIONS WITHIN THE COLEGIO MEDICO FOR THE FIRST 
STRIKE OF THE GREMIOS 
At the national level moves were afoot 
from the end of the Chilean summer in March 1972,to 
organize the first gremial confrontation with the 
Government. An important meeting took place on 4th 
March 1972 in the province of Chiluhue which the 
Right wing press called the "complot del pa~tel de 
choclo" .At this meeting 33 leading opposition 
figures were invited including Orlando Saenz and 
Domingo Arteaga of SOFOFA,Jorge Fontaine,President 
of the Confederacion de la Producion y del Commercio, 
representative of the Christian Democrat and National 
Parties and journalists such as Jaime Guzman and 
Julio Filippi. At the end of this meeting they 
released the following statement, 
"!Vue~tl7..o l;.Jd-el7..tad,nue~tl7..a democl7..acia 
y lo~ del7..echo~ humano~ e~tan 
~el7..iamente amenazado~ - tiene la 
ogligacion de actual7.. ante e~ta 
~ituacion,no cage la cogal7..dta ni 
el de~aliento. [~ la hOl7..a de la 
accion. II 21 
It was widely believed by the Left 
that this meeting decided to begin a national 
movement of all the gremios which would culminate 
in a general strike in September. It was however 
doubtful at this stage that even the Right wing of 
Christian Democracy was fully in favour of this 
form of direct action. Their position,at least until 
their failure in the March elections of 1973,was to 
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remove Allende through consti tutional means. However, 
for the Right pushing for this "movimienlo de ma~a~ 
de ea ~u~gue~ia", Christian Democrat acquiesence 
was essential because this party,unlike the National 
Party had support among the lower middle class and 
the working class. If this gremial action was to be 
effective it needed these groups to stop work as 
well. This March meeting probably represented an 
attempt by the "g~emio~ f2al~onaee~" to bring the 
Christian Democrats to their side. 
Whether the decision to launch the 
gremial movement was actually taken in March or 
not was irrelevant. A decision was taken and from 
March 1972 onwards Chile was alive with rumours of 
Right wing direct action in order to trigger the 
military coup. 
Attempts by the Right to align the Colegio Medico 
with the planned gremios' strike 
The Right's actions in the period from 
Fresia until the strike was eventually called in 
October had one common purpose:to prepare the Colegio 
Medico to join the strike whenever it was called. 
The Regional Council of Valparaiso 
took the lead inside the Colegio Medico in preparing 
itself for the gremios' strike. First it set about 
establishing excellent links with the local press, 
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radio and television in a clear move to give its 
future strike action maximum publicity in the 
port. It also began to cement links between itself 
and the other health gremios in order to bring 
them out.in symDathy in any future strike 
action. This was the logic behind an official 
Act of Constitution signed on 7th June between the 
Colegio Medico of Valparaiso and the professional 
22 Associations of Chemists and Dentists at the port. 
The Valparaiso group held several 
meetings with its co-conspirators in the Club Naval 
at Vina del Mar. This group included the Santiago 
doctors, several doctors from Rancagua and the 
Valparaiso group itself. They were.also known to 
spend weekends together in a holiday resort in the 
mountains above Santiago in order to carryon their 
d o ° f t to 23 lSCUSSlon 0 ac lCS. 
The major theme of these discussions 
was the problem of the Christian Democrats,Radicals 
and moderates inside the Colegio Medico and in 
particular,inside the General Council. These groups 
had been reluctant to call a national strike at the 
time of Fresia and when a decision to call a gremio 
strike was eventually taken, their loyalty would be 
in question. 
In order to try and weaken the 
influence of this moderate group inside the Colegio 
Medico,the Right proposed that the Colegio be 
215. 
216. 
restructured to allow the Regional Councils to have a 
greater say in the running of the gremio. The Right, 
believing that its suppport lay in the Regions,repeatedly 
called for conferences of the Regional Councils to take 
over the role of the General Council. The Right's tactic 
in calling for these special conferences was to bypass 
the inevitable objections of the moderate majority of 
the General Council to its call for a national doctors' 
strike. 
By far the Right's most ambitious 
tactic to transform the Colegio into an effective 
strike weapon was Alvayay's proposal to change the Colegio 
M~dico's Code of Ethics. He suggested that the Code 
should include the principle of flGremial Crimefl which 
meant that if a doctor refused to obey a decision of the 
Colegio M~dico,for example an instruction to go on strike, 
he could be legally punished by the Colegio under its 
Code of Ethics. It must be remembered that one of the 
difficulties Alvayay had encountered in the Fresia strike 
was a lack of response from doctors who for ethical 
reasons had refused to stop working. Alvayay planned that 
this change in the Code of Ethics would maximize gremial 
unity by forcing these doctors to obey a Colegio M~dico 
decision to go on strike. 
However,while the Regional Councillors 
of Valparaiso were very obviously on flstrike alertfl during 
this period, the General Council and the leadership of 
the Colegio had no strike plans They refused 
to implement at a national level the strike 
preparations under way at a regional level in 
Valparaiso. Alvayay's proposal that the Deliio 
9~emial be added to the Code of Ethics was not 
implemented in this period. Power remained very 
firmly in the hands of the General Council and 
was not devolved to the Regions. Thus,any strike 
decision would have to be passed through the 
normal Colegio Medico channels. 
In fact,to the horror of the Right 
the leadership of the Colegio was actually improving 
its relations with Popular Unity and especially with 
Salvador Allende. After one meeting with Allende, 
R.Acuna the Vice President of the Colegio Medico and 
a Christian Democrat de~lared to the General Council, 
"A m[ me impacia~on mucho de la~ 
co~a~ que dijo el Docio~ Allende. 
Yo c~eo que el D~. Allende e~ una 
pe~~ona de la cual no podemo~ 
e~ia~ dudando en at~oluio de ~u 
~eciiiud ni de ~u aciiiud." 24 
This drew Mundt ,the Valparaiso Representative in the 
General Council to contradict Acuna, 
"C~eo que el g~e.mio medicQ. e~ta.. 
p~otundamenie de~ilu~ionado del 
Seiio~ P~e~idenie de la Reputlica!" 25 
When the Right proposed in the General Council that 
the Colegio Medico should be ready to declare a 
strike,the majority of Radicals,Christian Democrats 
and Left wing consejeros on the Council rejected the 
proposal. In agreement with Villarroel the President 
of the Colegio Medico,Acuna declared, 
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"He ~ido ~iemp~e pa~tida~io de la 
l[nea ~eguida po~ el 'P~e~ idente 
actual del Colegio,e~ deci~ enemigo 
pe~manente de i~ a todo tipo de pa~o 
o hue l 9 a. " 2 6 
Silva argued that a strike was not the best method of 
obtaining Government support for the profession. He 
argued that a strike would not lead to "cola~o~acion 
po~itiva" between the Colegio M~dico and the Government. 
As Silva declared to the General Council,it was wrong 
to believe that a strike would do the profession any 
good since it was impossible to imagine that through 
strike action one can 
"a~~incona~ a un qo~ie~no pa~a 
o~liga~lo a actua~ po~que e~ta 
a~~inconado." 27 
Thus,while allover the country and in Santiago 
especially the gremios were expected to begin strike 
action against the Allende Government ,in one gremio 
at least there was clear opposition to this project. 
The attitude of these Christian 
Democrats like Silva and Acuna in wanting to negotiate 
with the Government angered the Right who warned them 
that they were out of touch with the mood of the 
profession. The profession,it argued was thoroughly 
dissatisfied with the Allende Government and if the 
General Council did not act, the Regional Council 
would be forced to take unilateral action. 28 
When the gremios' strike was 
eventually called this Right wing forcast proved to 
be correct. 
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6.9 THE OCTOBER MOVEMENT 
The strike of gremialismo began in 
October and not September as supposedly plannned . 
Allende's retirement of General Canales in September, 
widely seen as the leader of any military coup within 
the Army was the principal reason for this delay. Also 
a huge demonstration of popular support for the 
Popular Unity Government on 3rd September in Santiago 
caused the organizers of gremialismo to have further 
doubts about the appropriateness of a September 
strike. 
The incident which eventually 
triggered off the movement was barely worth reporting. 
The Government announced a plan to nationalize road 
transport in the small and remote region of Aisen. 
Thi s in ten tion was defini tely no t part of any wider 
plan to nationalize transport throughout the country; 
nevertheless it provoked a local truckers' strike on 
October 1st which by the 19th had led to a total 
national strike. It was clear at this stage that the 
gremial movement was using this local insignificant 
incident as the platform from which to launch its 
strike action. Several gremialismo leaders made 
announcements calling for civil resistance. Jorge 
Fontaine called for, 
"un g~an comando de la lite~tad 
que integ~a~fa a todo~ lo~ 
g~emio~." 29 
219. 
6. 10 
The Popular Unity Government was now 
facing a huge crisis. Geographically a vast country, 
Chile depended on its road transport to maintain 
the distribution of essential supplies. The spirit 
of crisis was reflected in violent street disorder. 
In the face of this challenge the Government 
declared a State of Emergency and,under special 
powers arrested the Truckers' leaders including 
Leon Vilarln. 
The Government's arrest of Vilarin was 
a mistake. It allowed the tlfront linetl gremios like 
SOFOFA,Camara de Comercio,Camara de la Construcion 
and La Confederaci6n Nacional de la Produci6n,the 
Gremios Patronales,to declare strikes in sympathy 
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with the arrested Truckdrivers' leaders. This launched 
a further wave of anti-Government street demonstrations 
which now also included the arson of any small 
businesses and firms which had not joined the strike. 
The Government's response was to declare States of 
Emmergency in 13 provinces and to close non-Government 
radi 0 s ta ti on s . 
THE DECLARATION OF A NATIONAL COLEGIO MEDICO STRIKE 
After the strike Alvayay complained 
that the Colegio Medico had lacked any central 
leadership . As he said, 
"e~ Co~eqio ~edico de Chi~e tenIa 
~o~o apa~iencia~ de ve~teR~acion 
naciona~. Ta~taRan deticione~ 
doctnina~ia~ y p~actica~ pa~a 
cu~tiva~ un q~emia~i~mo que hacta 
aqua po~ mucho~ to~ado~. 7ampoco 
tentamo~ un ~ide~azqo cent~a~ .•... n 30 
In fact the Colegio M~dico's strike was really."a 
strike of the Regional Councils especially Valparaiso. 
It was they who had forced the General Council and 
the leadership of the Colegio M~dico to make the 
strike national. 
Not surprisingly the doctors' strike 
movement began in Valparaiso. A group of Valparaiso 
doctors calling themselves, La Union de M~dicas 
Democraticas declared a strike of its private medical 
work on 14th October. Two days later,the Regional 
Council of Valparaiso after receiving a petition from 
250 local doctors declared an indefinite strike of 
all its activities with the exception of the emmergency 
services. 
The Regional Council of Santiago under 
intense pressure from its capitulos and their leaders 
like Arriagada and Artaza followed suit by calling a . 
strike of doctors in the capital. 
Finally,more than a week after the 
Valparaiso doctors had begun their action,the General 
Council met to discuss the strike. At this meeting 
it was agreed by a narrow majority to call a national 
strike. Of the 12 Regional Councils of the Colegio 
M~dico,7 had voted in favour and 5 against. 
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It could be argued that without the 
insistence of the Regional Council of Valparaiso and 
the capitulos of Santiago,i.e. the groups which were 
trying desperately to align the Colegio Medico with 
the gremios in a total stoppage, that the Colegio 
Medico strike would never have been called. 
6.11 DOCTORS'SUPPORT FOR THE STRIKE 
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The General Council's indecision 
reflected a rather surprising lack of support among 
doctors for the plan of the Gremios Patronales. There 
is no doubting the huge support among the profession 
in Valparaiso for the strike. The Regional Council of 
the port had claimed that 85% of doctors in its 
district had stopped work. No conspiracy,it would 
seem was needed here. 
However in Santiago and other Regions 
support for the strike was not as strong as in 
Valparaiso. The Regional Council of Santiago had 
tried to conduct a poll of the doctors in its jurisdict-
ion to measure support for a possible strike. Out of a 
total of 2,815 doctors only 1,295 actually voted which 
in itself showed a lack of support. Out of this 
1,295 only 805 voted in favour of the strike;142 said 
that they would strike but with certain misgivings 
while 355 doctors opposed the strike altogether. The 
Minister of Health declared that only one third of 
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doctors in Santiago actually stopped work. This figure 
was no doubt minimized in order to play down the 
effect of the doctors1 action. However,it was widely 
agreed that only half the doctors in Santiago were 
on strike in October. Moreover,in some hospitals in 
Santiago such as Barros Luco and San Borja,the more 
Left wing hospitals, striking doctors were in a minority. 
And in the Hospital Psquiatricoin Santiago,always 
renowned for its Left wing medical staff,no doctors 
were reported on strike. 
In the other major city of Chile-
Concepcion,the same lack of response was evident amongst 
doctors. According to a poll carried out by the Regional 
Council of Concepcion doctors were evenly divided on 
strike action . The Regional Council eventually 
declared a strike when the General Council!s strike 
order arrived. 
In the provinces support for the strike 
was even less than in the cities. This was not 
terribly significant because many of the Regional 
Councils such as Punto Arenas only had a few hundred 
doctors. Nonetheless, in the polls carried out by 
these Regional Councils,the vast majority of doctors 
in Antofagasta,Valdivia, Puerto Montt and La Serena, 
all voted against the strike. In these provinces 
even when the majority of doctors did agree to strike, 
few actually did so. It has to be remembered that 
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many hospitals in the provinces were cottage hospitals 
with a medical staff of only one or two doctors at 
most. If these doctors had stopped working there was 
no-one to treat the patients .Also doctors in these 
types of hospitals were much more visible to their 
patients because there were so few of them . As one 
doctor said, 
"Docto~~ in the tig ho~pital~ could 
go on ~t~ike without thei~ patient~ 
knowing,tut in the p~ovince~ 
~t~iking docto~~ could not hide 
thii~ action t~om thei~ patient~." 31 
Rather than face their patients! wrath doctors in the 
provinces tended to carryon working. 
EL PLIEGO DE CHILE 
On 22nd October during the strikes,a 
National Command of the Gremios was formed. This 
represented the realisation of the plans hatched in 
early 1971. But,in terms of attracting genuine 
professional support,the comando was a failure. The 
Comando Nacional de Defensa Gremial was formed before 
the Colegio Medico had actually decided on whether to 
join the national strike. Indeed,no professional 
college supported the Comando. Thus, while all the 
business gremios such as the Camara Central de 
Commercio Chileno and the Confederaci5n Nacional de la 
Producion e Commercio gave their support,the other full 
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batallions of the Colegios Profesionales were notice~able 
only for their absence. True a group called Profesionales 
en Conflicto and a Frente Nacional de Profesionales 
(which the Valparaiso Union de Medicos Democraticas 
had supported)were listed as members of the Comando, 
but this had very little support from professionals as 
a whole. The fact that no Colegio Profesional came out 
and publicly declared its support for the National 
Command was a considerable setback for the gremial 
movement. 
Two days after its formation,the Comando 
announced then Plight of Chile l! This was a document 
listing 28 points which the Government would have to 
agree to accept to make the gremios call off the strike. 
Many of the demands challenged the Governmentls right to 
extend the State sector of the economy. Allende refused 
to meet the Comando's representatives to discuss this 
document arguing that the Pliegols demands were political. 
THE DIVISION INSIDE THE COLEGIO MEDICO DURING THE STRIKE 
As the strike developed it became clear 
that the Right's aim of creating chaos in the health 
service in order to bring in the Armed Forces was not 
being supported by all doctors on strike. The moderate 
doctors' aims were much less ambitious. They had,as we 
have seen,only agreed reluctantly to calla strike. 
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Now out on strike, they were determined that their 
action should not be interpreted as having political 
overtones. Villarroel,the President,refused to have 
the Pliego de Chile discussed at any Colegio Medico 
strike meeting because of the political demands of 
this document . In general the Radicals and the 
Christian Democrats argued that their strike was 
lItruly 1Sremialll. It represented a protest at the 
infringements of gremial liberties daused by the 
" Government's arrest of Leon Vilarin . 
Because its protest was more symbolic 
than political the leadership of the Colegio Medico 
had not declared an indefinite strike. Unlike the 
Regional Council of Valparaiso it was not trying to 
push Chile into chaos and anarchy. During the strike 
it was perfectly willing to negotiate with the 
President of the Republic at any time in order to end 
the conflict. For example,at a meeting of the seven 
professional colleges -out on strike,a motion was 
debated whether to allow Allende to act as mediator. 
The motion was narrowly defeated by 4 votes to 3. 
Among the 3 professions supporting the motion was the 
Colegio Medico. 
In contrast to the General Council, the 
Regional Council of Valparaiso's aims were political. 
It drew up its awn ultimatum to Allende which was 
even more extreme than the actual Pliego de Chile. 
In this,it listed the conditions to be fulfilled 
before it could suspend its protest. These 
227. 
conditions called for the maintenance of the State of 
[mergency(because this gave the Armed Forces the 
role of protectors of public order); the halting of 
all agricultural expropriations; the reorganization of 
industry through the appointment by the relevant 
professional colleges of suitable technical staff; 
a replacement for the present Minister of Industry; 
and no further nationalizations. Finally, the 
ultimatum demanded that a plebiscite should be 
held before the elections in March to give Chileans 
the chance to vote on the llChilean Road to SocialismlT.32 
At the last moment this 
ultimatum was not published. If it had been published 
the Colegio Medico would have probably denied that 
these aims were in line with the Colegio's policy. 
Moreover, this would have given the impression of a 
disunited Colegio Medico, something which the leaders 
of gremialismo were trying to avoid. 
During the strike a dispute 
arose between the llpoliticos ll and the llgremialistas ll 
over how the strike should -be conducted. The 
Right saw the strike was having a minimal effect 
on the health service. As one of its adherents 
said, there was a need to 
"Cl1.eal1. una (Mehion 0icot.ogica en 
la po!laci6n y l1.ompel1. el equil-
iRl1.io que aciualmenie exihie 
at. dal1.1e el Yo!iel1.no vihOh 
de1l.ol1.mat.idad a nuehil1.o movimienio". 3 3 
To .this end the Right proposed to wi thdraw medical 
coverage in the emergency services.This was not quite as 
6. 14 
drastic as it appeared. The aim was principally to 
force strike breaking doctors to leave the non-
emergency cases and treat patients in the casuality 
services and intensive care units. Nonetheless,it 
was too extreme for the moderate doctors who rejected 
the suggestion out of hand. Thus,the efforts of those 
doctors who wanted the health services to fall into 
chaos and thus force the military to intervene were 
blocked. In a final desperate bid the doctors in 
Valparaiso agreed to stage a total medical stoppage, 
including the emergency services on 7th November. 
However by 5th November the national strikes had 
been called off,thus preventing the Regional Council 
of Valparaiso from declaring its all-out strike. 
THE FAILURE OF THE DOCTORS' STRIKE AND THE FAILURE 
OF GREMIALISMO 
The Right wing doctors had failed to 
inflict total chaos through their strikes. Their 
action had caused the health authorities few major 
problems. No patients were evacuated nor were 
refused treatment because of a lack of medical 
personnel. Laboratory· and X Ray tests were carried 
out normally. Treatment given to patients was 
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similar to that provided at weekends or at holiday 
times. Two reasons explain why the authorities were 
able to maintain a relatively normal service during 
the strike. 
First, a substantial number of 
doctors carried on working. By increasing their 
working day,they quite easily managed to cover for 
their striking colleagues. Secondly,the other members 
of the health team - nurses,auxiliaries and white 
collar staff,who had not joined the strike in any 
substantial numbers,together with final year medical 
students organized themselves efficiently to fill the 
" 
gaps caused by the missing doctors. 
But the Right!s main failure was that 
despite all its efforts,it had still not succeeded in 
obtaining massive doctors! support for gremialismo. 
In a meeting of Presidents of the Regional Councils 
of the Colegio Medico to discuss how the strike had 
been conducted,J.Alvayay declared that the Colegio 
Medico had failed to appreciate the need to join 
gremialismo. As he said, 
"C~ee que de~de hace iiempo no no~ 
\ e~iamo~ eniendiendo fd-ien, po~que 
Gno hemo~ hecho un e~tue~zo ~e~io 
pa~a diagno~iica~ €a coyuniu~a 
hi~ib~ica que vive e€ pat~ i) tin 
de ~iiua~ en e€€a a€ Co€egio 
~edico y €a Sa€ud Pufd-€ica pa~a 
, ~. . n " ~aca~ una p~ac~~ca g~em~a~. 34 
Moreover,Allende had managed to end the strike without 
having his Government overturned by a military coup. 
Allende had dissolved his Cabinet and appointed 3 
military generals,one of them the Commander in Chief 
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of the Military,General Prats ,as their replacements. 
The gremial movement declared this to be a great 
triumph. It was certainly true that the opposition 
had been wanting the inclusion of the Army in the 
Allende Government for some time. It believed that 
its inclusion meant that the Congressional elections 
of March 1973 would take place in an orderly way. 
Nonetheless,gremialismo had failed 
both to paraly.ze the country through its strikes 
and to force the Armed Forces to overthrow the 
Government. Gremialismo had hoped that the high 
inflation rate of almost 100% would have begun to 
erode working class support for Allende. But the 
strike proved otherwise;the strength and mobilization 
of the working class in order to keep the country 
running despite all adversities came as a shock to 
gremialismo. This working class resistance more 
than anything else caused gremialismo's failure. 
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CONCLUSION 
vremialismo was intended to build up 
a strong civilian opposition base to the Allende 
Government,organize strikes and demonstrations and 
through these tactics create the conditions in 
which the Armed Forces would have no alternative 
but to overthrow the Government. This strategy was 
co-ordinated by businessmen who lacked the social 
bases of support necessary for this plan's success. 
Thus,it was essential to incorporate groups like 
truckers and the professions who would constitute 
the necessary widespread support for the plan's 
success . 
A small group of doctors,coming mainly 
from the Regional Council of Valparaiso had almost 
immediately after Popular Unity's victory,decided to 
use the gremio of the doctors in this political 
struggle against the Marxists. 
While their organization and preparation 
were excellent,they did not succeed in bringing the 
leaders of theColegio M~dico and particularly the 
Christian Democrats along with them in this plan. 
Quite clearly they needed to break the mould of 
Colegio M~dico politics as practised by the Christian 
Democrats and Radicals. However,these men like Acuna, 
Villarroel and Silva were firmly tied to the belief 
that the Colegio M~dico should not be used as a 
political instrument against the Government. 
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This chapter reveals a quite significant 
divison of which the Left at the time was unaware p 
between on the one hand,the supporters of gremialismo 
and on the other the moderate doctors such as Acuna 
and Villarroel. This division was to grow in 
intensity in 1973. 
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C HAP T E R 7 
THE SUCCESS OF GRElvIIALISMO 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter we will examine 
the struggle developing inside the Colegio Medico 
from March 1973 until the coup. This conflict 
was between on the one hand,a group of Christian 
Democrat doctors and on the other the supporters 
of gremialismo . This split remained hidden from 
the public until almost the end of the Popular 
Unity Government. 
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THE EFFECT ON NATIONAL POLITICS OF THE 
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS OF MARCH 1973. 
The results of the March elections 
were a considerable blow to the National Party 
and the Christian Democrats. They had hoped that 
Allende's vote would be less than the 1970 level, 
and that the combined voted of the parties of the 
opposition would provide the two thirds majority 
necessary to impeach Allende and bring down the 
Government. Instead,Popular Unity received 43.9% 
of the March vote which represented an important 
increase from the 36.2% in September 1970. 
TABLE 12:1973 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 
PAR T Y 1973 Num ber of Votes % 
POPULAR UNITY 
Socialists 678,674 1 8.4 
Communists 595,829 1 6.2 
IC 41,432 1 . 1 
API 29,977 0.8 
MAPU 90,620 2.5 
Radical 133,751 3.6 
UP List 46,100 1.3 
TOTAL 1,616,383 43.9 
OPPOSITION 
Christian Democrats1,049,676 28.5 
National 777,084 21 .1 
PIR 65,120 1 .8 
DR 70,582 1 .9 
CODE Ticket 33,918 0.9 
TOTAL 1,996,380 54.2 
OTHER 
USOPO 10, 371 0.3 
Blank and Void 57,770 1 .6 
Registered 4,510,060 
Voting 3,680,307 
Abstaining 829,753 18.4 
Source:Arturo Valenzuela(1980) 1he Breakdown of Democratic 
Re~imes.John Hopkins University F.85 
The tragedy for the Chilean Left was that 
the elections instead of leading to a restructuring 
of the Popular Unity coalition,merely entrenched 
its position even further. Throughout Popular Unity 
the Government was plagued by a split between the 
reformists Allende, and the Communists on the one 
hand,and the more revolutionary Socialists on the 
other. 
After March the Socialists became much 
more radical whil( Allende and the Communists became 
more reformist. The latter continued to believe in 
the constitutional loyalty of the Armed Forces and 
the opposition .It continued its policy started in 
1970 of suppressing the spontaneous revolutionary 
acts of an increasingly radicalized working class. 
The Left wing Socialists began to support,even if 
am biguously, the in crease in lIillegal II occupa ti ons 
and demands for the replacement of the IIbourgeoisll 
Congress by a People's Assembly. These Socialists 
along with the MIR rightly saw the increase in the 
Popular Unity vote as a sign of the growing 
revolutionary consciousness of the working class. 
But,instead of offering revolutionary leadership 
they remained inside the Popular Unity coalition 
having to accept the reformist politics which tried 
to subdue this revolutionary consciousness. 
The reformists'belief in thA 
IIconsti tutionalism II of the opposi tion was fraught 
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with danger. By not taking any steps to prepare the 
working class for confrontation with the military, 
they were indirectly aiding the Armed Forces' task 
of repressing the working classes. Moreover,by 
continuing to work with the "revolutionaries" inside 
the coalition, they were increasingly seen by the 
opposition as supporting revolutionary policies. 
Popular Unity was eventually overthrown not because 
it was reformist,but because it was seen through 
the actions of its more radical wing,as revolutionary. 
The main error of the Allendista 
wing of Popular Unity was its hesitancy to come to an 
agreement with the progressive wing of the Christian 
Democrat Party around reformist policies .This would 
have meant splitting from the Left wing Socialists, 
but it would have also caused divisions within the 
opposition. A newly formed quintessentially reforillist 
Government made up of sections of Christian Democracy, 
Communists and Right wing Socialists of the old 
Popular Unity coalition would have been much less 
easily overthrown by a military coup. 
The major error committed by the Left 
wing Socialists was their reluctance to leave the 
Popular Unity coalition and offer the Chilean 
working class truly revolutionary leadership. If they 
had done this, the working class would have been better 
able to defend itself against a military coup. In 
conclusion,after March the Left continued to remain 
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uncompromisingly entrenched in its positions,even if 
the Popular Unity coalition was no longer suited to 
the country's social and political reality. 
In contrast,the National Party and 
Christian Democrats did adapt themselves to the 
changes implicit in the electoral result. The hard 
core Right of the National Party and the extremist 
Right wing Patria y Libertad now in the words of the 
headlines of the latter's party newspaper saw the 
only alternative as "lVaiionali-6m/j/1..l2J7liaf.i-6m and ihe. 
A d - " 1 /1..me. fO/1..ce.-6 • The elections had represented the 
last constitutional mechanism open to the opposition. 
This had failed to remove Allende . It was widely 
held by the opposition that the task confronting 
gremialismo was to build up its support and push the 
Armed Forces into action. As if carrying out this 
implicit strategy,the Right as we shall see in the 
case of the Colegio Medico increased its power and 
influence within the gremios in readiness for action. 
The Christian Democrats,unlike the 
National Party were more reluctant to use extra-
parliamentary forces to remove Popular Unity. This 
reluctance was clearly demonstrated at the time of 
the October Movement in 1972 . During the strike 
Christian Democrats,notably Tomic argued that the 
party should allow the people to decide the future 
of the Allende Government in the forthcoming March 
elections rather than taking action to destroy the 
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Government through unconstitutional means. After the 
1973 elections however,Tomic's position of adherence 
to political change through constitutional means 
became less influential within the party. The Freista 
wing under ex-President Frei was moving with the 
National Party in advocating,although never openly, 
a military solution. 
This shift in thought was not easy 
for the Christian Democrat Party. It was after all, 
a progressive party committed to a flrevolution in 
libertyfl . Also it saw itself as the protector of 
Chile's constitutional principles. 
As we shall see in the case of the 
Christian Democrat doctors,they remained equivocal 
towards gremialismo right up until the coup. 
flGREMIALSMOfl AND fiLA GREMIAL QUIMACAMENTE PURAfI 
INSIDE THE COLEGIO MEDICO 
As we saw in the last chapter,gremialismo 
inside the Colegio Medico had been instigated and 
espoused by a small group of doctors intent on using 
the Colegio along with the gremios to bring down the 
Government. Despite great detail and effort in 
organization and strategy this Right wing group of 
doctors had met with opposition from the more moderate 
members of the Colegio Medico. This latter group had 
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shown less than total support for the Colegio's 
October strike and by its vaciTIation had rendered the 
doctors' action relatively ineffective. 
After the March elections this stance 
became more identified with the Christian Democrat 
doctors inside the Colegio Medico. The implicit 
argument of this position was that the gremio of 
the Colegio Medico should not be used for the political 
ends of gremialismo. This policy 'was articulated by 
the Colegio Medico leadership and notably Ruben Acu~a. 
Acuna became President of the Colegio 
Medico after the resignation of Emilio Villarroel . 
Villarroel had resigned ostensibly to return to 
university teaching. He had also beendggrieved for 
a long time with thB General Council for not supporting 
him during a dispute with the Dean of the Faculty of 
Medicine,Alfredo Jadresic. The real reason however for 
Villarroel's resignation after the March Congressional 
elections of 1973 was that he could no longer remain 
.as President of a gremio which inexorably was moving 
into flpoli tical fI opposi tion to the Allende Government. 
Villarroel it should be recalled was a member of the 
Radical Party and had been a supporter of Popular Unity 
at one time. He was also a friend of Allende and as 
one doctor who knew him said, 
"Villannoel wa~ not willing to join 
the gnemio movement a~ leaden ot a 
gnemio in a political cnu~ade 
again~t hi~ tniend Salvadon Allende." 2 
He remained,however a General Councillor. 
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The new President R.Acuna did not 
represent a change from Villarroel's policy. Acuna 
was a Christian Democrat and like Villarroel,but 
unlike the group of Valparaiso and Santiago doctors 
had played a leading role in the Colegio Medico since 
1964 and even before as a leader of FEMECH in 1962. 
He was therefore,an "old style" gremio leader and 
in contrast to the gremialismo doctors, believed 
that the Colegio Medico had no role to play in politics. 
As he admi tted, 
"7hl!. Cofl!.gio'.6 ta.6k wa.6 to tight 
to~ docto~.6' intl!.~l!..6t.6,not to 
i~ing down thl!. 9ovl!.~nml!.nt ." 3 
And as he wrote to Alvayay criticising his continuing 
demands for the gremios to begin a political campaign 
against Allende: 
"Sil!.mp~l!. hl!. .6u.6tl!.nido una .6ofa finl!.a, 
fa q~l!.miaf quimicaml!.ntl!. Ru~a. 4 
This type of gremialism as represented by "fa g~l!.miaf 
quimacl!.ml!.ntl!. pu~a" was virulently attacked by Alvayay 
and his supporters. Alvayay accused the practitioners 
of this type of gremialism of siding with the Communists 
in attempting to destroy the Colegio Medico. After the 
coup,and seizing on the words Acuna had written to him 
in 1973 he wrote, 
"Dl!. acul!.~do a .6U.6 p~~ctica.6 haiituafl!..6 
dl!. J!-af.6idad l!. hipoc~e.6[a,fo.6 medico.6 
comuni.6ta.6 y .6U.6 compa~.6a.6 .6o.6tl!.n{an 
fa tl!..6i.6 dl!. un g~l!.miafi.6mo qurmicaml!.ntl!. 
pu~o,a.6£ptico,con.6t~inl!.ndo cil!.nto po~ 
cil!.nto a ta~l!.a.6 .6uiaftl!.~na.6,ajl!.na.6 a 
fa qUl!.mantl!. ~l!.afidad .6ocio- econ~nica 
pof(tica qUl!. impuf.6aia l!.f 9ogil!.~no de 
fa llnidad Popufa~,af Cofl!.gio ~edico dl!. 
Chifl!.,iu.6cando fa mane~a dl!. pa~afiza~fo 
en .6u accion . derJi£iicudo y f.uego dl!..6i~ui~P-o." 5 
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To accuse Acuna of acting as a Communist during this 
period,was of course,nonsense. One reason why such an 
extreme accusation was levelled at him was that the 
Valparaiso doctors hated him personally. Acuna was an 
unprincipled opportunist. As Alvayay replied to Acuna's 
letter describing his "quimicamenie puna" position, 
"7~ po~ici6n "gnemial,quimicamenie puna", 
iiene un ~6lo nom~ne • Pon cienio que 
no ~e llama Colegio ~edico de Chile. 
Se llama ~implemenie "Ru~e.n Acuna" y 
el gnemio e~ia can~ado del pen~onali~mo 
caciquil. " 6 
During this period Acuna was probably acting under 
instructions from the Christian Democrat Party or at 
least a section of it. The Christian Democrats attempted 
at every opportunity in the crisis to regain political 
power. Many Christian Democrats realised that this could 
best be achieved if Popular Unity handed over power to 
them. This was less likely to corne about as the result 
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of a couf since,they believed that they would have to share 
the spoils of victory with the National Party. It was 
quite conceivable that Acufia was trying to maintain 
the Colegio's independence from gremialismo so as to 
allow the Christian Democrat Party to reach a constitut-
ional solution with the Allende Government. 
Thus,there were two types of gremialism 
inside the Colegio between March 1973 and the coup:the 
Acufia line which was to keep the Colegio Medico out 
of politics;and Alvayay's gremialismo which sought to 
use the Colegio Medico as part of a struggle against 
the Popular Unity Government. 
The strllggle around these posi tions 
divided the forces inside the Colegio Medico. This 
was ironical given that the Left,the so called main 
divisive force,had all but departed from the Colegio 
Medico scene in the final months of the Allende 
Government. 
Although both Acuna and Alvayay were 
immensely powerful individuals the struggle should 
not be seen as a type of personalized duel between 
them . The stakes were consider~ble . Representatives 
of the National Command of the Gremios were urgently 
seeking the incorporatiion of the Colegio Medico 
into their organization in the months after March to 
give gremialismo more influnce . As Mundt the editor 
of Vida Medica declared after the coup, 
"Am~ab iQndQnciab ~QP~QbQnia~an c~iiQ~iob 0 
~obicionQb dQ lOb COnbQjQ~Ob,~abado~ Qn 
dibiiniab ap~QciacionQb dQl momQnio' hibio~ico 
y tUQ~on dQtQndidob con a~do~ Qn ia~gab y 
agoiadco~ab bQbionQb Qn Ql bQnO dQ£ COnbQjo 
gQnQ~al dQ la O~dQn •.• Ebia divibion pud~,en 
alg~~ momQnio,ponQ~ Qn ~iQbgO la u~iddd,lo 4UQ, 
adQmab dQ bU g~avQ i~anbCQndQncia g~Qmial iniQ~na 
y dQl dQiQ~io~odQ nUQbi~a imagQn aniQ la 
opinion puglica,pod~[a ha~Q~ biqniticado 
un dQbCOnciQ~io Qn la tilab dQl moviQ-
mQnio mutiiq~Qmial,con bQ~io dano oa~a 
la conbQc~aci6n dQ bUb O~ooobiiOb dQ 
boluci5n Oolriica q~Qmial." 7 
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7.3 THE AFTERMATH OF THE MARCH CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 
The Right wing doctors' policy towards the Colegio Medico 
The Right had begun to press the Colegio 
to MjoinM gremialiBmo before the March Congressional 
Elections . In the summer months of January and February 
when Chile was going through a political lull in 
anticipation of the elections,doctors in Valparaiso 
were very active. These Right wing docto~s refused to 
wait until the March elections for the defeat of the 
Popular Unity Government. They did not believe that 
Pop~lar Unity would honour its promise to hold elections 
in March • This sentiment had been strongly and 
genuinely expressed at one of the Right wing doctors' 
8 
mass assemblies in Janurary 1973. 
Thus,well before the March elections 
the Regional Council of Valparaiso was sending doctors 
allover Chile in an effort to convince moderate 
Regional Councils to appoint its type of "gremialistas" 
on to the General Council in Santiago. Officially, 
these roving doctors who travelled to such distant 
parts of Chile as Puerto Montt and Punto Arenas in the 
south of the country were "on holiday" . However, 
by the number of meetings these doctors had organized 
durin!:S their "holidays" it was fairly clear that 
these doctors were on a political mission. 
After the March elections and as part 
of a general movement inside the gremios, the Right 
took over key positions inside the Colegio Medico. 
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Artaza, Arriagada' and Donckaster(Merino wasalread~ 
President of the Capitulos)who had begun their mission 
in early 1971 ,were appointed to the General Council 
by the Regional Councils of Talca,Temuco and Valdivia 
respectively. Thellsoftening Upll of these Regional 
Councils by Valparaiso doctors during the summer had 
obviously paid dividends. At the same time.as these 
3 consejeros were appointed to the General Council, 
their fellow conspirator R.Merino,President of the 
Santiago Capitulos was finally after a long struggle 
accorded the right to attend General Council 
meetings. These appointments reflected the Right's 
determination after the failure of the March elections 
to push the Colegio Medico into political opposition 
to the Government. 
With this increasing influence the 
Right began to put its policy into practice inside the 
Colegio Medico, Its first success after the March 
elections was in maintaining the CoJegio's hard-line 
positions over SERMENA . The Colegio Medico in protest 
at the SERMENA reforms had advised doctors to stop 
treating SERMENA patients. Popular Unity had not 
al tered the servi ce, no r the am oun t of money do ctors 
received from SERMENA . The only change was in the 
method of paying doctors. During the summer the 
moderate Christian Democrats had seen little point 
in carrying on the protest against a relatively 
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minor change. However,the Right anxious to maximize 
any dispute with the Allende Government which 
conveyed to the pUblic(and the Armed Forces)the 
impression of chaos in the health service succeeded 
in ensuring that the Colegio Medico remained 
completely opposed to any changes,however minor,in 
the SERMENA service. 
The clearest illustration of the 
Right's policy after March was the inclusion into the 
Colegio Medico's Code of Ethics of the "Deliia 9nemial" . 
Alvayay had first proposed this in 1972 in order to 
increase gremial unity at the time of a doctors' 
strike. The General Council had refused this inclusion 
but now,with the obvious need for another doctors' 
strike and the increased Right wing influence inside 
the Colegio,the principle was accepted. There was no 
clearer demonstration of the Right's determination 
to unconstitutionally bring down the Government, 
than the adoption of this principle after the March 
election. 
7.4 THE REACTION OF MODERATE AND CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT DOCTORS 
TO RIGHT WING STRATEGY INSIDE THE COLEGIO MEDICO 
However,this surge of activity by the 
Right inside the Colegio Medico began to infuriate 
the moderates and the Christian Democrats. They 
248. 
were enraged when Right wing doctors had tried to 
persuade the Regional Councils to replace their 
Christian Democrat General Councillors with Right 
wing consejeros. The Christian Democrats were angry 
that the Right wing doctors had gone to La Serena 
during their summer campaign before the March 
election and had tried to convince the Regional 
Council that P.Silva,a Christian Democrat was no 
longer worthy of its confidence as a General 
Councillor. 9 In this instance,the Regional Council 
of La Serena on account of its Christian Democrat 
majority had refused'to replace-Silva by a Right 
wing consejero,but the Christian Democrats were 
clearly alarmed at what they considered to be a 
threat to their control of the Colegio Medico. 
The Christian Democrats inside the 
Colegio Medico too,began to quarrel with the Right 
over Colegio policy towards SERMENA . Unlike the 
Right wing,many Christian Democrat supporters were 
empleados,who were obviously suffering as a result 
of the Colegio Medico's boycott of this service.As 
one representative of the empleados declared to 
the doctors, 
"Si pa~a e06 medico6 ea 6iiuacion e6 
conteiciiva,pa~a eee06 eo e6 mucho 
ma6 aun,que e06 empeeado6 y 6u6 
tamieia~e6 e6ian 6in aiencion 
medica,." 10 
Rather than risk alienating this traditional group 
of Christian Democrat support Ruben Acuna in 
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particular,and the Christian Democrats in general, 
began to negotiate with Popular Unity in an attempt 
to find a solution on SERMENA. 
Moreover,even as late as May 1973, 
the majority of Christian Democrats inside the 
Colegio Medico resisted the Right's political 
project. For instance on 8th May,Acuna was invited 
by the Right wing Valparaiso doctors and their 
supporters in other Regions,including the Santiago 
quartet of Arriagada,Artaza,Merino and Donckaster 
to a dinner in the horne of Ernesto Mundt . It was 
clear that the aim of this dinner was not social 
conversation! The Right was anxious to discuss 
Colegio Medico policy towards the Marxists with 
Acuna. He however,was not prepared to discuss 
politics with this Right wing group and refused 
to have dinner with them 
7.5 THE GROWING DIVISION INSIDE THE COLEGIO MEDICO 
Two contradictory styles of action 
began to appear inside theCoJegjo M~dico. The 
Christian Democrats,while opposing the Government 
in their capacity as party members and not as 
gremial representatives,recognized the need to 
improve the Colegio Medico's relationship with 
the Governemnt . The Right~ in contrast,in its 
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attempts to build up opposition to the Allende 
Government was trying to maximize the Colegio 
Medico's problems with Popular Unity in order to 
avoid reaching solutions with the Government. 
Acuna became weary of this Right wing tactic and 
even threatened to resign. As he declared, 
"Si el Con~ejo Regional de Valpa~al~o 
~igue ~u~cando de impone~ co~a~;le~ 
~olicita que,po~/;avo~ ,~u~quen ot~o 
P~e~idente po~que no e~ po~i~le que, 
de~puE~ de t~e~ dra~ de e~ta~ t~atando 
p~o~lema~ que ~e ~etie~~n ~olamente al 
Colegio ~edico y que implica a todo~ 
lo~ medico~ en gene~al,llegue a la 
6e~i6n y ~olamente ~eci~a ing~atitude~. 
D~la~a,con mucho ~ince~iddd,con 
cla~idad y ha~ta con humilidad,que ~i 
Valpa~a[~o de~ea ~egui~ en e~te te~~eno 
de no ~u~ca~ ~olucione~ ~ino que 
complicacione~,el tend~a ~USl.. \ise." 12 
A clear example of the growing bitterness caused by 
this division between Acuna and his Christian Democrat 
supporters on the one hand,and the Right wing 
representatives of gremialismo on the other,was at a 
meeting in Valparaiso in April 1973 . This meeting 
was between the Regional Council of Valparaiso and 
representatives of empleados in SERMENA,who unlike 
their colleagues in Santiago were firm supporters 
of gremialismo. These representatives had recently 
had discussions with Acuna. Instead of bringing a 
written summary of these discussions to the meeting 
these representatives delivered a verbal~report 
because they felt that a written synopsis might 
have fallen into the hands of Popular Unity 
supporters and shown the "quie~~e en el ~e~o del 
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Coe~gio ~edico ." One of the doctors replied that 
such a precaution was, unnecessary since once doctors 
became aware of Acufia's intentions,they would 
remove him as President. As he said, 
"La /l..azon qu~ iuvi~/l..on eo/.) g/l..~mio/.) 
ma/l..[iimo/.) (W/l..a no ini~g/l..a/l.. iodo ea 
into/l..macion /l..~ciRida ~n ea /.)~/.)i6n 
pO/l.. ~/')c/l..iio pa/l..a no qu~R/l..a/l.. ~e 
Coe~gio ~edico, haR/l..{a p/l..oducido 
~xaciam~ni~ ~e ~t~cio coni/l..a/l..io 
ya qu~ ~e g/l..~mio medico /.)~ 
to/l..iae~c[~ ae ~eimina/l.. d~ ea 
P/l..~/.)id~nci~ a una p~/l../.)ona qu~ ha 
i/l..aicionado ae g/l..~mio medico." 13 
Moreover,rather than distancing himself from the 
Government and attacking it,Acuna the empleados 
argued,was working hand in hand with the Popular 
Unity health authorities ;as one empleado at the 
meeting declared, 
"HaRea/l.. con ~e ~ini/.)i~/l..io d~ Saeud 
o haRea/l.. con ~e D/l... Voueei~mm~ 
~/l..a eo mi/.)mo qu~ haRea/l.. con ~e D/l... 
Acuna." 14 
One should not interpret from these 
events that Christian Democracy inside the Colegio 
Medico was attempting to collaborate with the Popular 
Unity Government. It should be noted that when the 
Colegio Medico held a small convention in April 1973 
the main guest speaker was Leon Vilarin,President of 
the National Command of the Gremios. Moreover,at this 
time,the Christian Democrat leadership was accusing 
the Popular Unity Government of mismanaging the health 
service. sectarianism in the appointment of health 
personnel,high taxation on professional incomes,and 
many other things besides. 
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Nonetheless,this Christian Democrat 
opposition inside the Colegio Medico could still be 
interpreted as "gremial" in the non-political sense. 
The Right's strategy after March had antagonized them. 
Moreover,division inside the Colegio Medico between 
the Christian Democrats and the Right,of which 
everyone outwith the Colegio Medico remained entirely 
oblivious,was real enough. 
"TANCAZO" - MAY 1973 TO JUNE 29th 1973 
On 29th June tanks and armoured cars 
of the Second Regiment under the command of Colonel 
Souper attacked the Presidential Palace and the 
Ministry of Defence. This attempted coup was a 
failure. The plot had been exposed one week previously. 
Only 150 men participated including 5 leaders of 
Patria y Libertad,who later sought asylum in'~ the 
Ecuadorian and Brazilian Embassies. 
Thi sat temp ted c oup W~S The c~\N"\\~I3,'hon 
well-orchestrated Right wing offensive against Popular 
Unity which had begun 2 months earlier. This 
offensive commenced with a strike in the El Teniente 
copper mines,caused initially by economic grievances 
but gradually superseded by political motives. The 
strike began on 19th April and was to last 74 days. 
As this strike was reaching its climax,the truck 
253. 
drivers declared another strike. As in October, 
although on a smaller scale,gremialismo was activated 
and strikes were called. 
This clear Right wing action to 
support the plot developing within the Armed Forces, 
was the background to gremialismo's own offensive 
inside the Colegio Medico. It was quite clear that 
these Right wing doctors,along with other Right wing 
groups in Chile at this time were aware that a plot 
was being hatched inside the Armed Forces. They 
recognized that doctors had to be on strike(alongside 
other gremios)if this coup was to be successful. It 
is worth pointing out that one of the Patria y Libertad 
conspirators who was later to seek political asylum 
in the Brazilian Embassy was a doctor ,Eduardo Keymer. 
His private practice was situated in Vina del Mar, 
less than 100 yards from the home of Jorge Alvayay. 
Whether doctors and Patria y Libertad were working 
directly together to co-ordinate a doctors' strike 
with the coup attempt is not clear,but it is obvious 
that doctors attempted to call strikes at strategically 
crucial times in the build up to the first attempted 
coup. 
Not surprisingly it was the Right wing 
doctors who began the strike movement inside the 
Colegio Medico in anticipation of a national doctors' 
strike . They used their power bases in the Regional 
Councils of Rancagua and Valparaiso and in the 
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Santiago capitulos to launch a series of local strikes 
in the beginning of June. 
The Regional Council of Rancagua,in 
whose constituency the El Teniente mines were situated, 
~taged a 24 hour strike in sympathy with the striking 
miners. Never before in the relations between these 
two gremios' had doctors showed the slightest interest 
in the plight of the miners. Most of the doctors in the 
Regional Council of Valparaiso followed suit,declaring 
24 hour strikes and travelling to Rancagua personally 
to deliver money which they had collected for the 
strikers and their families. The Right hoped to use 
the dispute at El Teniente to trigger a national 
strike of all the gremios just as the Truckers had done 
in October of the previous year. Alvayay for example 
demanded \::\rlat. 
"cf. ConMz.jo Yene/1.af. def. g/1.emio 
medico dec/1.ete pa/1.O~ medico~ 
e~cafir.dc\os a t/1.ave~ de todo ef. 
pa[~,en conjunio con oi/1.o~ 
g/1.emio~,en apoya a f.o~ i/1.a~ajado/1.e~ 
def. cO~/1.e. II 15 
The Valparaiso doctors at this stage were using almost 
any pretext for calling a strike. For instance the 
Regional Council of Valparaiso passed a motion declaring 
that it would call an immediate strike if FENATS,the 
Health Workers Union in Valparaiso controlled by the 
Christian Democrats declared a strike for higher pay. 
Never before had the Regional Council of Valparaiso 
supported in word or deed the gremial grievances of 
health workers. 
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The Santiago capitulos had not only 
El Teniente as a pretext on which to call a strike 
action. The doctors had their own "El Teniente", 
a long drawn out strike by doctors in the Hospital 
Salvador in Santiago. It was true that Popular Unity 
had arbitrarily changed certain medical personnel in 
the hospital,but the Right wing Santiago capitulos 
were attempting to prolong this strike as best they 
could. This dispute began in early May and despite 
several "truces",was never really settled until the 
coup. It is interesting to note that one of the 
speakers at most of the assemblies of doctors at 
Salvador was the representative of Patria y Libertad, 
Eduardo Keymer. 
However,by mid June despite the 
staging of numerous strikes by the Regional Councils of 
Rancagua and Valparaiso and the Santiago capitulos,the 
Colegio Medico under Acuna's leadership had no intention 
of declaring a national strike. 
It is true that the ~oJegjo Medjco 
issued a statement supporting the El Teniente workers 
but this fell far short of what the Right had hoped 
for. Acuna and a majority of General Councillors, 
composed of moderates and Christian Democrats(the 
Popular Unity consejeros had all left by this time) 
while protesting in the strongest fashion possible 
about any violation of the profession were not 
prepared to allow the Right to use the Colegio Medico 
to bring down the Government . 
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The Chris tian Democrat leadership 
knew that it could block the strike demands of the 
Right wing doctors. Only during a meeting of the 
General Council could a strike call be proposed and 
passed. Since meetings of the General Council were 
only held once a week,in practice this meant that 
during June the Right only had 4 occasions on 
which it could propose a strike. The leadership also 
knew that it had a majority on the General Council. 
Moreover,there was a whole range of procedural ploys 
under which the standing orders of meetings of the 
General Council could be used to prevent the 
actual debate of a strike motion. Experienced men 
such as Acuna and the ex-President Villarroel knew 
flstanding orders lf backwards,while the recently 
appointed Right wing consejeros were relatively 
unaware of the complexities involved. 
A meeting of the General Council on 
15th June illustrated the way in which these Right 
wing doctors were outmanoeuvred by the moderates 
inside the General Council. The Right wing consejeros, 
because they were dispersed between Santiago and 
Valparaiso had to hold pre-General Council meetings 
to discuss tactics .Alvayay had proposed that in 
order to call a national strike,a conference of the 
Regional Councils should be held to discuss this 
issue. In this way, the Right believing that it had 
more influenc8 in the Regional Councils than in the 
General Council could bypass the objections of the 
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General Council and declare a strike on behalf of the 
Colegio Medico. Thus,the Right wing consejeros 
arrived at the General Council meeting prepared to 
demand an immediate Conference of the Regional Councils. 
Their deliberations had gone on too long however,and 
they arrived too late to place their resolution on the 
"matters to be discussed" by the General Council . Thus, 
they had to wait until the entire normal business of 
the Colegio Medico·.had been discussed before being 
able to table their resolution under "any other 
business". These other matters had also taken a long 
time to discuss and Villarroel,realising that the Right 
wing motion would be raised subsequently ,in perfect 
accord with standing orders,declared that the meeting 
had gone over its allotted time and issues arising 
under "any other business" should be discussed at the 
next General Council meeting the following week. Thus, 
the General Council maeting was suspended without even 
discussing the Right wing's motion. 
A measure of the fury that this tactic 
caused was E.Mundt's remarks made in the next General 
Council meeting one week later, 
"£l(Villa~~oel)iiene que comp~ende~ 
que lo~ iiempo~ han camgiado,ya que 
~e ha ie~minado e~ia aciiiud ve~~all­
e~ca de e~ie con~eje~o;e~iamo~ 
i~aiando D~.Villa~~oel con maione~ 
no e~iamo~ i~aiando con cagalle~o~, 
lo~ valo~e~,la hone~iidad,la ve~dad, 
la cagalle~o~idad,iodo e~o e~ia 
go~~ado en nue~i~a pai~ia,no~oi~o~ 
ienemo~ que lucha~ pa~a ~ecupe~a~ 
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aqu~ggo p~~o,pa~a pod~~ con~~gui~go, 
i~n~mo~ qu~ ad~cua~ nu~~i~a aciuaci6n 
a ga~ ci~cun~iancia~ y no qu~da~no~ 
p~gado~ ~n meiodo~ aniicuado~ pa~a 
e~ia~ ci~cun~iancia~. 16 
Faced with this inflexibility, the Right wing doctors 
had very little power to change the situation in the 
General Council. It agreed to send a deputation to 
Santiago in order to contest Acuna's refusal to declare 
a national strike but this was the limit of its 
actions. The Regional Council of Valparaiso could have 
gone on indefinite strike;however,the object of the 
Right wing exercise was to bring chaos to the health 
service in general and not only in Valparaiso. 
Moreover,if these doctors had gone on unilateral strike, 
the public would have seen the split within the gremio. 
It is worth noting that gremialismo repeatedly 
emphasized the unity of the gremios at this time. 
For these reasons the series of strikes 
called by the Right in Santiago, Valparaiso and Rancagua 
petered out. Moreover,to the horror of these Right 
wing doctors, the Colegio Medico was now mediating 
between the Government and the striking doctors in 
Salvador to end the dipute. Instead of siding with 
gremialismo to escalate the doctors' strike,the Colegio 
Medico was doing the very opposite. 
This feeling of total frustration with 
Acuna and his majority on the General Council forms 
the background to two Right wing terrorist incidents 
at the Regional Council headquarters of Concepcion 
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and Santiago . Bombs exploded at these buildings on 
the 28th of June .They were immediately publicized 
as Left wing attempts to terrorize the medical 
profession. However,the Christian Democrats inside 
the Colegio Medico knew that the perpetrators of 
these incidents in fact belonged to Patria y Libertad. 17 
It was no coincidence that these bombs exploded not in 
the Regional Councils of Rancagua or Valparaiso,but in 
Concepcion and Santiago whose General Council consejeros 
included such moderates as Acuna,Villarroel and Cruz 
Mena. The bombs were clearly aimed at putting pressure 
on the Regional Councils to demand direct action 
against the Popular Unity Government. The damage 
caused by the bombs had been embarrassingly miniscule. 
Bombing was a tactic used by Patria y Libertad to 
turn Chileans against the Government. In one week,from 
17th-24thJune 'no fewer than 776 bombs were exploded 
_ throughout the country. These bombs at the Colegio 
Medico had been exploded on the day before the coup 
as the last desperate attempt by the terrorist Right 
wing to push the Colegio Medico into declaring a 
strike. 
Moreover,by the time of the attempted 
coup on 29th June,all Chilean doctors were working 
normally. Indeed on the day before the coup Acuna 
announced to the medical profession that he had 
succeeded in finding a solution with the Popular 
Unity Government over the dispute at the Hospital 
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Salvador. Henceforth,he declared, the doctors at 
Salvador would resume working. 
THE FINAL STAGES OF POPULAR UNITY AND THE RESUGENCE OF 
GREMIALISMO:JULY 1973 - 11th SEPTEMBER 1973 
The military,to some extent had 
"rescued" Popular Unity in October 1972,when General 
Prats, the representative of its "constitutional" wing 
accepted a post in the Allende cabinet . The final 
stages of the Allende Government however witnessed a 
deterioration in relations between Popular Unity and 
the military and therefore a second "rescue" was 
impossible. 
A number of incidents accounted for 
the deterioration in relations between the Government 
and the military. First,General Prats Commander in 
Chief of the Army was subjected in this period to 
what amounted to a character defamation orchestrated 
by elements within the National Party and Christian 
Democracy. Demonstrations were held outside his 
house. Pressure was to reach such a height that he 
resigned from his post on 23rd August • Secondly, 
the Army began to apply a law passed in the crisis 
of 1972 which allowed it to conduct entry and search 
forays for hidden arms. All the establishments 
searched by the Army were Left wing, even though 
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Patria y Libertad had huge caches of arms and 
ammunitions. In these searches,many Popular Unity 
supporters were molested. Psychologically, the 
Army was being prepared for its confrontation 
with Popular Unity after the coup. Finally,the ultra 
Left was accused of hatching a plot to infiltrate the 
Armed Forces and turn ordinary sDldiers against their 
ff o 18 o lcers. 
The support of the Armed For~es was 
imperative for Allende to stave off g~owing opposition 
to his Government. On 29th July,the Truckers ostensibly 
protesting at the lack of spare parts staged another 
national strike;just as they had done in October 1972. 
The Gremios Patronales responded to the Truckers' 
initiative and staged major strikes. 
Moreover,talks between Allende and the 
Christian Democrats failed to reach a solution. For 
both these reasons,military aid was desperately 
sought by Allende to restore his regime's credibility. 
But the military,and in particular the Navy and the 
Air Force,had very obviously run out of patience 
with the Allende Government. 
THE STRIKE OF THE REGIONAL COUNCIL OF VALPARAISO 
The Right wing doctors of Valparaiso 
believed that a civil war would be necessary to 
remove Allende's Government. It expected the Armed 
Forces to split between pro and anti- Popular Unity 
262. 
factions . It recognized that in the ensuing conflict, 
doctors would be needed to treat the injured:those 
doctors of a Right wing persuasion would treat the 
injured opponents of Popular Unity while pro-Government 
doctors would treat their own supporters. In August, 
the whole of Valparaiso was on a war footing. Tension 
was also increased by a report that the ultra L8ft was 
trying to infiltrate the Navy. In response Naval officers 
detained the conspirators,and as was widely believed 
at the time,tortured them. 
In this atmosphere of impending civil 
war,Right wing doctors actually worked with the Navy 
to draw up war plans. In early August,a secret 
meeting took place between the Regional Council of 
Valparaiso and 40 of its most trusted doctors. As a 
doctor who attended this meeting declared, 
"W~ w~~~ agg a~~ign~d to a ~~cto~ ot 
Vagpa~a[~o and giv~n th~ nam~ ot a 
navag ottic~~ with whom w~ w~~~ to 
wo~k with .Wh~n th~ m~~~ag~ had R~~n 
d~giv~~~d to u~ that th~ tighting 
had R~gun,ou~ o~d~~~ w~~~ to 
imm~diat~gy contact ~~v~~ag oth~~ 
docto~~. W~ w~~~ th~n agg to ~~po~t 
to th~ ASIVA ho~pitag in Vagpa~a[~o 
and await tu~th~~ in~t~uction~. 19 
These doctors also collaborated with the Navy in 
providing it with the architects'plans of the various 
district hospitals so that the Marines would know 
which hospitals were the most easily defended during 
the forthcoming conflict. 
This plan of operation was eventually 
put into effect. On the day before the coup,doctors 
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were told to assemble at the ASIVA. On 10th September 
doctors spent the night with the Marines in this 
hospital waiting for the bloodshed to begin. 20 
This genuine belief that war was 
imminent in part explains why these Right wing 
doctors in Valparaiso behaved so belligerently in the 
months preceding the coup. The Regional Council of 
Valparaiso for example,actually came out and demanded 
military intervention to topple the Allende Government. 
It was the only gremio to publicly state the intention 
of its strike. As one Right wing doctor 
after the coup, 
"En e~ta Sal~ ~e tom6 el dcue~do de 
expul~a~ a Salvado~ Allende del 
Colegio ~edico de Chile,de pedi~le 
la aenuncia como P~e~idente de la 
Repu~licay,po~ ultimo,cuando la 
anafLq.u[a ha.B..[a af.canzado /)u 
"clImax" exiqilL la accion de 
nue~t~a~ tue~za~ A~mada~iunico 
~ecu~~o Ra~a imRedi~ una ~anq~ien~ 
que~~a civil y una matanza 
de~oiadada de lo~ di~iqente~ 
democ~6tico~ del oa[~. " 21 
reminisced 
Moreover,there was no doubting the political intention 
of the Right wing doctors when their strike was 
declared on 4th August. In a massive show of solidarity 
500 doctors in Valparaiso declared that their action 
would continue until, 
"el pa[~ vuelve a ~u no~malidad 
in~titucional ." 22 
This strike too,was indefinite. This meeting also 
agreed to demand that the Colegio Medico declare a. 
national indefinite strike and expel Salvador Allende 
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as a Colegio member. Moreover,Alvayay drafted a 
memorandum to Allende listing 21 grievances and 
personally accusing him for Chile's ruin. Hardly 
any of these 21 points referred to the health 
situation. These points were almost all political, 
angry with Allende's "'!/l..aude a la Con-6titucion", 
"de-6t/l..uccion del c.-6tado de De/l..echo" 'and "demo li cion 
~conomla del pai~;" 23 Quite clearly then,doctors 
in Valparaiso were striking for political reasons. 
Once on strike the Regional Council 
of Valparaiso did everything in its power to intensify 
its action. It was determined to make every single 
doctor in Valparaiso stop working. Thus,it utilized 
to the maximum, the newly approved ammendment to the 
Colegio Medico's Code of Ethics,the so called "Delito 
r. . II" '::f/l..em~a~ • Capitulos in Valparaiso were ordered to 
report all strike breakers to the Regional Council. On 
the basis of this information, the Regional Council 
drew up a blacklist of strike breaking doctors(see 
Appendix). The 80 doctors who appeared on this list 
were charged under the Colegio's Code of Ethics 
and ordered to appear before the Regional Council's 
Ethical Commission on the 28th and 31st of August. 
An investigating doctor was put in charge of each 
case by the Regional Council. Not only does this 
incident show the lengths to which the Regional Council 
would go to to obtain maximum support for its strike, 
but also the blacklist reveals precisely how few 
doctors were actually supporting the Popular Unity 
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Government. Out of 500 doctors in Valparaiso,only 80 
were working. 
This blacklist also served for another 
more sinister purpose. On the morning of the coup in 
Valparaiso all the Marines at official checkpoints 
had the names of Popular Uni ty doctors who were 
forbidden to travel on the grounds of "se curi ty 
reasons" . 
The Right wing doctors moreover, 
employed other methods to increase the chaos in the 
health service. In the last strike Popular Unity 
medical students had played a major role in alleviating 
the effects of the industrial action by replacing 
striking doctors at their place of work. Now orders 
were issued from the Regional Council to the heads 
of Hospital Services prohibiting medical students to 
treat patients. Also the Regional Council of 
Valparaiso forbade Directors of hospitals from 
transfering Popular Unity doctors from one district 
to another in order to cover hospitals which had been 
particularly badly affected. 
A resolution of the Regional Council of 
Valparaiso of 3rd September,to 
"pone~ en p~6ctica una ~e~ie de 
medida~ que pueden ag~ava~ aun 
ma~ ea ~ituaci6n de ~aeud de 
ea pofLeaci on. " 24-
further demonstrated its desire to increase the effects 
of the strike. One of these measures included the 
withdrawal of striking doctors from the Emergency 
Services. At this stage,these doctors were not worried 
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about risking people1s lives:their only concern 
was to ensure that their strike had the desired 
effect. 
Thus,unlike the previous strike in 
Valparaiso the situation was far from normal. Left 
wing doctors had to be commandeered from Santiago 
in order to provide cover for the emmergency services. 
As one Director of a Valparaiso hospital declared in 
an unusual display of frankness, 
" La~ p~e~iaci~ne~ medica~ pa~a lo~ 
eme~gencia~ ~e maniienen en to~ma 
no~mal,admiiiendo que el ~e~io de 
lo~ ~e~vicio~ e~ia ~ut~iendo un 
tue~ie deie~io~o acumulaiiv 0 ." 2 5 
7.9 THE SITUATION IN OTHER REGIONAL COUNCILS 
Valparaiso had declared a strike before 
any other Regional Council and before the General 
Council of the Colegio Medico had even debated the 
issue. Acuna still maintained his non-political 
stance and many Christian Democrats inside the 
Colegio Medico were still as stubbornly opposed as 
ever to the Right1s political project. Before the 
Regional Council of Valparaiso had declared its 
strike it launched with the help of its supporters 
yet another campaign to transform the Colegio Medico 
and force it to join the National Gremial Movement. 
At a meeting on 7th July of Al vaya-y, the Presiden t of 
the Regional Council of Valparaiso, Lavln the 
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President of the Regional Council of Rancagua,the 
Regional Council of Santiago and the General Council, 
the Right wing supporters of gremialismo tabled a 
vote of censure against Acuna. As a pretext for this 
censure, they us ed the fact that Acuna in reaching an 
agreement with the authorities over the Hospital 
Salvador had put his name to a document which affirmed 
support for President Allende. 26 This vote of censure 
was defeated but the Right did manage to persuade the 
Colegio Medico to declare a State of Emergency in the 
gremio. This involved holding an extra meeting each 
week of the General Council. Moreover,the entire 
Regional Council of Santiago was allowed to attend 
these meetings. 
Towards the end of July,the Truckers 
called their national strike,once again inviting 
other gremios to join their action. The Right forced 
a meeting of the Regional Council's Executive 
Committee and the General Council of the Colegio 
Medico to discuss the Colegio's response to the 
Truckers' strike. At this meeting the Right demanded 
that the Executive Committee of the General Council 
should, 
"Tome el lidenazgo de lo~ gnemio~ 
y Colegio~ Pnote~ionale~ en la 
deten~a de la litentad,ju~ticia 
y democnacia en el Chile . " 27 
Both Acuna and his Executive Committee refused to 
declare a national strike. As a result,another vote 
of censure was tabled against Acuna and again,he 
survived. 
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Thus,in one sense,the declaration of 
a strike by the Regional Council of Valparaiso was 
a failure. It had been unsuccessful in bringing the 
rest of the Colegio Medico out on strike. As 
Valparaiso proceeded with its strike,the Regional 
, -
Council put tremendous . pressure on the Christian 
Democrats inside the General Council to join it . 
In Santiago~its allies in the capitulo. movement 
were having an identical struggle with the Regional 
Council of Santiago which was predominantly 
controlled by Christian Democrats. 
It is worth repeating that this group 
of Christian Democrats and moderates supporting Acuna 
were in no sense supporters of Popular Unity. For 
example,on 8th August Acuna and Mena wrote a letter 
to Allende demandin~ that his Government respect the 
Constitution of the land. As they concluded, 
"Ha ttegado ta ho~a de deci~ie, 
como cotega~ medico~,junio~ con 
~epudia~ ~u ge~ii6n p~e~idenciat, 
exigimo~ una inmediaia ~eciitic-
acion. " 28 
Nevertheless,the division between 
gremialismo and the Christian Democrats was very deep. 
Informal talks were held between some Communist and 
Christian Democrat doctors to consider the possibility 
of joint action against the Right's attempt to take 
over the Colegio Medico. 29 This meeting took place 
at the same time as Allende supported by the 
Communists,was tryinr; to reach agreement with the 
progressive wing of Christian Democracy . Like these 
talks however,this initiative ended in failure. 
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7.10 THE DECLARATION OF A NATIONAL COLEGIO MEDICO STRIKE 
The declaration of a national strike 
was the result of a struggle between gremialismo 
and the Christian Democrats. A group of 100 Val-
paraiso doctors drove to the capital and occupied 
the buildings of the Colegio Medico in protest at 
the refusal of the General Council to call a national 
Colegio Medico strike. 30 This was surely one of the 
most remarkable incidents inside the gremio during 
the Popular Unity period. These doctors demanded that 
the General Council should start to play a leading 
role in the National Command of the Gremios and order 
the medical profession to stop work. Although this 
occupation was not violent,the Chief of Santiago's 
Police force offered to help the Colegio to remove 
31 the protesters. 
At the same time as pressure was being 
exerted against the General Council, the Regional 
Council of Santiago faced the growing hostility of 
its consejeros for not declaring a strike. 
With this intense pressure corning 
from both the Regional Council of Valparaiso and 
, 
the Santiago capitulos,the Christian Democrat 
dominated General and Regional Councils were forced 
to call a strike. The Regional Council declared a 
strike on 18th August. On the 22nd of August,almost 
3 weeks after the Regional Council of Valparaiso 
had begun its action, the General Council called a 
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national stoppage. 
However,Acuna,the Christian Democrats 
and moderates refused to make the strike political. 
The strike, they argued,was for better wages and 
conditions i.e. it was gremial . As proof that a 
change of Government was not necessary to end the 
strike they did not make the national stoppage 
indefinite. 
At this stage,gremialismo could have 
probably mustered enough support inside the General 
Council to remove Acuna. However,it was strategically 
unwise for the Right to begin a strike against 
Popular Unity in open conflict with the Christian 
Democrats. 
At first glance,the Colegio Medico's 
behaviour appeared ambiguous and contradictory. On 
the one hand,the Colegio Medico quite clearly had 
not joined the National Command of the Gremios. On 
the other hand,it appeared to be obeying its orders. 
One of the instructions communicated to all the 
striking gremios was to publicly demand the resignation 
of Salvador Allende as President of the Republic. 
On 27 th August a letter was published demanding 
Allende's resignation. 32 This letter bore the official 
seal of the Colegio Medico de Chile. However,the 
signatures of Acuna,Villarroel,Cruz Mena,Silva and 
several other consejeros were missing. These 
individuals believed that the Colegio Medico had no 
authority to demand the resignation of the President 
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of the Republic as it was not a political organization. 
Overriding the se 0 bj e cti ons of th e Chris. tian Dem ocra ts 
the Right drafted the latter and had it ratified 
by a majority on the General Council .Again,with 
opposition from the Christian Democrats,the Colegio 
Medico debarred Allende from practising medicine and 
in a symbolic gesture stripped him of the gold medal 
which it had awarded to him barely three years 
previously. 
THE COLEGIO MEDICO'S AGREEMENT WITH POPULAR UNITY ONE 
WEEK BEFORE THE COUP 
Because of his close ties with several 
Colegio Medico leaders,Allende personally must have 
been aware of the tensions within the gremio during 
its strike. Allende realised that there was little 
hope in persuading the Truckers to give up their 
action because their strike was unambiguously 
political. On the other hand,the objections of 
several doctors to the political overtones of the 
Colegio's action"showed Allende that there was a 
possibility of ending the physicians 'strike.In a clear 
move to appease the moderates of the Colegio Medico 
he appointed a new Minister of Health,Mario Lagos. 
He was an ex~Secretary General of the Colegio Medico 
and was widely respected amongst most doctors. Allende 
ordered Lagos to unconditionally accept all Colegio 
Medico demands. These stipulations included the 
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preservation of SERMENA system and a huge rise in 
doctors' wages. Allende was willing to concede any 
gremial demand to end the strike. He over-rode the 
objections of the Socialist Party and other more 
radical groups in the Popular Unity coalition who 
were furious at what they described as a capitulation 
t th d d f th C 1 . M 'd' 33 o e eman s 0 e 0 eglo e 1 co. 
On 4th September the General Council 
met to discuss the Government' soffer. In this 
historic meeting Patricio Silva,a leading Christian 
Democrat argued that doctors should accept the 
Government1s offer and 'therefore suspend the strike. 
Acuna,fearful of any victimization after the vote 
had taken place demanded that voting on Silva's 
motion be secret. However,the doctors who wanted to 
continue the strike were determined to shame Acuna 
and the Christian Democrats in the General Council 
and raised their hands against the motion in an 
act of defiance . The vote went against the Right by 
11 votes to 9. Acuna the following day appeared on 
television to declare the end of the Colegio Medico 
strike. That same day,a large publication appeared 
in the Popular Unity press signed by Acuna and the 
Minister of Health spelling out the terms of their 
agreement. 
It is impossible to overestimate the 
importance of Acuna and his Christian Democrat 
supporters' action inside the Colegio Medico. Chile 
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was strike-bound. The gremios were hOlding massive 
strikes openly declaring that the Government had 
to return to "legality" before their action could 
be called off. Talks between the Christian Democrats 
and the Popular Unity authorities at the national 
level had broken down. Reconciliation between 
Popular Unity and the opposition appeared impossible. 
And yet,the Christian Democrats inside the Colegio 
Medico had taken a clear decision to return to 
work. Here was the most unlikely of all organizations, 
the reactionary bourgeois Colegio Medico in nothing 
less than an act of loyalty towards the Government, 
ordering the medical profession back to work. 
The ending of the strike had,and 
was to have for many years to com~ a tremendous 
significance inside the Colegio Medico. The Right 
could h~rdly believe the magnitude of the Christian 
Democrats' betrayal. Accusing the Christian Democrats 
of calling off the strike for purely financial gain, 
Alvayay declared that they had sold the Colegio 
Medico to Popular Unity"po~ un plaio de lenieja~ " 35 . 
The supporters of gremialism inside the Colegio 
Medico who were in constant contact with the other 
striking gremios feared that a return to work by 
doctors would weaken both the resolve of the other 
striking gremios and the Armed Forces. 
It is worth noting that at this stage 
inside the Armed Forces,the Navy and Air Force were 
ready to stage a coup. However,the military was 
vacillating. The Navy and Air Force were thus 
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absolutely determined ,that the striking gremios' aetions 
should tip the balance inside the military in favour 
of action. Thus,the Air Force,wanting the doctors' 
strike to continue flew one General consejero,Dr. 
Donckaster to Antofagasta from Santiago to address an 
assembly of doctors and to convince them to continue 
their strike. Since all public transport was strike 
bound,Donckaster could not have made the trip without 
the Air Force's assistance. 
The assembly in Antofagasta was part of 
the Right's response to the Colegio Medico's agreement 
with Popular Unity. Up and down the country,assemblies 
were held to recruit doctors' support and thus,reverse 
this decision. In Valparaiso,an emergency assembly 
publicly rebuked the action of R.Acuna, 
"Po~ ha'e~ igno~ado la~ a~pi~aci6ne~ 
de la g~an mayo~[a de lo~ Con~ejo~ 
Regionale~ del pa[~ y oC,Q..0o.dO 
una ~olucion pa~a el contlicto 
medico que denig~a la imagen del 
Colegio fYtedico y ~u~ colegiado~i al 
hace~lo~ apa~ace~ como p~eocupado~ 
~olamente de lo~ p~o'lema~ ec6nomico~ 
olvidando~e de lo~ ot~o~ impo~tante~ 
p~o'lema~ g~emiale~ y de la g~avi~ima 
~ituaci6n gene~al del pa[~ ." 37 
Immediately after the vote in the General Council,the 
3 Valparaiso consejeros had resigned in disgust. 
After these assemblies, ,the Right held 
a National Convention of the Regional Councils. The 
agreements of this convention were quite openly 
political. Their strike had been stripped of all its 
ambiguity. For example,the convention agreed to 
maintain, 
"La lucha ~(una ~ectiticaci6n ~eal 
de la polltica gene~al de 9ogie~no." 
Moreover,the convention demanded that the Colegio 
Medico join gremialismo ,as it declared, 
"tl e/.)t~e::.hamiento de vfnculo/.) con 
ot~o/.) g~emio/.) integ~ando/.) a lo/.) 
Comando/.) ~ultig~emiale/.) a nivel 
p~ovincial y nacional." 39 
At the same time as the convention was 
being held, the 'Right held a referendum to determine 
the extent of the support it had for carrying on with 
its strike. In this referendum 89% of doctors replied 
that they wanted the strike to continue. Even though 
not all doctors were questioned,the result- shows 
impressive support amongst the profession for the 
Right's strategy. 
It was interesting to note that one of 
the questions put to the doctors asked if they were 
in support of the Colegio Medico forming alliances 
with other gremios even those not in the heal th 
sector,in order to exert pressure on the Government. 
This question in effect,asked doctors if they were 
prepared to join the National Movement of the Gremios. 
The response again,was impressively high,with 80.4% 
of doctors replying positively. 
As a result of this pressure Acuna and 
Cruz Mena resigned on 8th September. It is extremely 
informative to examine the way in which the Right 
reported this obvious struggle inside the Colegio 
Medi co . IfEl Mer curi 0 Ifin its edi torial of 10th 
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September played down these resignations suggesting 
that the Executive Committee of the Colegio Medico 
had merely undergone "una ~enovaci6n" • Osvaldo 
Artaza,echoing this clear desire by the Right to 
minimize the division inside the Colegio Medico;-
was actually lying when he declared to "El Mercurio", 
"Pa~a ef. D~. R.u&..E.n Acuna y quiene-b f.e 
acompana~on en -bU ge-btion di~ectiva 
-be t~ i&..uto un apt-au/) Q. " 40 
A few days later Acuna was to face 'rigorous 
questioning from his Regional Council for his actions. 
He was later forced to resign as a General Councillor. 
The Regional Council of Valparaiso was later to charge 
him under the Colegio Medico Code of Ethics for 
"anti-gremial" behaviour. 
The replacement of Acuna and Mena by 
Ernesto Mundt and Osvaldo Artaza was completed on 
9th September. 
The new Executive Committee called 
itself a Council of War. Its first task was to declare 
an indefinite strike against Popular Unity in alliance 
with the other striking gremios. The Colegio Medico, 
for the first time now belonged to the Comando 
Multigremial. In an interesting comparison of the aims 
of the two Executive Committees,Osvaldo Artaza 
de clared to "El Mercurio" on 1 Oth Sep tern ber, 
"La antigua Di~ectiv~ no ha&..la captado 
ef. -bentido muf.tig~emiaf.i-bta que tenIa 
ef. movimiento medico,co-ba que no 
ocu~~la con f.O-b p~ote-bionaf.e-b def. Cono 
su~ po~ ejempf.o donde f.O-b medico-b ya 
e-btan actuando en ef. -b~no de f.O-b 
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Comando~ ~ultig~emiale~ po~que "hemo~ 
~alido de un contexto economici~ta­
g~emial pa~a ing~e~a~ a ot~o Socia~ 
9~em ial-po lltico': donde la~ conqui~ta~ 
~implemente economica~ pa~an a un 
~egundo plano. " 
Undoubtedly the significance of this 
renewed doctors' strike was not lost on the military 
when it decided when to launch the coup. Three days 
after the Right's takeover of the entire Colegio 
M~dico,with most hospitals paralyzed ,the military 
took over. 
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CONCLUSION 
Why did the Christian Democrats within 
the Colegio Medico stubbornly resist the Right's 
political project for so long? It has to be remembered 
that ~elements of" Christlan Democracy held negotiations 
with the Left almost right UP until the date of the 
coup. Some of the Colegio Medico Christian Democrats 
believed that until these talks had completely 
failed they should oppose the Colegio's co-operation 
with gremialismo to topple the Government. 
However,these talks between Christian 
Democracy and the Left did fail and yet some 
Christian Democrats were still reluctant to accept 
the political goals of the Right. 
There is no single explanation for 
this behaviour. After all,even though members of the 
Christian Democrat Party these doctors were highly 
individualistic . Some of them had clearly been 
antagonized by the Right's tactics to take over the 
Colegio Medico. Their hatred of men like Alvayay 
and Artaza outweighed their dislike of Popular Unity." 
One suspects that this was the case with Acuna. 
The Right explained Christian Democracy's 
action in terms of cowardice. This reasoning should 
not be dismissed altog~ther . If,as was genuinely 
believed at the time,Chile was on the verge of 
civil war and a large part of the Army was going to 
support Popular Unity,then any individuals leading 
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the Colegio Medico into open opposition to the 
Marxists were exposing themselves to a considerable 
amount of personal danger. 
Moreover,the Colegio's settlement 
with the Government ensured that the medical 
profession received huge material benefits. This 
undoubtedly explained why some Christian Democrats 
decided to call off the strike . Indeed,in one of 
the heated debates inside the Colegio in early 
September,Cruz Mena urged the Right to accept the 
settlement with Popular Unity and then continue its 
political strike later. Mena's proposal was not 
quite as ridiculous as first appears. As he 
fore cas t, 
nIt the p~ote~~ion didn't win 
p~ivieege~ now, the new 9ove~nment 
woued take the p~ote~~ion'~ 
~uppo~t to~ g~anted ,and woued 
t~eat the p~ote~~ion wo~~e than 
Popuea~ Unity had done. n 41 
This is exactly what occurred. 
All of these reasons can be considered 
valid but perhaps the most important factor was the 
Christian Democrats' belief in the constitutional 
process. After Popular Unity the Christian Democrats 
were attacked for supporting the overthrow of the 
constitutional Government by a military dictatorship. 
Many Christian Democrats certainly cast aside their 
belief in democratic principles and fully supported 
the military coup. But equally there were many who, 
despite their hatred of the Government,did nat 
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sacrifice these democratic and constitutional 
beliefs. 
This stubborn inherent Christian 
Democrat belief in constitutionalism should not be 
over-emphasized. Even if there had been sufficient 
time before the coup took place it is doubtful 
whether Acuna,Silva and his Christian Democrat 
supporters would have tried to challenge the Council 
of War themselves. 
l\J-one thele s s' thi s small case study of 
the Colegio Medico during the Allende period perhaps 
suggests that Christian Democracy was less ready to 
abandon its democratic assumptions and work with the 
Right for the intervention of the military than is 
commonly supposed. 
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C HAP T E R 8 
THE POST COUP PERIOD: THE ULTRA 
RIGHT WING DOCTORS 'STRATEGY WITHIN 
THE COLEGIO MEDICO - 1973-1976 
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INTRODUCTION 
A few months after the coup a sPlit 
developed within the Colegio Medico. Two opposing 
group s emerged. 
These two groups consisted of on the 
one hand, certain Regional Councils,notably the 
Regional Council of Valparaiso together with the 
Executive Committee of the Colegio Medico ,and on 
the other, several consejeros in the General Council 
and the Regional Council of Santiago. 
The first group had seized control of 
the Colegio on 8th September 1973 and turned the 
Executive Committee of the Colegio into a Council of 
War. A few months after the coup the second group 
began to oppose the leadership of the Colegio Medico. 
At this stage we can call the former group, "the 
Right" and the latter "the oppositionll . 
The seeds of division were also sown 
inside the new health authorities. The Director 
General of the Servicio Nacional de Salud from 1973-
1975 supported the Executive Committee of the Colegio 
Medico and the Regional Council of Valparaiso while 
the new Minister of Health and his Under Secretary 
supported the Regional Council of Santiago in its 
opposition to the Colegio Medico leadership. 
In this chapter we will examine the 
reasons behind this conflict and the development of 
the struggle from the time of the coup until 1976. 
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8.1 THE RIGHT INSIDE THE COLEGIO MEDICO AFTER THE COUP 
It is no easy task to categorize these 
groups inside the Colegio Medico . Most of these 
groupings belonged to the IIRight ll ,but as we shall see, 
this IIRight" inside the Colegio Medico was fragmented. 
The IIRightll had seized outright control 
of the Colegio Medico on 8th September 1973. Under 
the leadership of Ernesto Mundt,a consejero represent-
ing the Regional Council of Valparaiso,the Executive 
Committee was turned into a Council of War. This 
IIRightll consisted of those groups who believed that 
a political strike was the only means of removing 
Popular Unity. This faction was composed of the 
Regional Councils of Valparaiso and Rancagua and 
several consejeros on the General Council such as 
Artaza,Donckaster and Arriagada. This group had 
opposed the Christian Democrats who had wanted a 
political settlement with Popular Unity without the 
intervention of the Armed Forces. 
This Right wing group of Valparaiso, 
Rancagua and some Santiago doctors maintained its 
extremist position after the coup. 
The Valparaiso doctors included many 
neo-fascists amongst whom was the President of the 
Regional Council of Valparaiso,J.Alvayay. These 
groups had remained silent about their beliefs 
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during Popular Unity for fear of upsetting their 
Christian Democrat allies. Now they felt no need 
to keep their real feelings in check. 
THE OPPOSITION INSIDE THE COLEGIO MEDICO 
Opposition to this extremist position 
came from more moderate Right-wingers inside the 
Colegio Medico. This position was typified by a 
General Councillor called Dr.Herrera,who whilst 
supporting the political strike,was d~~inst pushing the 
Colegio Medico into an ultra-Right wing position. 
As he reminded these extremists, 
"Chil~ ~4 un pa[4 mod~~ado y 
c~ni~i4ia. c4ia ~4 la ~alz 
p~otunda po~qu~ ~l ma~xihmo 
no pudo ~ni~oniza~ 4uh ga~~ah, 
hU mayo~ ~~~o~ tu~ d~hconoc~~ 
~4ta i~adici6n ~ igno~a~ q~ 
un 40% d~ la po~laci6n chil~na 
~h una cla4a media,4olida ~ 
iluhi~ada,qu~ ~n d~tiniiiva 
~~4 c~~~6 ~l paho." 1 
Allied to these moderate Right-wingers 
were the centrists in the Colegio Medico such as the 
Christian Democrats and,to a lesser extent,the 
Radicals. These doctors like R.Acuna,P.Silva and E. 
Villarroel had not supported the political strike. 
The position of their group throughout this post-
coup period mirrors the growing opposition of the 
Christian Democrat Party to the Junta. 
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This opposition group did not control 
the leadership of the Colegio M~dico,although it 
did control the Regional Council of Santiago. It is 
difficult to assess the amount of support it had 
amongst the profession since elections were banned 
and appointments to all Colegio M~dico posts had 
to be approved by the Minister of the Interior. 
What then were the reasons for its 
opposition to the Right's strategy within the Colegio 
M~dico ? 
THE "RIGHT WING's " STRATEGY AFTER THE COUP 
289. 
The underlying theme of the Right wing's 
strategy inside the Colegio M~dico was summarized 
in the pream ble . to its new heal th poli cy do cum en tc: . 
An extract from this read, 
~Nue~t~o~ go~e~nante~ han e~ta~lecido 
que el ~~gimen iniciado el 11 de 
~eptiem~~e de 1973,no de~e ~e~ con~id­
e~ado un pe~{odo de t~an~ici6n ent~e 
do~ admini~t~aci6ne~ pol[tica~ del 
tipo t~adicional. Su mi~i6n con~i~ti~a 
en to~ma~,con la ayuda de todo~ lo~ 
- ciudadano~ gene~o~o~ y pat~;:ota~, una 
' .--1 g.e.n.e/Z..acion qu.e mqnt.enga R..o tll-l!.. ;jO/l. de 
r nue~t~o legado cultu~al c~i~tiano e 
hi~panico . Se~a ella la que con~tituya 
una ~ociedad inmune al ma~xi~mo u 
e~ta~a to~mada po~ hom~~e~ li~~e~, 
digno~,~e~pon~a~le~ y ~olida~io~." 
To consti tute a society "inmune al fla~xi~mo" 
2 
necessitated a radical change in health policy. To this 
end, the Right sought the immediate privatization of the 
health service in order t6 destroy the Servicio NacionaJ 
de Salud. It declared that the State health service 
had given Chileans the false image that they 
belonged to different classes. The health service 
a Chilean used was determined by his occupation. An 
obrero obtained treatment in the Servicio Nacional 
de Salud;an empleado from a different service,SERMENA. 
The Right argued that the division of these services 
by class had to be ended ,for Marxism had used this 
division to propagate its aims. The Right argued 
that the new health service must be built around the 
individual and not the class grouping to which he 
belonged. "Lig~e elecci6n gene~alizada" - the 
freedom. of the individual to choose his health 
service was the principle on which the new model 
would rest. 
By focussing on the individual,their 
policy appeared to fit the vision of the free market 
economists. These economists,or Chicago Boys(since 
many of them had been trained at the University of 
Chicago) influenced the Junta to adopt their 
economic policies immediately after the coup. 3 
These economists had actually prepared their 
economic policy before the coup with the help of 
the opposition leaders from both the Christian 
Democrat and National Parties 4. These Valparaiso 
doctors who had possibly known of this plan had 
borrowed,albeit incorrectly,certain ideas from the 
Chicago Boys to draft their new health policy. 
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A new political constitution 
To create a society "immune al ~a~xi~mo" 
this Right wing group, particularly the doctors from 
Valparaiso, argued that the major task of the new 
Government was to "to~ja~ una nueva con~iucionalidad". 
In effect, this new constitution,if enacted,would 
have meant the end of all political parties. These 
doctors led by J.Alvayay argued that the political 
power which had been so shamefully abused in the 
previous epoch had to be divided into a social power 
and a political power pe~ ~e. The political power, 
they believed would be exercised by the Government, 
whilst the social power would devolve to the inter-
mediate bodies of Chilean society. These intermediate 
bodies were to be principally the .c.;remios. In order 
to ensure that this space between rulers and ruled 
was depoliticized,they argued that the, 
"pof.tiica gene~al de f.o~ g~emi.o~ no 
deRe e~ia~ comp~emeii.da con pol[iica 
pa~iidi~ia alguna,ni depende~,en ~u 
ideologla y p~axi~ de pa~tido~ 
polliico~." 5 
These ultra-Right wing doctors envisaged 
that decision-taking within the gremios would become 
strictly technical. 
This group idealized that the new 
Chile would be founded on a Ra~ii6n civico-milita~. 
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Since groups would no longer be represented by political 
parties,divisiveness would give way to an essential 
harmony of relations between the ~remios and the 
military. Society they argued,would become organic. 
It would be a society in which the citizen rather than 
certain political groups,would be able to participate. 
The role of the gremios would thus, 
take on considerably more functions than in the past. 
The gremios rather then the old political parties, 
would become active in formulating policy for Junta 
approval. It is not surprising therefore that the 
battle cry of this group after the coup was, 
"Raga 9~ande At Cotegio ~edico 
de Ch.J..te " 6 
Of course,it was not only this group 
of doctors who began to propose corporatist solutions 
to Chile's problems after the coup. The fascists in 
Patria y Libertad under P.Rodriguez began to try and 
push the Junta into adopting their prescriptions. A 
Confederacion Unica de Trabajo was set up a few days 
after the coup comprising truckers,building firms, 
agricultural interests and professional associations 
to put forward similar fascist solutions. These 
groups hoped that the Junta might use the gremios 
for its new political project. Gremialism had not 
only been successful in overthrowing Allende,it had 
also formed an embryo organizatio~ which the fascists 
believed could easily be strengthened to replace the 
old mechanisms of political party representation. 
Some doctors then,along with these groups,had high 
hopes that this Junta would be a "fascist" one. 7 
It was puzzling however, that this 
group of doctors mixed corporatist and neo-fascist 
prescriptions with demands for free market solutions 
in the health service. The classical fascist goal of 
a strong,even welfare oriented State appeared to 
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contradict the liberal intentions of these neo-fascist 
doctors in the health sector. It should be remembered 
that the fascists in Chile represented by Patria y 
Libertad never accepted the Chicago School free 
k t 1 ·· 8 mar e po lCles. 
These ultra-Right doctors wanted to 
see the health service free from State involvement 
because they viewed the Chilean State health service 
as a product of the Marxists. They could not support 
its extension or even its preservation because this 
would have meant allying with th~ basic tenet of 
Marxism. 
Repression of left wing doctors 
The final part of this strategy was 
to suppress the Left wing doctors of the profession. 
This group went to incredible,if not to say,brutal 
lengths to ensure that the Left would not represent 
a threat to their plans. This group always 
emphasized that Marxism had not been defeated after 
the coup. As it declared in 1976, 
"[l de~tino de nu~t~a Pat~ia ~igue en 
juego. [~ p~eci~o comp~ende~ que la 
lucha cont~a el ma~xi~mo continua. 
No podemo~ cae~ en el e~~o~ de c~ee~ 
que tue~on ~uticiente~ la~ Ratalla~ 
liR~ada~ du~ante el qoRie~no de la 
llnidad Popula~ y que todo te~min6 
con la victo~ia del 11 de SeptiemR~e. 
[£ comuni~mo e~ muy pode~o~o. 7iene 
la tenacidad oR~e~iva del tanatico y el 
calculo t~[o,in~en~iRle y met6dico 
de cientltico." 9 
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Thus,the repression of Left wing doctors 
was not simply to be understood as part of their 
thirst for revenge. The Left wing was seen as a 
continuous threat to the success of its strategy. 
Never ending vigilance had to be exercised to ensure 
that these Marxist elements would never re-emerge. 
Thus,these ultra-Right wing groups-were to continue 
the repression of the Left long after the coup had 
taken place. 
In the next section we will examine 
in greater detail the Right~s strategy,discover the 
ways in which it was promoted and the methods by 
which the opposition developed inside the Colegio 
M~dico to chaililenge it. 
8.4 THE COLEGIO MEDICO IN COLLABORATION WITH THE JUNTA: 
THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF THE COUP. 
In the first weeks after the coup all 
groups inside the Colegio M~dico were relatively 
united in their support for the new authorities. 
This reflected the general situation throughout the 
country. 
At the national level, the National 
and Christian Democrat Parties were allied in their 
support for the new Government. The National Party 
had completely supported the coup. The Christian 
Democrats however,had shown some ambiguity towards 
the unconstitutional change of power. A few days after 
the 11th, some of their members ihcluding Tomic 
declared the coup unconstitutional, but for the bulk 
of the Christian Democrats the end of the Allende 
Government had been a great relief. Public support 
for the new 4 man Junta was impressively high. The 
majority of Chileans united in their euphoria over 
the end of the Marxist experiment. 
This unity was reflected early on 
inside the Colegio Medico. The Executive Committee 
had been formed into the Council of War 4 days before 
the coup. In the words of one of the members,its 
main aims were: 
"1. P~z~iona~ la~enuncia dzl P~z~ideniz 
de la Rzpuglica,D~. S.Allzndz,a 
i~av~~ dz und huzlga m~dica 
indE-/-inida. 
2. Colo.&.. o(c<r con la~ nueva~ auio~idadz~, 
pa~a ponz~ en /-uncionamienio ~z~vicio~ 
dz ~alud g~avzmzniz poliiizado~ y 
de~qui ciado~. " 10 
If some of the Christian Democrats had doubts about 
the first aim of this council, all Christian D~mocrat 
~ 
and Right wing groups within the Colegio Medico 
were united after the coup in the second aim i.e. 
in helping the new Government to bring order to 
the health services. 
Support for the new Government from 
the Colegio Medico was demonstrated on the morning 
of the coup when the Colegio announced on the radio 
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that doctors should call off their strike and go 
back to work ,. 
"La ~e~a Di~eciiva del Colegio ~.dico 
~e ha manienido en ~u ~ede,de~de la~ 
p~ime~a~ ho~a~ de la manana de hoy, 
aienia a lo~ aconiecimienio~ que 
vive el paf~ y la ~iiuaci6n de la 
aienci6n m.dica en lo~ dive~~o~ ~iiio~ 
de i~a1lajo. 
In~i~utmo~ a iodo~ lo~ 
Con~ejo~ Regionale~ de nue~i~a o~den 
pa~a no~maliza~ la aiencion m.dica 
en iodo el pa[~ a la 1l~evedad po~i1lle, 
de comun acue~do con la~ auio~idade~ 
miliia~e~ de ~u~ ju~i~dicci6ne~.n 
After this radio announcement the Colegio Medico 
11 
published on 12th September a declaration giving total 
support to the new authorities. 
The CoJegjo Medjc~ and the Junta 
worked closely to return the health services to normal. 
Four days after the coup,the newly elected Minister 
of Health,a doctor and Airforce colonel,Spoerer asked 
the Colegio Medico to recommend a new Director 
General of the Servicio Nacional de Salud. In the 
past the Director General had been proposed by the 
President of the Republic and approved by Congreps. 
Now it was the turn of the Colegio Medico to perform 
this task. It recommended Darwin Arriagada,Treasurer 
of the Colegio Medico and a member of the Council of 
War. Together Arriagada and the Colegio Medico began 
to fill the vacuum wi thin the Servicio Nacional de 
Sa Iud caused by the downfall of the Unidad Popular 
Government. In the months after the coup the Regional 
Councils took over the administrative running of the 
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8.5 
Servicio Nacional de Salud and SERMENA • They appointed 
new personnel, organized working hours and even.fixed 
wages and fees • Spoerer had handed over the running 
of the health service to the Colegio Medico. This 
mirrored events in other ministeries:for instance, 
SOFOFA,the employers gremio was put in temporary 
charge of CORFO. 
THE REPRESSION OF LEFT WING DOCTORS 
Part of the reason for this unity 
was a common fear of a plot allegedly hatched by some 
Unidad Popular supporters to violently seize power, 
from the State by murdering top generals in the Armed 
Forces,opposition politicians and gremio leaders. The 
actual existence of this plot was open to question, 
however,it was certainly believed by the Colegio 
Medi co. 
IIPlan ZII as it was ca.lled was used as 
justification by the new Junta to brutally repress 
Popular Unity supporters. It couched a description 
of this slaughter in medical language. One member of 
the Junta,General Leigh described it thus, 
"~a~xi~m' wa~ a canc~~ in Chil~'~ 
gody pofitic;it had to g~ ~~mov~d 
gy ~u~gical m~an~." 12 
Included in this massacre of Popular 
Unity supporters were 32 doctors. This figure 
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represented only documented cases. 13 The true figure 
therefore was much higher. Some doctors argued that 
these victims were killed while fighting the security 
forces. This was untrue. On the morning of the 
coup,most Left wing doctors realised that the Unidad 
Popular Government was defeated and armed resistance 
was pointless. Only a very few doctors actually 
belonged to the MIR,a party which had ordered its 
members to fight the military with force. Moreover, 
as late as 1977,doctors were reported as being killed 
by the Junta. These included the cases of Drs. Lorca, 
Insunza and Godoy . Any fighting that had taken 
place was confined to a few skirmishes and occurred 
only in the first week after the military took over. 
The murder of all these doctors bore no relation to 
the threat they posed to the regime. Their deaths 
were part of brutal,cold-blooded policies of 
repression. 
Therp. is no evidence to link their 
deaths with the Colegio Medico. However, the Colegiots 
involvement in the sacking of many Popular Unity 
doctors from their Servicio Nacional de Salud posts 
is well documented in the minutes of Colegio Medico 
meetings. 
Immediately after the coup, many of the 
Popular Unity doctors were summarily dismissed. 
Darwin Arriagada the Director General of the Servicio 
Nacional de Salud had said that his first task on 
taking up his post was to purge the service of Marxist 
elements. The capitulos which had organized the 
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strikes in the hospitals now set about getting rid 
of their Left wing doctor colleagues. In some 
capitulos it was not even necessary to bring a 
formal charge against a doctor. As Dr. Uribe 
declared, describi_ng the si tuation in Valparaiso, 
"cl Dec~eto N°1 cmiiado po~ la 
Recto~[a de la Chile de Santiago 
dice:no puede expul~a~ a docente~, 
alumno~ y admini~t~ativo~ ~in 
~uma~io p~evio. Aqu[ en Valpa~ai~o 
~e tiene ot~a vi~ion. 14 
Many Popular Unity doctors lost their 
jobs because they simply appeared on a blacklist. 
Capitulos in Santiago for instance,divided all doctors 
into 3 lists;A,B and C.Doctors on List A were given 
clearance. Doctors on List B were allowed to carryon 
working,although were subjected to supervision. 
Doctors on List C were summarily dismissed. 15 
In Valparaiso,the capitulos actually 
informed on some Popular Unity doctors to the 
Intelligence Services. This was boldly reported by 
Dr. Barros,a General Councillor for the Regional 
Council of Valparaiso to the General Council in 
Santiago. 16 He told of capitulos dividing all 
Popular Unity doctors into 2 groups. The first group, 
the. capi tulos called "lo~ activi~ta~ " who had 
"tomado una actitud ~ien detinida y han p~e~entado 
~e~i~tencici." The capitulos called the second group 
"lo~ poe[:ti.co~" .Their "crimes" were apparently not 
so bad. They,it appeared had accepted the inevitab-
ility of the Junta and the destruction of their 
Popular Unity Government. When Dr. Barros informed 
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the consejeros on the General Council that the capitulos 
had handed over the names of "eo~ activi~ta~" to the 
security forces,not a single consejero questioned his 
t o f tho to 17 apparen acqulesence 0 lS ac lon. 
In general the Colegio Medico did not 
challenge this process of expelling its members. Many 
of the Colegio Medico consejeros had attended capitulo 
meetings when these lists were being drawn up.When the 
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fate of the doctors on List C was discussed by the Santiago 
Regional Council and General Council on 23rd October, 
no criticisms were levelled at the way doctors had 
been sacked. No inquiry was set up to determine 
whether this procedure had been fairly executed. 
They accepted the decision of the capitulo on 
each individual doctor's case as final. This meeting 
formally agreed that only if a doctor on List C was 
to approach them directly,would they reconsider his 
case. However,even when ex -Popular Unity doctors 
did attempt to obtain help from the Regional Council 
or even from the Executive Committee of the Colegio 
Medico,they were offered no practical assistance 
despite severe economic hardship. 18 No Popular 
Unity doctor was reinstated in his job by the efforts 
of his Regional Council. 
The same type of dismissals and 
expulsions took place inside the universities. No 
Popular Unity professor remained in his teaching post 
after the coup. With Popular Unity students however, 
greater leniency was shown. In Valparaiso for instance, 
Zeldis,the Vice Rector of the Universidad de Chile 
expressing alarm at the expulsion of students from 
the final years of medical courses offered two 
solutions: 
W a ) cnv{o po~ pa~t~ d~i 9o~i~~no a 
Cu~a 0 ot~o pal~ dond~ puedan 
~~ci~i~~~ y ~j~~c~~ ~u p~ot~~i6n 
y 
~) Da~i~~ ia po~i~iiidad d~ 
continua~ ~u~ ~~tudio~ ~ajo 
Vigiiancia. w 19 
The Regional Council of Valparaiso discussed the 
suggestion and agreed that, 
"Con io~ aiumno~ no ~~ d~~~ ~~~ muy 
~~t~icto ya qu~ iodavta ~~tan ~n p~oc~~o d~ 
to~maci6n m~ntai y ~~pi~ituai • Ai 
mi~mo . tie.mpo ~~ ~~ cat~g6~i co ~n ia 
n~c~~idad d~ ~iimina~ a io~ medico~ 
d~ izqui~~da d~ ia doc~ncia." 20 
Once the Popular Unity doctors and 
professors had been expelled,the capitulos and Regional 
Councils began appointing their replacements. In normal 
times appointments in the Servicio Nacional de Salud 
had to be made through strict competition. The 
expulsion and subsequent appointments were all done 
very quickly • The entire process was completed wi thin 
two weeks of the downfall of the Popular Unity 
Government. 
Precisely why was the Colegio Medico 
involved in this witch-hunt of doctors,who after all 
were fellow members? As we have mentioned,the "Plan 
Z " was genuinely believed by the Colegio. Some 
consejeros argued that doctors who were suspended 
should be shown little sympathy. As one said,they 
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were behind the plan, 
"k!.n k!.f- cuaf- .ok!. conik!.mpf-afJ..a f-a 
guif-f-oiina pa~a iodo.o f-O.o 
con.ok!.jk!.~o.o y qUk!. ma.o a4n 
conik!.mpf-afJ..a f-a di.oapa~i:cion dk!.f-
Cof-k!.gio f1edico. 21 
These consejeros argued that because Chile was in a 
state of war,the Colegio Medico should offer no 
objections to the capitulos appointing their own 
medical personnel. 
Another reason for this Colegio-Medico 
complicity in the expulsion of Popular Unity doctors 
from the Servicio Nacional de Salud,was the Colegio's 
hatred of Left wing doctors. It had not forgotten 
how many Left wing doctors had insulted it during the 
previous Government. As one member declared, 
"No .ok!. dk!.fJ..k!.n P~k!.ocupa~ dk!.ma.oiado 
po~ f-O.o medico.o qUk!. k!..oian k!.n 
p~ofJ..f-k!.ma.o ya qUk!. k!.lf-o.o no .ok!. han 
aCk!.~cado a .ou Cof-k!.gio P~otk!..oionaf-
a pk!.di~ p~oik!.cci6n,p~imk!.~0,po~qUk!. 
con.oianik!.mk!.nik!. k!..oiuvik!.~on k!.n coni~a 
dk!. la O~dk!.n,.ok!.gundo po~qUk!. ~k!.iik!.~a­
dk!.mk!.nik!. dk!..oo.e..k!.dk!.cik!.~on .ou.o acuk!.~do.o 
y,ik!.~ck!.~o,po~qUk!. pk!.~mank!.nik!.mk!.nik!. 
han manik!.nido una aciiiud dk!. 
dk!..op~k!.cio hacia k!.f- Cof-k!.gio .C~k!.O 
qUk!. a k!..oia.o pk!.~.oona.o,quk!. no iik!.nk!.n 
inik!.~i.o k!.n·pk!.di~ p~oik!.cci6n,no .ok!. 
pUk!.dk!. i~ a ot~k!.c~~.ok!.f-a a .ou.o ca.oa.o.- 22 
At this stage there was some internal 
opposition to the suspensions in the Servicio 
Nacional de Salud. Most of the consejeros in the 
General Council who voiced doubts about the legality 
of these sackings were Christian Democrats or Radicals . 
P.Silva argued for instance, that the Colegio Medico 
could not legally suspend doctors from their jobs in 
the Servicio Nacional de Salud . As he said, 
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"Ni eo~ Cap[tueo~ ni eo~ Con~ejo~ 
Regionale~,ni ee Con~ejo gene~al, 
puede con~titui~~e en t~igunal 
popula~ pa~a acu~a~,ni pa~a pedi~ 
~ancione~ a m~dico~ ni meno~ 
juzga~lo~." 23 
These Christian Democrat doctors also 
objected to the way lists were used to suspend doctors. 
They argued that an investigation should have taken 
place before these lists had been drawn up, for as one 
declared, 
"No ju~titica que ~e apeiquen 
~anci6ne~ po~ la u[a de la 
~imple caliticacion." 24 
One should not however, exaggerate the 
criticisms of some Christian Democrats to this purge 
of Left wing doctors. Their opposition in the 
General Council was more concerned with the method 
of dismissing Left wing doctors rather than the actual 
expulsion itself. Even when Christian Democrats in 
the capitulos in Vina raised objections to doctors 
being sacked because of their political beliefs, this 
did not prevent them,as one Christian Democrat 
admitted,from joining with the Right and sacking the 
Director of the Hospital Vina del Mar,a Socialist, 
Marco Maldonna. 25 
Moreover,it is worth noting the 
overwhelming mood of vengeance felt by many doctors 
as a result of their experience of Popular Unity. 
For example there were still some doctors who 
wanted the Colegio Medico to publicly expel Salvador 
Allende from the Colegio,even after his death. 
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In conclusion,in the first weeks 
after the coup the Christian Democrats and the 
various Right wing tendencies of other groups inside 
the Colegio Medico were united in their support for 
the new authorities. 
8.6 THE BEGINNINGS OF OPPOSITION TO THE RIGHT WING PROJECT 
INSIDE THE COLEGIO MEDICO:OCTOBER 1973 TO DECEMBER 1973. 
From October 1973 onwards,preparations 
went ahead for the first Medical Convention to be 
held since the Junta had taken over power. This was 
to be held in December. The Right inside the Colegio 
began to campaign for the privatization of the 
Chilean health service and the reconstruction of the 
gremios as part of the new corporatist Chile. While 
their first part of the strategy,the suppression of 
Left wing doctors had been completely successful and 
had been largely supported by groups within the Colegio 
Medico,their attempts to implement their other radical 
proposals,in contrast,began to arouse opposition. 
Mundt,the President of the Colegio 
Medico and the main proponent of this strategy became 
frustrated and annoyed at the lack of support he was 
receiving as President. As he described in a private 
letter, 
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"De./)pu.e/) de.l Wl.Onunciamie.nio miliia/l.. 
lle.v~ al Con/)e.jo pO/l.. e.l camino de. 
la ma/) /)ince./l..a y te.al colaRo/l..aci6n 
con e.l nue.vo 9bRie./l..no pa/l..a ta 
/l..e.cupe./l..acion de.l paf/),/)in p/l..e.ocupa/l..me. 
de. ta/) c/l..liica/) que. e.tto me. ai/l..ata 
de. atguno/) /)e.cio/l..e./) wino/l..ita~io/) de.l 
g/l..e.mio." 26 
It has to be recalled that a great 
animosity existed between the Christian Democrats and 
the Right as the result of ,the vote taken a few days 
before the coup to suspend the doctors ' strike. This 
breach between the two groups never healed. To some 
extent this was the fault of the Right. After the 
coup it had impeached Ruben Acuna and demanded that 
the Colegio Medico's Committee of Ethics investigate 
his behaviour. It also pushed the Regional Council 
of Santiago into carrying out an enquiry into the 
behaviour of Acuna and two other General Council 
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consejeros p Cruz Mena)and Merino who had voted with him, 
for the termination of the strike.Acuna and Hena were 
forced to resign as consejeros as a result of the 
Right's actions .27 
However,when Acuna returned to the 
General Council in November 1973·,this time a~ 
Representative of Punto Arenas,Mundt and his other 
Righ t win supporters were fearful tha t thJ:~ "/)e.cio/l..e./) 
Medico into opposition to the Junta. They had tried 
to persuade the Regional Council of Punto Arenas not 
to appoint Acuna as its consejero,but among the 
Christian Democrats,Acuna was very popular.Mundt 
declared that, 
neg inconce~i~le ~eto~no del D~. 
R.Acuna al Con4ejo qene~al,de4pul4 
de ha~e~ 4ido 4epa~ado de 4U ca~go 
po~ Santiago a ~alz de la claudicacion 
del Con4ejo qene~al que el p~e4id{a 
demve4t~an que mucho de nue4to~4 
di~igente4,no e4tanen la linea 
pat~i6tica de la ~econ4t~ucci6n 
nacional. n 28 
Opposition to the Right emerged from 
another source. The new Minister of Health,Colonel 
Spoerer and his Under Secretary were both Christian 
Democrats. This was not unusual. The Junta had 
appointed Christian Democrats to other Government 
posts,for example in the Ministry of Labour where 
both Lamberto Cisternas,Under Secretary of Labour 
and Guillermo Videla"Director of Labour were Christian 
Democrats. The result of Spoerer's appointment led to 
a clash of policy with Arriagada the Director General 
who with the full support of the Right wanted to 
eliminate immediately the Servicio Nacional de Salud. 
§poerer, on the other hand, had no plans to change 
the structure of the health service. 
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Spoerer was thus reluctant to collaborate 
with Mundt and his Executive Committee on certain 
health policy decisions. He blocked all Mundt's 
efforts to put forward new private medical schemes. 
By 8th October,the group of Valparaiso doctors had 
prepared a radical health policy,but at this stage 
apart from Arriagada,the authorities remained impassive. 
Mundt thus bitterly complained, 
npo~ d~~g~acia~~ta ~ana y pat~i6tica 
int~nci6n ~~ via ~nto~p~cida po~qu~ 
~l~m~nto~ d~l pa~ado ~egim~~ ,log~a~on 
int~oduci~~~ ~n ~l ~ini~t~~io d~ Satud 
d~~d~ dond~ pudi~~on n~ut~aliza~ 
nu~~t~o~ ~ano~ p~opo~[to~. [l d~c~~to 
dd ~anc~l d~ 7~cn6logo~ dictado po~ 
~l ~ini~t~o :Spo~~~~ hin ningun 
~~tudio p~~vio y ~in ~l ma~ mInimo 
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'conocimi~nto d~l Col~gio ~edico,~~ una 
fd.u~na d~m.o~tr61cion d~ como ta 
inttu~ncia ma~xi~toid~,qu~ ~i~p~~ 
at~nt6 cont~a ta p~ot~~lon medica,tog~6 
~xito~ ~n ~~a S~c~~ta~[a d~ [~tado.n 27 
The Right's intention to reform 
gremialismo was not so much blocked,as ignored. 
Attempts in Valparaiso to re-activate the Comando 
Multi-Gremial proved fruitless. Groups which had 
shown so much interest in the activities of the 
gremio during Popular Unity were now totally 
apathetic. When the Valparaiso ultra-Right wing 
doctors held discussions with the new authorities to 
complain that the gremios were not being promoted as 
the Junta's partners, the military correctly replied 
that this was through no fault of its own but was 
the result of the total disinterestof the gremios 
themselves. 30 
8.7 THE NATIONAL MEDICAL CONVENTION DECEMBER 1973 
The National Medi~al Convention's 
conclusions appeared t~ show that the Right's project 
inside the Colegio Medico was proceeding satisfactorily 
The Convention's representatives,all of whom had to 
be approved by the Minister of the Interior,over-
whelmingly endorsed preliminary schemes to move to a 
private health service. The principle that those 
Chileans who could afford to pay for their health 
treatment should not receive free State care was 
accepted. 31 Implicit agreement that the Servicio 
Nacional de Salud should no longer be the fulcrum 
of the Chilean health service was reached when the 
Conference approved the new title for this health 
service, the Sistemas Nacional de Servicios de la 
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Salud. Regarding gremial policy, Alvayay, corporatist 
proposal for the Colegio Medico was passed unanimously. 
These "victories" however were 
hollow ones. Health policy was still not determined 
by the Colegio Medico and Spoerer blocked any radical 
scheme which undermined the Servicio Nacional de Sauld. 
Moreover,Alvayay's proposals to reconstruct the Colegio 
Medico required a change in the law. The Junta whose 
support for the Chilean fascists was always ambiguous 
refused to legislate on these proposals. 
After the Convention,Ernesto Mundt, 
reco~nizing that the Right wing project was running 
into severe difficulties resigned as President of 
the Colegio Medico. His letter of resignation 
revealed a thorough disillusionment. The new regime 
had not matched .the ideals he and hi s supporterS' 
had held on the 11th September. To men like Mundt 
it seemed incredible that the Junta should allow 
"£l£m£nth ot th£ old ~£glm£ "(by which he meant 
Christian Democrats)back into positions of influence. 
These Christian Democrats were the enemies of all 
their attempts to radically change Chilean society. 
The parallel with the Allende regime was obvious; 
the revolutionary Left had had exactly the same 
difficul ties wi th these stubborn Christian Democrats. 
Mundt's resignation however,by no 
means signalled total failure for the Right. He 
remained as a General Councillor. In the election 
of the new President and his Executive Committee 
conducted by the General Council and thereafter 
approved by the Minister of the Interi6r,the Right 
was still clearly in control of the Colegio leadership. 
Hugo Salvestrini was now President of the Colegio 
Medico. But more importantly for the Right,Osvaldo 
Artaza became Secretary General and R.Donckaster, 
Treasurer. Both these men were committed to the 
sweeping privatization of the health service. 
Their election however,now clearly 
showed the division inside the Colegio Medico which 
had deve'loped since the coup. Both Donckaster and 
Artaza were elected by 11 votes to 9 . The Right 
had therefore,only a slim majority on the General 
Council. The division between these groups was to 
take on a much greater importance in the coming 
months. 
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8.8 THE ELECTION OF SALVESTRINI'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE FROM 
THE MEDICAL CONVENTION OF 1973 TO THE RESIGNATION OF 
ALVAYAY IN NOVEMBER 1974. 
Opposition to the leadership of Salvestrini: 
At the national level during this 
period, the Christian Democrats were moving into what 
one observer called "loyal oppo~ition" • 32 Already 
their newspaper, "La Prensa" as well as their radio 
station had been closed. Of all the political parties 
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the Christian Democrats had no immediately identifiable 
social base on which to rely for support. They thus 
depended for their survival on a regime which 
guaranteed freedom of expression in order to promote 
their ideas and policies. The increasing Christian 
Democrat opposition towards the Colegio Medico 
leadership reflected their party's growing disaffection 
wi th the new regime and explains why the Chri stian~ 
Democrat opposition within the Colegio increased 
against the Colegio Medico's leadership. 
Another reason for the Christian 
Democrats' growing opposition to the Colegio Medico 
leadership was its failure to protect the living 
standards of the profession in the soaring inflation 
which had followed the downfall of the Popular Unity 
Government. As one Christian Democrat complained, 
" 7 h.e. Col.e.gio fl ed ieo i~ ~ .e.1l.U i i.e. to 
th.e. autholl.iti.e.~. " 33 
There was no doubt that the Colegio Medico was 
unwilling to pressurize the Junta for an increase in 
wages. The President of the Colegio Medico,Ernesto 
Mundt refused to demand higher wages,as he declared, 
WYo ~oy pa~tida~io de nO hace~ nada 
po~que e~o implica intlaci6n. En 
lo~ ~e~vicio~ de ~alud,la ~ituaci6n 
e~ de tal p~eca~idad que no podemo~ 
po~ el momento a~pi~a~ a un In311:SO 
digno,po~que el pat~,e~ta p~actica­
mente en quiei~a. La ~ituaci6n eitan 
c~[tica que apena~ ~e van a pode~ 
mantene~ algunos ho~pitale~) y e~ta 
e~ la du~a ~ealidad a la qu~ tenemo~ 
que atene~no~.w 34 
The Right wing controlled Colegio Medico 
had,in the eyes of the Christian Democrats swallowed 
the Junta's line that, 
WSi du~ante el ano 1974 no~ alcanza 
pa~a come~)ya:;;qui~e deci~ que 
e~tamo~ oiteniendo exito." 35 
Moreover, many of the opponents inside 
the Colegio were annoyed that the leadership was 
prepared to give up certain professional privileges in 
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its willingness to make sacrifices for the new Government. 
For instance,a special holiday concession,won after a 
long struggle in the previous administration was given 
up without a murmur. 
The sacking of Colonel Spoerer. 
In addition to these worries about their 
professional future came the announcement in the winter 
of 1974 that the Minister of Health,Colonel Spoerer 
had been sacked. He was replaced by another Air Force 
officer,General Herrera,whose position in health 
policy was the same as that of Arriagada, the 
Director General of the Servicio Nacional 
de Salud. With Spoerer's departure the Christian 
Democrats in particular and the opposition in general 
inside the Colegio Medico had lost much of their 
capacity to block Arriagada's and the Right's 
privatization schemes. 
In the months since the coup the battle 
between the Ministry of Health on the one:hand,and 
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the Director General on the other,resulted in no 
coherent health policy being formulated. Now at least, 
there was the possibility of a health policy developing. 
The opposition,therefore did not 
welcome the new Minister of Health,General Herrera. It 
was quick to complain that he had formed a cabal with 
Arriagada and the Executive Committee of the Colegio 
Medico to exclude other consejeros from discussions 
on health policy. Herrera's reaction to this_ 
opposition was unyielding:at a meeting with the 
Regional Council of Santiago,the new Health Minister 
declared that in his relations with the Colegio 
Medico he would only deal with the Executive 
Committee of that institution. 
The"mini"purge of "opposition" doctors from their 
Servicio Nacional de Salud posts. 
With the arrival of Herrera the Junta's 
health authorities,apart from the UnderSecretary of 
Health,Luis Givovic,were in the words of one of the 
members of the opposition,united in their desire for, 
"Una ~apida ji~a~izaci~n d~f S~~vicio 
Nacionaf d~ Safud." 37 
They were faced with many doctors occupying powerful 
Servicio Nacional de Salud posts, who while total 
supporters of the Government,were hostile to such a 
plan. 
In what seems from hindsight,a 
particularly crude and clumsy way of forcing through 
a health policy,several high ranking doctors in the 
Servicio Nacional de Salud,and all staunch supporters 
of the health service were sacked. Amongst others, 
this included the Technical Director of the Servicio 
Nacional de Salud,the Assistant Director of the 
Hospital Salvador and the Directors of the Hospitals 
San Francisco de Borja and the Barros Luco . In 
contrast to the huge purge of Left wing doctors in the 
weeks after the coup,these sackings in the winter of 
1974 amounted to a "mini purge". 
Little explanation was given by the 
authori ties for the dismissal of these doctors. 
However,it soon became apparent that these doctors had 
lost their jobs because they had been officially 
described as "statists" i.e. they supported the State 
health service. "Statists" took on the same 
derogatory connotation as "communist" or "marxist". 
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It was ironic that many of these doctors had been 
during Popular Unity,the most fervent anti-Communists. 
This "mini purge" was intended by 
Arriagada to prepare the way for the full launching 
of his private health scheme.In a letter to the 
Regional Council of Valparaiso he asked doctors 
who supported his free market ideas for the Servicio 
Nacional de Salud to be ready to take up Servicio 
posts in Santiago. 37 
The Executive Committee was now 
placed in an awkward situation. It had been one thing 
to refuse any help to Left wing doctors sacked on 
account of their beliefs;it was now quite another to 
ignore the similar plight of Right wing doctors. The 
Executive Committee tried to minimize the problem 
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and claim that these sackings were local administra~ive 
problems to be solved by the respectiye0 Regional 
Councils but this did not satisfy the opposition. 
A feeling of dissatisfaction with:the 
conduct of the Mesa Directiva grew. The situation in 
the hospitals in Chile still recovering after the 
first wave of purges was described by Dr.Herrera, 
himself an opponent of the Right's project in the 
following terms, 
"7odo~ e~ta~ ~ituacione~ acumu~ada~ 
c~ea~on en a~guno~ Ho~pita~e~ una 
atmo~te~a i~~e~pi~a~~e de ~umo~e~ 
y p~e~ione~. La ~e~pecta~i~idad 
de ~a~ pe~~ona~ ~emovida~ en un 
pa[~ en que no conocemo~ todo , 
c~e5una ava~ancha de p~ote~ta 
muda,que ya no pudo ~e~ detenida." 38 
8.9 THE RESIGNATION OF J.ALVAYAY AS PRESIDENT OF THE 
REGIONAL COUNCIL OF VALPARAISO. 
In the midst of growing opposition 
to the Right's strategy,J.Alvayay resigned as 
President of the Regional Council of Valparaiso 
in November 1974. In his letter of resignation he 
protested at the authorities' failure to create a 
corporatist Chile and at the opposition group 
within the gremio for obstructing the Right's 
strategy. 
By 1974 it was clear to the fascists 
in Chile that this military Junta was not going to 
support their own ideas. Already,Pinochet was 
coming under the influence of the neo-liberal Chicago 
School economists. The State's role in the economy 
was rapidly being dismantled. The gremios were without 
power or influence. As Alvayay bitterly complained 
to 'the authorities just before his resignation, 
"S.e f..es'h i..zo .6aR.e/L f..a i..nqui...eiud pO/L 
f..a laf..ia d.e pa/Lii..ci..paci..on .en f..a.6 
f..aRo/L.e.6 d.e YoRi...e/Lno,/L.eco/Ldandof...e.6 
qu.e ani.e.6 d.ef.. 11 d.e .6~pli...emk/L.e .el 
Cof...egi..o fU,di..co .e.6iaRa d.eni/Lo "d.e 
f..a cancha" d.e.6pue..6 d.ef.. 11 i..ncf..u.6o 
no .e.6ia,ni.. como oR.6.e/Lvado/L." 31 
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The Colegio Medico,despite being closely 
linked with the health authorities through the 
relationship between Arriagada and the Right in the 
Executive Committee and the Regional Councils of 
Valparaiso and Rancagua,had little influence in 
deciding health policy. After the coup, power was 
concentrated in the Junta and Pinochet in particular 
as well as the Ministery of Finance. The health 
authorities themselves were powerless. They were 
totally dependent on the decisions of the Minister 
of Finance. As the Minister of Health,Spoerer had 
complained to the General Council, 
"No~ot~o~ no hemo~ tenido a~te ni 
pa~te,en ningun momento ~e no~ ha 
con~ultado,nq·hemo~ tenido ni voz 
ni voto,de tal mane~a que £6do lo 
que ~e ha hecho ha~ta e~te momento 
lo ha hecho Hacienda ~in con~ulta~ 
a nadie." 40 
The Junta however,was not totally 
responsible for the failure of the fascist project 
after the coup. The gremios themselves had disinteg-
rated after September 11th 1973 . Groups within the 
gremios which had united around the common goal of 
fighting Popular Unity's Government suddenly found 
that their intersts were extremely diverse after the 
coup. 
Although harbouring great bitterness 
towards the Government,the main thrust of Alvayay's 
letter of resignation however, was directed towards 
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the opposition within the Colegio Medico. In particular 
he criticized those colleagues who were becoming 
"soft" towards the Left wing doctors. As already 
stated previously, this was not a question of Alvayay's 
appetite for revenge towards the Popular Unity doctors. 
Any softening towards Popular Unity doctors signified 
for Alvayay a conciliation towards Marxism and the 
possibility that the Government could become a form 
of "Mark II" Popular Uni ty . 
The circumstances in which a certain 
softening of position towards Popular Unity doctors 
took place surrounded partly the punishments which 
were meted out to Left wing doctors for not obeying 
the strike call of August 1973. Under the Commission 
of Ethics,disobedience of a "gremial" decision was 
a punishable offence. After the coup, and especially 
in Valparaiso, Left wing doctors were ordered to 
appear before the Commission of Ethics to face 
charges (See Appendix) . As late as June 1974 Left 
wing doctors. in Valparaiso were receiving suspensions 
and fines for not stopping work almost a year earlier 
during the Colegio Medico strike. 
Some doctors appealed against the 
sentences to the General Council. To the horror of 
the Right wing, including Alvayay,the General Council 
quashed most of these sentences. The General Council 
wrote and complained to the Regional Council that 
these sentences were "exce~lvamente ~eve~o~." As the 
lawyer of the Regional Council of Valparaiso dismally 
reported, 
"en fo~ dIve~~o~ ~uma~lo~ po~ int~accl6n 
af pa~o medIco en 1ue ~e ~u~pendI6 a 
dl~tInto~ p~ote~ionaee~,po~ un me~,o 
ma~Jha~ta ~el~ me~e~,ee H.Con~ejo gene~af, 
ha~ta ef momento,ha ~evocada todo~ eo~ 
taffo~ que han ent~ado a conoce~ y ha 
~u~titu[do fa pena ~e ~u~pen~itn po~ 
mufta 0 cen~u~a 0 amone~taclon,ni.nguna 
'" h d d ." ~u~pen~ion a que a 0 en p~e. 41 
Alvayay was particularly infuriated 
that the appeals of the Left wing doctors to the 
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General Council were supported by doctors who had 
previously been allies of the Right. Many of these 
former allies were Christian Democrats. Alvayay 
was quick to point out that during the strike thay 
had,along with the Right denounced Popular Unity 
doctors • 
It is worth quoting at length from 
Alvayay's letter of resignation to show the strength 
of his feelings against this Christian Democrat 
perfidy, 
"E~i~ dem&~ comenian iodo el inmen~o 
inagajo e ingnaia~ aliennaiiva~ que 
la, inamiiacion de lo~ ~umanio~ le han 
~igniticado al Con~ejo Regional,a lo~ 
Con~ejeno~ Sumanianie~~a lo~ Agogado~ 
del Depanimenio :;'un[dic0..:J 01 go~ pnop'.io~ 
Cap[iulo~. E~ de~monalizadon y nepudiagle 
que pon un ~eniimenLali~mo mal eniendido 
en una in~iancia ian gnave como la 
apelacion de un tallo emiiido pon el 
Con~ejo Regional de la juni~dicci6n,do~ 
Cole~ado~ que,de una 0 oina menena ~e 
hicienon ~olidanio~ de la~ denuncia~ en 
conina de la~ aciividade~ anii-gnemiale~ 
de e~to~ ~adico~,a la po~tne ~e tnan~­
tonmen en ~u~ deten~one~. La auionidad 
del Con~ejo ynemial no puede ~en vejada, 
n~ humillada ian gnaiuiiamenie." 42 
The Regional Council of Santiago 
unlike that of Valparaiso,was not prepared to embark 
on the huge task of punishing all those doctors within 
its jurisdiction who had not obeyed the Colegio Medico 
order to stop working in August 1973. As Dr. Olave 
said to a meeting of the General Council, 
"Ahona,de~de el punio de vi~i~ de lo~ 
~umanio~,~e vio que ena ag~oluiamenie 
impo~igle hacen un ~umanio a cada uno 
de e~io~ madico~, .•. •• lo~ 770 que no 
ogedicienon la onden de pano,e~o 
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~ignitica~[a qu~ ~g Con~~jo R~gionag 
d~dica~[a ~u gaRo~ d~g ano a hac~~ 
~uma~io~,cuyo ~~~ugtado no va a m~jo~a~ 
~n nada ga g~~ti6n d~g Cog~gio.n 43 
Moreover,the "Alvayay" Right was also 
furious with the more moderate Right wing and 
Christian Democrat doctors for another reason. This 
concerned the decision by the Regional Council of 
Santiago early in 1974 'to restore the Left wing 
doctors' right,which they had lost since the coup, 
to treat SERMENA patients. It should be recalled 
that during Popular Unity the Colegio Medico had 
organized a boycott of the SERMENA service in protest 
at the Allende's Government's desire to change this 
system. As a result it forbad all doctors from 
working in the service. Just as they had refused to 
obey the Colegiols strike call, so the Left wing 
doctors did not comply with their Association's 
instructions and carried on treating SERMENA patients 
normally. This prompted the Colegio Medico to take 
away their right to treat SERMENA patients. 
After the coup, the doctors who had 
previously boycotted SERMENA resumed working while 
the Colegio Medico's decision to remove all Left 
wing doctors from the institution carne into force. 
Left wing doctors were now in an intolerable 
situation. Not only did many of them not have a 
State job but also they were deprived of an important 
source of income through the treatment of SERMENA 
patients .Moreover,few private patients would seek 
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treatment from doctors who bore the stigma of being 
prevented from both working in the Servicio Nacional 
.F 
de Sa Iud and in SERMENA. As one Colegio Medico 
representative vividly described the plight of these 
doctors, 
"Po/Z.qUl!.. ha~[a gul.il!.. qUl!.. ha~{a qUl!..dado 
~in nigun oi/Z.o ~i~il!..ma dl!.. ing/Z.l!..~o qUl!.. 
l!..f qUl!.. fl!.. podIa p/Z.opo/Z.ciona/Z. fa Cu/Z.aiiva; 
l!..nioncl!..~ ,l!..f p/Z.o~ll!..ma l!../Z.a /Z.l!..afml!..nil!.. d/Z.am-
aiico:incfu~o medico~ qUl!.. ffl!..ga~an a 
ffo/Z.a/Z. af Coll!..gio pa/Z.a qUl!.. fo~ dl!..ja/Z.amo~ 
i/Z.a~aja/Z.." 44 
Several doctors saw no point in 
carrying out this persecution. As one said, 
"Ha~ia cuando vamo~ a ~l!..gui/Z. pl!../Z.higui£n-
dono~);" mofl!..~iando, di/-i cufiando a fa 
gl!..nil!..?" 45 
Moreover,aven sections within the 
Government,worried that because the sackings and 
expUlsions of doctors after the coup had led to a 
shortage of doctors suggested to the association that 
a Colegio Medico policy of prohibiting doctors from 
working was damaging national interests. 
The decision by the Regional Council 
of Santiago to restore the Left wing doctors' right 
to practise in SERMENA was a response to both these 
mounting pressures. This softer treatment of Left 
wing doctors was a major cause of Alvayay' s 
resignation as President of the Regional Council of 
Valparaiso. 
At the same time as Alvayay was 
making his protest other ultra Right wing doctors in 
Valparaiso resigned from their posts in the Servicio 
320. 
8.10 
Nacional de Salud. Moreover,Mundt,who had previously 
refused in September 1974 to sit on the same 
Commission as R.Acuna because the latter lacked all 
sense of "auto~ldad mo~alu resigned his seat on the 
General Council. 46 Taken together,these resignations 
signalled the failure of the "corporatist II part of 
the Right's strategy inside the Colegio Medico. 
FROM THE RESIGNATION OF THE ULTRA RIGHT IN NOVEMBER 
1974 TO THE IMPEACHMENT OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE 
I N A PR I L 1 97 5 • 
The announcement of the Right's health policy. 
In contrast to the failure of the 
IIcorporatist project",the Right's plans to construct 
a new,totally private health scheme were progressing 
satisfactorily. Spoerer had been removed and several 
prominent doctors in the Servicio Nacional de Salud 
hierarchy sacked. There only remained the task of 
drawing up the health plan for general approval. 
During the months of December 1974 
and January 1975, a specia2 Commission comprising the 
Executive Committee of the Colegio Medico,Darwin 
Arriagada,Director General of the Servicio Nacional 
de Salud and economists from ODEPLAN,the Government 
Central Planning Office,worked on the final touches 
of this health plan. They were advised by a Senor 
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Cash,an American economist,who had been invited to 
attend these meetings because of his experience in . 
running private health schemes in California. 
The outcome of these meetings was the 
publication of two similar documents;the first 
entitled, "Sistema Nacional de Servicios de Salud" 
was published by Arriagada in February 1975. 48 
He intended to present this document for Pinochet's 
approval. By this time Pinochet had become the 
leading fugure in the Junta and his approval would 
have meant that these proposals would have become 
the Junta's health policy for 1975. 
The second health policy document was 
published by O.Artaza and was directed at the medical 
profession for its approval in the National Medical 
Convention in April 1975. 49 
The major theme of these documents 
was that the health service,like other services had 
to become part of the social market economy. This 
was to be done by breaking the State's monopoly in 
health. As the Director General of the Colegio 
Medico told "Que Pasa ?" on 13th March 1975, 
"S.e t/Lata d.e t/Lan-6!-o/Lma/L- g/Ladual y 
p/Lud.ent.em.ent.e f.a medicina !-unciona/L~a 
actual .en una m.edicina adaptada a la 
.econom[a -6ocial d.e m.e/Lcado ....•••••• 
NO-6to/Lo-6 qu.e/L.emO-6 cumpli/L a cagalidad 
con .el p/Lincipio de. -6ui-6ida/Lidad de. 
que. hagl6 e.l Yogie./Lno :e.l c-6tado de.ge. 
cug/Li/L aque.llo-6 campO-6 e.n lO-6 cuaee.-6 
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ea iniciaiiva p~ivada ~e manite~ie 
como in~uticienie .••...• No~oi~o~ 
que~emo~ de~e~iaiiza~ ea medicina ya 
que ~~ia adOeecL de dna ~e~ie de vicio~. 
C~eemo~ que e~ ma~ eticienie ea emp~e~a 
p~ivada que ea paReica en cuaequie~ 
campo,y ee campo de ea ~aeud no e~capa 
a e~ia ~egea........... 50 
It is important to realise that despite 
this Right wing group's hatred of the State system, 
this new health plan allowed the State to playa 
predominant role. The providers of health care in 
this scheme i.e. the hospitals, clinics and doctors 
would work in the private sector. But the finance 
for this care would still come from the State which 
would pay these "private establishments" for treating 
the patients who were unable to afford their health 
treatment. Over 70% of the Chilean population had 
insufficient financial means to pay for their treat-
mente State financing of these new schemes therefore 
would be significantly high. 
This new scheme did not allow for a 
direct investment in health care by business. There 
were no plans to turn over the running of hospitals 
to finance houses and insurance groups or business 
interests. The doctors who had planned this scheme 
firmly ruled out the possibility of business 
operating the hospitals for profit. As these doctors 
argued, 
"Lo que no pa~ece admi~iRee mo~aemenie, 
pue~,de~i~uye fa e~encia dee ~eniido 
humani~ia de ea- medicina,e~ que 
capiiaei~ia~ ai~eado~ 0 con~o~cio~ 
inviR.J..Lan dine~o~ en ea po~e~i6n y 
expeoiacion de e~iaReecimienio~ de 
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~alud,con tlne~ ~lmplemente come~clcile~." 
Thus,this scheme was quite different 
from the one that would be presented three years 
later by the Chicago School economists. In the latter's 
plan, the private sector would be encouraged to take 
over the State's role of financing health establish-
ments. 
In essence this Right wing plan 
generalized the situation already existing in doctors 
work in their private clinics. These private clinics 
were run by doctors themselves. All their patients 
paid them a fee for the treatment they received. 
This system was called libre eleccion. No private 
capitalist,no public body interfered in this 
financial transaction between the doctor and his 
patient. By providing this system with fiscal funds, 
doctors could treat all patients including their 
former Servicio Nacional de Salud patients in this 
way. Libre Eleccion generalizada as the scheme was 
described,would have transformed many doctors from 
being part State employees and part independent 
Dratitioners into total liberal professionals. Just 
I 
as in their own private clinics there was no 
possibility under this scheme that doctors would 
lose their power to outside public or private agencies. 
Through continued State funding of these hospitals 
and clinics doctors would be cushioned from the 
discipline of the market place. 
The bonus which the supporters of this 
51 
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plan believed their scheme would give to patients 
was the freedom to choose their doctors or health 
establishemnt. This change, these supporters argued,_ 
would introduce market competition. Thus,the scheme 
would be true to the principles of the free market 
economy. ;' 
This argument was very naive. The 
"true" liberal economists believed that the market 
could only operate effectively if the State was 
eliminated as far as possible. In this scheme the 
State would be regulating the whole mechanism by 
ensuring sufficient demand for these private health 
establishments. Competition therefore in this scheme 
would only exist in a nominal sense. 
Probably because this scheme was a 
type of hybrid free market scheme ,the ODEPLAN 
economists who had been involved in the discussions 
did not put their names to it. It remained the 
brain child of D.Arriagada,Director General of the 
Servicio Nacionald ae Salud and O.Artaza,Secretary 
General of the Colegio Medico and several 
Valparaiso doctors. 
THE CENSURE OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE 
COLEGIO MEDICO. 
The opposition inside the Colegio 
Medico disagreed with the plan for different reasons. 
The Christian Democrats objected to the scheme 
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because in eliminating the Servicio Nacional de Salud 
it went against the principles of social medicine. 
This was also the position of Luis Givovic ,Under 
Secretary of Health,the only remaining Christian 
Democrat influence amongst the health authorities. 
The more moderate Right wingers did not disagree 
with the essential aim of privatization. They were 
no admirers of the State's role in health care. 
However,they argued that the private Chilean health 
schemes were not sufficiently advanced to absorb 
the new demand that would be created by eliminating 
the Servicio Nacional de Salud at a stroke. As one 
of the doctors holding this position argued, 
"Un g~upo d£ Con~£j£~o~ £~timaga 
n£c£~a/"o £vita~ f.a d£~t~uccion d£f. 
S£~vicio Nacionaf. d£ Saf.ud 0 ~u 
jiga~izaci6n,ha~ta q¥£ f.o~ o~gani~mo~ 
p~ivado~ af.t£~nativo~,pu£d~n ~t~uct­
u~a~~£,no £n un docum£nto £~c~ito, 
~ino £n f.a p~actica.n 52 
Fearing that this plan would become 
official policy,these groups united to get rid of 
both the Colegio Medico leadership and D. Arriagada. 
A meeting was held secretly in February 1975 between 
Dr. Luis Gi vovi c the Under Se cretary of Heal th and 
Rene Merino a General Councillor, both Christian 
Democrats,on the one hand;and R.Hurtado,President 
of the Regional Council of Santiago and Mario Herrera 
representing the moderate Right wing group on the 
other,to discuss how best to go about removing 
these doctors. 53 They agreed at this meeting to 
force the Executive Committee to resign by impeach-
ing it and to replace the President,Salvestrini by 
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Ernesto Medina. This group hoped that Medina,a 
distinguished public health Professor would defend 
the Servicio Nacional de Salud from the economists' 
attacks. This group also agreed to push the 
Government to sack Arriagada and to appoint Rene 
Merino,a staunch defender of the Servicio Nacional 
de Salud in his place. 
It is not clear how this group 
managed to get Arriagada sacked as Director General of 
the Servicio Nacional de Salud,but in March 1975 the 
Junta announced that he was to be replaced by R.Merino 
as Director General. In April 1975 following what 
"Ercilla" called an epidemic of censures inside the 
Colegio Medico,the Executive Committee of Salvestrini, 
Artaza,Donckaster and Chahin were forced to resign~ 
The President and Secretary General were replaced by 
two Regional Council of Santiago appointed consejeros, 
Medina and Rojas respectively. 
Apart from the group who had been 
ousted in this remarkable episode, the most alarmed 
section of Chilean society at these events was the 
weekly review "Que Pasa ?". The team who worked on 
"Que Pasa?",were the staunchest supporters of the 
Friedmanite experiment in Chile. They quite rightly 
saw that with Medina as President of the Colegio 
Medico and R.Merino as Director General of the 
Servicio Nacional de Salud,the Junta's health policy 
had undergone a change from the one which planned to 
organize health policy along market principles. 
In an editorial "Que Pasa?" declared, 
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W[~£ cam~io ~ignitica qu£ coniinua~~ 
op£~andomonopogicam£ni£ £g mon~i~uo 
£~iaia£ d.e ga ~agud." 
Predictably this Right wing group 
which had been on the poin.t of implementing these 
54 
sweeping health reforms,reacted bitterly at seeing 
their plans in ruins. One Right wing consejero 
accused the opposition of using "iaciica~ ma~x.i.~ia~" 
to get rid of them. 55 The Regional Council of 
Rancagua declared that the new Executive Committee 
headed by E.Medina had allowed itself to be manipulated 
by critics of the Government amongst the profession. 56 
This Right wing group demanded that the Commission 
of Ethics impeach both Hurtado and Givovic for 
plotting the downfall of the Mesa. 
All the old animosities that had been 
created at the time of Popular Unity re-emerged. The 
Right complained that the Regional Council of 
Santiago!s past record during Popular Unity showed 
that it was incapable of defending the profession. 
This Regional Council had,after all supported 
Acuna's Mesa "chu~caw during the last months of 
Popular Unity. This Regional Council which had always 
been "vacigani.e y d£~ign during Popular Unity had it 
was claimed, 
Wninguna auio~idad mo~ag.a c.en~u~a~ 
ga ~£~a Di~£ciiva.n 
To try and restore its influence 
inside the Colegio Medico this Right wing group 
called on the President of the Colegio,Medina to 
57 
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fix a date for a National Convention.Medina's first 
act as President it should be remembered was to cancel 
the National Medical Convention scheduled for April 
1975. Medina and his supporters were concerned that 
had the Convention taken place,motions would have 
been passed supporting the privatization of the health 
service. The Right wing group wanted the next Convention 
to be binding on the Colegio Medico leadership. 
Medina however,refused to give this 
group a platform from which to exert its influence. He 
reminded the President of the Regional Council of 
Valparaiso who had demanded a National Medical Convention 
that his Regional Councillors in comparison with the 
Regional Council of Santiago represented only a small 
fraction of doctors. As Medina wrote to the President 
of the Regional Council of Valparaiso, \ 
"Qui~i~~a ~in ~mia~go,~~co~da~l~ qu~ 
gu~t~ 0 nO qu~ ~l Con~~jo R~gional 
Santiago ag~upa a un 6Z.5% d~ eo~, 
medico~ ~n actividad.D~ ~~t~ modo 
cualqui~~ d~ci~i6n qu~ tom~ ~l g~~io, 
~~ca~ mayo~ita~iam~nt~ €n eo~ coe~g­
iado~ d~e Con~~jo R~gionae d~ Santiago. 
A~umi~ndo,hipoteticam~nt~,qu~ la m~~a 
qu~ ll~t~d p~~~id~ ~~p~~~~nt~ l~gitima­
m~nt~ ~e p~n~ami~nto d~ eo~ medico~ d~ 
Vaepa~at~o, e~to~ eam~ntail~m~nt~ con~­
tituy~n ~olo un 10% d~ todo~ lo~ 
medico~. No pa~~c~,~n con~~cu~ncia 
conc~iiie~ qu~ una mino~[a p~~t~nda 
~~gi~ eo~ d~~tino~ d~ eo~ medico~ d~e 
~ " pa~ . 58 
Faced with Medina's refusal to call a 
National Medical Convention, the Consejo Regional de 
Valparaiso organized one itself. In a final attempt 
to give this Convention more legitimacy,it invited 
the Executive Committee of the Colegio Medico to 
attend. This invitation was refused. When the decision 
of Medina and the Executive Committee was communicated 
to the Right at a meeting of the General Council on 
13th April in 1976,the consejeros from Valparaiso 
walked out. The last time a walk out had occurred 
inside the General Council had been during Popular 
Uni ty. 
The Medical Convention of the Regional 
Council of Valparaiso which took place on 1st May 
1976 was similar :to the Left wing doctors' Convention 
of May 1971. Both events were attended only by 
their supporters and both were political. The main 
aim of each of these conferences was to work out 
a tactic by which their group could takeover the 
Colegio Medico. In May 1971,the Left had discussed 
schemes to give power to the "Ra~e~" of the profession 
i. e. the younger, Servi cio ,Nacional de Sal ud oriented 
doctors. In contrast, the Convention of May 1976 
proposed a restructuring of the Colegio Medico to 
replace the General Council by a Consejo Nacional 
of Presidents. Through this tactic they hoped to 
rid the Colegio of what they called, 
"f.o~ ce~a/l.ist2:}.s enqui..~tado~ en 
la~ al~a~ di/l.ectiva~ de f.a 
o/l.den ." 59 
The participants of this Convention 
were extremely Right wing. The ex-Executive 
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Committee of the ColegioMedico,leaders of the 5 
Regional Councils who had called for the political 
strike in August 1973,the ex-Director General of 
the Servicio Nacional de Salud,D.Arriagada,all 
attended. Support for Arriagada and Artaza's 
private health schemes not surpr.isingly was passed 
unanimously. 
The Convention was held in an 
atmosphere of great euphoria. It was another 
opportunity to recall the great and glorious battles 
against Popular Unity. But despite this,the 
Convention represented the failure of this Right 
wing group to implement its ideas inside the 
Colegio Medico and inside the Government. 
331 . 
CONCLUSION 
The fall of the Mesa of the Executive 
Committee of the Colegio Medico has to be seen in 
the light of the increasing influence of the 
Christian Democrats inside the Colegio Medico. 
The Christian Democrats had never 
contemplated the fascistization of Chile through the 
gremios. Their view remained committed to constitut-
ional and democratic representation. Moreover,the 
Christian Democrats had never been strong inside the 
gremios which during Popular Unity had been Right 
wing fronts. 
Nor were the Christian Democrat 
doctors willing t~ contemplate the destruction of 
the Servicio Nacional de Salud which they had 
helped to construct. 
Thus,they had joined with the more 
moderate members of the Right to remove those 
forces planning such a course of action. 
These moderate Right wingers like 
Hurtado and Herrera remained committed to the Junta: 
they knew that the demands of the ultra Right 
wingers in the medical profession as well as the 
demands to terminate the Servicio Nacional de Salud 
would be highly unpopular with the medical profession 
as a whole,and would create opposition towards the 
Junta. 
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This was the basis of the alliance 
which so successfully overthrew the Right and 
ultra Right groups who represented in particular, 
the Regions of Valparaiso and Rancagua. It was 
an alliance however,which was short lived. 
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2. 'El Sistema Nacional de Servicios de Salud.' 
(SINASESA) .Date and place of publication unknown. 
3. O'Brien,P.J. 'The New Leviathan.' p.198 .op cit. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Report of the Convencion del Consejo Regional 
Valparaiso-Aconcagua. 30th April 1976. 
6. Editorial.Ibid. 
7. See Henderson,B.(1977). 'The Chilean State after 
the Coup.' in Miliband,R. and Saville,J.(eds) 
The Socialist Register 1977.Merlin Press.London. 
8. Note.See text. 
9. 'El Sistema Nacional de Servicios de Salud.op cit. 
10. Footnote 2.op cit. 
11. Vida Medica.Sept.1973. 
12. These were the words Leigh had used in a television 
interview shortly after the coup. 
13. A list of these casualties was compiled by Dra. 
Gilda Gnecco with errrors due to circumstances. 
The following is a list of doctors slain between 
September 1973 and February 1975: 
1. S. Allende 
2. Enrique Paris Roa.Psychiatrist.Beaten to 
dea th . 
3. Eduardo Parede.Tortured and shot in Regimento 
Tacna. 
4. Jorge Klein.Psychiatrist and President's 
doctor.Body unrecovered. 
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12. Arturo Hilleras. 
13. Eduardo Gonzalez.General Practitioner from 
Curico. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter we will examine the 
reasons behind the Colegio Medico's objections 
to the health plan proposed by the Government's new 
health spokesmen who were appointed in early 1976. 
These newly appointed officials 
although predominantly doctors-themselves,were 
heavily influenced by the Chicago School free market 
thinking on health policy. The doctors who belonged 
to the Junta's health team such as Francisco Quesney 
and Eduardo Cruz Mena were political mavericks. They 
were not members of any political groups. They were 
quite independent from the extreme Right wing group 
of doctors which had first tried to apply the 
principles of the free market economy to the health 
sector after the coup. 
Until now we have viewed politics 
inside the Colegio Medico in terms of the political 
struggle amongst various groups of doctors. This 
chapter represents a slight departure from this 
organizing principle. Doctors were relatively 
united against the economists' ideas in health 
policy. Thus,the Colegio Medico in the period when 
these health plans were gradually being revealed, 
was able to play the role of defending the profession 
as a whole. The revolutionary nature of the economists' 
health plans,even more wide ranging than anything 
considered by the Left during Popular Unity,united 
the profession in opposition. 
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However,this class division within 
the profession was not totally submerged by the 
display of professional opposition to the health 
plan of the economists. 
A split gradually developed inside 
the profession between the younger doctors who 
relied predominantly on the State health service 
on the one hand,and the more established,private 
medicine oriented docto~ on the other. In essence, 
the economists' health plans were intended to open 
up the Chilean health service for private business 
investment. To facilitate this process,the economists 
attempted to dismantle the power of the profession 
concentrated in its organization,the Colegio Medico. 
The economists envisaged that the dominant force 
in the organization of Chile's new health system 
would be insurance groups,financiers and businessmen 
rather than the State and the medical profession. 
The more established members of the profession were 
most able to defend themselves in this proposed 
shift in control of the health service. This 
group had its own private practices. Some of its 
members were already collaborating with insurance 
companies in operating their private clinics. The 
new health plan offered this group of doctors the 
possibilitiy of co-operating with the new business 
managers and a greater opportunity to earn more 
money . 
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This shift in control away from the 
State to private business was much more dangerous 
for the younger doctors. Rather than being able to 
collaborate with the new bosses, they would be more 
likely to be their employees. Only the more 
established doctors would become partners with 
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private business in the new private health enterprises. 
Thus the new health plan offered the younger doctors 
not the possibility of co-operation with the business 
managers but some for m of exploi ta ti on. 
While the health plan was only ratified 
in August 1979,several private medicine experiments 
before that date offered ample evidence to the young 
doctors that they were too weak to defend themselves 
against business interests in the new private 
sector. 
This split between the young doctors 
and the more established members of the profession 
remained under the surface until the protest 
movement of the capitulos began in 1978. After 
1978 the Colegio Medico began to discard its lIprofess-
ional ll role and became once again engulfed by 
competition between political groups. These political 
resul ts of the Governmen t's heal th policy will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
In the following sections we will 
examine how the health policy evolved and the effects 
it would have on the power of the Chilean medical 
profession as a whole. We will show too,how the 
9.1 
proposed changes had a different meaning for the 
various class groupings of the profession. 
THE GENESIS OF THE NEW HEALTH POLICY. 
The Junta had taken control of the 
country without a clearly defined health policy. 
As a result,appointments to the health ministries 
were made arbitrarily. In the first years of the 
new Government,no coherent health policy emerged. 
Instead,the Minister of Health and Director 
General of the Servicio Nacional de Salud proposed 
completely contradictory health plans. Nothing 
tangibile was produced. The Servicio Nacional de 
Salud and SERMENA continued as they had in the 
past. 
However,in other aspects of Chilean 
society dramatic changes were taking place. Under 
the sway of the Chicago School economists,the 
Junta was applying the laws of the market to the 
economy. Reversing the historical trend that had 
begun in the 1920's,the role of the State was 
drastically reduced. The economists argued that 
the health sector could not continue untouched by 
the changes taking place around it. There were 
however,other groups inside the Junta who insisted 
that health could not be produced in the same way 
as a car or a house. Economic criteria could not 
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be applied to this sector. 
A new health team was appointed in 
1976. Air Force General Matthei was made Minister 
of Health,Dr. Cruz Mena was appointed as the 
Under Secretary to the Minister of Health and Dr. 
Francisco Quesney became Delegate of the Government 
to the Servicio Nacional de Salud. They joined Dr. 
Rene Merino who became Director General of the 
Servicio Nacional de Salud in April 1975. While 
Matthe~, Mena and Quesney all shared the ideas of the 
economists viz. that health had to be incoporated 
into the market place,Merino an ex-Christian Democrat 
argued that health should still be delivered by 
the existing Serivico Nacional de Salud. 1 
This conflict between free market 
thinkers on the one hand and more State oriented 
thinkers on the other,was also apparent inside the 
Colegio Medico. The President of the Colegio,Ernesto 
Medina and his Executive Committee had come into 
the Colegio to defend the Servicio Nacional de Salud 
from the attacks of the economists in the Government 
planning office,ODEPLAN. Opposing them were some of 
consejeros including Artaza,Chahin and Donckaster 
who supported greater privatization. 
The background to this debate was 
the general recession of 1975-77 sparked off by the 
"shock" treatment of the Chicago School economists. 
This involved a huge cut in public spending coupled 
to tight control of the money supply. This squeeze 
induced a fall in industrial production and the 
Gross National Product and a sharp increase in 
unemployment. In this crisis, the health budget 
was drastically reduced. 2 
From every viewpoint, spending on 
health care was dramatically lower than in previous 
years. Taking 1970 as the base year, the first 2 
years of Popular Unity, 1971 and 1972 showed an 
increase in health expenditure of 28.3% and 39.5% 
re spe cti vely (See Table 1 3). After the coup, there 
was a net decrease reaching its lowest level in 1975 
when only 76.9% of the 1970 amount was spent on 
heal th. 
In 1975 and 1976 respectively,236.6 
and 230.8 millions were spent in comparison to 384.4 
and 418.0 millions in 1971 and 1972 respectively. 
(See Table 1 3) . 
In per capita terms,40.28 and 42.99 
dollars were spent annually on each Chilean in the 
years 1971 and 1972 in comparison to only 22.49 and 
22.82 dollars in the years 1975 and 1976.(See Table 
14) . 
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YABLE 13 :PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ON HEALTH 
(IN MILLIONS OF US 31976 
YEAR PUBLIC % REAL BASE INDICE 
EXPENDITURE ANN.UAL EXPENDITURE 
IN HEALTH HEALTH 
1969 251 .7 -- 84.0 
1970 299.6 19.0 100.0 
1971 384.5 28.3 128.3 
1972 418.0 8.7 139.5 
1973 249.0 (40.4) 83. 1 
1974 169.7 8.3 90.0 
1975 230.6 (14.5) 76.9 
1976 283.6 3.5 79.6 
1977 286.3 20.0 95.6 
1978 351. 9 22.9 117.4 
Source:Minister to the Treasury 
TABLE 14:PER CAPITA EXPENDITURE ON HEALTH 
(IN US S 1976) 
YEAR PER CAPITA EXPENDITURE 
1969 27.37 
1970 31 .98 
1971 40.28 
1972 42.99 
1973 25.15 
1974 26.77 
1975 22.49 
1976 22.82 
1977 26.87 
1978 32.41 
Source:Minister to the Treasury 
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As a result Servicio Nacional de 
Salud services deteriorated. Because of financial 
ceilings,medical personnel were cut to the minimum. 
Because of the cut in doctors' hours in the 
Servicio Nacional de Salud,in the childrens' 
ward of the Hospital San Juan de Dios,doctors had 
to treat on average 16.5 children per hour. This 
meant that less than 4 minutes was spent on 
diagnosing and treating each child. In the out-
patients department of the Hospital Luis Calvo 
Mackenna,300 patients on average were treated each 
day by only 4 doctors. Each doctor had to therefore 
treat 75 patients a day. In the Hospital Exequiel 
Gonzalez,in a department of 7 doctors .,550 patients 
3 were seen each day. 
In these deplorable working conditions 
doctors were paid extremely low wages. Fernando 
Matthei,the Minister of Health at this time, 
recognized that doctors' wages were low. He did not 
offer any wage increase to doctors because of the 
restricted health budget he had been given, 
"El p~e~upue~to pa~a Salud tu: de 135 
mi.llone~ de dola~e~.'f..l cent~o de 
di.5li.~i.~ nece~Tta ampli.a~~e;el p~oyecto 
~o~~e de~nut~i.ci.on ~e come 34 mi.lli.one~; 
la con~t~ucci.6n de ho~pi.tale~ y cent~o~ 
de e~peci.ali.zaci.on tam~i.en nece~i.ta 
di.ne~o. Lo~ medi.co~ po~ el momento 
de~e~&n e~pe~a~ .••.•••••• " 4 
Fees from their SERMENA work offered doctors no 
comfort . These reached such a low level that out 
of 2,200 doctors in Santiago only 600 remained 
;I 
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treating SERMENA patients.Private .practice remained 
an option only for the experienced doctors who had 
buil t up a pri va te clientele. And even for them ,the 
general economic crisis was lowering demand. ~he 
Colegio Medico expressed alarm at the increasing 
number of doctors who were leaving the country to 
practise abroad because of low incomes. 
Methods of raising doctors' incomes 
became the major concern of the Colegio Medico. 
For Medina and other consejeros,doctors had to seek 
increases in their income from SERMENA and the 
Servicio Nacional de Salud to restore the cuts 
suffered as a cause of the recession. In contrast, 
other consejeros argued that, 
"E.f.. p/Lo.&..f..e.ma no -t>e. a/L/Le.g f..a. c.el"\ ~nOS 
pe.-t>o-t> ma-t>,-t>ino que. ha.&../L£a que. moditica/L 
e.f.. -t>i-t>ie.ma pO/Lque. e.n e.-t>ie. mome.nio f..o-t> 
que. e.-t>ian ayudando a tinancia/L e.-t>ie 
o.&..-t>~f..e.io -t>i-t>ie.ma -t>on f..o-t> medico-t> 
/Le.c~'&"ie.ndo un -t>ue.f..do mi-t>e./La.&..f..i." 5 
One consejero saw the economic crisis as a relief, 
"ijo me. af..e.g/Lo de. f..o que occu/Lio,pa/Le.ce. 
que. pO/L tin e.-t>iamo-t> e.nie.ndie.ndo ef.. 
me.n-t>aje.,ha-t>ia aqu{,he.mo-t> e-t>iado i/Le-t> 
ano-t> i/Laiando de. a.&../Li/Lf..e f..o-t> ojo-t> a 
f..o-t> medico-t> y dici.e.ndof..e.-t>-qfJ!!:-r.o puedel'l 
e.-t>pe./La/L nada de. un e.mpf..e.ado/L puK€ico 
e.n -t>af..ud: f..a unica. po-t>i.&..if..idad kque. 
e.f.. medico /Le.cupe/Le. -t>u nive.€ en f..a 
-t>ocie.dad,e.-t> .&..u-t>cando oi/La-t> af..ie./Lnaiiva-t> 
aho/La ••••• iiene.n que -t>omeie/L-t>e. af.. 
diciado de. e.-t>ie. e.mpf..e.ado/L unico." "6 
This group wanted to use the opportunity of the 
crisis to privatize the system and increase doctors' 
earnings when the economy moved out of the recession. 
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The General Council began to discuss 
in detail the feasability of private schemes which 
could replace the Servicio Nacional de Salud and 
remedy the drastic economic plight of the doctors. 
An experiment had already begun in 1975 when a 
private corporation took over the largest health 
sector in Santiago from the Servicio Nacional de 
Salud and began to run it as a private business. 
Representatives from this corporation were invited 
to the General Council to discuss the likelihood 
of raising doctors' incomes through this venture. 
Another pilot scheme involving the 
Consultorio Maipu in Santiago had already been 
handed over from the Servicio Nacional de Salud to 
the private sector to see if it could be run more 
efficiently. Private insurance agencies were setting 
up their own medical clinics for the empleados of 
big businesses. Doctors were being given more 
opportunities to work in private hospitals owned 
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by insurance companies like the Hospital de Trabajador 
in Santiago or the ASIVA in Valparaiso. Private 
co-operative schemes of doctors setting up their 
own health group were begun. The Director of one 
such.yenture was R.Hurtado,the President of the 
Regional Council of Santiago. All this activity 
and these embryo schemes reflected doctors' 
anxiety at earning less and less from their 
Servicio Nacional de Salud work. 
Support for the incorporation of 
health into the econom[a deg me~cado ~ociag grew 
amongst doctors who believed that privatization 
simply meant more income. 
A final outcome of the conflict 
inside the health authorities between those 
groups who favoured privati7.ation and those who 
wanted the preservation of the Servicio Nacional de 
Salud was the sacking of R.Merino as Director 
General of the Servicio Nacional de Salud. Thus, 
the final internal obstacle to the presentation 
of the new health plan had been removed. 
On the date of Merino's sacking in 
1977 with the new health team of Matthei,Mena and 
Quesney firmly in control of the destiny of the 
Chilean health service,an increasingly impoverished 
medical profession was looking to them and their 
economistic ideas for financial relief. 
But from 1977 onwards, as the new 
health policy became clearer and more defined and 
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the consequences thus made apparent to the profession, 
these early enthusiasts amongst the profession 
slowly became implacable opponents. 
This new health plan bore no 
similarity to the ultra-Right privatization scheme 
after the coup. In this latter plan, these doctors 
even though claiming their policy was compatible 
with free market principles still envisaged that 
the State would playa major role in reimbursing 
the less affluent patients who could not afford to 
pay for treatment from the new private enterprises. 
In this way, the Stat8 fuelled demand for this 
"private" health system. The planners of this 
scheme argued that doctors would still control the 
health service as they had done in the past. For 
instance, these planners did not intend to open the 
way for the takeover of the health service by 
businessmen . Any private enterprise which took 
over a sector of the health service and employed 
doctors had to have their contracts with these 
doctors approved by the Colegio Medico. 7 
In complete contrast to this naive 
and plainly doctor-centered privatization model, 
the economists' plans were intended to radically 
reduce the role of the State and shift power in 
the health service out of the hands of the profession 
and into those of private business. It was to 
become abundantly clear that pursuing profits 
in the health service was not necessarily compatible 
with doctors' interests. 
Even before the health policy was 
announced, Medina warned that the simple equation, 
nmo~~ p~ivatization ~quae~ mo~~ 
mon~y to~ docto~~ " 8 
-was fal se. In the se new al terna ti ves to the Servi ci 0 
Nacional de Salud,he said, 
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"~i~ni~a~ eo~ p~opio~ medico~ nO ~~an 
capiiaei~ia~,~e~an con~id~~ado~ 
t~iam~ni~ como in~umo~ d~e p~oc~~o 
d~ p~oducci6n. A dit~~~ncia d~ eo qu~ 
ha ocu~~ido ha~ia ea techa,a pe~a~ de 
eo~ inconv~nienie~ qu~ ha ~igniticado 
ee ~i~iema ~~iaiae,eo~ medico~ han 
i~nido mucho ma~ v~niaja~ y det~n~a. 
Po~ e~ia~ ~azone~ juzga de ~i~~go~o ~e 
~i~iema p~ivado como mod~eo exi~n~ivo 
a iod~ ea o~ganizaci6n d~ Satud,ya qu~ 
ae medico ~e e~ conci~~ como un in~i~u­
menio at ~~~vicio d~ ea o~ganizaci5n." 
9.2 THE NEW HEALTH PLAN 
Details of the privatization plan 
emerged in 1977. This plan for removing the State 
as the fulcrum of the Chilean health service was 
much more sophisticated than earlier privatization 
attempts. The health authorities in close collabor-
9 
ation with ODEPLAN realised that privatization could 
not be introduced overnight. A successful privatiz-
ation scheme required that the purchasing power of 
the Chilean people was sufficient to sustain a 
thriving private sector. Until their economic power 
increased,the State the economists argued,would 
still have to playa major role in providing free 
health care. Moreover,the State would still have to 
perform the unprofitable tasks such as vaccination 
campaigns,water purification and the provision of 
services to remote geographical areas. In the short 
term,the plan intended to entice the private sector 
into taking over the State service as far as was 
possible. 
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The major obstacle in the way of 
creating business interest in the Chilean health 
sector was the Servicio Nacional de Salud. The 
huge centralised structure of the Servicio Nacional 
de Salud could not be transfered easily into 
private hands. The Service's inefficiency and 
over-large bureaucracy further discouraged private 
investment. In a clear attempt to make the Servicio 
Nacional de Salud more attractive to businessmen, 
it was divided into 27 autonomous regional sectors. 
Instead of the entire service being centrally 
organized,power was devolved to the regional unit 
called the Unidad Operativa de Salud. In quite 
simple terms, this regionalization of the service 
allowed private capital to take over a part of the 
Servicio Nacional de Salud and run it independently 
of the State. 
Both the creation of a separate 
Fondo Nacional de Salud to finance the system and 
the scrapping of the post of Director General of 
the Servicio Nacional de Salud were designed to 
attract businessmen's interest. The Director 
General had previously controlled the Servicio 
Nacional de Salud budget;now the finance under the 
autonomous Fondo Nacional de Salud was independent 
of Government policymakers. A hospital was no 
longer dependent on the State and the Director 
General of the Servicio Nacional de Salud for its 
finance. The way was open for private capital to 
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take over one hospital,or indeed several hospitals 
in the same way as the economists' plans allowed 
private business to take over one or several 
regional units. 
In order to streamline the Service 
and make it more efficient and thus,more attractive 
to private investment the criterion for funding 
these local regional units or Unidades Operativas 
de Salud changed dramatically. In the past,each 
hospital received a set budget. The size of the 
budget depended on the number of people in the 
area it served. Increases were calculated on the 
yearly inflation rate. Now,hospital establishments 
were no longer guaranteed their incomes. Finance 
would be given in direct proportion to the number 
of cases treated. An establishment which failed 
to attract patients through inefficiency or lack 
of competitiveness with other health enterprises, 
risked bankruptcy. 
Also in order to make the Service 
more cost effective priorities for the distribution 
of resources changed. The economists considered 
that the Servicio Nacional de Salud was over~ 
sophisticated to tackle Chile's real health problems. 
This echoed the cry of Popular Unity health 
ministers who had argued that the high technology 
curative hospitals were inappropriate for 
combatting major killers in Chile like infant 
diarrhoea and pneumonia. The Chilean health service 
they argued,had to promote preventative medicine 
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Similarly, the new Health Minister divided the 
service into 3 levels:the primary(the level of 
prevention i.e. consultorio periferico);the middle 
(local and small regional hospitals);and the 
third(high technology hospitals). His aim was to 
reduce costs by concentrating State resources at 
the primary level, allowing the private sector to 
take over the sophisticated hospital level. 
Instead of paying doctors to operate 
sophisticated equipment at the third level,it was 
cheaper to scale the health service down to the 
primary level. Here less qualified and thus, cheaper 
personnel could utilize low cost preventative 
practices to better effect. As Cruz Mena declared, 
- "cl. he.cho e./) q.ue. .oJ.. una vacuna 
apl.icada .e.n e.l. nive.l. {&.oico-cue..oia 
.oupongamo.o un pe..oo,una ho.opiial.-
izacion con 10 d[a.o de. e..o~adQ 
cue..oia 600 pe..oo.o. c.o o{vio q.ue. 
hay q.ue. pone.~ g~an Enta.oi.o e.n e..oia 
pa~ie. p~e.ve.ntiva po~q.ue. e./) mucho 
,.. ",. h " ma.o e.conom~ca y umana. 10 
The economists'health team realised 
that private capital had to have a guaranteed 
demand before it would invest in health care. 70% 
of the population who received free attention from 
the Servicio Nacional de Salud starved the private 
medicine market of potential customers. To entice 
this group into the market, the economists offered 
them the possibility of paying for their medical 
care. They argued that it was anomolous for the 
empl~ados to partly pay for their health care in 
3)b. 
SERMENA when the obreros,who often earned as much 
as the empleados,received free treatment. In August 
1979,SERMENA and the Servicio Nacional de Salud 
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were combined to allow all their beneficiaries the 
choice of whether or not to pay for their treatment. 
In this way a large group of the population was 
released from the total State system into a semi-
private organization. The economists of course, 
realised that although this opportunity had now 
been given to asegurados it would be a long time 
before they were in a financial position to pay 
even part of their care. But at least this scheme 
dismantled the stranglehold of the Servicio Nacional 
de Salud on this potential market. 
Moreover,the economists envisaged 
that the hospitals of the third level would be the 
most likely to attract private capital. By shifting 
State capital from this level to the primary, 
the economists were opening the door for capital to 
take over the large hospitals.'Already,Paula 
Jeraquemada the most sophisticated and newest 
hospital in Chile,was being operated by an American 
consortium. Studies of this hospital suggested 
that under the directorship of professional managers, 
the hospital was treating more patients with a 
smaller budgAt than a similar sized hospital in 
the Servicio Nacional de Salud. 
Paula Jeraquemada was a non-profit 
making enterprise .'The health authorities however, 
! .3 
were looking for business to take over the hospital 
administration and run it as a business for profit. 
As Quesney declared, 
"7he./Le. -t>houf.d £..e. no o£..je.ct.i.on to a 
p/Livate. g/LOUp making p/Lotit-t>,it the.y 
a/Le. /Lunning the. e.nte./Lp/Li-t>e. mO/Le. 
e.tticie.ntf.y than the. State.." 11 
By 1980,according to Francisco Quesney,American groups 
with experience in running hospitals were making 
enquiries about taking over Servicio Nacional de 
Salud hospitals. Already a U.S. multinational had a 
50% interest in the private Santa Maria clinic. 
THE PROFESSION'S OPPOSITION 
It could be cynically argued that 
doctors' worries about the form of privatization 
envisaged in this economic health model, stemmed 
from threats to their professional status,power 
and traditional authority in the health service. 
As we shall see,these worries about the future of 
the profession were significant factors in their 
opposition to the new model. 
However,doctors in Chile also felt 
a strong sense of service to the poor. Their 
medical profession's training imbued them with 
the belief that the State should provide free 
health care for those unable to pay for their 
treatment. Chilean doctors believed that in the 
past,the medical profession itself had bAen 
358. 
primarily responsible for the creation of social 
medicine and the predominant role of the Chilean 
State in healt~ care. The belief in social 
medicine organized by the State,and a strong sense 
of duty towards the poor were widely held by 
Chilean doctors. 
These medical beliefs were now being 
challenged by the Chicago School economists. R.Cruz 
Coke,son of one of the important founders of social 
medicine in Chile,wrote a letter to the "Revista 
Medica de Chile" entitled "D.e./-.e.n-1a d.e. €.a 7/l..adicion 
fYledico d.e. Chi€..e." 1 2 In this letter he attacked 
the economists in the health team for proposing 
changes in the health service which would destroy 
everything that doctors had built. For instance, 
the concept of the subsidiary role of the State in 
Chilean medicine,Cruz Coke argued went against the 
whole tradition of Chilean medicine. As he said, 
this concept 
"S.e. C/l..ean pO/l.. de/-inicion ta/l../l...e./l..a-1 
economica-1 y /-inanci.e./l..a-1 en €.a 
aienci6n medica qu.e. di-1io/l..cionan 
€.a ca€.idad en d.e.-1med/l..o de €.a 
pot€.acion d.e. tajo-1 ing/l...e.-1o-1." 13 
This belief that doctors had to defend their role 
in providing free health treatment for the poor lay 
at the heart of many cri ticisms made by the doctors 
against the health model. 
It should be pointed out that Cruz 
Coke was no Left wing sympathizer. He had been 
strongly opposed to Popular Unity and like his 
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father, belonged to the Chilean Right. Even the 
conservative wing of the medical profession however, 
believed in what Cruz Coke called, 
~el magno editicio de la ~edicina 
Social." 
This ~editicio" had to be defended from any foreign 
i.e. non-medical ideology. 14 
Doctors' sense of duty towards the 
poor was an important element in their ideology 
and should be borne in mind when we examine how the 
health changes affected the power and standing of 
the profession in Chilean society. 
It should be mentioned that the 
economists' proposals for the health service repres-
ented a total package of reforms. This package 
was revealed to doctors between the time of Merino's 
sacking in 1977 and 1979 when some of these reforms 
were put into practice. During this period the 
economists were trying to convince Pinochet to 
enact these proposals as well as attempti"lg to 
placate the fears of the Colegio Medico. As will 
be seen not:all the intended economists' reforms 
were put into practice. The process by which the 
Colegio Medico prevented some of the proposals 
from being implemented will be discussed in the 
next chapter. In the following sections we will 
examine doctors' responses to the total package 
of reforms being proposed by the economists. 
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.4 DETERIORATING STATUS 
The medical profession felt that the 
economists' attempts to reduce costs and increase 
efficiency in the health service would lower the 
sDcial status of doctors. It should be pointed out 
that the economists regarded doctors in much the 
same way as they regarded the Servicio Nacional de 
Salud. They were a bureaucratic and inefficient 
monopoly. The economists argued that doctors' high 
social status was unjustified. Through their monopoly 
organization,the Colegio Medico the economists 
believed,doctors were protected from market compet-
ition,in the same way as national industry had 
been protected by high tariffs. 
The financial restrictions inside 
the Servicio Nacional de Salud from 1974 until 1977 
began to have an effect on doctors' technical 
status. The cutbacks in the health sector in these 
years had particularly affected the sophisticated 
hospital level,where doctors enjoyed working most. 
In general,doctors preferred the complicated clinical 
case or the complex hospital operation to their 
work at the primary level where they supervised 
auxiliaries,nurses and mid-wives or administered 
vaccination campaigns. 
Doctors felt that although the 
economists could not be entirely blamBd for the 
economic crises and the resultant need for 
economies in the health sector,they had cut back 
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more at the hospital level than in the primary level. 
This discrimination against the hospital level doctors 
argued was reducing their technical expertise. As one 
doctor warned the Minister of Health by emphasizing 
coverage(cut~~iu~a)rather than quality (calidad),he 
was creating, 
"m~dicina d~ ~~gunda cla~~ ~n ta~~ a 
p~ot~~ional~~ pa~a-medico~." 15 
During this period of economic cutbacks,the Colegio 
M~dico constantly complained to the Health Ministry 
about the chronic shortages of equipment and materials 
at the hospital level. As one doctors said, 
"No pod~mo~ ~ni~nd~~ qu~ la pe~d1da d~ 
calidad y d~ ~tici~ncia ~ignitiqu~ un 
m~jo~ ~~~vicio medico y COn la cot~~iu~a, 
~~io ~~ p~~i~nda ~oguciona~,no ~~camo~ nada 
con qu~ ~~ i~ng~ g~ni~.~n Policl[nico 
pa~a ai~nd~~ mil v~c~~ ~l mi~mo colicol 
h~paiico ~i no ~~ l~ pu~d~ hac~~ la 
• / col~ci~iog~at[a po~ no- ~x.i~ii~ izpa~aio 
',,- d~ ~ayo~, ~~o ~~ pe.~di..do.. de ~~cu~~o~ 
/\~humano~ y mai.e.~ial~~." 16 
Moreover,doctors felt that the health 
authorities' policy was intent on undermining doctors' 
supremacy within the health team. For instance a new 
sanitary code in 1977 gave auxiliaries the right to 
request a laboratory test for a patient. Until then 
only doctors were able to demand these requests for 
their patients. One doctor in the General Council 
declared that this new code revealed the health 
authorities' 
"d~~~o ~vid~ni~ d~ di~minui~ ~l medico 
~n ~u calidad d~ l[d~~ d~l ~quipo d~ 
~alud." 17 
It was clear to one consejero why the economists 
had introduced this new provision. As he said, 
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"De~de el punto de vl~ta de lo~ 
economl~ta~ e~o ~e~ulta mucho ma~ 
tacil y ga~ato hace~lo COn 
aux.ilia~e~.n 18 
This apparent policy of the economists,to cut costs 
by devolving certain doctors' tasks to lower cost 
professionals and auxiliaries caused the Colegio 
M~dico much concern. For example,a special conference 
was held b y the Regional Council of Valparaiso in 
January 1978 entitled, "Inva~i6ne~ en el campo 
p~ote~ional del midico" .19 Moreover,the President 
of the Commission of Ethics,in an effort to prevent 
further legislation which would undermine doctors' 
authority over groups such as nurses and auxiliaries 
threatened to punish doctors working_ for the 
Government who were involved in drawing up plans 
20 
which threatened doctors' professional powers. 
Furthermore,the economists' plans 
to use managers as opposed to doctors to direct the 
new regional health units brought them into 
opposition with the Colegio M~dico. The economists 
argued ,with a certain validity,that doctors were 
trained as doctors not as health administrators. 
For too long these doctors had run Chile's health 
establishments with little regard or concern for 
cost-effectiveness. The Colegio on the other hand, 
was aghast at the prospect of hospitals and clinics 
being run by managers who had no understanding of 
medical science. As one consejero said, 
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"Qu.e. lo/.) t£cnico/.) .e.n /.)alud vamo/.) a 
d.e.p.e.nd.e.~ .e.l'dfa de manana d.e. un 
Con/.).e.jo Admini/.)t~ativo to~mado po~ 
p.e.~/.)ona/.) d.e. gu.e.na voluntad qu.e. no 
.e.nti.e.nd.e.n d.e. balud,a mt m.e. pa~.e.c.e. 
qU.e..e.b una mat.e.~ia inbobt.e.nigl.e.." 21 
In a further attempt to give priority to the primary 
level of care,the new health authorities in 1977 
announced 64 grants for newly graduated doctors to 
-~ 
learn to become General Practi tioners. The economists 
clearly wanted less clinical doctors working at 
the hospi tal l:evel and more doctors wi th a global 
vision of public health problems to work in the 
primary level in the consultorios perifericos. The 
public health experts in the General Council like 
Ernesto Medina favoured these attempts. However, 
other consejeros in their own words, 
"VibtO d.e.bd.e. .e.l punto d.e. vibta bocial 
no d.e.bd.e. .e.l punto de. vibta d.e.l 
balug~ibta." 22 
were concerned that the posts of General Practitioner 
would become the norm,and that opportunities to 
specialize at the hospital level would diminish. As 
one said, 
"E.l p.e.~bonalm.e.nt.e. d.e.b.e.a~[a qu.e. al 
p~ot.e.bional no b.e. l.e. bugvalo~iza~a 
binD qu.e. cada d[a tu.e.~a mab p~otundo, 
mab g~and.e.,mab ~.e.bPztado,y con mayo~.e.b 
conocomi.e.ntobY qu.e. bU p~.e.btigio 
co~~.e.bPondi.e.~a tanto a bUb connotac-
ion.e.b ci.e.nttticab como al abp.e.cto 
.e.con6mico;po~ lo tanto no .e.b pa~tid­
a~io qu.e. b.e. .e.bt~ p~oduci.e.ndo,pa~a 
bali~ d.e.l pabo,un medico 1U.e. .e.b un 
poco mab qu.e. una .e.nt.e.~me~a." 23 
9.5 
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WAGES 
Wages were another cause of animosity 
between the Colegio M~dico and the heal~h authority's 
economists. Before,doctors' Servicio Nacional de 
Salud wages had been calculated separately from 
other public employees in a manner which took into 
special consideration the skilled nature of their 
work. In order to prevent public employees using 
their bargaining power to obtain wage increase,the 
Ministry of Finance decreed that all public employees 
be fitted into a single wage scale (the Escala Unica). 
Doctors did extremely badly out of this and their 
, I 
wages deteriorated disproportionately to other 
public employees. Cruz Mena asked doctors therefore 
to provide him with data to present to the Minister 
to the Treasury confirming this deterioration in 
their wage. The Colegio study argued that doctors' 
wages had deteriorated by 20% in comparison with 
other similarly placed professionals. 25 
The Treasury Minister refused to 
accept this data or even to meet the Colegio to 
discuss the rna tter further. Their policy was not to 
bargain on wages directly with State groups. 
According to Cruz Mena,the economists,despite 
giving other public employees wage increases,were 
2': 
determined not to grant doctors any rise whatsoever. v 
The economists argued that groups such as teachers 
were much more deserving than doctors. Doctors 
were more able to go into the private sector. As 
Reyes complained, 
"La /-if-o/)ot[a de. liacie.nda e./) que. 
f-o/) medico/) no vaf-e.n nada como 
tunciona~io/),po~ f-o que. ie.nd~[an 
que. i~/)e. af- /)e.cio~ p~ivado e.n 
iu/)ca de. me.jo~e./) i/)pe.ciiva/)." 
The Colegio decided to bypass the 
27 
economists and go straight to Pinochet. He met the 
Colegio in early June 1977. His response to their 
requests was made in a letter: 
"[l Sup~e.mo 9oiie.~no ~e.conoce. f-a 
ju/)iicia y ne.ce./)idad de. ~e.vi/)a~ e.f-
/)i/)ie.ma de. ~e.mune.~acione./) de. f-a f-e.y 
N-15.076 di/)io~/)ionado po~ la de./)-
ualo~i2aci6n de. /)u unidad de. ~e.te.~­
zncia y po~ /)u/) p~opia/) comple.jidade./) 
y Con i~adiccione./)." 
The.letter agreed to recompense the doctors 
------
28 
accordingly. Shortly afterwards Pinochet came under 
the influence of the Minister of Finance and the 
ODEPLAN economists. They argued fiercely that the 
Colegio Medico was a prestigious caste and was 
not entitled to special favours. Doctors represented 
an inefficient State medicine. They must learn to 
sink or swim in the new private sector. Pinochet, 
thus never kept his promise and doctors remained 
financially worse off in the Escala Unica than 
other similar groups. Never in the history of the 
Colegio Medico,even during Popular Unity,had it 
been treated with so little respect as when the 
economists dominated the Finance Ministry. 
The economists'decision to devalue 
doctors' SRrvicio Nacional de Salud work by offering 
such low wages affected the young members of the 
366. 
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profession more than the established doctors. The 
latter group was able to draw on its private income 
to supplement its meagre Servicio Nacional de 
Salud wages. 
THE REFORM OF SERMENA 
The health authorities had decided 
to close down the Servicio Nacional de Salud to 
release p~tients for the private sector. The Servicio 
Nacional de Salud patient was given the opportunity 
to choose to have his treatment free under the State 
or in part payment under the old SERMENA scheme. 
The economists wanted this new organism to be 
transfered out of State hands and be operated by 
private companies and insurance groups. To accomplish 
this,they needed to break the power of the medical 
profession who supervised the scheme for the State. 
This aim of trying to replace the Colegio Medico" 
by capital produced the bitterest confrontation 
between the Colegio and the health authorities. The 
economists were not the first group to try and break 
doctors' powers in SERMENA. Popular Unity had tried 
to do this between 1970 and 1973 and failed. 
SERMENA was a system which had been 
devised by doctors for doctors. Part of the fee 
for treating a SERMENA patient came from the patient 
himself. The other part was paid to the doctors by 
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his Colegio from the SERMENA fund. The Colegio 
Medico had control over the finance of the system , 
which included fixing the fees charged. It also 
supervised the professional behaviour of doctors 
and determined which doctors were considered 
suitable to practise in this system. Young doctors, 
for instance,were notably excluded from this 
scheme. 
Accountable to neither Government, 
nor beneficiaries ,doctors operated the system as 
a closed shop. Corr~ption became endemic. Doctors 
commonly overcharged. When offenders were reported, 
the Colegio was notoriously slow in punishing them. 
One of the worst practices was to treat SERMENA 
patients in the hours in which doctors were paid 
to work in the Servicio Nacional de Salud. This 
practice had commenced as soon as the SERMENA 
system had been created. Since the doctors were in 
control of the system,it was impossible to find a 
solution to this problem. 
The economists realised that the 
Colegio Medico's powers prevented capital from 
taking over SERMENA . To be efficient,managers 
had to exercise their power over their employees. 
Managers needed the right to investigate ,sanction 
and ultimately dismiss its workers. Managers,not 
the employees had to fix the fees for the service 
offered. These could not be set at a minimum. 
Competition for a share of the market required the 
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power to cut prices. Finally,managers had to have 
the power to pay their employees directly. Profit 
could not be created if fees went first to their 
employees. 
Under the economists' proposals 
the Colegio Medico would lose its power to fix fees, 
pay doctors and administer SERMENA. The private 
enterprises would recruit and dismiss employees at 
will. DoctoDS would be paid a fixed wage and not 
earn their income by fees. Instead of ~reating 
SERMENA patients using Servicio Nacional de Salud 
facilities, the economists envisaged privately run 
clinics employing doctors to treat exclusively 
SERMENA or private patients. Such was the incred-
ulity of the Colegio Medico towards these changes 
that one consejero from Rancagua was moved to 
report that, 
"Ee antep~oyecto pa~acie~a haRe~ 
~ido p~oducto de un pen~amiento 
ma~xi~toide intiet~ado en ee 
~eno dee ~ini~te~io." 27 
The sweeping nature of the reform and its boldness 
far outweighed anything even hinted at during 
Popular Unity. 
By abolishing the Colegio Medico's 
power to fix the minimum fee a doctor charged his 
patients, the economists allowed doctors or private 
groups employing doctors to compete with each 
other. Through this form of competition the 
economists hoped that SERMENA patients would 
benefit from cheaper services. 
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The removal of the Colegio Medico's 
power to determine which doctors could treat 
SERMENA patients would have lowered technical 
standards and commercialized Chilean medicine. 
Until now, the Colegio Medico had been responsible 
for selecting doctors to treat SERMENA patients 
on the basis of their proven skills and experience. 
This pre-screening ensured that SERMENA's technical 
standards were maintained. The economists wanted 
to abolish this pre-selection. If this was 
imFlemented patients would no longer choose their 
doctors on the grounds of his technical skill 
but,rather on the success of his business acumen 
in selling his expertise at the most competitive 
price. The doctors or private organization 
which best advertised these skills would receive 
more patients and hence the most income . 
The most important power that 
the SERMENA reforms threatened was the doctors' 
right to Libre Eleccion. This principle, considered 
sacred by the profession established the right of 
the patient to choose his doctors, and the right 
of the doctor to receive payment directly from 
his patients in the form of a fee. By giving 
private capital control of the health institution, 
doctors would lose their power to charge their 
patients themselves. Even at this time,newly 
emeTging private establishments were paying the 
doctor a wage and thus preventing him from 
receiving an income from fees. The COlegio 
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Medico's fear was that this process would convert 
doctors into paid employees of capital. 
Finally,doctors were concerned 
that the new SERMENA reforms would lower their 
income. The SERMENA fund and the Servicio Nacional 
de Salud fund in this new scheme were to be pooled. 
Doctors fel t that SIERMENA money would be used to 
alleviate the chronic financial crises of the 
Servicio Nacional de Salud. Doctors also feared that 
the income they received from SERMENA would be 
reduced since a part of this fee would now be 
needed to pay doctors' support staff such ~s 
auxiliariaries and nurses. Under the existing fee-
for- service system,only doctors received a 
special ~income from SERMENA. Under the new wagf' 
s chern e, it would be more likely that the SERHENA r 
income would also be shared with other staff. 30 
The root cause of doctors'opposition 
to the SERMENA reforms lay in the fact that these 
changes shifted power away from doctors to private 
interests,and in the process,converted doctors 
into salaried employees with little power within 
their workplace. We have already noted that 
part of the deskilling process which Braverman 
highlighted involved the worker's loss of control 
and autonomy in relation to his tasks. It could 
be argued that in the case of the Chilean doctors, 
their opposition to the SERMENA reforms lay in 
their aversion to management control and the 
subsequent loss of autonomy in their workplace 
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which this implied. 
THE POWERS OF THE COLEGIO MEDICO UNDER ATTACK 
Under the SERMENA reforms,the Colegio 
Medico faced the prospect of losing its power to pay 
doctors for treatingSERMENA patients. Since this 
role of distribution of SERMENA income was often 
the only contact the Colegio had with its members, 
these SERMENA proposals,if implemented ,would have 
gravely damaged the importance of the Colegio Medico 
amongstthe profession. As we shall see by the end of 
1979 it was clear that the Colegio had won a reprieve: 
its control over the administration of the system and 
the payment of its members were preserved for the 
time being. The Colegio however,was not able to 
prevent or delay,the passing of legislation which in 
practice threatened the very existence of the Colegio 
along with all other Chilean professional 
associations. 
On 6th February 1979,a decree law N° 
2.516 was passed which declared that the fixing of 
fees by professional associations; 
"S6lo .6e~vi~an de me~a ~e/!.e~encia 
pa~a la /!.ijacion del hono~a~io 
~e~pe ciivo • n 31 
and that the holding of a professional title in order 
to perform certain public functions, 
"~e eniiende cumplido po~ el ~6lo 
hecho de enconi~a~~e en po~c~ion 
de f! itiulo co~~e~poi1di.ei1Lc..." 32 
At a stroke,the professional colleges both lost 
the power to fix fees and to require professionals 
to be members of their respective associations. 
The Junta in abolishing the State's 
requirement that all professions belong to their 
relevant professional college wanted to prevent 
those individuals who worked for the Government 
having their performance scrutinized by their 
f . 1 . t· 33 Wh . 1 th· pro eSSlona aSSOCla lons. l e lS new 
law was designed to give Government appointees 
independence of action from their professional 
associations,its scope extended to all professionals 
in public posts. The State's requirement that all 
Chilean doctors be members of the Colegio Medico 
which the reformist wing of Popular Unity had 
never dared to alter was effectively abrogated by 
the decree law of 1979. 
The reason for ending the professions' 
fee fixing power was more ideological than political. 
Fee fixing was a monopoly practice which eliminated 
competition and prevented the consumer from 
obtaining the best and/or cheapest goods or service. 
Abolishing the Colegio Medico's power to fix fees 
was also intended to allow business itself to 
determine what it should charge the patient. For 
the Colegio Medico,the loss of these powers to fix 
the fees of its members and to oblige membership 
was disastrous. The Colegio,already weakened by 
the prohibition of elections within its organiz-
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ation,was losing its capacity to effectively 
represent the profession. 
Undoubtedly,all the class groups within 
the profession were harmed by the Colegio Medico's 
loss of power. Young doctors needed a strong gremial 
organization as much as the more established 
doctors. However,the weakening of the Colegio Medico's 
power had a greater impact on the private medicine 
oriented segment of the profession. 
Those members of the profession who 
gained the bulk of their income from private medicine 
needed the Colegio to regulate the supply of doctors 
in the private sector. Demand for private health care 
was not elastic. They feared a free market situation 
in which doctors competed with one another for a 
scarce demand. The fixing of a minimum fee by the 
Colegio Medico prevented competition between young 
doctors and their more senior colleagues. Under a 
fee fixing policy, young doctors could not attract 
the private patients of the more established 
segment of the profession by offering their services 
at a lower price. If young doctors had charged the 
same as their more established colleagues they 
would have soon gone out of business. The Chilean 
private patient would always choose the more 
experienced physician in preference to the younger 
one. The ending of fee fixing threatened the more 
established doctors' monopoly over their private 
clientele. For the established doctors, a reduction 
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in their Colegio Medico's powers was of more 
sigificance than a threat to the State service. 
In contrast, the young doctors had less to lose 
from the dismantling of the powers of the Colegio 
Medico than from the termination of the Servicio 
Nacional de Salud. 
The long term strategy of the 
economists was to restructure the doctors' repres-
entative organization. They felt that the Colegio 
Medico could n~act as an intermediary between 
doctors employed in a private enterprise on the 
one hand,and the managers or owners of the private 
enterprise on the other. A union,uniformly 
representing all doctors working in independent 
private enterprises could curb competition between 
the independent private institutions. The economists 
hoped to relegate bargaining between employers and 
doctors to the level of each enterprise . Thus, 
instead of a single doctors' union, there would be 
as many doctors' unions as there were private 
health enterprises. 34 
The economists envisaged that the 
Colegio Medico would only retain one power-the control 
of doctors' ethical behaviour. Again this project 
was intended to apply to all professional colle~es. 
In refering to the future functions of the College 
of Architects,which had the same powers as the 
Colegio Medico,one economist was reported as 
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saying, 
"La~ tunclone~ del Coleglor ........... ) 
~olo ~e ~etle~en a la p~ote~l6n de 
a~qultecto dent~o del amRito de la 
itlca p~ote~lonal." 35 
THE REFORMS IN THE SERVICIO NACIONAL DE SALUD 
In December 1979,the Servicio Nacional 
de Salud disappeared as a separate entity. By 
combining the Servicio Nacional de Salud with SERMENA, 
patients had the choice of receiving free treatment 
from the State or paying a part of their treatment 
under the old SERMENA system. 
The economists were quick to point out 
that they had not fundamentally changed the service. 
It was probable they argued,that the ex-Servicio 
Nacional de Salud and SERMENA patients would carry 
on receiving treatment from their respective 
services. Howevpr,while it mi~ht have been true 
that patients would probably be treated in the same 
way as before at least in the short term,the whole 
philosophy underlying the health service and the 
role of the State had changed. 
Until this time,the State service 
was seen as the fulcrum of the Chilean health system. 
The founders of the Servicio Nacional de Salud in 
1952 had argued that a modern and sophisticated 
public service was essential to respond to the heal th 
needs of the Chilean people. Chile's health needs 
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were scientifically determined ~y Chile's State 
health planners. These planners since the setting 
up of the Servicio Nacional de Salud in 1952 had 
attempted to produce the most suitably qualified 
medical personnel for Chile's health care 
requirements. This strategy assumed the State's 
responsibilities in educating doctors not only to 
graduate level,but to specialist status as well. 
Chile's State policy produced fully trained doctors 
well versed in the modern techniques of medical 
science . This umbilical cord between the determin-
ation of health requirements by the State,the 
formation of health plans and the resFonsibility of the 
the State to produce adequately trained doctors 
made the Chilean medical profession the most 
capable in Latin America. This philosophy was 
reflected in the very close links between the 
Servicio Nacional de Salud and Chilean University 
Medical Schools. 36 
The economists argued that the health 
service should not be structured around the State's 
determination of Chile's health requirements. 
ItHealth need" was a subjective notion which had 
resulted in imprisoning patients into certain 
categories, such as Servicio Nacional de Salud and 
SERMENA,and which had prevented them from choosing 
their health service. In order to free Chile's 
patients from these State "health prisons",the 
patients themselves,the economists argued should 
be allowed to choose and thus,to determine Chile's 
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health service. 37 The economists maintained that 
patients' demand should be the underlying principle 
of the health service. The market mechanism of 
demand,rather than the State's notion of need,should 
be the fulcrum of Chile's health service. 
The economists' arg~ments that 
patients' demand should determine the size,structure 
and scope of Chile's health service carried certain 
disturbing implications for doctors. Under this 
argument ,doctors were seen as over-skilled. The 
economists argued that Chile was an underdeveloped 
economy with low health demands. The State had 
ignored this weak demand and had built an over-
sophisticated health service,over staffed with over-
qualified doctors . The new health service based on 
demand would result in a more realistically equipped 
and trained medical profession. 
The desire to de-skill the profession 
had already been seen during the economic crisis 
when the economists had cut resources at the hospital 
level of the service,favouring the retention of the 
less sophisticated primary level. Now in 1979 and 
1980 the economists began to end the State's role 
in educating doctors. First the economists 
drastically cut the intake of medical students and 
secondly,they withheld State ~rants from doctors 
who needed these funds in order to become specialists. 
In the next chapter we will describe this de-skilling 
process in greater detail and the profession's 
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response to it. For the moment it is important to 
realise that the re~0rms of the Servicio Nacional 
de Salud and the change in its philosophy meant 
that doctors could not expect the high level of 
training they had recp.ived in the past from 
the Servicio Nacional de Salud. 
Doctors were equally concerned about 
the effects of the change in the funding of the 
service. Under the proposals funding would be in 
direct relation to the number of patients treated 
by the service. For each patient treated,a hospital 
would receive a certain amount of money. The more 
patients treated, the more money a hospital received. 
If a hospital failed to treat a sufficient number 
of patients to ~over its overheads, the hospital 
could face backruptcy. In this scheme,hospitals 
were to be run like businesses, depending on their 
ability to compete with each other in order to 
survive. 
The implication of this change in 
funding health establishments was that doctors 
38 
would be forced to work to maximum efficiency. 
In the past some doctors had treated their 
Servicio Nacional de Salud work rather lightly. 
This was more often the case with the more established 
established physicians who relied on their private 
practices for most of their income. These doctors 
invariably did not work the full hours for which 
they were hired by the Servicio Nacional de Salud. 
In theory,a doctor had to sign a book on his 
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arrival at his place of work. This system of control 
was easily evaded;doctors would sign for colleagues 
who had not already arrived. It was almost unheard 
of for doctors to be disciplined for arriving late 
or leaving early from their Servicio Nacional de 
Salud jobs. 39 
Moreover,according to their Servicio 
Nacional de Salud contracts,doctors had to see a 
set number of patients per hour. Once again,if 
doctors failed to treat the required number in 
each hour,no disciplinary measures were taken 
against them. Of course,most doctors did fulfil the 
terms of their contracts and indeed,saw more 
patients than they needed to. Young doctors, 
especially worked round the clock in an effort to 
treat as many Servicio Nacional de Salud patients 
as possible. But for a small group of doctors who 
were not so motivated in their Servicio Nacional de 
Salud work,it was easy under the existing structure 
to do only the bare minimum of work. 40 
Possibilities to treat the Servicio 
Nacional de Salud work in this way would not exist 
if the economists' plan to change the financing of 
the system was implemented. Under the new business 
conditions,work in a hospital would mean that a 
doctors would have to treat as many patients as 
management required him to. This entailed arriving 
on time and working the full hours for which 
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he was paid. Doctors' work would be much more 
ri~orously controlled by business managers. The 
survival of the enterprise depended on the number 
of patients it treated. 41 
The Colegio Medico argued that the 
system of competition between hospitals envisaged 
in this scheme was ridiculous. For example,it 
argued,how could one hospital in order to attract 
more pa tien ts claim to offer better appendectomies 
than another hospital? 42 Doctors feared that 
working in these new cost effective enterprises 
would regiment them in the same way that factory 
workers were controlled in business corporations. 
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CONCLUSION 
The economists' heal th proposals 
should be contrasted with the earlier "privatization" 
scheme suggested by the ultra-Right wing doctors 
after the coup. While the latter had attempted to 
build a private health system which protected 
doctors' interests,the economists' model was intended 
to break the power of doctors in the health service 
in order to attract private investment. 
For so long the controllers of the 
State service,doctors under the economists' plans 
now faced. control themselves from private business 
managers. The economists' scheme was designed to 
destroy the Colegio Medico,the institution through 
which doctors had been able to exert their control 
in the health service. Under the economists' 
proposals,the Colegio Medico would lose its powers 
to fix fees, administer SERMENA and require all 
doctors to be members. The destruction of the 
Colegiols power would allow private caoital to 
invest in the health service. 
The effect of the opening up of the 
health service to private business investment would 
convert doctors into employees of capital and 
hospitals into private businesses. Doctors realised 
that working in business brought none of the job 
security that they had enjoyed for so long with the 
State. 
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The task of providing doctors with 
specialist training would now pass from the State 
to the pr\vate sector. Doctors realised that the 
private sector would not give them as expert a 
specialist training as the Servicio Nacional de 
Salud had provided . 
Whilst the breadth and scope of 
this package of reforms received almost universal 
condemnation from the profession,the reforms did 
not affect the physicians in the same way. 
The more established doctors with 
their own private practices were more alarmed at 
the loss of the powers of the Colegio Medico. A 
strong Colegio could ensure that a privatization 
scheme did not go against their interests by 
protecting them from private business and from 
open competttLO~ from young doctors. The younger 
doctors in contrast who relied totally on the 
State for training and income,could not accept 
privatization under any form. For these doctors, 
defence of the Servicio Nacional de Salud was more 
crucial than the continuation of the Colegio 
Medico. 
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C HAP T E R 1 0 
DOCTORS AGAINST THE JUNTA 
THE CAPITULO MOVEMENT 1978-1980 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter we will examine the 
capitulo ,movement of 1978-80 in relation to 
the changes in health policy,and the consequent shift 
in the class position of doctors as described in the 
last chapter. 
The Association of Santiago Capitulos 
was formed in the capital at the end of 1978. Before 
this date,some capitulos held meetings in their own 
hospitals but not since before the coup had the 
capitulo movement come together and united in a single 
Association. Although the Association received 
support from doctors outside the capital,the movement 
was confined to Santiago. 
Before analysing the reasons behind 
its formation,it is necessary to understand the 
background inside the Colegio Medico from 1975 until 
the Association's creation in 1978. 
There was a stark contrast between 
the Colegio Medico of December 1974 and the Colegio 
Medico of December 1978. Immediately after the 
coup,the Colegio had tremendous power,influence and 
prestige. The Colegio Medico was responsible for 
making the health service operational after the 
downfall of the Popular Unity Government. It appointed 
the Chiefs of Departments and the Directors of 
Hospitals. It exerted great influence over health 
policy. No better demonstration of this influence 
was the location of the Minister of Health's offices 
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Gn the fourth floor of the Colegio Medico buildings. 
The Colegio had gained a new found prestige through 
its "glorious" battle and victory against Popular 
Unity. And yet 5 years later, the Colegio Medico 
threatened by a sweeping new health plan,was barely 
able to raise a whimper in protest. The heady days 
of authority in the aftermath of the coup were but 
a distant dream. 
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1 O. 1 THE COLEGIO MEDICO BETWEEN 1975 AND 1978: 
THE BACKGROUND TO THE FORMATION OF THE CAPITULOS 
After 1975 the Colegio Medico lost 
its power and influence as a gremio. For the first 
two years of military Government the Colegio Medico 
and especially its General Council had such a 
close relationship with the military Government 
that one doctor described this relationship as 
"co-qo'i~~no". 1 After the overthrow of the 
Executive Committee headed by Salvestrini in April 
1975,this close relationship was almost dissolved. A 
year after Salvestrini had been dismissed froID the 
Presidency of the Colegioithe economists' influence 
on health policy reached its height. This signalled 
a period of bitter conflict between the health 
authorities on the one hand,and the Colegio Medico 
on the other. The Colegio was not consulted when 
the new economists' health plan was being drawn up. 
The Colegio Medico,which had played a major part in 
bringing the military to power in 1973,was 4 years 
later completely excluded from decision taking 
within the health sector. It was a bitter irony. 
The loss of the Colegio Medico's 
power and influence was accompanied by its growing 
isolation from its members. Since 1973 elections 
had been banned inside all organizations. Thus, 
the Coleaio Medico could not claim to be truly 
n 
representative of doctors' opinions. Colegio Medico 
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representatives were in many cases Government 
appointees. Also some consejeros in the General 
and Regional Councils had not faced elections 
since 1971 .Moreover,approval to hold conventions 
which might have given the profession some contact 
with its representatives had to be sought from the 
Minister of the Interior. When the Minister of the 
Interior did allow these Conventions to take place, 
delegates were mostly Government appointees. 
Because of these Government constraints 
on councillors in the Colegio Medico,some consejeros 
on the General Council who represented small Regional 
Councils went to these localities and organized 
unofficial assemblies. There debates and elections 
by acclamation took place. These councillors felt 
that only in this way could they truly perform their 
function of representing their Regional Councils. 
Despite these efforts, the Colegio Medico lost its 
contact with the profession as a whole and became 
powerless and ineffective to challenge Government 
heal th poli cy. 
THE ROLE OF THE REGIONAL COUNCIL OF SANTIAGO 
In the midst of increasing demands 
from doctors to have more accountable representatives, 
the R~gional Council of Santiago drew closer to the 
Government and, for all intents and purposes, acted as 
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a Government agency. From 1977-78,the Regional 
Council stifled debate amongst the capitulos of 
several Santiago hospitals. The Regional Council 
refused to hold any special assemblies to debate 
Government health measures. It also vetted 
appointments of capitulo representatives in 
hospitals,and doctors who had not been appointed by 
the Regional Council were refused permission to 
hold capitulo meetings or assemblies. 
This link between the Government and 
the Regional Council of Santiago was reflected in 
the background of the Regional conseieros. The 
President of the Regional Council,Raul Hurtado 
belonged to the Edwards familly who owned, amongst 
other things, the Right wing newspaper,El Mercurio. 
Professionally Hurtado worked in the Hospital 
Salvador and was Director of a flourishing Centro 
Medico nearby. Sergio Olave was a Colonel in the 
Air Force as well as being Vice President of the 
Regional Council. The Treasurer,Hidalgo was also a 
member of the Armed Forces. Dr.Infante,the Permanent 
Secretary actually worked in the Government's health 
team. The Executive Committee was,thus,very much a 
Government front. Some of the members of the Regional 
Council had links with the secret police,the CNI, 
the ex-DINA. For instance,the lawyer of the Regional 
Council defended Contreras,the ex-head of Chile1s 
secret police from an extradition order made by the 
United States' Government in 1978. 2 
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A good illustration of this 
transformation of the Regional Council from a 
representative organi70ation of doctors to a 
Government body to watch over the profession was 
the changed nature of the Regional Council meetings. 
Instead of being transcribed into minutes,so that 
doctors could follow the discussion of their 
representatives,Regional Council meetings were 
frequently held in secret. No doctor in Santiago 
was able to discover what his own Regional Council 
had discussed. 3 
Moreover,the Regional Council of 
Santiago exerted an inordinate amount of influence 
on the Colegio Medico. Six out of the 20 
representatives on the General Council were 
appointed by the Regional Council. The President 
and Vice President of the Colegio Medico,Medina 
and Rojas were themselves General consejeros of the 
Santiago Regional Council and thus,had to report 
back to it . 
During the struggle with the 
economists over health policy,the Regional Council 
of Santiago along with its General Councillor Medina 
refused to publicize its disagreements too openly. 
This group preferred more discreet ways of putting 
pressure on the economists. Medina's brother was 
a General in the Army and belonged to the Comite 
Assesor of the Junta. The Comite's role was to 
discuss proposed legislation and to then offer 
an amended version to the President for his approval. 
Medina supported by the Regional Council of Santiago 
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was using his brother to argue against the 
economists 'health plans as they were being discussed 
in the Comite Asessor. 
Some consejeros on the General Council 
argued that this tactic of opposing the health 
reforms within the Junta was ineffective. The 
Colegio Medico,they declared had to publicly show 
its hostility to the Government's treatment of the 
medical profession and the health service. In March 
1978 for instance,Acuna accused the Presiient,Medina 
of failing to interpret the true anguish being felt 
by the medical profession. Comparing speeches made 
by Medina and the Minister of Health,Acuna declared 
to a General Council meeting, 
ffLo~ di~cu~~o~ ianio del Seno~ P~e~idenie 
como del ~ini~i~o - que lo~ analiza 
deienidamenie- tue~on de cacacie~[~iica~ 
~imila~e~ en ~u~ exp~e~ione~ lo que le 
llama la aiencion po~que el de la maxima 
auio~idad del Colegio,que e~ia ~ep~e~eni­
ando a un g~emio angu~iiado,de~e~[a ha~e~ 
~ido en i~~mino~ que hu~ie~an ~etlejado 
lo que ~ealmenie ~ienien lo~ medico~ en 
e~ie momenio." 4 
However,Medina and his supporters were against any 
proposal which would dramatically publicize the 
Colegio's opposition to the Government's health 
plans. Such a protest they feared,might be inter-
preted as an act of opposition to the Junta. For 
example,when one of the anti-Government groups 
inside the General Council suggested that the 
Colegio Medico turn down a Government invitation to 
attend the 1st of May celebrations in 1978,Medina 
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said that even if this action was agreed upon by 
the General Council,he still intended to go none-
theless. As he said, 
"Si el Con~ejo acue4da lo p4opue~t~ 
~l a~i~tl4a de todo~ mane4a~ 
de~doRl~ndo~e de ~u calldad de 
P4e~idente del Coleglo ~edlco." 5 
Medina's attitude meant that even if the General 
Council had voted for the resolution that the Colegio 
Medico should refuse the Government invitation, the 
fact that the President of the Colegio would still 
have attended anyway,made the resolution meaningless. 
Thus,the resolution was withdrawn,much to the disgust 
of the anti-Government doctors such as Acuna,who 
described Medina's attitude as "lnconceRl!le ". 6 
In July 1978,the conflict between the 
Regional Council of Santiago and some of the General 
Councillors reached its height. Rojas,the Vice 
President of the Colegio Medico growing tired of the 
Government's continuous refusal to listen to the 
Colegio,proposed that the General Council,together 
with the Regional Councils should resign en ma~~e.7 
395. 
This proposal came at a particularly acute time for the 
Gove~nment. At the end of July,General Lei~h was 
forcibily removed from the Junta,being replaced 
by General Matthei. Rojas,together with some other 
consejeros paid Leigh a visit to give him their 
support. At this time,some eonsejeros suggested 
that the Colegio Medico should actually publicly 
declare its support for the deposed General. 
These manoeuvres by Rojas and some 
other consejeros proved too much for the Regional 
Council of Santiago. Rojas,one of the Regional 
Council of Santiago", s conse j ero s in the General 
Council was summoned to a secret meeting of the 
Regional Council on the 22nd of July 1978,and was 
sacked. Before his dismissal,Rojas had demanded 
that the General Council of the Colegio Medico 
resign in protest at General Leigh's removal from 
the Junta. Moreover,Rojas had written a letter 
supporting the relatives of two doctors,Lorca and 
Insunza who had "disappeared" in 1977. Their 
relatives, convinced that they had been murdered by 
the secret police were putting pressure on the 
Government to find out what had happened to them. 
In the eyes of the Regional Council, Rojas, by 
writing a letter to these doctors' relatives,was 
acting against the Goverment. For these reasons,in 
addition to Rojas' attempts'J to oppose Government 
policy in a more openly critical way,the Regional 
Council decided to remove him. 8 
Rojas' dismissal came as a blow to 
those councillors in the General Council and to 
certain Regional Councillors who had wanted the 
Colegio Medico to resist the Government's health 
plan more firmly. Some General councillors 
proposed Acuna's name as a replacement for Rojas 
for the Vice Presidency of the Colegio Medico. 
However,the Regional Council of Santiago recalling 
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that Acuna was probably more opposed to the 
Government than Rojas had ever had been, attempted 
to block this appointment. Thus,the post of Vice 
President remained unfilled. The Regional Council 
even tried to force Acuna to resign at the same 
time as it sacked Rojas. 9 
Rojas' sacking and the Regional 
Council of Santiago's continuous efforts to control 
the opposition building up inside the profession, 
convinced many doctors that a more effective 
organization than the Colegio Medico was needed if 
the profession was to offer any defence of the 
existing health system. The background to the 
formation of the capitulos therefore was an almost 
impotent Colegio Medico,sapped of all its force by 
the unswervingly pro-Government Regional Council of 
Santiago. 
THE "CLASS" BASE OF THE CAPITULO HOVEHENT 
The main supporters of the capitulo 
movement from 1978-80 were the younger doctors who 
had been most affected by the changes in the health 
service. These doctors relied primarily on the 
Servicio Nacional de Salud for employment, income 
and education. Around half of the profession 
according to Colegio Hedico statistics,were totally 
dependent on the State for their livelihood in 1979. 10 
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Thus,these doctors represented a sizeable group. 
Faced with the gradual transfer of health care into 
the private sector these young doctors were least 
able to defend themselves against their new private 
bosses. 
There were few similarities between 
the capitulo movement of this period,1978-80, 
and its pr~decessor in 1971-73. The capitulos under 
Allende were used by gremialismo to organize the 
hospital strikes in order to bring chaQs to the 
health service. The main fears of the leaders of the 
capitulos in the Allende period was the threat to 
private medici.ne posed by Popular Unity's proposed 
Servicio Unico de Salud. Thus,the organizers of the 
capitulos in 1971-73 were the more established members 
of the profession who had most to lose financially 
from the curtailment of their private practices. 
In contrast, the capitulo movement 
in 1978-80 was struggling amongst other thin-gs to 
defend the role of the State in the health service. 
The 1978 capitulo movement bore more similarities 
to the FEMECH movement of 1961-62 which had attempted 
to defend the State against the attempt by Allesandri's 
Right wing Government to minimize the role of the 
Servicio Nacional de Salud. 
The capitulo movement in 1978-80 was 
caused by a growing class deprivation,felt principally 
by the young doctors. Although never high, the young 
doctors' economic status was now deteriorating. After 
the coup Servicio Nacional de Salud wages had 
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decreased. Moreover in 1979,while comparably placed 
professionals had moved upwards on the Escala Unica, 
doctors' position~ had remained unchanged~ Doctors 
also failed to obtain a wage rise to compensate for 
those losses incurred through the economic crisis 
of 1975 and 1976. Not only young doctors were 
suffering from this squeeze on their wages, their 
colleagues who had private practices were also facing 
financial worries;for the lack of private demand 
through these years, coupled with only very small rises 
in SERMENA fees had blocked additional income from 
outwith the Servicio Nacional de Salud. 
Moreover,under the changes in the 
health service,young doctors faced greater difficulties 
in gaining technical expertise from the Servicio 
Nacional de Salud. Financial restrictions in this 
service had led to the shortage of materials, 
(equipment,drugs etc.) and the means to develop their 
specialist skills(scientific journals,attending 
conferences etc.). 
More importantly however,was the 
Servicio Nacional de Salud' s policy to cutback on 
its scheme to provide specialist training for newly 
graduated doctors . Since the setting up of the State 
service in 1952,the Servicio Nacional de Salud had 
offered the Chilean doctor 4 routes to specialization. 
ThAse were: "Beca Re~idencia P~ima~ia":"Beca 
Unive~~ita~ian;"~edicatu~a gene~al U~tano":and 
"~edicatu~a gene~al de Zona". 
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By providing doctors with grants to 
specialize,the State hoped firstly, to encourage 
expertise in the medical profession and secondly,to 
distribute resources away from the connurbations to 
areas where doctors normally,for financial,social 
or other career reasons would not venture. 
This grants' scheme had both 
disadvantages and advantages for doctors. The main 
advantage was that it gave doctors a career in the 
Servicio Nacional de Salud as well as the chance to 
become specialists. The scheme's disadvantages was 
that it obliged doctors to spend several years 
working for the ServicioNacional de Salud in remote 
outlying areas of Chile. 
The new health team which became 
dominant around 1977 began to run down this scheme, 
which had provided doctors with both a job and a 
career inside the Servicio, Nacional de Salud since 
1952. Quesney for instance,argued that it was no 
longer the responsibility of the State to create jobs 
for graduating doctors. In the la~guage we used in 
the last chapter,the economist-minded health 
authorities like Quesney were trying to break the 
umbilical cord that existed between State planning 
in the health service and the State's education of 
doctors. Thus,in each year from 1977 to 1980,and 
fmr the first time since 1952,half the doctors 
graduating from universities were not offered Servicio 
Nacional de Salud jobs. 
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TABLE 15:PLACES OFFERED TO CHILEAN MEDICAL STUDENTS 
BY CHILEAN UNIVERSITIES. 
YEAR 
1973 
1979 
Places available for medical 
studies in Chilean Universities. 
998 
679 
Source: Fi eldwork hoseo 0<"\ ~...,j<:«"I'I"V'\EY'"'\\-
6\ahs.ncs $S ~enlEct \Y''\ ~~f'E-'I"S. 
TABLE 16iNUMBER OF CONTRACTS OFFERED TO 
GRADUATING DOCTORS BY THE SERVICIO NACIONAL 
DE SALUD. 
YEAR N° of contracts N° of doctors N° of doctors 
offered to graduating failing to 
graduating tha t year. obtain a SNS 
doctors by the post. 
SNS 
1976 511 741 230* 
1978 424 705 300* 
1979 319 676 357~~ 
* These figures suggest that some doctors did not 
accept some of the posts being offered by the 
Servicio Nacional de Salud. One of the reasons 
for this was that th~ quality of some of the 
SNS grants was very low and hardly worth accept-
ing although in 1979,all available posts were 
filled. 
4.01 . 
Sour ce : Fi eld wor k ba..sec.l 011. Government .sta. tisrc:,s «.$ pres en-ced 
,'" newspa.{)ets. 
Strictly speaking those doctors 
who had not been given Servicio ~acional de Salud 
posts were not unemployed. They could,as indeed 
many of them did,set up their own private Centros 
Medicos. But in reality the Servicio Nacional de 
Salud's failure to recruit young doctors made them 
redundant. Doctors through their University 
training were equipped to work in the Servicio 
Nacional de Salud,not in the private sector. More 
importantly,young doctors· were having to face a 
future without the possibility of becoming 
specialists . In general the private sector did 
not give young doctors the possibility of specialist 
training. Only in one private hospital in Santiago 
did they receive in-service training. Thus,for 
both these reasons,doctors' survival in the private 
health market was difficult. Added to· this was the 
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hostility of the Colegio Medico towards private 
ventures set up by young doctors. The Colegio Medico 
was anxious to keep the private health market in the 
hands of specialists. Also,it was widely known that 
Chilean banks were reluctant to extend credit to 
1 1 
these private enterprises run by young doctors. 
It is not surprising that on account 
of the difficulties surrounding the setting up of 
their o~n Centros Medicos,young doctors were 
compelled to join the more established practices as 
paid employees of groups of older doctors or entre-
preneurs. As a result,these young doctors' work 
became tailored to the profits of the Centro Medico. 
Their wage was determined by the number of patients 
they treated in their working day. Young doctors 
were no longer being paid a fee directly from their 
patients,but became the "mere factors of production" 
as Medina warned in 1976. They lost their autonomy 
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. th . t . t· 12 In e prlva e organlza lons. The General Council 
received reports of young-doctors working in poor 
conditions in these private clinics. Often these 
Centros Medicos were owned by more established 
doctors who then employed young doctors. As one 
consejero stated, 
non 
"~~1dicho qu~ hay C~nt~o~ ~edico~ qu~ 
~~tan op~~ando con ~g 6i~t~ma d~ 
"medico~ poggo~",o ~~a medico~ d~ 
p~~~tigio e~tan cont~atando medico~ 
~~cien ~e.ciRido~ pa~a que. hagan todo 
~g t~aRajo ~uRagte.~no." 1 3 
Another option for the young doctors 
who failed to find work in the Servicio Nacional de 
Salud ~as to work in the Chilean local councils . 
However,in 1980 the young doctors who had been 
recruited by these local councils were only paid the 
minimum wage(e.mpge.o m[nimo). The situation for 
doctors,particularly the younger ones,was no better 
in the Servicio Nacional de Salud. It is interesting 
to examine the work situation of doctors who were 
employed by the Hospital Paula Jeraquemada. 14 This 
hospital complex was the largest and most modern in 
Chile and it employed the largest number of doctors. 
Since 1976,hospital administration had been taken 
over from the Servicio Nacional de Salud by a 
private American owned corporation although strictly 
speaking it remained within the Servicio Nacional de 
Salud since all its finance came from the State. 
Paula Jeraquemada crystallized the 
processes affecting other Servicio Nacional de 
Salud hospitals. The economists wanted the practices 
employed by the business managers who ran Paula 
Jeraquemada to be copied by other hospital administr-
ations in Chile. Although the hospital was still not 
making profits,it was being run by cost-effective 
criteria under the control of business managers. 
Although other Servicio~Nacional de. Salud hospitals 
were still being directed by doctors,many practices 
initiated by the managers from Paula Jeraquemada 
were being incorporated into the running of many 
other Chilean hospitals 
The doctors in Paula Jeraquemada were 
in constant conflict with the business managers who 
ran the hospital. The aim of these business managers 
was to increase the number of patients treated in 
order to obtain more finance from the State. Managers 
made doctors treat more patients without an increase 
in resources. One of the effects of this cost-cutting 
was that doctors were refused many of their requests 
to carry out ECientific tests such as X rays and 
blood tests because they were considered unnecessary 
and too expensive by the managers. 15 Doctors 
complained of being turned into "m.dico~ con lo~ 
o)o~" and not being able to use the science 
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th h d I d t U . . t 16 ey a earne a nlverSl y. Moreover, 
doctors ran into conflict with management over the 
number of patients they had to treat in an hour. 
The managers wanted to increase effiCiency by asking 
doctors to treat an extra patient each hour. Thus, 
instead of doctors seeing 7 patients in the hour, 
they had to treat 8. Doctors argued that treating 
8 patients an hour did not allow them sufficient 
17 timA for diagnosis. 
Doctors in Paula Jeraquemada also 
had less job security than in the old Servicio 
Nacional de Salud system. Many of the doctors 
particularly the younger ones were given only 30 
day contracts. At the end of this period the doctor 
I 
could easily be dismissed for with-the growing pool 
of "unemployed" doctors there was no problem in 
finding a replacement. This high turnover in medical 
personnel allowed the managers not to pay many 
doctors the a~ignacion i.e. the automatic bonus 
which accrued with a doctor's length of service. 
Finally,working conditions in Paula 
Jeraquemada were very poor. Despite being a modern 
hospital complex ,attempts to save money led to 
shortages of basic materials particularly in the 
consultorios perifericos of the hospital. For 
instance,in these consultorios furniture was at a 
premium. During the winter many of the buildings 
were not heated. Doctors had to bring in their own 
fires as well as basic elements such as chairs, 
18 tables and blankets. 
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Paula Jeraquemade was unique in that 
its administration was in the hands of a private 
corporation. But the crippljng budget restrict.i.ons 
in other Servicio Nacional de Salud hospitals had 
the same effect elsewhere on doctors,particularly 
the younger members of the profession. Both under 
the constraints of a contracting State sector and 
under the imperatives of capital in the expanding 
private sector,these groups of young doctors faced 
a deteriorating economic,social and technical 
situation. This group was suffering a gradual de-
skilling. Young doctors began to lose the protection 
they once had through the Servicio Nacional de Salud. 
They began to lose the status which had set them a 
apart from the working class- without it they were 
gradually being proletarianized. Thisllprocess of 
proletarianization ll forms the basis of the capitulo 
movement in 1978-80. 
Of course many of the supporters of 
the capitulos came from sectors of the profession 
which could not be des:cribed as IIproletarianized ll . 
These doctors worked in their own centros medicos 
under Libre Eleccion,in complete autonomy from 
capital or the State. The reason for their opposition 
was rational. They argued that a private health 
model was not appropriate for a country in which 
70% of the population could not afford to pay for 
health treatment. 
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Despite this, the groundswell of 
the movement came from the younger doctors. Its 
centre was the capitulo of Barros Luco which 
served the poor, southern area of Santiago and had 
a mainly young medical personnel. In eontrast,in 
Hospital Salvador where the doctors' centros 
medicos around the hospital served the wealthy 
of Providencia and Apoquindo,capitulo activity was 
low. Indeed,this capitulo came out against the 
stand taken by other capitulos against the economists' 
proposals for health care. 
It is important to distinguish between 
the reasons which lay behind the profession's 
hostility to the economists' plans. For the young 
doctors both forms of privatization,either by 
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creating more patients for their own private practices, 
or by giving power to private financial groups to 
run the health service with salaried doctors as their 
employees posed a threat. The established members of 
the profession who already had private practices 
welcomed more private patients in their own clinics 
However, they demanded that the State health service 
should care for the poor and that it should provide 
doctors with the means to maintain their specialist 
skills. They did not accept however, "privatization" 
in the economists' sense of the word,which meant 
that the Colegio Medico and doctors would lose control 
of the privatization process to insurance groups and 
businessmen. 
A split between the Colegio Medico leaders 
and the capitulos developed in the late 70's because of 
their essentially different class positions.This was shown 
in the different emphasis each group gave to certain 
aspects of the health system. For their part, the young 
doctors and the capitulos demanded that the Servicio 
Nacional de Salud should be preserved. The Colegio Medico 
leaders bn the other hand and in particular, those doctors 
from the Regional Council of Santiago who began to be 
more identified with the economically strong segment of 
the profession stressed the need to protect the power of 
the Colegio Medico. The representatives of the capitulos 
argued that the Colegio Medico leaders were obsessed with 
the retention of these powers to the exclusion of other 
goals such as the defence of the Servicio Nacional de 
Salud. One representative of the capitulos even suggested 
that the Colegio Medico's tactic in its negotiations with 
the economists was to allow more privatization in the 
health service and the ending of the Servicio Nacional de 
Salud provided that the profession could maintain its 
1 9 powers as a gremio. Such a compromise,while gravely 
damaging the interests of the young doctors would have 
given more established doctors greater opportunities to 
practise privately as well as allowing the Colegio Medico 
to defend the established doctors from threats to their 
autonomy and control as posed by business interests. 
One should not emphasize this split 
between these class groupings too much. The capitulos 
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were willing to join with some elements in the Colegio 
M~dico to jointly fight against the economists. 
Nonetheless,even though they were campaigning 
together against the economists' health plans,each 
group was suspicious of the other . 
THE POLITICAL AIMS OF THE CAPITULO MOVEMENT 
As we have argued the process of 
proletarianization affecting mainly young doctors 
was the underlying cause of the doctors 'protests in 
1978-80. However,given that Chile is such a polit-
icized country,it was inevitable that doctors 
had political motives in forming the capitulos in 
1 978. 
The idea to resurrect the capitulos 
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came principally from a group of Christian Democrats. 20 
Under the auspices of the Corporacion Promocion 
Universitaria these Christian Democrat doctors met 
regularly to discuss health policy. 
All the political parties had their 
own health research units staffed by their own 
party's doctors. For instancp- C.E.S.P.O. was a 
research unit studying the effects on people's 
heal th of the Jun ta 's heal th programm e s. 110 s t of 
its researchers were Communist doctors. AnDther 
research unit,the Academia de Humanidad Cristjano 
was staffed by doctors who belonged to the Communist 
and Socialist parties and MAPU . Only by working 
in research units could these doctors meet on a 
regular fashion without interference from the 
secret police. The Junta appeared to tolerate 
this type of "research" activity. 
Amongst the Cnristian Democrats who 
had proposed the reformati6n of the capitulos in 
1978 was Jorge Jimenez. Jimenez was the son of 
Popular Unity's first Minister of Health,and he 
himself belonged to the Left wing of Christian 
Democracy. Through this network of research 
institutes,the Christian Democrats met with 
Communist and Socialist doctors to discuss this 
Christian Democrat initiative. ~he outcome of these 
discussions was the settirlg up of an Association of 
Capitulos in 1978. It should be pointed out that the 
old Association of Capitulos which had done so much 
to remove Allende had practically ceased to exist 
after the coup. 
The new Association was presided 
over by Jimenez. Its principal office bearers were 
drawn from the ex-Popular Unity parties. 21 
This co-operation between the 
Christian Democrats and ex-Popular Unity parties in 
forming the Association represented an interesting 
development in the opposition to the Junta. After 
the coup,and at least until 1976,the Christian 
Democrats were clearly unprepared to meet with the 
ex-Popular Unity parties to discuss joint action 
against the Junta . This intransigent Christian 
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Democrat position had clearly undergone a change. 
From 1978 onwards,the Communist and Christian 
Democrat doctors in particular were to form 
extremely close ties. By 1980 doctors from these 
two parties were ever publishing joint statements 
on health policy under the auspices of the newly 
formed Commission of Human Rights. This institution 
itself symbolized this close collaboration between 
the Christian Democrats and the ex-Popular Unity 
t o 22 par les. 
It was of course,important for the 
Assocaition of the Capitulos to ensure that their 
actions could only be interpreted as opposing the 
Junta's health policy not the Junta itself. But 
in private discussions the leaders of the capitulos 
were quite open about their political intentions. As 
one said,the capitulo movement was, 
"aim~d at c~~ating an op~ning in~id~ 
th~ dictato~~hip ~o that th~ condition~ 
might R~ c~~at~d to~ a ~~tu~n to 
d~moc~acy." 23 
Their aim was certainly ambitious. 
But doctors genuinely believed that their actions 
could weaken the Pinochet Government. After all, 
doctors were a most influential group in Chilean 
society. Only five years before doctors' actions 
had clearly precipitated the downfall of the Allende 
Government. Finally,the capitulo movement was taking 
place at a time when the military junta was at a 
particularly low ebb in its fortunes. 
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0.5 THE BEGINNINGS OF CRISIS IN THE PINOCHET REGIMEi 
1978-1980. 
With the advantage of hindsight,we 
can say that the period 1978-80 represented the 
beginnings of the cri~is which was to plague the 
Pinochet regime in the early 80's. From 1973 to 
1978 the counter revolution of the bourgeoisie 
broke all forms of resistance to the Government. 
The generalized terror propagated by the secret 
police in the factories and in the poblaciones 
paralysed the creation of any mass opposition 
movement. All the workers and popular organizations 
were liquidated or disintegrated . The only trade 
union confederation,the Confedaracion Unica de 
Trabajadores(CUT) was dismantled. 
From 1978-80 the first signs of 
mobilization of workers and other people's organiz-
ations could be recognized. As one of the union 
leaders of MEDECO(the Copper Industry) declared, 
after having undergone this terror the Chilean 
24 
masses had, "lo~t eve~ything,even tea~." One of 
the causes of this mobilization was the Government 
itself which in 1978 presented details of a new 
Plan Laboral. This "plan" legalized unions wi thin 
a restricted framework. The new legislation 
allowed workers to hold meetings at which they 
could discuss work-related matters.It was expressly 
forbidden to discuss politics at these gatherings. 
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Nonetheless these meetings encouraged the development 
of a more "Ii beral" spiri t in whi ch cri ti cal 
discussions could take place. 
Also opposition to the regime was 
beginning to grow. As we have already seen,in August 
1978 Air Force General Leigh a member of the four 
man Junta was dismissed. He had become increasingly 
critical of the way Pinochet was concentrating 
power in his personal hands. Leigh's dismissal 
alienated many Air Force officers and civilian 
supporters of the Pinochet regime. Thus,the opposition 
for the first time since the coup was joined and 
strengthened by influential ex-supporters of the 
Pinochet regime. Suddenly, the monolith that Pinochet 
had built around himself began to look vulnerable. 
Moreover,at this time a split began 
to develop within the Junta itself. This division 
arose as a result of the publication of a report, 
the"Comision Ortuzar" which had been created in 
December 1973 to prepare a new constitution. This 
Commission's report included a draft constitution 
which Pinochet and the Junta intended to revise. 
During this revision a split intensified between 
on the one hand the "du~o~" who supported a nation-
alist and corporatist model for Chile reinforcing 
repression and continuing the dictatorship,and on 
the other hand,the"glando~" who wanted to build around 
their neo-liberal model a constitution which would not 
only create a less rigid political system but would also 
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improve the image of Chile to the outside world. 
Pinochet,however was opposed to the idea of a 
constitution which would limit his power and saw 
the positions of the "'lando~" as a threat. 25 
Another cause for the political 
crisis which was beginning to affect the Pinochet 
regime was an American extradition order made 
against the ex-head of the secret police,General 
Contreras for his involvement in the assassination 
of Orlando Letelier,the ex- U.S. Ambassador of 
Chile in Washington. It was widely suspected that 
Contreras had been working on the orders of Pinochet 
himself when he instigated the plot to assassinate 
Letelier. 
Thus,for all these reasons,the 
beginnings of a reorganization of the masses,the 
strengthening of the opposition,internal divisions 
within the Junta and a U.S. manoeuvre which would 
at the very least embarrass the Government,Pinochet's 
fortunes were at a low ebb. The regime could 
certainly do without a well organized capitulo 
campaign from this influential sector of Chilean 
society. 
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10.6 (a) 
415. 
THE OCCUPATION 
The Association of Capitulos had 
been formed towards the end of 1978. The first issue 
which confronted it was the plight of the newly 
graduated doctors competing for Servicio Nacional 
de Salud posts during the summer months of January 
and February 1979. At best,half of the doctors 
leaving University were not going to obtain a job 
in the Servicio Nacional de Salud in 1979. Many 
of these young doctors were founders of the Association 
of the Capitulos. During the summer months with 
clouds of uncertainty hanging over many doctors 
leaving University, several of these newly graduated 
doctors formed an association called the Asociacion 
de Medicos Recien Egresados. This organization 
became one of the capitulos within the larger 
Asociation de los Capitulos. The momentum for the 
movement of the capitulos during 1979 originated 
from these young doctors' plight and,in particular 
in their choice of action in March 1979 . 
During the summer months of 1979 
young doctors were in a rebellious mood. They had 
just completed 7 years of University training at the 
end of whi~h they had confidently expected to be 
offered jobs in the Servicio Nacional de Salud . 
Instead,the Government had told them that it could 
not guarantee them either a Servicio Nacional de 
Salud job or the money to specialize. The Government 
during its negotiations with the young doctors had 
been completely insensitive to their situation. The 
Government receiv8d support from many older doctors. 
This group reminded their younger colleagues that 
they~too had left University without the guarantee 
of a job and had to make a living in private practice. 
For example, Dr. R.Walsen told young doctors to stop 
complaining and to start looking for private patients. 
The Colegio Medico also offered young 
doctors very little assistance. It was deeply 
suspicious of the recently formed Asociacion de 
Medicos Recien Egresados. Medina,the President and 
also the Dean of the Faculty of Medicine in Santiago 
knew many of the student leaders personally. They 
were his ex-students and he was fully aware that 
their politics were firmly anti-Government. The 
C~legio Medico clearly distrusted the young doctors' 
movement. For instance,in return for allowing these 
young doctors to use the Colegio's facilities to 
prepare their statements,it demanded that they seek 
the College's approval before any of their statements 
27 
were released to the press . 
Faced with insensitivity from the 
Government,many older doctors and the Colegio Medico 
these young doctors decided to take militant action 
in order to register their protest. At a meeting 
of over 300 doctors in the offices of the Colegio 
Medico in March 1979,it was decided to occupy the 
Colegio Medico buildings until the Government 
a~reed to offer them Servicio Nacional de Salud posts. 
a 
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Over 200 young doctors proceeded to take over the 
Colegio building. They hung banners from the 
windows and shouted slogans to the crowds who had 
gathered in the street outside. 
Events are only significant when 
placed in their context . This occupation took place 
in a dictatorship where individual liberties were 
at the mercy of an arbitrary and often ruthless 
Government . No occupation had taken place in Chile 
since the coup. The "loma" had once been a very 
common form of protest but after the coup,no group 
had dared to risk their lives in such action. Seen 
in this context the doctors' action was very daring. 
Moreover,the occupation had even international 
ramifications. Cables arrived at the Colegio Medico 
offices from Prague,Berlin and Brussels supporting 
the young doctors' action. 
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The occupation revealed the very close 
links between the Junta and the Colegio Medico . 
Instead of offering to talk with the young doctors, 
or to represent them in negotiations with the 
Minister of Health,the President Medina ordered the 
young doctors to leave the building immediately. 
When they refused to end their protest and repeated 
their demand to see the Minister of Health,Medina 
gave his permission for the police to enter the 
Colegio buildings and forcibily dislodge the 
protestors. The occupiers were brought out at 
gunpoint and the leaders of the protest were placed 
under house arrest. The next day,the Regional Council 
of Santiago published in "EI Mercurio",a vociferous 
attack on these "delinquent" doctors promising that 
it would do everything in its power to bring the 
guilty parties to justice. The Regional Council of 
Santiago even threatened the office staff at the 
Colegio's buildings with dismissal for having allowed 
the young doctors to hang banners from the windows. 27 
Not all Colegio Medico representatives 
were as hostile to the protest as Medina and the 
Regional Council of Santiago. Ruben Acuna had 
visited the young doctors on the day of their action 
offering them his full support. Acuna,along with 
other anti- Government General Councillors such as 
Villarroel condemned the role of Medina in working 
with the police to end the demonstration. They also 
condemned the Regional Council of Santiago for its 
publication in"EI Mercurio~. 
Indeed,the Regional Council was 
attacked from all sides as a result of its hostile 
publication towards the young doctors. Every Santiago 
capitulo declared its opposition to the Regional 
Council's declaration and demanded that elections be 
held in order that the Regional Council could startto 
begin to genuinely reflect Santiago doctors' opinions. 
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Gabriela Venturini,the only Christian Democrat 
representative on the Regional Council resigned in 
protest at the Council's response to the occupation. 32 
E.Villarroel,realising that this episode clearly 
demonstrated the tight connection between the Colegio 
Medico and the Government resi~ned as a General o 
Councillor after more than 20 years service inside 
the General Council. 
The effect of the occupation inside 
the Colegio Medico was to polarize consejeros into 2 
groups:those who supported the Government and the 
Regional Council,and those who opposed these two bodies. 
The occupation also saw the end of E.Medina as 
President of the Colegio Medico. Until the occupation he 
had managed to tread carefully between the pro 
and anti-Government supporters inside the Colegio 
Medico. However his actions during the occupation 
revealed his pro-Government leanings. He was now no 
longer a suitable President for the anti-Government 
group of councillors. Thus,Medina offered his 
resignation as he was required to in March in 
accordqnce with Colegio Medico regulations but instead 
of being re-elected for another term of office,his 
resignation was accepted. A new compromise President 
was sought who was not identified with either the 
pro or anti-Government factions. The doctor finally 
chosen for this post was Sergio Reyes,who had been 
careful not to take sides in the battle between the 
Regional Council and some General Councillors. 28 
This change in the Presidency showed the delicate 
nature of politics inside the Colegio Medico. 
The effect of the occupation on the 
capitulos was to accelerate the formations of these 
organizations in hospitals. Meetings of doctors took 
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place inside hospitals for almost the first time 
since the coup. At these, elections by acclamation 
took place. The newly elected doctors then set 
about organizing further meetings and demonstrations 
as well as co-ordinating with other capitulos through 
the Association of the Capitulos. 
All these changes in organization 
within the Colegio M~dico and amongst the capitulos 
as a result of the occupation contrasted with the 
continuing intransigence of the Government towards 
the young doctors' plight. The latter group's 
occupation had not changed Government policy. Half 
of those leaving University failed to find a Servicio 
National de Salud job - the worst record since the 
service had begun. 
(b) THE CONVENTION OF THE CAPITULOS:AUGUST 1979. 
The occupation had revealed the gulf 
that existed between the Regional Council of Santiago 
and the capituJos. The Regional Council's claims to 
speak on behalf of the profession in Santiago were 
ridiculed by capitulo leaders. Doctors in Santiago 
began to demand a forum in which they could question 
the representativeness of the Regional Council. Thus, 
between March and August 1979,the Association of the 
Capitulos began to prepare for a Convention at which 
it would examine the role and behaviour of the 
Regional Council of Santiago. 
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The Regional Council of Santiago was 
alarmed at this prospect and not surprisingly, tried 
to prevent the Convention from ,being held. When this 
proved impossible, the Regional Council ,obstructed the 
preparations for the Convention in every way it could. 
It refused to supply the capitulos with conference 
facilities. It refused to publish pre-conference 
documents (including a pamphlet which criticized the 
Government's health policy and the lack of democracy 
in the Colegio Medico) . In some hospi tals, the Regional 
Council nominated its own supporters ~s capitulo 
representatives. These representatives tried to 
prevent meetings taking place whereby doctors could 
elect new representatives who might prove hostile to 
the Regional Council. 30 
Instead of attempting to moderate its 
pro-Government stance in the run up to the Convention, 
the Regional Council of Santiago appeared to be even 
more supportive than before. In June,barely 2 months 
before the Convention was to be held, the Regional 
Council had failed to support a joint protest of the 
General Council of the Colegio Medico,all the other 
Regional Councils of Chile, and the Association of 
the Capitulos,at some derogatory remarks made by the 
Minister of Health Jimenez against the medical 
profession. The Regional Council was the only body 
of doctors not to declare its opposition to Jimenez's 
remarks. 
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In a final manoeuvre to avoid a 
defeat at the Convention,the Regional Council of 
Santiago informed the General Council and capitulos 
that it would only attend the Conference if the 
question of the representativeness of the Regional 
Council was not discussed. After discussions between 
the Regional Councils,capitulos and the General Council, 
with President Reyes acting as mediator,it was agreed 
to defer the issue of the Regi6nal Council's 
representativeness to a specially convened conference 
to be held one week after the Convention had taken 
place. It was on the basis of this agreement that the 
Regional Council agreed to attend. 31 
However,when the Convention began it 
became immediately apparent that the question of the 
legitimacy of the Regional Council could not be 
deferred. All the representatives of the capitulos 
were anxious to discuss this matter. As the Represent-
ative of the Hospital Felix Bulnes declared, 
f\YI~ <12btaia/l. e.e p/l.oiee.ma de. ea-b /l.e.mune./l.-
acione.-b y de. ScR~cNA,e./l.a p/l.e.vio 
/l.e.te./l.i/l.-be. a ea contianza que. -be. 
ie.n[a e.n eO-b di/l.ige.nie.-b de.e Re.gionae 
Saniiago." 32 
The Conference almost unanimously agreed to table a 
motion of censure against the Regional Council. 
This motion was passed by an over-
whelming margin:only 3 capitulos out of 30 voted 
against. These three hospitals,Salvador,J.J.Aguirre 
and Catolica had Right wing leanings since most of 
their doctors were private medicine oriented. Adding 
all the votes and the number of doctors rJpresented 
the capitulos claimed that well over 80% of tie 
profession in Santiago were against the Regional 
Council. The city.'s Regional Council had not waited 
for the result of the vote of censure. Once it had 
been told that it was to take place, the members of 
the council walked out of the assembly amidst loud 
jeering. 
Moreover,other resolutions of the 
Convention aside from the censuring of the Regional 
Council were also extremely hostile to the Santiago 
gremio. One resolution, clearly attacking some Regional 
Council consejeros for being both consejeros and 
belonging to the heal th authori ties, called for the 
General Council of the Colegio Medico to make dual 
occupancy of a gremial post and a Government appoint-
J 
men t illegal. The Convention also demanded that the 
Regional Council sack its lawyer,who had defended 
Contreras against the U.S. Government extradition 
order. 
Finally ,Conference resolutions clearly 
demonstrated the class position of the supporters of 
the capitulos. The capitulos represented the Seryjcjo 
Nacional de Salud oriented ·doctors,not private doctors. 
For example,the Conference rejected the principle of 
subsidiarity as applied to the health sector,re-affirm-
ing the State's predominant role in health organization. 
Notable by its absence was a reference to,or support 
for,private medicine. On the contrary,private medicine 
was assumed to be a threat. The organization of medicine 
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by private medicine could exploit doctors. As one of 
the resolutions read, 
nc~ n~c~~a~io cu~~tiona~ pu~licam~nt~ 
a aqu~lla~ in~titucion~~ qu~ ot~~c~~ 
Salud po~ d~~ajo d~ .lo~ a~anc~l~~ 
m[nimo~,a co~ta d~ manO d~ o~~a 
medica ~a~ata y utiliz~ndolo~ pa~a 
~u p~opia p~omoci6n com~~cial." 33 
:c) THE AFTERMATH OF THE CONVENTION 
The Convention marked the peak of the 
capitulo1s activities. Thereafter it was never able 
to sustain the same level of impact. There was no 
doubt that it still commanded an impressive amount 
of support amongst the profession. For example,when 
a Government commissioned questionnaire was sent out 
to every doctor in the land requesting opinions on the 
restructuring of the Chilean health service only 6.9% 
of doctors went against the capitulos advice and 
completed the questionnarie. The capitulos had over-
ruled the Regional Council of Santiago which had 
encouraged doctors to co-operate with the Government 
in this survey. 34 
Moreover,the capitulos could still 
organize spectacles which dramatically drew the 
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public's attention to the demise of the health service. 
The end of the year 1979 officially marked the end 
the standard of medical care provided for the 
Chilean people from the beginnings of the service 
in 1952 until its end in December 1979,the capitulos 
gathered all the former Director Generals of the 
Servicio Nacional de Salud together and presented 
them with certificates. 35 Press and television 
gave extensive coverage to this event which was held 
infue Colegi6 M~dico offices much to the anger of the 
Regional Council of Santiago. 
Nonetheless,the capitlilos were never 
able after the Convention to threaten the Government 
again. The capitulos had certainly not managed to 
create the ap~~tu~a as they had hoped. After the 
summer of 1980,the capitulos' activity decreased 
sharply. 
Moreover,the strategy of trying to 
create a movement within the Colegio M~dico against 
the Government had clearly failed by 1980. The 
General Council and particularly the President, Sergio 
Reyes turned against the Association and moved 
towards the position of the Regional Council of 
Santiago . There had only been a brief hint that the 
General Council might support the capitulo movement 
against the Regional Council of Santiago. This 
occurred after the Convention when the General Council 
passed a motion of censure against the Secretary 
General of the Colegio and Representative of the 
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capitulos by preventing discussion in the General 
Council of several conflictual issues surrounding 
this dispute. Now 6 months later,Reyes and the 
Regional Council were working closely in opposition 
to the Association . 
The failure of the capitulo'~ 
strategy to alig~ the Colegio Medico with their 
opposition movement to the Government led the 
Association to consider the setting up of a rival 
organization to the Colegio,a sindicato de medicos. 
Doctors were not the first profession to discuss the 
possibility of forming a rival organization to their 
colegio. Lawyers had already formed a sindicato in 
opposition to the Colegio de Abogados which these 
lawyers argued was openly operating on behalf of 
the Government. But the doctors were discouraged 
from forming a sindicato de medicos because of the 
lawyers' experience. The latter had found that only 
10% of the profession were willing to join their 
sindicato despite every indication that more than 
half of the legal profession were opposed to the 
Colegio de Abogados. Doctors felt that the same 
tactic could similarly backfire. Thus no sindicato 
of doctors was set up to rival the Colegio Medico. 37 
A measure of the decline in the 
capitulo's organization and activity was its failure 
to publish a statement at the time of the plebiscite 
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gave Pinochet the right to continue in power for 
another 8 years and a possibility of an additional 
8 years thereafter. The opposition parties claimed 
that the Constitution was a fraud,institutionalizing 
the dictatorship rather than signalling its end. 
Amongst the many groups which pronounced their support 
for the Constitution and for Pinochet was the Regional 
Council of Santiago. The Council paid a visit to 
Pinochet with over 400 ~ignatures of Santiago doctors 
declaring their support for the new Constitution. In 
contrast to the Regional Council of Santiago, the 
capitulos were unable to organize a similar demon-, 
38 
stration in opposition to the Constitution. Only 
the capitulo of the Hospital Psquiatrico in Santiago 
announced its rejection. For the most part, opposition 
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doctors demonstrated their hostility to the constitution 
where they were able to,in their political parties 
not in their capitulo. It is to the reasons for this 
decline in the strength of the capitulos that we now 
turn. 
DECLINE 
Any attempt to examine the reasons 
for the failure of the capitulos must take account 
of the difficulty of achieving political goals in 
Almost in defiance of these difficult~es the 
movement was overtly political. 
In discussing whether the capitulos 
had political or merely gremial aims, a General in 
the Armed Forces put it to Reyes,the President that, 
"LO-6 medico-6 en e-6te momento e-6tan 
igual que en el tiempo de la Unidad 
Populal1.. " 39 
Reyes replied unconvincingly, 
"Si tien e-6 ciel1.to be e-6t~ ge-6tando 
un movimiento pal1.ecido,con gl1.an 
pl1.e-6i6n de €a ta-6e medica,quel1.[a 
dej~11. en clal1.o que hat[a una gl1.an 
difel1.encia en el otje.ti~d~~uy 
impol1.tante.. La pl1.e-6ion e.n tie.mpo-6 
de. la Unidad Populal1. tu~ pal1.a 
del1.l1.ital1. a€ 90tierno y camtial1.e.l 
-6i-6te.ma polrtico de.l pa~-6,lo~ 
al1.gume.nto~ que u~atamo~ e.l1.an en e.l 
tondo ~olo PI1.e.te.xto~ pal1.a e.~e. tin. 
en camtio ahol1.a e.l movimiento e.l1.a 
e.xclu~ivame.nte. gl1.e.mial,~in ninguna 
l1.e.lacion polLtica." 1,0 
Reyes was clearly deceiving the General in describing 
the capitulo movement as non-politi~al. 
Capitulo leaders had agreed to make 
it clear to doctors that they were opposed to the 
Government. The President of the Capitulos,Jorge . 
Jimenez at every meeting of his capitulo in Hospital 
Roberto del Rio declared himself to be against the 
Government. He was re-elected twice. Seen from this 
perspective of a relatively open, anti-Government 
movement,the question really is not why the capitulos 
achieved so little,but rather why they succeeded in 
_~ .. ...... 1.,... 
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pressure exerted on them by the military dictator-
ship. The scope of the capitulos ' action was 
always limited by the restrictions placed on them 
by the military. Everything was much more difficult 
to organize in a dictatorship. In a democracy, the 
Santiago capitulos would have simply impeached the 
Regional Council in order to remove its members. 
Under Colegio Medico regulations any Regional 
Councillor could be impeached by the doctors within 
his jurisdiction. It only needed 20% of doctors 
within the Regional Council to sign a demand for 
the council's impeachment. However,under a dictator-
ship doctors would not have dared to sign such a 
demand for fear of recrimination. 
The dictatorship and its supporters 
could also use various means of restrictin~ the 
capitulos' activities. For instance,some senior 
doctors who were Government supporters refused 
their 'juniqrs leave of absence to attend capitulo 
meetings. In Hospital Barros Luco.for instance the 
doctor in charge of the maternity section forbade 
all doctors working under him to attend their 
hospi tal.s ' capitulo ,tneetings. 42 And after the 
Convention of 1979,the authorities stopped allowing 
capitulos the right to hold meetings in hospitals. 
In Barros Luco for instance, the Director refused to 
allow meetings of doctors to take place. As a result, 
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reduced. Thusas a result of these obstacles placed 
by the authorities on capitulo meetings, capitulo 
activity in general decreased. 
In September 1979,doctors were given 
a warning of what could befall them if they carried 
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on with their capitulo activities. Jorge Jimenez,the 
President of the Capitulos was sacked from his Servicio 
Nacional de Salud post. No reason was given for his 
dismissal but every doctor was fully aware that it was 
a result of his role inside the Asociacion de los 
Capitulos and his opposition to the Government. 
Moreover,during the summer of 1980,two 
prominent capitulo leaders,A.Bellet and F.Aranda were 
also sacked. This occurred while all Servicio Nacional 
de Salud contracts were being re-approved as part of 
the re-structuring of the service. As a result of these 
sackings,many doctors no longer dared to attend 
meetings of the capitulos for fear of losing their 
jobs. 
THE COLEGIO MEDICO's VICTORY ON HEALTH POLICY. 
A more important reason however why the 
capitulos declined in 1980 was the success of the 
Colegio Medico in challenging the economists' health 
olicy. The Cole~io Medico as has been described. was 
ratification in September 1979. By the time the plan 
had become law,the Colegio M~dico had succeeded in 
watering the project down. 
During the legislative progress of 
the proposed health plan a struggle took place between 
the health team proposing the changed in the health 
service and the Comite Asesor . In this Comite were 
Medina,the ex-President of the Colegio's brother and 
Dr. Schuster,a military doctor. They had supported the 
Colegio's arguments on the dangers of privatization. 
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Both Medina and Schuster represented a 
strong tendency amongst top Army generals who considered 
the Colegio a bastion of the authoritarian soceity they 
wanted to create. It was bad politics these Army 
generals argued,to push the Colegio into the camp of 
the opposition against the Junta. This alliance 
between Army generals and the Colegio M~dico leaders 
presented a formidable barrier to the health authorities. 
As the struggle intensified between the 
economists on the one hand,and the Colegio M~dico and 
its allies in the Comit~ Asesor on the other,Pinochet's 
approval of the new health legislation was delayed. 
The health authorities began an unprecedented campaign 
to force Pinochet to sign their health policy and make 
it law. To this end ,mass meetings of health workers, 
nurses,auxiliaries and empleados were regularly held 
in Diego Portales. 43 At these,Jimenez,Cruz Mena and 
time that large meetings such as these had been 
organized since the coup. 
To counter these tactics of the 
economists,the Colegio Medico took every opportunity 
to publicjze its case. The Colegio's public relations 
staff had cultivated good links with the media. "El 
Mercurio" was swung over to its position as were 
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other newspapers who held the Colegio Medico in high 
regard. Even the public relations staff in the Ministry 
of Health were pro-Colegio and biased against the new 
health reforms. 
As a result,when the health plan was 
finally enacted in law in December 1979,the Colegio 
Medico had managed to gain many consessions. First, 
there was the absolute guarantee that the national 
fund which would finance the Unidades Operativas de 
Salud would receive their budget in the usual way and 
not in proportion to the number of cases they treated. 
Competition between each Unidad Operativa de Salud 
was thus ruled out. Moreover,the Colegio Medico's 
powers of inscription,payments and ethical control 
of doctors working in SERMENA remained intact,therfore 
keeping this power away from private business interests. 
To cement this change in practice,those 
responsible for the new legislation,Quesney,Jimenez 
and Cruz Mena were replaced by their most vociferous 
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now considered himself Director General of the Servicio 
Nacional de Salud, whereas his predecessor in an attempt 
to minimize the State service had called himself merely 
"Government Delegate to the Health Service" . 45 
The 2 economists in the health team, 
J.Aritzia and Donoso still retained some influence. 
Throughout 1980 they staged a campaign attacking both 
the Colegio Medico for misappropriating SERMENA funds 
and SERMENA doctors for malpractice. 46 
These 0-«; os a.. t ~ 0 n. oS were aimed at convincing 
Pinochet that control should be taken away from the 
Colegio Medico and put in the hands of private 
businesses who would supervise the work of doctors 
much more effectively than the State. But despite 
this highly effective campaign which created great 
consternation inside the Colegio Medico the economists 
lost their case. Donoso was sacked. Once again,the 
Colegio Medico/military alliance had scored another 
victory over the economists. 
Thus,the capitulos no longer had the 
advantage of these sweeping changes in health policy 
to bolster their opposition to the Regional Council. 
Schuster and Medina were much more sympathetic to 
the power of the Colegio Medico and the prestige of 
the profession and did not slander the doctors in the 
way Jimenez had done. The capitulos therefore,because 
the terin down of the economists' health plan 
THE YOUNG DOCTORS 
Although the capitulos declined in 
1980,their work was carried on by the young doctors. 
For the first time in the history of the profession, 
the young doctors formed a completely separate and 
permanent organization to fight for their interests. 
FEMECH in the 60's and the capitulos in 1979 had 
to a large extent,represented their interests,but 
these organizations were not permanent. 
Now in August 1980,the young doctors 
set up an organization called the Asociacion de Medicos 
Jovenes to look after the interests of medical students 
unable to find work on leaving University,unemployed 
doctors who had already graduated but were still 
without work,and young doctors in both the Servicio 
Nacional de Salud and the new private enterprises. 
This organization demanded finance and facilities 
from the Colegio Medico to form its own separate 
departments to examine and protect the various aspects 
of a young doctor's work. They argued that a separate 
body was necessary since the Colegio Medico represented 
a different tyue of doctor. Moreover,they argued that 
as they constituted over 40% of the profession they 
had a right to form their own representative organiz-
ation. They even questioned the Colegio Medico's power 
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number of doctors now working for the new private 
enterprises and the conditions under which they 
were working. 
The Colegio Medico had not instigated 
this new movement and it did not have a particularly 
good relationship with these young doctors. Many of 
the young doctors' leaders were those who had led the 
occu'pation of the Colegio buildings in 1979. Their 
leaders belonged to the opposition parties to the 
Junta. The Colegio Medico was thus, suspicious of this 
potential rival. Nevertheless,despite the fact that 
its formation implied a criticism of the Colegio in 
not being successful in representing these young 
doctors' interests it allowed them facilities within 
the Colegio building to meet on a regular basis 
and finance to conduct their studies. 
It can be argued that the process of 
nroletarianization which had affected in the main 
this young group of doctors, was the main cause of the 
creation of the young doctors' association. They 
themselves remarked that their separate interests 
needed a separate organization to truly reflect these 
needs. However,it is interesting to note that they 
remained within the Colegio Medico. On 8th August,"El 
Mercurio" announced the setting up of this new 
organization claiming that the doctors had formed it 
because their interests had been constantly disregarded 
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even though it reflected their true feelings,they 
needed the Colegio Medico's finance to operate 
effectively. 47 Thus,for the immediate future,the 
young doctors were willing to work within the 
Colegio. 
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CONCLUSION 
Between 1975 and 1980 those doctors who 
could not protect themselves from the gradual privatiz-
ation of the health service experienced.a change in 
their class position. Their work process came to 
resemble that of proletarians. This process of 
proletarianization had always affected a particular 
segment of the profession. The difference now was that 
the economists'health changes accentuated the process. 
This changing class position influenced 
their pol~tical actions and orientations. Not only 
was this group largely responsible for setting up the 
Association of the Capitulos but it also indulged in 
quite dramatic actions such as the occupation of the 
Colegio Medico. 
One reason behind the formation of a 
separate organization to the Colegio Medico was that 
the latter had come to represent the interest~ of 
more private medicine oriented doctors. This was 
especially true of the Regional Council of Santiago. 
Another reason behind the founding of thA Association 
of the Capitulos was political. The Regional Council 
of Santiago was one of the Junta's most loyal supporters. 
Many of the young doctors' representatives were trying 
to use the Association to take over the Regional Council 
and thus,put pressure directly on the Government. 
of the proj ect as well as the harassmen t and 
sacking of capitulo leaders by the Junta. Also the 
success of the Colegio Medico in modifying the health 
plans of the economists removed the main catalyst of 
the doctors' protest. Without the health plan to 
campaign against, the capi tulos lost their I/.ai~on 
d'~il/.E. • 
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Colegio Medico delivered to a meeting of the Academia 
de Hum ani dad Cri s tiano . San tiago .. J anuary 1 980. 
2. The Carter Government operating under the principle 
of respect for human rights was anxious to question 
Contreras in connection with the assassination of 
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7. Minutes of the Cons.Gen.Col.Med. Acta N° 258. 8 de 
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21. The other two office bearers were Drs.Aranda and Bellet. 
22. This Commission monitored the respect for human rights 
in Chile.For instance the author attended a press 
conference at this Commission!s headquarters at which 
Claire Wilson,a British passport holder who was 4 
months pregnant at the time,described how she had been 
tortured by the Chilean Secret Police. Santiago. 
August 1980. 
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CON C L U S ION 
Medical professions throughout 
the world are notoriously conservative in 
political matters. In Chile however,this 
conservative behaviour is not universal amongst 
doctors. Indeed,we have argued that the 
profession in Chile is broadly split into 
Left,Centre and Right wing groupings .The 
major question is to determine what explains 
these divisions • 
Some social scientists argue 
that in the case of doctors "class ff is not a 
sufficient explanation for the political 
divisions within the profession. They remain 
unconvinced that class alone can explain the 
contradictory political responses of doctors 
when their social background in unambiguously 
upper and middle class. 
For these social scientists, 
"class" refers to social origins. Doctors' 
backgrounds,their wealthy upper class families 
and good schools make them part of the upper 
strata in Chilean society. Certainly most 
Chilean doctors have this privileged background, 
and this is a relevant factor in their class 
Dosition. However,we have used a different sense 
of the term "class". Rather than "class" as 
"social origins",we have analysed II cl ass " in 
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from the capi talist mode of production. lIClass 11 
for us means what does a group do?lI rather 
than Ilfrom where does the group originate?lI. 
This thesis argues that in our sense of the 
term ,Il class If can explain to a large extent, 
the political division and diversity in political 
behaviour of Chilean doctors. 
THE CLASS LOCATION OF DOCTORS AND PROLETARIANIZATION 
This thesis has attempted to 
examine the politics of a medical association in 
terms of the contradictory class location 
of its members and to determine to what extent 
the class situation of doctors determines their 
political behaviour .The class location of 
doctors was fixed in relation to the extent 
to which doctors' work was part of a labour 
process,or in other words,the extent to which 
in performing the functions of capital,they 
also carried out the tasks of the lIcollecti ve 
la bourer Il . 
Using doctors' work as the 
criterion for class location,we placed Chilean 
doctors into three broad class groupings. The 
first grouD was located very close to the 
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constituted as part of a labour process. The 
second group which shared its work equally 
between State and private medicine had a 
more ambiguous relationship towards the 
bourgeoisie since part of its work(in State 
medicine) was carried out as a labour process. 
The third group which had no access to private 
medicine and worked totally in the State 
sector tended to lose its autonomy and control 
in its work place to administrators and managers. 
This latter group was situated closer to the 
proletariat because its work was carried out,to 
some extent as part of a labour process in the 
same fashion as the proletariat . 
It was also argued that the 
location of Chilean doctors in this class 
structure was not the same for doctors in 
other parts of the world. Chile's young doctors 
were required to work in the bureaucratic and 
impoverished State health service. As a result, 
this group's class situation was unique. For 
these reasons Chilean doctors cannot be compared 
to medical professions elsewhere in the world. 
We have argued tha-t amongst the 
profession it was the young doctors who 
underwent the most significant change in their 
TYl <:1Yl<:1l>TQ1YlIT t.hp I":h,qnap i 
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we have tried to make a parallel between their 
class situation and the "proletarianizLrt.j" 
effects of the capitalist labour process on 
certain skilled occupations such as craft 
worker s. "Prol etarianiza tion 11 is the pro ce s s 
whereby the worker is forced into a closer 
relationship with capital which removes the 
skill(the conception and execution of work) 
and therefore,the relative autonomy of the 
worker. 
Thi s "prol etariani zing" the si s 
has been most imaginatively described by Harry 
Braverman in Labour and Monopoly Capital. In 
this book he argues that formerly skilled work 
has been degraded by the imperatives of the 
capitalist organization of the labour process. 
The first imperative is the concern to cheapen 
labour:in Marxian terms,to reduce the value of 
labour power by substituting simple for complex 
labour. The second and more fundamental 
imperative is to guarantee effective capitalist 
control of the labour process . The effect of 
these imperatives on labour is to "deskill ll it. 
We have tried to argue that this "deskillinglf 
process which as Braverman argues has affected 
craft work b similarities to the nrocess 
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in the late 70's. 
From the beginnings of the 
Servicio Nacional de Salud until the mid 70's 
young doctors were converted into salaried 
employees. They had no private work and were 
totally committed to the State for income and 
flJrther educa tion. T21e Sta te servi ce was a 
huge bureaucratic and centralised organization. 
On the one hand it faced constant financial 
crises .This forced it to pay low wages to its 
employees and to restrict both quantt.:t:a.ti..veIy 
and q uali ta ti vely the servi ce it offered to its 
patients. On the other hand,the demands placed 
upon it increased as Chile's population rose 
steeply in the 50's and 60's. In this constrained 
State sector young doctors did not enjoy the 
autonomy and control in their workplace which 
their more established colleagues had in their 
private practices. Young doctors were subject 
to bureaucratic and administrative controls 
which deprived them of .a sense of mission and 
service. In the late 50's and early 60's, 
studies appeared which discussed the tlproletar-
ianization tl of the young doctors in the 
Servicio Nacional de Salud. 
In the late 70's this process 
accelerated and affected youn doctors in the 
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private sector. In the first period from 1952 
to the mid 70's,young doctors' class situation 
had been affected principally by financial 
stringencies in the State sector. After the mid 
70's,financial restri~tions increased,but a new 
factor was added to the process. Doctors' work 
became degraded by a more rigorous type of 
capitalist control both in State and private 
medicine. Under the new health plans,the State 
sector was opened up for privite investment 
and in the process transformed to fit the 
pattern of a capitalist labour process. 
As we have argued inside many 
hospitals attempts were made to cheapen doctors' 
work. Joctors were prevented from carrying out 
scientific experiments to help them in their 
diagnosis. Their working materials were 
stripped to the bare minimum. The use of drugs 
and machines,the tools of the doctor,were 
carefully monitored by managers intent on 
cutting costs. 
A new type of control on 
doctors' work became evident. Before, 
restriction had emerge~ from the imperatives 
of financial cutbacks. Now,under the new 
health rAforms young doctors' work was 
increasingly controlled by managers who 
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maximum number of patients possible in their 
working day. This new rigor in the organization 
of the health service placed doctors under a 
new discipline. Modern scientific management 
techniques in both the Servicio Nacional de 
Salud and in the burgeoning private sector 
regimented the work of many young doctors. 
Under these conditions they lost control and 
autonomy in their workplace. 
The normal mechanisms of defence 
which the young doctors might have used to 
counteract these changes were dismantled by the 
Junta. There was no strong gremial organization 
to protect them. Not only had the Colegio 
Meaico been weakened by its inability to hold 
elections and by its loss of power to require 
membership amongst the profession but it had 
moreover began to support the more private 
medicine oriented doctors, who in some cases 
were the employers of these young doctors. 
Furthermore,the ruthlessness of the dictator-
ship rendered any other form of effective 
class resistance impossible by young doctors. 
These changes in their work 
process which tended to deskill and proletar-
ianize this large section of the profession 
were linked to the growth of a "reserve army" 
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young doctors. It should be remembered how 
Marx had noted that capital in changing the 
labour process,tended to both throw 
employees out of their jobs ,and lower the 
wages of employees in those jobs that 
remained. 
The cut in the Servicio 
Nacional de Salud budget and the increase in 
private medicine under the control of business, 
also affected the work of the older doctors. 
But since the more established doctors had their 
own private practices these changes did not 
have the same impact. Private practice 
protected doctors' autonomy and control in 
their work. The larger a private practice a 
doctor had,the less impact the doctor's 
State work had in degrading his skills. 
In sum,through the proletarian-
ization process young doctors did not only 
come to resemble other workers in economic 
terms i.e. less financially advantaged,more 
vulnerable to redundancy and pressurized 
towards increased workloads,but the proletar-
ianization process also involved a loss of 
control over their work process which became 
monopolized by the State or private managers. 
This proletarianization thesis 
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profession. No attempt has been made to extend it 
to all doctors,nor to other medical professions 
in other parts if the world. However, this was 
not an unique phenomenon affecting only 
doctors. Bec~use the State had been withdrawn 
from sectors other than health care,other 
professional and middle class groups have 
also been affected by this "proletarianizating" 
process. The State had played a huge role in 
economically protecting the status of many 
middle class groups such as teachers,architects, 
chemists etc. The dismantling of the State had 
left these groups at the mercy of the private 
sector. Given the weakness of this sector,many 
of these groups' social power had deteriorated. 
This new phenomenon of the proletarianization 
of many middle class groups in Pinochet's 
Chile had been described by Jair Gillon the 
occasion of the 9th anniversary of the 
Chilean coup, 
"7he pettu gou~geoi~ie ha~ unde~gone 
a p~oce~~ ot p~o~eta~ianization , 
and even in ce~tain ca~e~; ot 
"~umpenp~o~eta~ianization",a~ the 
~ma~~ me~chant o~ taxi d~ive~ who 
~o~e thei~ gu~ine~~ o~ thei~ 
wo~king equipment cannot in the~e 
condition~ ge integ~ated into the 
p~oce~~ ot p~oduction. 7hey 
~u~vive gy "odd jog~". /;jhe~ea~, 
to~me~~y,they had p~otited t~om 
the deve~opment ot the State 
~e~vice~,the petty gou~geoi~ie 
i~ todau,g~ound down gu the c~i~i~. 
7hi~ i~ one ot the mo~t impo~tant 
/1 r I • /J • _ __ " _ .t . 
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One caveat is in order at this stage. 
It is still premature to argue that a large 
se~ment of the Chilean medical profession has 
been llproletarianized ll . We have been careful 
to use the term llprocess of proletarianization ll 
when describing the changes affecting the class 
situation of young doctors. In no sense of the 
term have young doctors become llproletarians Tr . 
Their length of education and the nature of 
their work will always keep them ultimately 
separate from the working class. Moreover,the 
changes that were underway in the late 70's 
and in particular the direct capitalist control 
of doctors' work are still in their early stages. 
CLASS LOCATION AND POLITICAL ACTION 
Having described the alteration 
in the class location of doctors and described 
the main change in their class situation as a 
form of llproletarianizationTr,we shall return 
now to our original question, can class location 
explain doctors' political action? 
We have argued that the Chilean 
medical profession is politically split into 
three main political groupings;Left,Centre and 
Right .No better demonstration of this split 
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Medico which produced the following results: 
Christian Democrat(Centre) 40% 
Right 33% 
and Popular Unity 26% 
As previously argued,the profession is split 
into three class groupings although still 
remaining in a contradictory class location 
between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. 
It is too simplistic to argue that these class 
positions neatly map onto the political leanings 
of the profession. The political split within 
the profession may simply reflect the three way 
political split in Chilean society between 
Popular Unity and the Left,Christian Democracy 
and the Centre,and the National Party and the 
Right. However there is evidence to suggest that 
the young doctors i.e. that class grouping 
which is closer to the proletariat,are more 
likely to belong to the Left group inside the 
profession and equally,the more established 
doctors i.e. the class grouping which is 
closer to the bourgeoisie are more likely to 
belong to the Right wing group of the profession. 
Historically ,the young doctors 
have always been on the Left wing of the 
profession. Since the 1950's the Left wing 
orientation of young doctors has been mainly 
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above. In 1962,this group of young Servicio 
Nacional de Salud doctors formed FEMECH in 
in order to fight to defend the State health 
service. For the first time ever, these 
doctors called a strike. P.Silva commenting 
on the use of a strike declared, 
"It wa~ unthinkalle that a middle 
cla~~ g~oup ~hould ~e~o~t to the 
weapon~ ot the wo~king cla~~(ie 
the ~t~ike). Neve~thele~~,it 
wa~ logical given the g~owth ot 
thei~ State wo~k,thei~ dete~io~­
ating condition~ within it, and 
the lack ot any pe~manent 
~elation~hip letween them~elve~ 
and thei~ patient~. Docto~~, 
we~e ~n tact leing p~oleta~ian­
ized. " 
One example of the political sympathies of 
these young doctors was their choice of 
President,Waldo Inostroza,a member of the 
Socialist Party. 
This tradition of young 
doctors Left wing militancy carried on 
during Popular Unity when they were the 
main supporters of the Allende government. 
The Left wing doctors' organization attacked 
the Colegio Medico for ignoring their 
interests and declared that they themselves 
would personally represent the interests of 
young doctors. Moreover,a survey of the Left 
wing exiled doctors revealed that the vast 
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As the process of proletarian-
ization increased in the late 70's,young 
doctors became more and more militant. The 
occupation of the Colegio Medico buildings, 
the creation of the Association of the Capitulos , 
their attempts to form a sindicato(with its 
working class connotations),reflected the 
degradation these young doctors were suffering 
as a result of the exploitation of the health 
sector by private capital~ The creation of a 
permanent Association of Young Doctors in 1980 
was an implicit criticism of the failure of 
the Colegio Medico to represent their interests. 
Young doctors belonged to a different class 
grouping and for that reason they needed a 
separate organization to defend their 
interests. 
The demand for new organizations 
to replace their professional association was 
significant. The process of proletarianization 
gradually broke down the doctors' individual-
istic professional self-i~age,and forced them 
into revived recognition of a collective 
interest in organizing against their employers. 
The term "profession" implies a group of 
classless autonomous individuals with similar 
status and standing who come together for 
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eminence of their occupation. The process 
of proletarianization as we have described, 
attacked this idea of professionalism at 
its roots. 
The Left wing militancy of 
the young doctors was,then a constant 
recurring factor in the history of the 
profession and we have argued that this was 
caused by a process of proletarianization. 
This process gradually rendered "professional" 
forms of action and representation of doctors 
redundant . 
The class location of the more 
established doctors in contrast to the young 
members of the profession resulted in more 
conservative political action. As autonomous 
urofessionals,protected by their individual 
private practices,they were considerably 
more supuortive of their professional 
association,the Colegio Medico. Unlike young 
doctors,they had no use for sindicatos to 
conduct collectjve action against their 
employer s. 
During Popular Unity the 
origin of the Right wing takeover of the 
Colegio Medico was Vina del Mar where 
private practice was more prevalent than in 
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practices and little involvement in the 
State sector. 
However,the most crucial 
political group was not the young doctors 
and the more private medicine-oriented 
members of the profession but those doctors 
who split their time more or less equally 
between State and private medicine. These 
doctors tended to be politically of the 
Centre;they exerted a moderating influence 
on the politics of the profession. During 
1970-1973,these centrist doctors joined with 
the Right and blocked any plan to place the 
whole of Chile1s health system under the 
State in a Servicio Unico de Salud. Equally, 
after the coup this moderate influence was 
exerted against the Right wing plans to 
privatize the health service. 
We have argued that there was 
a tendency for the three main class groupings 
to adopt Right, Centre and Left positions. 
However,these are general political tendencies 
at the level of the profession. When we come 
down to the level of the Colegio Medico,the 
articulator of these political tendencies, 
politics takes on a considerable autonomy. Of 
course,the conflict between Left,Right and 
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groupings in the profession,but eaually,it 
may have been derived from political party 
struggles as a whole. 
Particularly during periods 
of political crises,party politics rather 
than class politics dominated the Colegio 
Medico. This is demonstrated during Popular 
Unity when doctors supporting gremialismo , 
Popular Unity and Christian Democracy all 
tried to use the Colegio Medico not for 
their own class ends, but for the wider party 
political goals. It might not be too fanciful 
to suggest that during Popular Unity the 
doctors who were working to promote gremialismo 
inside the Colegio Medico were operating under 
instructions from the businessmen I s llMonday 
Clubll;certain Left wing consejeros on the 
General Council were receiving orders from 
the Central Committee of the Chilean Communist 
Party;and even the President of the Colegio 
Medico Ruben Acuna was taking orders from the 
Christian Democratslparty headquarters. In 
other words, during the political crises 
surrounding Popular Unity, the class location 
of doctors was insufficient to explain the 
nature of the political struggle inside the 
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However,noting the complexities 
of politics at the Colegio Medico level,the 
fact that at certain crisis periods,politics 
reflected the wider party political struggle, 
does not refute our central thesis that class 
to a large extent explained the political 
division inside the profession. These class/ 
political divisions were reflected in the 
struggle inside the Colegio Medico. However, 
given the extremely politicized nature of 
Chilean society,the unique period of Popular 
Unity and its aftermath which raised political 
passions to even new heights,class consider-
ations became submerged to these wider political 
goals. 
Finally we have been at pains to 
state that our proletarianization thesis only 
refers to the Chilean medical profession . 
However,there are signs that the private 
medicine experiments of the late 70's in Chile 
are attracting the favourable attention of 
European policy makers. At least since the 
Second World War.most European Governments 
have committed their State to the primary 
role of providing health care for their 
people. In Britain,Belgium and Scandinavia 
this philosophy has led to large State health 
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State's predominance in the health services 
has occurred. Accompanying this reaction 
has been an increase in private investments 
in the health sector. In Europe private 
clinics and hospitals have been set up, 
financed by private insurance companies, 
and lately by American mUltinationals 
specializing in private hospital administ-
ration. 
Irrespective of the effect 
on the health services of these developments, 
our evidence should be a warning to medical 
professions in Europe. The organization of 
the health service by private business 
interests does not simply offer doctors 
higher material rewards. Private business 
mav take control away Trom doctors and in 
imposing a strictly capitalist labour process 
lead to thA type OT medical proletarianization 
that this thesis has described in the case 
of the young Chilean doctors. 
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NOTES 
1. Gil,J.(1982).'Chile:Nine Years after the Coup.' 
International Viewpoint. 18th October N° 15. 
2. See also Silva,P.(1966) .'Trabajo Medico y Seguridad 
Social.' IX Congreso Medico Panoamericana. 25-30th 
April.Lima, Peru. 
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A p P E N D I c E s 
Appendix A. 
Two letters which reveal the friction that 
was caused between Jorge Alvayay and Juan 
Chiorrini over the former's attempt to 
change the Colegio M~dico's Code of Ethics 
to include the principle of grem~al crime. 
Even though Juan Chiorrini was himself on 
the Right wing of the profession,Alvayay's 
tactics had annoyed him. 
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MEPICO PE CHILE 
RlQIONAL ItANC:AGUA 
CAal1..LA IS' 
Senor 
Dr. Jorge Alvayay C. 
Presidente del.Consejo Regional 
Valparaiso Aconcagua. 
VALPARAISO 
Distinguido Amigo: 
RANCAffiUA, Julio 8 de 1972. 
JCA/eaa 
Indiscutib1emente que en 1a reunion del Viernss en e1 
Club, destinada a estrechar filas y a unir los 8sistentee tuvo moman -
tos no muy felices y a mi me tocaron dos interrogacion8squa debi con -
testar en forma molesta. En 8se estado de animo probablemante no estue 
ve muy sereno a1 recorder suS palabrss sobre e1 C6digo ds'Ctica y d~ -
mostrarme 1astimado por ~11n6.-
Quiero d8cirle, amigo H1vayay, que la verdad 8S que -
nunca he astimado intencionadas sus palabras y menos tratand~8a de mi 
persona que comu1ga con Ud. an idantldad da parecers8 y finea. Muy por 
el contrario, siempre ha encontr~do sus argumentscionae oportunaa, 
conatructives 8 inia11g8nt~s.-
lodas BUS inainuaciones, pet1cionas y dsseos manifes-
tadas por su Colegio 0 por Ud. personslmente, ~eran consideradas -y no 
podria sarlo an otra forma- como una va1iosa syuda para parfaccionar -
a1 C6digo que tanto nos ha preocupado.-
Reciba, como siempre, e1 efecto y raspeto di qui'n 10 
aprecia sinceramente.- I . I 
J\; ) //{( <: ·C{( ;. 'c ~ ~ <::-~. • 
Dr. Juan Chiorrini A. 
Presidente Departamento Etica y Aranc,ls~ 
Colegio Medico de Chile. 
a MEDICO DE CHILE 
INSEJO REGIONAL 
RAISO - ACONCAGUA 
SIL 168g - TELEFONO 87:16 
\LPARAISO 
S.llor 
Dr.Juaa Ckierr1.i 
c. ••• j.re Geovral 
Col~~l •• _dico d. Ch11. 
S.A.JfTUGO 
ta 1. reuoioD del Vi.ro.a retroprox1 •• Ud. 
hizo liD deilDCe a .... str. NaorYac1oa •• criticaa 841»,.. .1 Cti-
4i,0 d. £t1&a Prot •• ioaal e las que d&40 la {D'.la do 1& r~. 
a4oa, •• tl" l .. portu .. re.peader. 
LAaoato quo Ud. ae kaTa ••• tide la.tl .... 
pOl' uate Yoto, laaplrado oa 1&. aejore. lat.acioneo de pertoc-
cloDar' taD iaportaAt. la.traaeato. a tio do ciapl.a.at~r1. eGa 
01 rubro: "d. la. rela.ciollo. de loa Medico .. tuDcioaar.l.o .... ia-
clUTtUldo .1 priacipl0 del deli to vealal, a CiD d. telt~" •• 
bu.a iaatruaollto 4a d.t.aoa 4. oue.tro. tan apcrr.&~-ta.r .. 
protc.ioaal •• pOI' ~rte dol prapoteat. Goblera. 4e 1. U.P •• 
a • .oa eatado. 1 p.r.oaala.au al qa. aU.-
crib., 4. aaDa.J!&-l»J.7 aspecial, 8Hl11.joa ct. la lat.Du'." 
a.noscabar 0 d. yala.rar a Ie c .. 1610a d. Etlca Prot •• 1GeAl 
7 ... cU, .. ~r_aa. q ... r •• ~taa.,. ooao la q •• aLa • 
.A.provecao 1~ oportuDidad para ill.l.tir, 7a 
que Ud. ·th •• 1a r •• poopbU idad de tao iaportaDt. OrlaDl ... 
d.l Ca.,10 M'dl.o, pare q.a .. aatadl. rap{d .... t. 1& aoditl-
e&010. ooat •• 1d& •• _I .o-t.o r •• p4cUYO. r.toraa.do .1 C44J.p 
d_ Etlc& Prot •• lo-.&l. _-----.... 
"-
a.o.lba 04. to4e 1& G4"1d.rac't~/\ ;f!, 01 .tNt. 
d. au •• rvldor. 
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Appendix B. 
Report of Meeting held in Valparaiso on 
1st November 1972 between four professional 
- . 
associations to discuss the progress of 
their strike action. 
Fri",era Reunion del Comi te Coordinador de los 4 Colegios Profesionales de la 
Sq lun. 
A::;istcnci2.: 
Colegio de Dentistas: Sergio Lobo; Guillermo Vi~rtcl; Alvaro Lc5pez; 
Jose Gu;:rr.an. 
Colegio de Quimicos-Farmaceuticos: Jorge DroPP5l",ann+ Guillermo Harding; 
Ramon Soto. 
Colegio de Enfermcras: Ana Abarca; En12stina Esparza; Lila Aguilar; 
Annu.l>!nria Barbera. 
Colegio ~;edico: Jorge AlvayEiY, Gonzalo Garcia, Roracio Bruzzone; Jaime 
Veneziano 
Lo~ intcrrrantos de la roun10n procedicron a darsc una directiva formada por, las 
siguientes personas: Alvaro Lopez, Pu'sidente; i.nnaIkrici Barbera Secretaria. 
TABLil.-
1.- Cuenta de los Colegios sobre la marcha del movimionto. 
2. - l~ccioncG 11 prograf.'ll!r en conjun to. 
3.- Sueldos mos de Octubre. 
4.- Estructuracion fonda de Solidaridad Gremial. 
El obJotivo central de osta reunion fue coordinar la labor de estos ou~tro Cole-
gios on rclacion al conflicto Gremial oxictente, llev~r informacion oportuna y 
pl~tca~icntos comunes hacia las directivus supcriores y ~ las bases. 
1._ Cuenta do los Colegios sobre la marcha del ",ovimiento. 
Cologio do Enformcrasl 
La presidenta del Colegio informo que sus colegiadas se en-
contraban en paro desde 01 dia 20 y que Qosdc 01 dia 27 01 pero se cnduroeio ha-
ciendose indefinido y con retiro de los turnos de emorgencia. Las Bases pidicron 
una mayor relacion de los Cuatro Colegios para un rospaldo mutuo y coordinacion 
on las mcdidas futuras que se adopten, 10 que motivo su asistencia ~ esta reunion. 
El Comito de Control de dioho Cologio ha estado visitando los distintoG establc-
cimientos y hn podido detercinar que hay 142 enfernoras en paro y 14 trabajondo 
(En 'JGto total est5n comprendidas enformeras Jefes de i.:J:eas y de Hospital, "uto-
rizadns por dicho Colegio para laborar). Entre elIas so cuentan adcmne enfermc-
ras en suplencia, a honorarios y contratns a quienes no lee ha llegado este de-
creto. 
La difusion de la marehn de este movimiente se ha hecho sola",ente por In prensa, 
dndo que -:La television se ha negado a ineluir en sus programas informaeionee al 
respocto. 
El Dr. Vcnozian ofreco, a nombro del Cologio Medieo espaeio en sus programas de 
difusion radial. En cunnto al sueldo del mes de Octubre cste hn sida pagac.o con 
cl descucnto total de los dias no trabajados, 10 eunl ha creado un problema oeo-
nomieo a las eolcgiadas. En este mo",cnto 01 comito de ?innnzas d81 Calc~ia 3e ha 
abocado "I ostudio de este problema, y 0stnria en condici0~os de darlc Go1ucion 
p. corto plrtzo. 
Cologio de Quinieo-Farmflceuticos: El Sr. HardinG informa que se esta haciendo un 
chcquGO ;:. nivel provincial do los fnrnaceuticoG on pero. En cstn provine;':! :1O.y 
nproxin~df!.00nt(' 140 PTofcsionnlcs con nr.tividn.dcs priv~-:n.5 que C'~t2.n lie .:"c'uerrif'" 
c"m ('1 p:!.TC .. 
- 2 -
Como funcionnrios en los di~tintos entablecimicntos hospit~lnrios 5C encontrari~n 
trnhnjllndo: En Deformes 3; on QuHlotn 1; Van Buren y ho"pi tnl dE' ViTia del llcnr 
1~ mayoria. 
Los funcionarios de cstablecimientos hospitalarios son muy pocos y su auscncia 
del t.rabnjo se traduce cn poca presion sremial. La parte privada de estc Colecio 
n; In mts import"..nte. En cstc aspecto, In primera medidn hn sido reducir la jel'::n, 
dn do ntencion al publico en 2 horas, de 18 n 20 hrs. a diario. En Quillota solo 
se encuentran funcion~do las farrnacias de turno. 
Ln ndvertencia de las autoridades en relacion a medidas de cierre de farrnacias 
fue de que sertan rcquisadas y atendidas por funcionnrios farmaccuticos de la 
llniversidnd ce Chile 1!.dictos nl Gobierno. Otros modos de presion1!.r 1!. las farrna-
ci,~" pnrn quebrar el movimiento ha sido la entrega discriminada de productos rlel 
Laboratorio Chile y Chiprodal (estatales). 
En relncion a la baja asistencia a reuniones citndna por el Colegio de Quimicos-
Farm::l.ceuticos por parte de sus colegiados, el Dr. Alvayay propuso 1!. la directiva 
de dicho Colegio promover una reunion que ojala con tara con la asistencia do 1n 
totalidad de los quc nctualmente osten en paro; y vincularlos asi en forrnn m~s 
estrecha y definitivn nl movimiento. Hizo presento que los distintos profesiona-
les, en los hospitales, podrian encatgarse de rclacionar 1!. los farm1!.ceutic~s de 
dichos est1!.blecimientos. 
Se informo que, en Scntiago, cada Farmac:!a ha .:tportndo con E' 250.- ninimo como 
una formn de paliar los problemns economicos de los otros sremios en conflicto. 
El presidonte del Colegio sugirio quo 10 mismo podria renliz.:trse en esta provin-
cin. 
Trnjo informacion del Comite Coordinador general respecto a estrategia a scguir 
para endurecimiento del paro. Una de las formas seria 01 ciorre total de las P.:tr-
macias quedando abiert.:ts solo Ins de turno y on una segunda etapa el cierre seri~ 
total. Otra forma sorin el paro totnl.de funcionarios por estableeirnientos y e~ 
distintos din.s. 
Despues de un breve intercambio de opiniones, los rcpresentnntes del Colegio de 
Quirnicos-Farr.lilceuticos recogieron 1" sugerencia de no expander nrticulos c.e pe:'-
fumeria, como unn manera de endurecer, en estos momentc9, al movimiento,y de sol',-
dariznr con cl paro del Comorcio. Lo trntarinn a nivel de su Ccnscjo Provinei~~, 
Colcgio !ledico: El secret.:trio de dicho Colegio informa que de In totelidad de 
Colegiados se encucmtra trebajnndo solo el 15%. El pero de astos profesiona1,,:; e:; 
indefinido, y en ostos momentos se han retirado los turnos do emergencia; y lo~ 
de Urgoncie en nquellas roperticiones donde se hen enviado n laborar Medicos G0 
Carebineros 0 que la dotacion de medicos no plegados ~l pare se~ sufioiente pnra 
cubrir dichos turnos. Es "si como se retir"-ron los turnos de TJrgencin ,lel Ikc.p:'-
tal do Quilpue, en donde se ha producido un grnve conflicto yn que los medicc~ 
nutodenominados p.:ttriotns no han eceptado que 1" Direccion de cicho Hospital l0~ 
envie a efectuar estos turnos. 
A 10 Inrgo del pais se encucntran todos los Colegios Regionales en estns misrn~s 
condiciones, excepto el de lmtofegasta, en don de no se 2-cate el paro, debido 
principalmonto n los profesionales medicos de Chuquicamata, Quiencs ostentnn G~ 
~~rgo por cuoteo politiCO y nO por merito propio 0 concurso. 
Las modidns disciplinarias tomcdas por este Colegio h.:tci2- sus celcgiacos que h~~ 
desobedecido 01 mandato de le Asamblea, dicen relneion con: cenfoccionar una li::;-
ta c,e Ins personas disidentes que seria dada a eonocer "- todo nivel; bloqueo pro-
fesional a nivel de consultas particulares y funcionnrio. 
Al termino de este movimiento seanalizera desde el punto de vista juridico la nc-
titud nntigromial de dichos colegindos. 
1.dem';:s se ha solie1 t~,do In desti tucion de los Doctores Cord,,-, NaGel y Sn.ldonaCc 
de sus pucst~s de medicos Directorcs de Hospi telcs, en b, .... sc z. li'..S :'.cti tudcf' !'e:;;-2. 
sivns e injuriosas que h~n tcnido. 
;, nivel o'.el Consejo General del Colegio Medico sc este estu(~i"-ndo un Sumc.rio U:-J. 
centre del Director General del S.N.S. por injuri"-s, per rotencr sueldos :; por 
dL'..r orden de cnncclo.r sucldos con c.escuentos. Estn r.Jisr.1~ mcC\ida. 5e cst.:'!. 0st'...:r~iQn-­
do par"- 01 Sr. Ministro de la Snlud y Dr. Requcna, ,,-1 primere por injurins :i v;:· 
hnbcr rccorrido bospitalcs concicntizanco n cnfcrnos y rcrson~l oontr~ cl Gr0ni~ 
ncdico en l1~ro; a1 segundo, por haber cnvi~do unn. circulr1.r ordcnG.n(:'(' 1;;. cr(:::ci'~:: 
r:c brigt'.dn.s de rcegunrdc, que 8n dcfinitivn S0n r.l:'l.toncs que h:"'..n d,,-'.::':'="J CfJr.lO TS;'"..1:-
tp!.co 01 conflicto prDvoc(\do cn el Hospi tal S~n Juc:.n de Dir::;, que tr;rr.1in"~ cc>n In. 
"('T('3i ~n ,., 8 medicos. 
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C(Jl(,,·;i~' ,'(. Dcnti"t,,,,, !.c,mc".i,lI~ y C<.qtlinbo- 550 c·;l'o,-,~s, 53 en tot,,-l n::> acntaron 
orden de paro. 
Postns de UrBcncins en b~so :t los que no ~c~tD.n <?l p~.rc. 
I.ccif:n ColoGio no pnsiv~, sino P0CO publici tadn. 
Accion Cc1egiados. Se ci tnrnn al Colc6ic y catalogaron gr2.do de culpa no afan de 
represalil.l sino de justici,., para los que no estnn acatando el p"ro. Se aplicaren 
s~ncioncs de In ley. 
Frcnta "- 1,,- rcnuncia del Presidente del Ccnscjo Genorp.l Dr. Hugo Morale!': V. solo 
un "i~ple incidente en esta lucha gremial. El Consejo Genernl no ha sufridc tri-
zndllr~!:j sin repcrcusion. 
El prcblemn de les odontologos venia de antes quo so gestara. 
El Colegio de Dcntistas eo mantiene en paro no s610 por sue planteamientos gro-
lDiales (!G carnctcr 6encr~1, sino por sus prob10m~s profcsionales. 
Informnn de la reunion del Comitce Coordinndor de Ius 4 Colegios Profesionales 
de l~ Snlud, renlizada en Santiago en el dia de ~yer, en ella se planteo la ne-
cesidad do tener una rounion con todos los gremios en conflicto para coordinar 
In accion y dej~r en claro que loe 4 Cologios no persiguen otros objetivos quc 
los senalados en los 5 puntos debidamonte pub1icitados. 
" 1.- Libertad de cxprcsion Greminl en toda su extonsion. 
2.- Retiro de las querellns contra d~rigentes. 
3.- Personeria Juridica revocable sol~ por ley especificn 
4.- Fuero Greminl para suS dirigentes. 
5.- Garantia fidedigna de instauracion de las medidas que aseguren los objcti-
vos gromialos pl?~teados. 
La posicion dol Comitcc Coordinador do los 4 ColoGios es eonflictiva perque si 
no so llega a un entendimiento con 109 gremios, lamentablemente tendrian que ini-
ciar acci:mes independientemento de ellos pero sin clnudicnr en sus planteOJllien-
tos gremialos anteriormente citados. 
So suspenue In sesion a las 13.45 hrs. y se reinicia a las 20 hrs. con la misma 
asistoncia faltando los Doctores Sergio Lobo y Venezian y agregandose a olla el 
Dr. :,gustin .Ascorra. 
2.- Problema de Sueldos: Ante la si tuacion planteaca par 01 Colcgio Hccico de 
nctuar en forma coordinndn en el cobra GO sucldos, SO ~cord6: a) ~utorizar 
a los colegindos para que cobron sus suelcos c(;rrespondiontes al mos de Oc-
tubre y oficiar a sus Consejos Generales para proto star por los doscuentos 
de los dins no trabajados. No se pretonde obtener 01 paGo de oSOs dias sino 
que manifestar su disconformidad por un procedimiento que no es 01 habitual 
on las huelgas • ilsimismo se informarn de osto a los Parlnmontarios de 10. 
Zona. 
3.- Fondo de Solidaridad Grominl: So coordo oonstituir un Comiie inteGrado por 
los tesoreros de los 4 Colcgios parn eoordinar la ayu,~a que fuera nocosaria 
prostar Co lOG colegie-dos en conflicto. Por ,,1 momento se cejo ost:1.blecide 
que cnda Cologio estaba en cendiciones do resolver inicialmente estos pro-
blemas. Se acordo igualmcn1n la necesidad do crear en 01 future' un fondo de 
solir.larid;td grcmin.l corotin; materia sobre la cuel S0 ciscutio cxtonsn.mente. 
4.- llcciones on Conjunto: Se analizo la necesidad C'O enduroeer las aeciones quo 
actualmonte se llovnn a Cabo ante In posibilicad do un fracaso en Ins ges-
tiones quo realiza e1 Comito Coordinador Nacionnl. Despues de un amplio dobc-
te sobre esto problema so acorde: 
1) Efoctuar un paro total de actividades x 24 hrs. con retiro de los turne8 
y servicio do Urgoncia y cicrre total de las fnrrnacias. 
2) Este ccso total de actividados dobo ser dobidnmente publicitado para crear 
un~ prosion sicologica on 10. poblacion y romper 01 equilibrio que actual-
monte existe al darle el Gobicrno visos do nQrmalicad a nuestro me,vioien-
to. 
3) So deja constnncin que no so producirin mayor r:~n?io Q. la IJGblQ.cion en con-
sidorl'.cion a 1 •• nccion de los Cologinrtos que no han "eeptado el raro, y 
nl Plan Tridonte de las Fuorzas llr~adas. 
4) ~'l~istir tOd~3 Jas mesns dircctiv:ls de cste Comi tee .,,;1 (!i .... Viornce 3 a l~s 
10 hrs. n.1 Comitcc Co()rdinador Nacionn.l p~rn pltu1tcC!.r]r; l~ ncccsir1n.c1 ~}0 
:"'.110pt<'..r f"!stn. actitud :l nivcl nacional.En c.l C;!G(I r.c no obtenor It!. apr0ba-
~i1..'jn SP ~01icitn.rin nutorizncicn pnrn efcctuarl(·· .:. nivc:l rcCicr..:-.l. 
4 
5 ... Estr.1::1-.:ct:r \::;:1 l~:l[~ l·~~rtc:s '( parD. cfectuar csta aecion. 
5-- Asuntos Vr:.ric..s: S·::! ",,"cucrdn intcrcE'.Cl.biar informacion pcrmanentcmentc s.')b~ .. : n.ctu~ci0n{:s (10 los CrJlugiQ.(los tlurantc 01 pnro Y que puvdnn gu~rdar intcr~s 
prtr<'.. los Cull!r;i0s rcsr,ectivQs. 
So lLv"ntrt 1" s"sion :1. 1:08 21,45 hrs. 
.l'mnaM~r:l~'. B,-lrb0rn 
Sccrct:-o.ri:'"!. 
.i 
l~lvr:.ro L6p0Z 
Pr0sidcntc 
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Appendix C:Ultimatum of the Regional Council of 
Valparaiso to the Allende Government. 
23rd October 1972 . 
•• JlO.A.DUM 
................... 
(1JL'I'IKA'I'VK) ( • ~1a 4. ~lt&lo , ) 
AI. z... 1r.1'reaUoak I. la lepbUa. T .. lqSa4.e Dr. 
&U.TJDOIl .u.I.DDB OOMIIS al. ~Je hCio.al ftlpal'd ... -.&o. ...... 
tel Cel.a ."h. 4e ~ ex,...1 
~ .. AeaQl .. ~rt.1aar1. Iel.·La. .. IS I. o.~ 
lire I. Ilfa, I.. -"1000 •• T.lpae .-.leN01lpll lI.aa •• "'aU ~r 
1.- ~ al PAlO XlDtCO , .. c1 ~ •• Uao, .... 1eu4e 7.preba-
•• por el. z.lIOr01e a. ... j. o.a.ral 7 la _1Ul~. UuurUaaru .. Mf. 
... DireoUna Ie ~a o.t.ctao hC14aJUll.ea I. to4e el. pa18, reali.1e 
e1 Doa.l.Dot U 4e oature t. IHI, a. 1111016 .... apo,. • laa p.t1-
.!ollea lacit1Mo poea1al .. tel CJnaJ.e 10 haape:rtlaUo. 
1.- Qae .pe''Iua T U'" ..,. el. pe'l"rlo to ou. pm .. a 01on4a II 
111 eoaa1terea1P C. laa .1l .. r14 ..... per 410u crea1a. 
a.- ~ .,.,.. T b ... ..,. al ,LImo VIrICO Dll P~ tel 
0.-.... "e.leM1 e.. ~ ar.1a1, t. r~ .. .ua a ..... la. or-
r;u1su1oad 1N&1a1" .. ...rUe", • I. 1up Ie t.44I 01 ,.la . 
.. - QIIe ld -"t.. _ .. taM • ..au. e1 o.1I1u.. _tame;' .atH 
ttl DVISGOBDUO. 
1.- J)ZS.lUftJICJDttDN D tos JDBPIrAID. bDU T JII3DU Ell 
IIUSS'!IO PUDl.O. 
q,a. ell Tlria «. la paTe oU •• U .... aOa1ca ,G.o U 
U2'Ilau.40 a1 ,d. 10 .... 1'enllU&a .. t.oU. «. a ....... rea • 
alTa1 a1a1a\c1a1, 10 .. :1M eareo~ I. la ",lU, , .... aoarroa4o 
JwIbe ., a1aerla .. :100 ..... no .. la pe'1oalP to .. MJea lacr!, 
.. a, d .. roalo aecN t. _Ia alaao .. an1ealeo u.at..u. .apo.lal-
... to JU' laa aqenl .. reo 10 1 .. 1a4uvlaa h\al1sa4 .. , 1a .tUeU-
'ttl t.lu C. «ld .. a ~re 1a ~n.eUa 10 al...u. ...... 1elea •• 
Mlo al'Yel; la laport •• Ua I •• 11 .... ~. 1-". lUtea pab.a 4e laa 
ol.uo a..lIia_lea. ell oa.UtH .. J--- nat ... per 111 tMJloa ra1.a-
ala to .aaatn .lI'laIlUIU'II; .1 cnn 4.hrlare till la pl'e41U10U. T 
upon-.lO. 4a aIleatre .. lira, "8eelA.e 4. OIlU.- T la a.a.a~1a re1-
aaat. oa ta ••• 'a __ ._~. 
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»-1" h • ...,.t .... l •• la filM 4e prapal'So16A thllloa T ...... n ••• 
la tal,. d. heIIoftbll1ta4 t. ~ 1IU4o. __ 1 .. 4. ell aob1e~. ell 
],a Acrl.lIlltQ.l'8. la Wutrt •• e1 0Mer.t. ,. 18 JLiAuill. RlC!l108 j 
UD • .ADJIUB IlJU'l'a) PBWIO PL1I:OO DX 1'ftIOI0D8. OIl lat 'eralaoa 'Ill • 
• eo .. ~1AaaoU .. reaiatbe •••• la ~, .. ueer preuat. LA J'.u.D _ 
CUMPLIllDII'm DJa. 'Pa)QUII& n LA lDIID.AD l'OPVLl2 OR tete. aquu.. .... 
peet.. CIllo tloa relao16 .. OOlll .1 4.terloze t. auatl'8 _A.a. oen la 
latholM. ooa loa b.et'101 •• pJ'OllltUa.a a 1 .. 01 ....... larl ..... 
eo •• 1 reapeto • la 1ep1l4~,. t'1lAI .... "iaeAh ooJl el PBGaa~ '00-
Uai .... la Jl'ao16n. 
T 1 ... Uou. ....... 14al'8Z' 1 ••• 1I;Il1e1l ••• pateer 
1) :t.IlJ!.I!Al) : d: 
.) L1br. exp~UJa te lea -.41 •• 4. lntlraaolO11: PrIll" • 
... 1. T T.l •• ta16a. 
b) Libenol_ 4e preMa »-l1U ... T Ud"OAha craa1a1 •• 
0) ........ u. tel. 'btu. •• WlUZ'ceilola. ~rqlle .. laba-
to e1 '!Itado h blo!'Cellota nltari ' ... a.a •• Cl'UPO' ~.ta. 4e 
Iqa1e.r4a 0 4. Doreoh8. ,. lIOrq ... ~n.ll. 10 au .... _. 1' •• tolD 
el. pa.eble .. OhU •• pb'Il roacau4U el oJ'f.eD p~l1oo. It .. 10. rapr .. 
aen ... _ .. tel Pot.r WJ .. llt1ft .. IateD4 .... 1 ... QaMma.s...a ... 
J porqllO .'peruea Ii" la. J'J'.ll. OlAlla'" M .. 10 •• -
vUl.... ,. JNlUun .. lAIN' qae .. t&. ... .-pe!aA40 .. loa 41 •• a-
el .... , .. 1'1 ....... tn hula. 
IX) !NIt119DUhv PI Afl!!P'P" 
•• ..,1" 4a __ AI Illle8tn pr"ollploU. pel" l.a _11111 
•• la pebhoUa. 
Para paU.r aUl'S ,. "lel'Sr _ el t'lltaze .1 .1I.n .. la1oa.-
te T la alt....t •• U ........ tz.. pllOblo, .... l"HI'· ..... 1. ,.tiM •• 
• ) 0aU1o el. Illata'" tel ra-. POI" .tZ'8 .. I."", 
b) Dotoa.or 4.840 'NI'S ,. pel" 10 ...... pep te4e .1 .10 U'1:5 
la ~hJl •• 16Jl 4. pre4loa .p'u.lAIa. ,. DO OOAtlaurla aI_tra. lie ••• , 
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••• aerIe t'onloa 'T or~4ltoo oontrol.4oa 0 n1,..1 d. t04 •• b. tierra. 
pr04~.t1TS_ eXpropi.~ao. qa. r.pro_entan 10 .1 ~~ 4. 10 tIerra ara-
bl. 4. Chil., 4. 1. ooal b _,IU' pert. permensoft 1apro4~otlTll. 
Ill) INDuSTRIA Y KIN:RIA: 
!eorgsn1z.ao161l •• la. lakr •• a .. reo da flqa.!po. tioaloaa 
_ooc144/. POI' la a CGlsc1o. Pnr .. Ieul .. eorr.apon41ent.. • 
Y para CIa. al ,r04a.o~ 4. la. IndWltrlaa U.gu.e • lAt. eon-
otalda~ a treri. 4e 101 ___ alea ~r .. 1 DO a trayb 4al ... lillillllillI& 
_l"oaU a.ara T a PhOto. pohlblUvoa. :fill'S l.a gl"IJA AII.a d. IUleatn • 
.... Ia4.4aoo •• "'l~ltc.. t 
.) aa.bloa an loa lllnln.rlo. eorra.pou41~t .. POI' ~naa 
._ lUn ••• 
~) l'reaact.OUA 4. Balane. 4.. a. t.D4W1trlu ~-tQt1sait •• ; 
.) InnRl ... 1'. to •• .rpaJ.".l'. aat"! ,.1" IAap .... h. 
fa la Cutoarb Geaaral 4e la .p~1>lloo; J: 
cO W. .b eXpn'lao ..... ai_tn. De •• y_ olal"CJleDte al 
ltoa.l"lolo pera 1.8 poblJl.U. sen~l ct.l paa de lao a%p1"llplaolon._ 
ra ~11:E84a.. 1fl ... te_. l1epla •• 
Conouta • la dll4"aa{a para qu ... praruaa.lo _111"11 1. e-
uptao1c5a a reohuo a 10 "TI.l aa:n..~ AI. SOOIALISII)-. n.lda.ito q ... 
t.ber4 r .. l1sarae 4.nt%O 401 ;pba cI. ~ ttaa, • en .u tat.ote. pra-
yla aeJlsa.1t8 .1 Ooasr.a ... lenal. r .. llsazlo Jante .. .11 lao .1 ... lon •• 
4. w.rse pr6xt.. 
Ao.,tada. lAt. pn..r.o tJ"N putos do .~u. paUterla ..,1-
,..~ 0 a ... tn. la_ .... \\.~lt1aa~ T DO. 01"~ •• UI. ,are "'1a1" 
a Ai yet 4.1 1"Mt. 4e 1 .. Orpn!ftoloA •• gr-.lal.aa .. ...t'll.w pIIN la 
",140 ,.pallueUA do lu 0.\hl4a4 .. 401 paia. 
aaludan 0 lJC • ..,. -"e. T MJl 1.0. a.aU.lacwe 4. all ~l' 
o.ad4araoUn. 
coxn~ 1lIIInOWAL TauAUISl-1COWCAOUl 
tal OOLllOIO nDrco DS CHILJr 
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Appendix D: Letter of resignation from the General 
Council of the Colegio Medico of the 
three Valparaiso Councillors. 
) MEDICO DE OHILE 
/.::it:JO I-lEQIONAl 
A'::iU - ACONCAUUA 
8th January 1973. 
474. 
j{l!J:". Prebcnlall r~nullci6. a cargos de Con6le-
jerot:> (icnerales. 
tW. NU 
VALPAI£AJSO, t1 cI~ i'''l~ro de 1tJ73 
Seiior 
Dr JorgQ Alvuyuy C. 
Proj,lidenle COllbc,lo llc;.;ioliUl VaIIJ,U"uitso-Acollcuguu 
Colegio ~ledico ue Chile 
VALIIA1Ul.l::>u 
Bbtimado colega: 
En 1() 1"'1cl1l1 convJ.ct:iOll de que e1 Consejo GtHH:lral de nue .. -
tra Orden nect!61 ttl UII" j.J·ofllnda .. cc~tl"Ucturd.cj 611 4ue le permi ta agillzAr 
jiU labor a tono con 1li gruvedud de 106 problcml1o que en elitos lUomento8 
~nfrentl\ a1 Cuerpo H(;cU co de t.ouo el pa! b, heillos deci dJ.do deJar en liber-
tad de i.lcci6n nl Cull,sejo Regioulil pl1n! que. di.sponga de IlUej,ltroli cargoji tln 
al Consejo GeneJ"/d en 1a [OL"rod. que s~ elitime DI!S convcnionte para 101i fi-
lies que hemos senulado. 
I::n l:sta l"orul.1 venimo.s <:n prescntttl" Ii Ud. nueot.ra cenuncltl 
cowo Con~eJcroa Gutlers leB ell r~pr-escn lac i Oil de VuJ pu.rall"o-4coIlCl:I.gua. 
1'01' 61limo, d~eeamoo QXPl'C6Ur" a Ud. y delll~B ConsejeroAi 
nuestro6 agra.dec imi en los pOl' L" c01l1" i u liZ 11 que Giempre IIOb di~pens&ron. 
::> ... lud<tll .\ tte. a IJd. 
" 
-, ) 
Or J~l'neolo ~lund t 1<'luhmann 
Appendix E. 
Letter of Jorge Alvayay,President of the 
Regional Council of Valparaiso to the 
President of the Colegio Medico,Ruben 
Acufia att~cking him for his "non political ll 
position against Popular Unity. 24th of 
May 1973. 
475. 
Senor 
Dr. Ruben Acu~a 
Presidente 
Consejo General 
Colegio Medico de Chile 
Santiago 
Chile 
~ Dr. Acuna 
476. 
Valparaiso, 24 de Mayo de 1973 
No me extrana el contenido de tu resquesta y que, para mayor claridad, tratare 
de analizarle punto por punto. 
En 10 formal hay, desde luego,una violencia diferencia en el trato reciproco y 
basta leer ambas cartas para hacer la estimacion adecuada. No te voy a seguir 
en el camino de la injuria y llena de adjudicaiones sucios. 
Te envio me carta de 7 de Mayo del ana en curso, de manera directa y personal, 
nada menos que por intermedio de Dr. Ernesto Mundt, Consejero General del 
Colegio Medico de Chile, quien hizo entrega de ella en la Secretaria del 
Colegio Medico, recalcando que me tratara a un documento personal. 
Acusas del ulterior destino que esta carta tuvo al Consejero General Dr. Darwin 
Arriagada. Como te das caracter oficial a la carta me contestas como Presidente 
Subrogante. 
En merito a la oficializacion del tramito de la carta y que compromete gravemente 
la responsabilidad administrativa de diversas funcionarios en que hemos instrurdo 
a nuestros Consejeros Gremiales para que soliciten un sumario administrativo 
a fin de investigar la responsabilidad de los comprometidos y sancionaria en 
consecuencia. Desde luego tengo una sola certidumbre. El Dr. Darwin Arriagada, 
Consejero General y Sub-Secretario del Consejo General, es ageno a esta sucia 
maniobra, que tu tan precipitadamento me la imputa. Y como el Dr. Arriagada es 
un hombre de honor se apresuro a presentar sa renuncia. 
Con respecta a las fuentes que he tenido y que tiene el Consejo Regional 
Valparaiso - Aconcagua acerca del lamentable destino de los acuerdos de la 
convencion reciente sobre el tema Medicina Curativa y especificamente sobre 
la conduccion de las negociaciones con los personeros de Gobierno para transar 
el bono cheque p~r una orden simple, te adjunto copia de un documento elaborado 
por el Dr. Ernesto Mundt y de cuya responsabilidad, correccion y enteresa 
personal y gremial, no nos cabe duda alguna. Desgraciadamente para ti, de este 
documento se comprende una muy grave responsabilidad, la que no pueden aludir, 
ni siquiera con insultas, ni of ens as personales. 
A mayor abundamiento la Mesa presento a la consideraci~n del Consejo General la 
reduccion de las Conclusiones de la Convencion Extraordinaria de Consejos 
a 2 28 de Abril de 1973. aue termina con la si~uiente 
477. 
"En relaciO'n a todos los temas de la Convencion, se acordo facultar al H. 
Consejo General a su ..... ..... para que, conforme a las circunstancias, 
ultilise los acuerdos aprobados, teniendo como unico punto de vista, los 
intereses superiores del GREMIO MEDICO". 
'" Pero no es esto todo. Tengo un documento escrito del Dr. Arriagada que, entre 
otras cosas, y •••..••• alarmado por la conducta de la Mesa Directiva expresa 
10 que sigue : en referencia a los acuerdos de la Convencion : 
"En una de las sesiones de la Mesa Directiva, me llamo poderosamente la atencion 
sus comentarios (Dr. Ruben Acun~ relacionado con la correccion de los acuerdos 
en que expresara que "10 importante que significaba estar en la Presidencia 
para poder corregir los acuerdos con otro sentido .... ". 
Me parece que estos fundamentos son serios y que por ahora bastan para justificar 
nuestras aprehensiones y repudiar practicas antigremiales que, por desgracia, 
han llegado a constituir normas, con grave deterioro de los intereses del 
Colegio Medico. 
En contrasto con tu desorbitadaydescalificada reaccion, no mencionas en tu 
resquesta que te habiamos invitado a una reunion en la casa del Dr. Mundt el 
Sabado 5, precisamente para tratar directa y personalmente estos asuntos. 
Parece que has olvidado deliberadamente este parrafo: "En estos momentos tan 
conflictivos el buen entendimiente entre los dirigentes responsables del Colegio 
es un requisito para la defensa de los intereses gremiales". 
No es dificil colegir dada tu responsabilidad compremetida, que te hayas negado 
a .... encuentro, pero preferiste seguir te propio camino, pavimentado de 
afirmaciones gratuitas y ofensivas, y calificando intenciones. Es dificil 
acceptarlas cuando se ha estado demandando el trato directo y personal desde 
hace muchos meses entre los dirigentes responsables del sector democratico de 
los Consejos Regionales de la zona central y donde tu por desgracia has brillado 
por tu ausencia, no obstante los requerimientos de que has sido objeto. 
Te esto adjudicas una imagen demasiado benevola cuando afirmas que : "siempre 
he sostenido una sola linea! la gremial quimacamente pura !". 
Cuando nuestra jurisdiccion ha llevado un correlato sobre Politica Gremial a 
la reciente Convenci6n y ha fundamentada una teoria y una practica de la accibn 
gremial para el Colegio Medico de Chile, 10 ha hecho en nombre de nuestras bases, 
de nuestros capitulos y del Consejo Regional. La informacion basica la hemos 
entregado a la consideracion de todos los convencionales y 10 que aprobo la 
convencibn sobre la materia es categorico y terminante. El esclarecimiento de 
la conducta gremial se ha debatido publicamente, a la luz del dia y cara a 
cara en un dialogo abierto. 
Nuestro pensamiento es mi tradicional de Valparaiso, mantenido por anos y frente 
a todo tipo de gobiernos. Felizamente hay abundante documentacion sobre la 
materia. Tu posicion gremial pura tiene un solo nombre. Por cierto que 
no se llama Colegio Medico de Chile. Se llama simplemente "Ruben Acuna". Y 
el gremio esta cansado del personalismo caciquil. 
Finalmente estimas que se te amenaz~ porque he escrito el siguiente parrafo 
478. 
"Estimo que la cordura y el respeto por ciertos princ~p~os fundamentales de 
democracia interna y gremial contribuirar a que podamos entendernos. En las 
negociaciones ...•..•.... una alternativa que contradiga las resoluciones 
de la Convencion Extraordinaria, este Regional exige una Reunion Extraordinaria 
de Mesas Directivas, para analizar la situaci6n y resolver en consecuencia." 
Solo tu incurable personalismo te lleva a considerar estas razonables 
consideraciones como una amenaz.a, ya que la practica recomendada es usual 
en la vida interna del Colegio Medico de Chile. 
Tu respuesta a mi carta la leiste en una reuni6n-comida a la que concurrieron 
diversos consejeros generales, el Presidente del Consejo Regional de Santiago, 
Dr. Raul Hurtado y el Presidente de la Asociacion de Capitulos, Dr. Rene Merino. 
Esta de~as que te comunique que copia de esto documento enviare a las referidas 
personas. 
Te saluda. 
Dr. Jorge ALVAYAY CARRASCO 
Presidente 
Appendix F: Black List of Doctors in Valparaiso 
not obeying 
decision to 
their Regional Council's 
strike in August 1973. 
MEDICOS NO ADHERENTES AL PAro - LISTA NEGRA:.. 
1.- Dr. Arturo Sacith 
ASIVA: 2.- Dr. Pedro Rodriguez 
HOSPITAL VAll BUREN 
3.- Dr. Mois~~ Cerda C. 
4.- Dra. Ines.Verna G. 
5,- Dr. Guillermo Torres 
6.- Dr. Oscar Isla Q. 
7.- Dr. Carlos Hurel M. 
8.- Dr. Mario Contreras 
9.- Dr: Juveno.l Witto 
10.- Dr. Pio Del.t~a G. 
11.- Dr: Franc~sco Velasco 
12.- Dr; Carlos Bo.saure 
13.- Dra. Luz AgUirre B. 
14.- Dr. Carlos Bresky A. 
15.- Dr. Luis Ferreira 
16.- Dr. Julio ~varez S. 
17.- Dr. Roberto Watson R. 
18.- Dr. Javier Nunez(Jub.) 
19.- Dr. Rene ·GQnzalez(Jub. ) 
20.- Dr. Enrique zarate 
21.- Dr: Vicente Dagnino 
22.- Dr. Vicente Salucci 
23.- Dr.' Juan Montedonico 
24.- Dr. P:ltricio Palor,:inos 
HOSPITAL ''E. DEFORHES" 
25.- Dr. Luis .<l:6uilar B. 
26.- Dr. Carlos Contreras B. 
27.- Dr. Jorge Ramirez S. 
28.- Dr. lJ.borto Neur.1o.nn L. 
HOSPIT,U, S;J'.:TORIO 
V fJ.J' .:R!.I SO 
29.- DJ" •. Sergio Fischer P. 
30.- Dis. Bruni 4bo.rzua R. 
31.- Dr. Oear To.+houk P. 
32.- Dr. David Grossman 
33.- Dr: ,Carlos Villanueva. 
34.- Dr. Juan Horo.gas 
SERMEN;. - HOSPITAL 
DEL EHPLEtJX) 
35.- Dra. Margot Parade. 
HOSPIT,U, VB':., DEL 
~ 
36.- DJ".. Marcos Maldonado A. 
37.- Dr: Luis Hurty C. 
38.- Dr; Gilberto Zamorano 
39.- Dr. Exequiel Barrono 
40.- Dra. Ecna:~cuno. 
41.- Dra. Monico. LCniz 
42.- Dr. Rodrigo Contreras A. 
43.- Dr. Juan Jos6 Maurcira 
44.- Dr. Alfredo Tapia 
45.- Dr. Hernnn Hoena 
46~- Dr: JoeI 'Andrade U. 
47.- Dr; Hin'nan ioto 
48.- Dr. Mari~ V.~.gas 
49.- Dr. Hugo Sie~s 
50.- Dr. Francisco Acevedo T. 
51.- Dr; Ro~erto Reyes 
52:- DJ". Hernan Baeza 
53.- Dra. Aida Milinasy 
54.- Dr. Jerge QUiroz. 
55.- W::;o )bls'a:ol'" E=lIB 8"""!"'" 
HOSPITAL DE qUILPUE 
56.- Dr; Rene Graf 
57:- Dr. otto Nagel 
58.- Dr. Erich Muller 
59;- Drs. Mila Sanchez 
60.- Dr. Humberto sotono.yor 
61;- Dra. Monica Cornejo 
62;- Dr; Patricio Weitz 
~3.- Dr. Juan Suarez 
64.- Dr. Pedro Menendez 
HOSPITAL.DE PENABLANC~ 
65.- Dr. Mario Ibacache .,. 
66.- Dr. Tulio Moreno 
67.- Dr. Ramon Lopez 
68.~ Dr. Guillermo Rivero S. 
~""";Dr ~ 75 z 
HOSPITAL SAN MARTIN QUILLOTA 
, 70.- Dr. Patrici~ Rojas 
71.- Dr. Jose Garcia Rosado 
HOSPITltL DE SAN FELIEE 
72.- Dr. Alfonse Ide' 
73.- Dr. Cupertino Burcon 
74.- Dr. Claudio Drapltin 
75 •. - Dr. Ernest'.) Villablnnca 
76.~ Dr. Jose Lelas 
77.- Dr". Haria Fletcher 
HOSPITAL SAN JU,\N DE DIOS 
WS ANDES 
78.- Dr. Fernando Vargas 
79.- Dr. Luis Vergara 
80.~ Dr., Pedro Sxendro 
479. 
Appendix G:Resignation of General Councillors 
representing Valparaiso at the 
General Council's decision to 
call off the Colegio Medico strike. 
ht.h Sp.:rt.p.mhp.r 1 Q7'3. 
, COLEGIO MEDICO DE CHILE 
/ 
'" CONSEJO REGIONAL 
YALPARAISO.ACONCAGUA 
A'll. 8111AIIL 1MQ - TliLlltONO 112, 
VALPARAISO 
"!lor prea1denUt 
C»UeJo s.n.»al. 
RItF. Benunela a O&riO da oo~aJ.ro 
dal H. eonaeJo ~ral. 
Ool.eciA MMJ. __ 4a.. CI/Ula., 
~mQ9J '. 
. . . 
JIli ..... ZIIIa t.Nile .-r .. 1 ~eJo (knoral. 
._ ·la.taKa U1 d1.aJ.4e'WI.,~ant-., Aa. ~~t~ 
~ l!Ieap"peebU"...,_ta.1. OcIN .. jo BadNlAl ClllA ~ 
.anIa~ 7' ...... tN ~ _tit loa, A()J.u~IL~ ~ ~ 
--at."... ", 
.1.) JU ~ ttl6 ~Qll.~ M pl.-ino oazw.1-
.1anto de que IIlta d. 1a .ltad d. lOa ·Co~.Jo"~'lonal.. . 
•• t.b&n .;d,lendo eoJW .. r en [oraa preTia l&a baa .. para 
\InA Tu1t. al. trab&Jo. 
2) L&a ,arant1u alMpt&da. p&ra au.apeud.r 
·el pare, &1. el..la.a ... , ,J'Oducian .l:~ ~1""",~te t\a 
1.tI401a .0006.1 ... , a ."Der, .nTio d. 1.tI4iO&o1o.n.e. al proy .... 
to que .. enoontraba en 1& 0ra1Jl16n d.l Senado Y un d.ueto 
para auaentar 1.0. aran .. 1 .. d. lIedl.1nA caratiTa. 10 •• 
• x1c1a nl 1& dero,uU.,Ml c1Mre1:D -:t19 nl otro •• U) q_ 
noa p.raltl.r& tenar al.£'Ul 1D4101o de que .1 Goblerno tlen.e 
real. d •• eo ci. bWl ... r ao1"-Oion .... tr&T4a d. au nuevo 1I1n1A-
t.ro. Colltruta .. ta aod .. t1& d.l eon..jo Ganeral eon l.aa 
,.-.J.u&~.4el Clo.l.a&1.e .Jl.u.:l en .u .... t.Wo da que no 
.010 1. intern .. al. ,~1o .1 up.oto • .an:d.ieo d. r •• une-
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FOLEGIO MEDICO DE CHILE 
, CONSEJO REGIONAL 
VALPARAISO·ACONCAQUA 
AV. BRAall lUG - rEll:jlCOHO "20 
VALPARAISO 
riLoionu IIllW 1.& 101ucl6a iIta~rlL1 Ii loa .:rlolve. prob11""u 
~ue atuWn 1& at.no16n d, 1a aa.lud du La pobl.l.lo16n. 
3) Xl aeuardo contravlons 10 8stab1oclao 
.o~ politla.. t;reaUl, en la. Convenc16n d. Corde.1oa Re.:lon.a-
laa 4., J.brll d,.at. afLJ y e1 oontexto l:en.r&l d. l.a .mou .. t. 
,(w.e a.1.1al:16 para l'fIall.u.r el 'lt1ao ret.rendlllli .apecla.laente 10 .oaten1do ell ,1 tltbo ptrrUo del pltltor o. 
Kat1a&aoa qua .1 aeUlrdo en cuaat16n, 1.Dd.p.n-
41entu_nto del u.ao qu. ... le hay,. dNQ 0 lAa t.»anaroraa.e1.oJ:ula 
que puoda b&ber ~Z'16QJ)OjIterj,o.nMlAte. oenat1.tllJ"S UL.Il r"lta. 
d. 00IUt4eraa16n • loa '~~J~ a.jtlOP.&l .... lUMata.rtoe nu.a-
~ '7'" 1noOn .... ~+& 0QIl 4 polt.t1o& tr...-4a por 'ato. 
al. ~e .10 0ena2'al1 1;040' 10 . oual poc1r1a aer habllaAmt. explo-taALe pua. 4aa&OHCl tar &l crealo. 
Ooao tuI a49P~0 pOl' 1& tot&lid1L4 de J.Da 
COnalJIJ'Oa Qel1erale.~ blcbo extraord1nuio y aOPpNnd.ntu en 
1a b.1.Itorla rao-lenh de1 'OQ:auj, .. Oea..ru.- y 00lI0· 1a "Ot,aI16n 
pOl' a&,}'Ozia de TOto. lui uU'~.· uti • ...,. loa aba.jo t1rtLantea 
q~ ~ '1 Oon .. jq deq,. dej&l! " 10- I,ionuJo.e RaCl.OD&l .. en 
Ubert...4 dQ aae14)l pan If9!'lD:tV ,A~:vo.,~t&:r.1oa.81 ad 10 
aa tUl&J'en . eonyenfent •• 
Por nuatrll pUt. haoelloa, d4tada ya, entre, .. 
cie nue. tru renunolu poao eonse jaros Qaneralaa por VaJ.~r.1ao­
J.4on.a&pa Y UJlJ" .... os· ~t~ a,r~ .. o:1Jl~ pol" 1a eonf1a.n-
&& q\M'IIUAatro. lII.IUld&llte. dapo.lt.ron lin noliOtro ... 10 oual ha-
~~~~'4~ oorre.ponder an 1a .~jor toraa poalb1e. 
S~ ~';1'0 ~t:tfu4r. l.o .ah41&a .~ at.ntaaent •• 
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Appendix H:Agreement of special assembly of 
Valparaiso doctors condemning 
the call to return to work. 
7th September 1973. 
( COPU ) 
ir-~il 1 t- L t. r \ ·N( l ,"/ , 
L I' :\ j( :\ IS" 
:'C{j~mDO ASAWBLE.A. CON'SEJO RF-GIONAL VALPARAISO-ACONCAGUA 
CULEGfO MEDICO DE CHILE 
482. 
liar la uct~a~ion del Prcslde"te d~l Co~sejo General d~l Cole~io ~edico 
lile. Dr. Rubu" Acuna, p~r haber ignUadQ las 115pir~cione8 dc"la gran Iila-" 
L da lo~ Co~~cjo~ R;gionales d~l pala al aceptar una solucio" para el co"-
~ ~edico que de~i~ la imagen del c;legl0 Medico y de aus c~legiados ~l 
~lo~ nparceer co~o preoeupadoa 80lamente de lOB problemaa economico& olvi-
)se de 100 ~tras importantes problemas gresiales 1 de la gravisima 6itua-
general del p~i&. 
lrar a Ia Mesa Diree~iva del COnsejo General por haber aetuado en la salu-
del canflicto B cspaldas ~e las bas!& ~~dic~s de todo el RU£ •• 
...... ." ..... .... 
eatar la orde~ del Pre&id~~te del Ca"sejo Ge~eral de suspender 01 paro 
co y COr>tinuurlo en 1'01'''4 indefinida hasta la. salueIon de todo!» los pro-
as qu~ afcctan a ~Olii ~;jd.icos. a los o!ros grt.'IUios en .. confllc!o y 801 paia. 
g41r u!'! v~tQ de cunf"i2.nzU a 1;;:s Drs.~ia;:uel Rarros, Ernesto »undt y Horacia 
~ar>e. Con!!t:j.:rotS G.cocrul&s··e ... re.'prcse"tac·lon del COnsejo Regio.,..al Valpa-
o-AcOnea~\t por ~u brillunte actuacion en de!enaa de lOB aeuerdos de &u 
~j0 Regio ... al •.. 
... citt!; a la •. 6plnib ... PuhliCA que .. la ao~ueio" que be ha prete::dido dar a1 co .. -
to IDedic~ signifiea UAA burda maniobra politica del Gobierno para !Rvorec,r 
mage" d~ UnO de lo~ partidoa i ... tegrantes de 1~ Unidad Popular al cual per-
ce el Mi~i&tro de Salud • 
. erar 100 acuerdos tomado£ e" Asamblea a .. terlorea eft el sentldo de qu~ el 
'11cto IIH~dico solo podro. licr" solucio .. ido cuando se obserTelluna. clara eYid~"­
de qu£: al ll<.t!~ recobra Slol it\stitucionalIdad y retor"a e1 reslJeto a la COna-
., 
.cio ... y lao Lcyes" a traves de una profunda restlficacion de la po1itica del 
e1"1l0. 
EL CONSEJO REGIONAL 
.. 
Ito8 Rcu::rdos ad~ptadoa en Una Asamblea can a~iBte~ci6. de 320 colegt..dos. e,.. 
'xxwtakt~~d Iu cual oe a"ulizo e1 Acta de ayeni~iento firaada por e1 Preside" 
..:- ""- .. -~, ,1..1 ""nl~vin M~dicu <.1;; Chilo. D;. R~ben Acuna, y e1 Hi-
Appendix I. 
Letter to Jorge Alvayay from the General 
Councillors of the Regional Council of 
Valparaiso reporting on the decision to 
call off the Colegio Medico strike . 
6th of September 1973. 
483. 
MISSING 
PRINT 
leo DE CHILE 
REGIONAL 
~CONCAGUA 
TELEFONO 3716 
R A ISO 
)r 
forge llvayay C. 
ildente 
VALPARAISO, 6 de Septie~bre d~ 1973.-
:;ejo Regional Valparaiso-Aooncagua 
3gio M~dico de Chile 
5ENT:ti 
iHado cole~u y ~igol 
En la Reuni6n ~tra:)rd:inaria d.el Consejo 
ional y Gapitulos M~dicos, se !lOS 3011cit6 lIDa.. re1aci~n de los 
hos oeurridos e1 d1a 4 de Septiombre er!. el COlLSeJo General del 
ag10 M~dico de Ci"1ile, dada la enorme irl.pol"tancia de 10 tratado. 
. En la ~afiana a las 11 45 hrs. se reun16 e1 
i.Sejo G':l!lera.J.. ~Ol.!. la clsistenoia de ;).9ro::.<.ilh~alr.Gnte 12 Consejero5 
fl'es Idida por e1 Dr. RU.ben Aoufia. En esta oportun1dad COIlO en las 
;erio~ no qued6 ~raoada 1a Sesi6n y 10 6uico oficial es 1a asl~ 
leia y los ac~erdos que fueron los si~uientes, 
12. Prolongar y Ilantener el paro a nivel n~ 
mal has'Ca o!.rcen~r sd.tiai'acoionas del petitorio planteado. En es-
ti911tido y Jado e1 compromiso Qon 10 otros ConseJos Generales del 
'a de la S~~d, Ley 15.076 Colegio de Enfarmenras y FEPROTEC 
cons ider6 qua e1 presldente 11evara este aCl.~erdo en 01 oar4.ater 
so11c1tud a estes Cole~10s para que adoptaran a1 mismo aau~rdo. 
2~. Envl0 a tOd05 los Consejos Regionales 
1 pais del Pr-oyecto de Acta da Aver.i.1miento y la ~5puesta del Sr. 
uistro de Sal~d, s1 ~sta llegaba ell el dla. 
3~. Con respecto al proble~a runda£enta1 
.a &e l'sftH-ia. t1. l~ bl1squedC*. de ~aI"ant1as sa 1nsist16.. en que e1 
• ~inis tI'o de bla. en pri.loer t~r.liilno dar ;I~\.l.n.as it.ues tras de que 8.§. 
ia. tiispu.esto a 8.i\plia..r 6;( ... su inte~ridad los cO:l.promisos. &stas 
.u.e~traS dl:: runO!,I', C::OiuO fu~ defli.'ll<1o por algunos Consejeros d8b~ 
.U S9r sin u1nt;ftn cOJllprollis'o de parte del gremio y podr1an ser ~ 
-9 otras las siguientes: 
484. 
MEDICO DE CHILE 
>EJO REGIONAL 
AiSO ,ACONCAGUA 
1689 - TELEFONO 3716 
:'PARAISO 
485. 
- 2 -
4Q.Realizar 131 dla SabaQo [) de SEtptlen:br<i con 
.bilidad de con tL"luar 01 dla Domingo una Convanci6n Regional de ll.!, 
Dir~etivas de COll~ejos Regionales. 
6e l€.vant6 la sos i6n aproxinad&l:!onte a las 13 ,30 ho-
quedando el Consejo citado a las 18 P.~. en la seda del Consejo 
rr.l del Coleg!.o dG Odor .. t610~os por razonas de seguridad. 
En la reun16n e!ectuada an la tarde, en primer lugar 
BOl'premi16 01 hecho que era. Wla reuni611 wuplia de 10i Consejos Ge-
.le.3 del Area <!e IE.. Salud y en la cual sa d16 Q\!Emte. Qal Jlov~l'11en­
:re~ial por los Presidentes de los Coleglos y las couversa.ciones ~ 
.s u efectc has ta (;se l1o~ento en que se ~b1& out::ogaGCJ of'ic1.aaente 
petlciones al ~inistro de Salud, Ell esa oportun1dad S~ l"filcalc6 que 
'ur:o de los 4 Coler;:tos, ni Feprotac, vo1ver!an £11 trabajo 111entru 
'ueran satlsfochas las aspiDaciones ~ediat&s que hab1a que ~ntrar 
.altzar en fona adocuada ya que mucr..as do lan pet1cicn~5 fcrr:ula-
no podr1an se~ scluoionadas an fo~a inmedi~ta y que deb1an U8C8-
.~ente quedar en "'.n 22. plano. 
En esta oportwlidad se inEisti6 en 61 problema de aon-
.za Qn 61 cUl:';plilil.i~nto de las promesas,ya qua teniamos experiancia 
rior con una Leta firmada por 01 Ministro Dr.Juar~ carlos Concha, 
• la eua1 no s ~ cllllp116 nin~t.Ulo de los puntas. Er... as t.1;j s~utldo s e did 
'nocer los Acnerdos del Consejo ljeniral del Colagio ~~dico de la ma-
. de ese dia y se inslsti6 en que la 'tIDies. manors. dQ que se Cltwplle-
re.d icaba en el m.iS~to greJlio. 
El problema comeuz6 a producirs6 cuando al Dr.Patricio 
'a hlzo un dotallaao analis1s de la sltuao16u aatual y conslderando 
hab1a que e:lccntrar pruebas de que e1 Sr.M:1nistro estaba e.ctuando 
'OI-La a 10 conversado con e1 Dr.Acuiia, hab1a conseguido copta de 2 
JU5ntos del Mir:5,st~r10 de Salud, an qu~ se ccnsidera'ua el arre~lo .-
mico por una parte y so1uci6n parcial al problena de Medlcina CUra-
5n e1 otro De~J'etc·. En forlt1a J1uy elara ',j. h0ne.5ta da:j6 esta1'l~cido 
s1 ~sto lle::;ara a EJl.!viarse a 1£1. Cololis16n dQ S~lud dtll Senado era u-
l"l:eba avidGute que astaba autorizado paI'a ~.:llucl~llai' Iifl \:oni"licto 
los Profesionales da 1a Salud. lli1 ~sta ~entido sollal~ba publica-
e qua en Qse ~om8nto sa t0ru.ara acueret;'. en e1 santldo de suspander 
iaoriamente el paro exixtiendo compromiso verbal del Ministro de e~ 
, ~stos docnwento~. Este compromiso habr1C'~ side dado direata1i.ente al. 
.cufia. 
.8u d5 tas condiciones se suspeI~.i6 10. S~~~ ·i.OL por 10 m.1 
~ y a. ;;;cJ..icitud de algunos Consejeros qu. estimamos que un acu8rdo 
~ ~a. ~ruv(Jde:ul tfJLia que sar analizado preViCl!ueI~te por chd.:l uno de . 
CoWQjos ~narales de los Colegios de 1a Salud; por sopara.do, SEl a-
6 h~c~l' l'Buni6n t;xtraordinaria de cada uno C!e lo~ C'Jle~i.)s. 
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Despu~s de analizar la s1tuaci6n sa procedi6 a votar 
oc1.6n del Dr.Silva en forjl;.a secrata, 10 Qual dl6 11 vctos a favor 
s t;;;. idea y 9 8!1 cor~tra; en consaauenQia 91 Pres idente del Conse jo 
j facultado para pronlmciarse an favor Je la suspensi6u prov1soria 
paro s1 los documentos arwQ1zados sa ofioializaban. Esta aQuerdo d. 
llevar~e al CC 4 Y FEPROTEC para su resoluoi6n dafinitiva. 
Estos son los heahos ooncretos que aeonteeieron QU 
p,~rtunidad) pero es 1ndudable, que debemos dejar estabiaaido en QS 
IiIlato algu.u.vs heehos que son reaaQntQ contradictorios con la realI 
naeiooal :I fe l"cfiel'e al hoioll!ho i.n£!w1abl& que hubo nuchos Consajeros 
votaron an contra du la flpiui6:u cla los CUl1SejO;3 1\ugion.u.les qua rQ-
Glltan. :v COlUC 6 ;·:i~ t8 .w.turahltillt~ la dud3 do :i.u rupresantatividu.d 
d~l pU.i.1S&.r111unto cldaouado de l~ basQs QZ'O_w05 q.\lG DO podamos perte-
r ~l Consojo G~1r.er,\1 en estas circunstancias, pOl' 10 eual debemos 
un imperativo de con~ieneia r-sllllnciar a nuestros ca:-gos de Conse-
s Generales, que el Con.sejo Regional que Ud. preside nos confiara 
O1ll8UCOti de taJ:.i.ta cS:·i.ls(;eruldilcia pal.'d r.Lu.os tf'O pais, tau severwr.ante 
:lZ5.do con li.!. i,-~eolo~lCt y la p:L'actica marxista. Greerr:os haber aum-
o desae .D.uestro sitio art que se nos dasign6 y s610 en esta forma 
5 actuado desd~ que se iniaiara nuestro :mandato, con pleno poder ; 
esentatividad del eonsejo Regional y de la~ bases m~dicas con las 
as homos estado en perlllanertte conta.cto en las lI16.1tiples As at:lbleas 
izadas en as te ~on.i·lic;to gl'emial. 
Agl'l:1deuel'1Os sinu81'Wuente la l.mestrb. cie confianza que 
~la aido \)"t;vl·~::"U~ d 11I"..:..nte este llli:.l.ild",to y qU~d<Ul0S a vues tra enters. 
os ici,~n po.r~ ::;e~u.il' trabajando por 1<.1 co~plet<l soluci6n de los PX2. 
9.S nacionale3 'lti.e CO:tlO oiudada..Ylos y CoXl~") I.Jrofes ionales tenel!los Ie. 
gaci6n de conCitH1Cia de cooperar en la. sol.uai6n dai'initiva. Relt.!:. 
5, que los p.!.'oulc4.\as de indole econ.6lliico~ por leg1t1Eos e iLpotan-
que :;;~a.Li, lw iJUbUtln ;;,81: t;.L~allSd.d05 'pOl' los pl'inaipios enunciadca en 
c1 cutat;61'ica 'pot' la E:n.cuesta reallzada a ldvel naoional y que fu.§ 
latafol'~ila de lUella desdd ,-!ue CO.illell2.6 nUeSl..l'O CCl1i"i.icto • 
. SiLl ot.r'o j;J.!1rticular, saltldamos ",tte. a Ud. y dellt.s 
?.:; ~r-os • 
DR.bU~UEL BARB0S B. DH.hORACIO BRtJZZONE F. 
Appendix J:Letter of the Executive Committee 
of the Colegio M~dico to some 
New York doctors replying to their 
fears for the safety of Left wing 
doctors. 
24th January 1973. 
;UJ. ',:; lU J.L:;"ilUU u,; Ulll.L (:( :.J 
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1JUc:rO~US Dl::L 
u':>?Ad'l'AJ.J.::iT'J:O .i-':~ Gt.LUD 
,)!:: LA ClunLD DE 
llUJVA YWK.-
Con respecto a eu c::.rta del 17 do "neL'o tie 1974, 
debemos puntu:llizarles 10 siguiente: 
1 0.- Estamos absolutamente de acuerdo que unO. de 
los propOsitos de la profeGi6n medica es la 
de defender la vida de sus conciudadanos,especialmente de sus co-
legas, 1ndepeniientemente no s610 da su color politico, sino que 
tambien religioso y racial. li:s 10 que ha hecho el Colegio h!edico 
de Chile permanentemente y muy en especial durante el regimen mal'-
xista el cual llev6 ala hambruna y a la angustia~ la inmensa ma-
yoria de los chilenos, y a la persecusi6n y la muerte de muchos de 
nuestros cmapatriotas. 
Asi se 10 representamos ptiblicamente a las maxi-
mas autoridades de nuestro pais en repetidas oportunidades. 
Ustedes han de saber que esta gravisima situaci6n 
nos condujo a tomar la grave y responsable decisi6n de efectuar 
prolongadas huelgas, a las ~uales adhirieron el noventa por ciento 
de los medicos y a las que se sumaron todos los otros grupos labo-
rales del sector salud. Le acompanamos copia de las cartas publi-
blicas que nuestro gremio le d1rigi6 al Doctor :';alvador Allende G., 
donde ustedes podria'l 1nfQrmarse de algunos de los problemas que 
afrontabamos los medicos y todos los chilenos. 
En ese tiempo no supimos que las Asociaciones por 
ustedes representadas manifestar~ el menor interes en defender a 
los 6.000 medicos chilenos gravemente afectados por la persecusi6n, 
el sectarismo, el odio y la violencia fisica y verbal marxista. Hu-
bo muchos medicos vejados por la prensa cOlllunista en forma injusta 
y canallesca, otros fueron golpeados salvajemente 0 exonerados de 
sus cargos por causas politicas. Los libcales del Colegio Medico en 
Santiago y concepci6n asaltados y destrozados por turbas fanatic~s 
diri~idas por colegas marxistas. No supimos de ninguna interven.,.,·· 
ci6n de ustedes en esa epoca en apoyo de lo.s derechos himanos que 
eran pisoteados a diario por ese regimen nefasto. 
20._ Con respecto a los medicos a que ustedes ha-
cen referencia 
a) El Doctor Sergio Infante ;101dan, ex Director General del Sel'vi-
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cio IIacional de :3alud, no ests. detenido, por 10 quecsabemos, cs-
taria asilado en una Embajada. 
b) Todos los dems.s que ustedes mencionan fueron detenidos con pos-
terioridad al pronunciamiento militar que nos liber6 del marxis-
mo, movimiento que solo se realiz6 despues de agotadas todas las 
posiblidades Constitucionales y con el pais paralizado por la 
protesta de sus fuerzas vivas, que vcian venir una dictadura to-
talitaria 0 una guerra civil. 
Esto es un buen ejemplo para ustedes de que en 
la conciencia del pueblo chileno II freedem and life are sacl"ed ". 
Todos los m~dicos que ustedes mencionan son res-
ponsables de haber perseguido a sus colegas cuando estaban en el 
poder, de destruir los organiamos de salud del pais, transformando 
nuestros lIospitales eficientes en sitios donde reinaban el odio, 
la violencia y elsectariamo, desabastecidos de medicamentos y de 
todos los elementos m!nimos para trabajar. Este signific6 numero-
sas muertlopor falta de tratamiento adecuado. Con posterioridad 
al 11 de Septiembre, los dirigentes Gremiales del Colegio Medico 
pudimos descubrir numerosos Hospitales clandestinos, repletos de 
instrumental y medicamentos que hubieran salvado tantas vidas si 
hubieran estado disponibles en nuestros centr~s asistenciales. 
Los Hospitales clandestinos junto a los arsena-
leo ocultos, incluso dentro de los Hospitales, son una clara de-
mostraci6n de que las autoridades del regimen marxista se prepara-
ban para la guerra civil, desastre del que todo el pueblo chileno 
estaba consciente. 
Esto s! era un motivo para h:rrorizarse, pero 
ustedes se mantuvieran en ~ilencio. 
Chacabuco y la Isla Dawson son carceles habili-
tadas por las actuales autoridades, donde lOB presos tienen todas 
laB garantias, como ha side comprobado por la Cruz Roja Interna-
cional y numerosos organiamos extranjeros que los han visitados y 
han emitido informea imparcialea. Kadia ha aido torturado, aegUn 
10 han conatatado loa medicoa que atienden estos recintos y 10 han 
corraborado aquellos presoa que deapues del proceso judicial han 
recuperado 10. libertad. Es que uatedes no saben que el Poder Judi-
cial mantiene au total independencia de 10. Junta de Gobierno? Ig-
noran que los procedimientos judiciales, los jueces y los Tribuna-
les siguen vigentes y constitu!dos por las mismas personas ? 
Los medicos que ustedes mencionan estan siendo 
sometidos a procesos por la justicia militar, de acuerdo con la 
Constituci6n Y las Leyes chilenas, y deberan, responder por los 
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cargos fundados que se 1es han formulados, entre los cuales e~­
tan los que anteriormente hemos res&lado y que tanto dano Ie cau-
saron a 1a salud de nuestro pais. 
Jll. Colegio 1.jedico mantiene su independencia y 
libertad. Vela por e1 estricto cump1imiento de nuestras normas 
constituciona1es y legales vigentes y esta atento a los procesos 
que afectan a sus co1egiados. 
Nuestro pais esta ampliamente abierto a cualquiel' 
extranjero de buena voluntad que desee venir a informarse fehacien-
temente de todos estos hechos. Co1egio Medico estara gustoso de 
recibir 1a visita de a1guno de ustedes, pues estamos ciertos que 
e1 conocer nuestra dolorosa experiencia sera de gran valor para 
que puedan opinar con la objetividad que deben tener siempre los 
medicos. 
3°.- llepresentamos a ustedes nuestl'a formal pro-
testa p~r 1a Ultima frace de su carta. No 
aceptamos que ningnn grupo extranjero, menos una instituci6n pu-
blica, nos conmine a actuar en ninguna forma. Tenemos 160 anos de 
vida independiente y rechazamns con altivez su tone insolente, de 
afiejo corte colonialista, que constituye una clara intramisi6n en 
nuestros propios asuntos. 
Dr. RaUl Donckaster R. 
VI C..:l-PilESIDBNTE 
Dr. Hugo ..ialvestrini j,{. 
Presidente 
Dr. Osvaldo Artaza ,i . 
.5ECllL'TA...lIO GEUErtAL 
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Appendix K:Declaration which ex-Popular Unity 
doctors had to sign in the presence 
of examining doctors of the Regional 
Council of Valparaiso. 
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DECLARACION 
Slendo 1es •••• hor,.s del <He. ••• de •••••• de 1974 oon· 
ourre e prester declarac16n ante e1 Investlgeclor susorl to. ml embro de la C. 
lIll:.ll6n de Etloa del Consejo Recion!'1 VAlpera{so-Aoonoagua del colel';lo ~'~(11-
co oe. Ch116. el Dr. 
• .1u1en b'!jo p-romes!I de decir Is verd,,{ 
o eolarl.! 10 o13ulente: 
1.- PRIDTJNTA: l. Es erectly'! 111 denuncls forlllull,da por e1 capitulo "Mlco de 
Sll Hnspltr.:l en el sClltlcb ite que Ud. he desobedecldo ls 6roon gremlol 
d'lo8 por e1 celeslo l-T(.dloo de. ~;II~pel1der Ins Activl(1.,dee funclonllrll1s y 
prlvada3 eu apoyo a ex1r.:f'ncl~s e;-rerulBles plllnteadas 61 supremo GohlerllD' 
4'::!U. 
,~'cOLEGIO MEDICO DE CHILE 
CONSEJO ItEGIONAL 
VALPARAISQ.ACONCAGUA 
AV ....... ,l leeD - rElEFONO 112. 
VALI'ARAISO 
.-. 
- .-
"'. - PREGLTl"·J}'A: LU~I!;O de:. COliC ccr tl:ltas dl!:lpo->liclones " I;sta c1isPLH::;tO "' 1!18ll-
t~&r au actitud d6 ·c1e"obedi • .rJoia <J &u colee!:io prote.::!ional ? 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
FirillB Dbclarante 
.................. 
VALP.AiL\I.;iO ••••• de .•••...•.... de H174. 
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Appendix L :Letter from alawyer to the Regional Council 
of Valparaiso complaining that the General 
Council had quashed sentences passed 
against the strike breaking doctors by the 
Regional Council of Valparaiso. 
4'J~. 
o EWING G. 
~ DESERTI ,~ . ..1./\ L YUSEFF ()' 
OGADOS 
; • CAsILL~ee 
LPARAI1 
GgJJ~;:;~tado ., ....•... --..••.. -
Valpar-aiso, 14 d e.iJ1i:cieJ.!lbre 1974. 
M' ~~ Sr~:. 
11 v n. C J! J: ,~"1.~ Ii...- i; nal del 
, .. _,. .\'w ., .. "-.' 
~01eFl0!rul~lc0 deChile 
. "-Pres G2-1t r::. 
Ref.: Sus·,~ensi'~lJ c1ras. Docie v Avso-
10ffiovicl::.; fl:"tllosdelH_. C',)llse jo. 
Las sentenci8.:3 dict[lE1a~; en 108 SUllW,-
rios del rvb:r-o, por nO'acata!l1iento delparo mecJ.icb, en que 
se suspehdi~ porquince dia3 a a~b~s profesiQftales, no fueron 
apelaclas, q v et\ar'on. firmas y debe-J\ cumplirse, "era, a.u.n 
no 6 e. ha noti fic~d() al e~pl e~dor de c:iichas prcfesdonales, 
elServicio N. deSa}ud~ Procede, enconte~, ~fici2r 81S.~.S.J 
lOf1;::tl, Val:pct:r~i so, p~r,'l. el cumpliruiento de ambos fallos y 
a las afecta.(ias pax-a que tBten il\foY'iiJ.<)cLts de 10que expre;~a 
e] H~Con8ejo. I 
A fin de que la .suspe.ns:icSn corra. en fo{'.~a que. 
haya el menor t:r-CJsForno posible en los S(: lvl.cios del~.i;.S., 
y a fill de day' t ieillpo a est e, p8r8 or~ani~ar las supl encL~s 
y notif:icaciones lit -atnbas pro,fesi·:.Jllalesy·a sus respectivos 
servici06 eo que ~t; ienden, insirH1.0 que el Consejo tOl!\e un 
;~el~el'do ':'" eJ :etmtio.o de Que dichas s;lsDensior:es carren 
desd e e1 1 0 al 15 de,e,ner~; ~b[l.s fechas - in.clusi V(-G, 0 bien, 
desde ~l 16 a1 30 de En~:r-o, iB.thbien ir ..clusives, la al tcrna-
tivo que ~ejor parezca al li.Conseja • 
• 
Acompalio unpnoyecto de oficio <ll~.l'.S. sabre 
oe.l pa.rt iculEtr'. 
Copia de estos oficios se enviaria a las dra~. ' 
Bocie ~ /-I\;so10!n
'
J,ricl-.., y copia t RI1lbien sedej~rf.a ei c;:rdtt Ullo 
de los res.p~ctives e~p'edientes.-
Ha,ouso de esta oportul"ttCll:lcA .para plGntear al 
H.Cof)se.jo,una. inquietud que flle ha aS2tltado a ~i reaeso deJ. 
I EWING G. 
DE;BERTI B . 
. YUSEFF S. 
)GADOS 
• CASILLA 366 
PARAISO 
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leB, por un me~..;, 0 mas, hasta s eis m.eses, el H.ConsejoGene-
x'al, hasta el mOalento, ha·r-evocado todos los fallos queha 
eotrail.il a conocer y l1a swtitu1do la pene.. de suspensi6n, por 
multa 0 censura 0 a,rnonestaci6n;, ni(\ltuna susrensi6n ha quedado 
en pie.-
Con esto s el H.Consejo, atenc.ido el nuruero de sen-
tenciBs mo(lificadas, ha dado a entender HI H. ConsejoRegional 
deValpararso, que no est~ de acuerdo can los fallos dictados 
por estimarlos e:r.cesivarnente severos j a.!:1orc1, nos er..contr8.lllos 
con q~e las dos profesionales a las cuales se les aplic61a 
sa.nciOl\ men-or ---dentro del concepto de 1a suspensi~--- han 
C}.uec1ado COlt 1 a sa.nci6f1 [uayor, pues so·n las unicas susrer..didas 
ha~ta In fechEl; m~s ~un, las profesiunales que no respetaron 
el !allo del Consejo Regional y apelaron (en BU rerfedto dere-
cho per 10 demas) quedan wejor que las das profesiJDales que 
S1 respet~ron la decisi6n del H.Consejo (tambi~n en su per-
fecto dere~ho de h~cerlo) 
E6t a. injust fi situacion sbbrevinient e, tendr{a 
una, eoluciofl. que, debo reconocerlo, no e~lenterRili.ente leg.al, 
aunqve G { eshumana: qye.l aon.Conse j.o ReJional, l!ioc1ifmque 
su fa.llo de suspensi6n a las ... dras •. Bucie y Avsolomovich y 
10 SlJstituya por :nulta, censura, 0 bien, otra alternativa, 
Que declare qlJ.e ambos fallos suben"'en eonsulta tl al Hon. 
Con.se jo General p<.3.ra que ~ste deeidalo que e1st:iiiile oportuno. 
8i el H.Con~ejo·desea adoptar este acverdo, 
Ie a,~adecere r;lE loexprese y les:edf··ctare un&. pr·oyectm.:5de 
resolucion c()mple!!\erl\tar~ 0 mod±ficatoria, o··de eonsulta en 
su c aso. Igua.llOent e en ef':.to s e'Vento s, no se not ificnr1a ni 
oficiariR al Director Zonal deSalud, hast a que una nueva 
resoluci6n fiI'Wl~, e~)tableciese el camino R s.esuir. 
S:;luda atte. al·H.ConsejoH'-.~ional 
Appendix M:Notification by th~ Regional Council of_ 
Valparaiso that it had suspe~ded Drs. 
Bocic and Asolomovich from practising 
medicine.These doctors had not obeyed 
the strike call in August 1973. 
PRCiYECTO de <)ficio PHI', llutifie[1I' 'al Di]' ,,::etor 
del S.}~ .. S. '\lasnsllensitjll,de IRS dras.Bueie y 
Avsoloaovieh 
S t; deja un,l eopia del of ieio f paI'R cada expe-
diente OS\lmflrio~ 
.. 
Vr, In r:,' '., l~SO' \.... 1 <. j (. , a.'. . . 
En lossuillaI'.~os se!~,uic,os ante este COi,:i.0jo 
L.n81 ;~: elCole,:io l,iedico, de""hiJe, en contr~; de Ian dr8s 
s.Nino::.~-:-a Docie Cruz~t.y •••• . Avsoloirlovicl-.i.. Calle:j.R., 
dietS sentenciRsuspen~ieridolu~ del ej~rcic~) prufecional, 
[t\'~a Uli~l. ~ eell as, Tor ~5 . alas curriq.0 $. 
El :fu110 no fue apelado y se e euentra 
c:e. 
Er::. su u1~i.illa reuniol:, '81 Conseju tu~,;o 
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Appendix N:Letter from Valparaiso doctors to J.Alvayay 
on the occasion of his resignation as 
President of the Regional Council of 
Valparaiso.29th October 1974. 
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Appendix O. 
Letter from Jorge Alvayay giving his 
reasons for resigning as President 
of the Regional Council of Valparaiso. 
20th November 1974. 
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Colegio Medico de Chile 
Consejo Regional 
Valparaiso - Aconcagua 
N Senor 
Dr. Jorge Aguirre Julio 
Presidente 
Consejo Regional Valparaiso-Aconcagua 
Colegio Medico de Chile 
Valparaiso 
Estimado Sr. Presidente, 
498. 
Valparaiso, 20 de Noviembre de 1974 
En mi poder su communicacibn del 18 de Noviembre del ~o en curso sobre la 
materia del rubro. 
Agradezco muy sinceramente el contenido de esta comunicacitn, que largamente fue 
sobrepasa en mi quehacer gremial pasado, presente y futuro. Ciertamente vuestros 
sentimientos estan dictados por la genorosidad espiritual de Ud. S~lo me resta 
ponorme a la altura de aquellos. 
La distancia es una buena receta para lograr un positivo cuestionamiento de 
si mismo, 10 que permite justipreciar con cr~t~ca serena y equilibrada los 
aciertos y los desaciertos, las grandezas y las miserias, que de una 0 otra 
manera uno ha protagonizado, tanto como actor. Gustosamente aportare con toda 
modestia la asesoria que sea menester, pero, como queda ya establecido, respetando 
la distancia que la estimo fecunda e indispensable para los delicados momentos 
que se vive. 
Como no se trata de meras palabras, me tomo la libertad de comenzar a ejercer 
desde luego tan honroso, como significativo cargo. 
10. HOSPITAL E. DEFORMES que yo sepa, tan delicado asunto aun no se ha resuelto 
en los t€rminos que deja establecido una conversaci6n directa entre el Consejo 
Regional, el Capitulo Medico del Hospital Deformes y el Director del SNS., 
Dr. Darwin Arriagada, y de cuya conversacion se redact6 un memorandum, firmado 
por los anteriormente mencianados y enviado al Dr. Arriagada. No se ha cumplido 
con la rectificacion del Acta de la Intendencia en 10 que dice relacion con la 
posibilidad de construir a futuro, en los terrenos del Hospital Van Buren, 
mediante el sistema "reversar". Tampoco se ha cumplido, por parte del Capitulo 
Medico del Hospital Deformes, de la entrega de los proyectos y aspiraciones que 
dicho Hospital tiene, a fin de seguir funcionando en forma adecuada, documento 
indispensable para una visita del Jefe del Departamento Tecnico del SNS. Dr. Grey. 
20. SUMARIOS DE NUESTRA JURISDICCION : He sido informado por el Dr. Javier 
Valenzaela que 2 sumarios incoados por traici6n al gremio en contra de los 
Drs. Rios y Moena tuvieron un sigular destino en la apelacion entablada por 
los afectados ante el Consejo General ya que ambos exhibieron en su defensa 
cartas de recomendacion ; el Dr. R[os de parte del Dr. Tornvall y el Dr. Moena 
de parte del Dr. Sergio Munoz larranaga. El Dr. Rfos fue absuelto por la 
unanimidad del Consejo y el fallo del Dr. Moena quedo pendiente. 
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Este hecho, a mi juidio, es de una inaudita gravedad. Hay que tomar en cuenta 
que estos sumarios se hicieron a peticibn de las numerosas Asambleas sostenidas 
antes del 11 de Septiembre de 1973, y las denuncias fueron concretado por los 
respectivos Capitulos, tanto del Hospital Valparaiso como el de Viaa del Mar, 
Capitulos a los cuales pertenecen el Dr. Tornvall y el Dr. Sergio Munoz Larranaga. 
Esta demas comentar todo el immenso trabajo e ingratas alternativas que la 
tramitaci~n de estos sumarios le han significado al Consejo Regional, a los 
Consejero Sumariantes, a los Abogados del Departamento Juridico y a los propios 
Capitulos. Es desmoralizador y repudiable que por un sentimentalismo mal enten-
dido, en una instancia tan grave como es la apelacibn de un fallo emitido por el 
Consejo Regional de la jurisdici~n, dos colegiados de una 0 otra manera 
se hicieron solidarios de las denuncias en contra de las actividades antigremiales 
de estos medicos, a la postre se transformen en sus defensores. La autoridad del 
Consejo Gremial no puede ser vejada, ni humillada tan gratuitamente. Como ex-
Presidente del Consejo Regional yo protesto airadamente de esta conducta, ya 
que, como le consta a los Consejeros, no me retire de mis actividades presiden-
ciales hasta que estos sumarios no estuvieron totalmente tramitados y cada uno 
de ellos lleva mi firma. 
Tiene tanta gravedad esta incre{ble situaci~n, que me permita sugerir que 
ambos hechos sean puesto en conocimiento a los Capitulos respectivos. 
30. CONDUCTA DEL DR. GERMAN DAZZARELA : En los 6ltimos tiempos de mi gesti~n 
presidencial tuve que desgraciadamente, constatar que la indispensable cohesi~n 
colegiada del Organismo maximo de la Orden de nuestra jurisdiccion se habia 
perdido. Los sumarios y su tramitacion con sus respectivas sanciones fueron 
talvez la causa determinante m~s importante para originar esta ingrata situaci6n 
en el seno de nuestro Consejo. Sumarios en plena tramitacion eran conocidos por 
los afectados y daban margen a toda suerte de infundios destinados a socabar 
la autoridad moral del Consejo. A titulo de ejemplo me permito acompanar diversas 
comunicaciones desde el area de Vina del Mar que, confirmando anteriormente 
expuesto, ya que otras pruebas han sido y son dificiles de exhibir. 
Los referidos documentos vienen del area de ViU(a del Mar y donde taxativamente 
se senala al Dr. Dazzarela como el informante responsable de las resoluciones 
contenidas en los respectivos sumarios. Es conveniente destacar que dichos 
sumarios, en aquel entonces aun no habian terminado su tramitacibn, no estaban 
fallados definitivamente, y por consiguiente, ten(an el caracter secreta que 
la Ley obliga a respetar. 
Si esta situacion ha sido grave, mucho mas 10 ha sido la situacitn creada al 
Consejero Dr. Ivo Sapunar con motivo de la creacion de Centros Medicos en nuestra 
zona. En este aspecto el Dr. Dazzarela ha faltado gravemente a las mas elementales 
obligaciones morales que contrae un Consejero para con su Consejo y cada uno de 
sus integrantes. Esta situaci6n ha sido protagonizada en el Hospital de Vina 
del Mar, llagando el Dr. Dazzarela, incluso, a tomar ella iniciativa para 
denostar la autoridad moral y la dignidad del Dr. Sapunar. 
Estimo tan grave esta situaci6n que pienso que el Dr. Dazzarela debe renunciar 
a su cargo de Consejero, ya que su presencia vulnera muy seriamente la autoridad 
del Consejo y la armonia solidaria que debe existir entre las bases gremiales y 
los dirigentes. 
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Lamento muy sinceramente tener que empezar a pres tar mis serV1C10S de asesoria 
en esta forma. Pero estos motivos y otros fueron los factores mas importantes 
que me impulsaron, a nivel local, a presentar mi renuncia como Presidente y a 
retirarme del Consejo como Consejero. La causa gremial se puede servir desde 
muchos puestos de combate. Nadie es indispensable e insustituible. Pero no se 
trata de problemas de personas. Se trata de principios y practicas gremiales 
que comprometen una escala de valores. Si esta escala de valores es vulnerada 
las instituciones se pudren. Y en este momenta situaciones semejantes no 
deben ser toleradas. 
Saluda atentamente a Ud. 
Dr. Jorge Alvayay Carrasco 
Appendix P. 
Letter of Ernesto Mundt to the 
President of the Regional Council 
of Valparaiso giving his reasons 
for resigning as General Councillor. 
29th December 1974. 
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Senor Presidente 
Dr. Jorge Aguirre J. 
Consejo Regional Valparaiso-Aconcagua 
Colegio Medico de Chile 
PRESENTE 
'" Estimado Senor Presidente : 
502. 
Valparaiso, 29 de Diciembre de 197 
La presento tiene por objeto hacerlo llegar m~ renunc~a al cargo de 
consejero general con el cual el H. Consejo Regional Valparaiso-Aconcagua 
constituido en 1971 decidio honrarme y en el cual fui confirmado por el 
H. Consejo constitu[do en 1973. 
Esta resolucibn la he tornado despu~s de una larga meditacion y de hacer un 
instance de mi actuacion y de la situaci~n actual. He llegado al convencimiento 
de que la mision para la cual fu{ elegido esta cumplida y que ahora nada mas 
tengo ya que hacer. Por eso es que Ie doy a mi renuncia el caracter de 
indecl (nable. 
Fui al H. Consejo General a trabajar por la ca{da del regimen marxista de 
Allende. En ese sentido represent~ siempre, fielmente, el sentir de nuestro 
Regional. La accion mancomunada de todos los sectores civiles involucrados 
en la lucha permitio crear el ambiente necesario para que las Fuerzas Armades 
dieran el paso que libr~ a Chile del Marxismo Internacional. Dentro de esta 
accion el gremio medico puede honrarse de haber estado en las primeras filas. 
Los reveses parciales que tuvimos que lamentar en diversas ocasiones no se 
debieron a falta de empeno sino a que las circunstancias fueron superiores a 
mis fuerzas y capacidad. 
....... Acepte la presidencia del H. Consejo General el dia 8 de Septiembre del ana 
pasado conciente de las condiciones particularmente deficites, graves y 
riesgosas que imperaban. Despues del pronunciamiento militar lleve al Consejo 
por el camino de la mas sincera y leal colaboracion con el nuevo Gobierno para 
la recuperaci~n del pais, sin preocuparme de las criticas que ella me atraia 
de algunossectores minoritarios del gremio. 
Por desgracia esta sana y patri~tica intencibn se vio entorpecida porque 
elementos del pasado regimen, quiz~s por poseer mayor sagacidad, quizas porque 
se vieran favorecidos por compromises de mayor contenido afectivo que racional, 
lograron introducirse en el Ministerio de Salud desde donde pudieron neutralizar 
nuestros sanos propositos. El decreta de Arancel de Tecnologos, dictado por el 
Ministro Spoerer sin ningun estudio previo y sin el mas minimo conocimiento del 
Colegio Medico, es una buena demostracion de como la influencia marxistoide, 
que siempre atento contra la profesion medica, logro exitos en esa secretaria 
de Estado. 
La reforma tributaria anunciada por el Ministro ya mencionado, que no se 
materializo, y la suerte corrida por el bono compensador, sobre 10 cual se 
habia llegado a un acuerdo completo con el Ministro Herrera a pesar de todas 
las interferencias provenientes del mismo Ministerio, dejan la sensacion de 
vernos retrotraiooo:;: a 100:;: r;pmn()c: rlp 1;:, TTnirl;:,rl P"n"l~,.. an ~.,t-a,..~., ,l~ ~,..~~~,l~_ 
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Por otra parte, el inconcebible retorno del Dr. Ruben Ac~a al Consejo General, 
representando a Punta Arenas, despues de haber sido separado de su cargo por 
Santiago a raiz de la claudicaci6n del Consejo General que el presidfa, 
contraviniendo la voluntad de la mayor1a de sus mandantes, y la incalificable 
inconsecuencia del Consejo Regional Santiago en el sumario posterior contra 
dicho consejero, sumada a una serie de otras actitudes irresponsables de dicho 
Regional, demuestran que muchos de nuestros dirigentes, apernados en sus cargos 
por decreto gubernamental, no estan en la l{nea patriotica de la reconstruccion 
nacional. 
Estas y otras muchas actitudes explican perfectamente bien la falta de confianza 
que el actual Senor Ministro de Salud parece tener por los dirigentes gremiales 
medicos a 10 largo del pais. En la reunion que tuvimos con el el dia 18 de 
Noviembre del ana en curso y a la cual Ud. tambien asistio, esto quedo bien 
demostrado. Su malestar por la actitud del Consejo Regional Santiago 10 encuentro 
absolutamente justificado, conociendo muy de cerca la irresponsabilidad con que 
proceden sus consejeros. El Senor Ministro dio a entender con meridiana claridad 
que el solamente se entenderia con la Mesa Directiva del Consejo General. Dadas 
las circunstancias, 10 entiendo perfectamente bien, honradamente, no le podrra 
relatar su proceder. Sin embargo, ella me hace sentirme como un consejero mas 
que ocupa un asiento en torno a la mesa sin una labor concreta y positiva a 
realizar y a la misma altura de aquellos que, traicionando la voluntad 
mayortaria del gremio y la gran causa de Chile, acordaron en una votaci~n, 
cobardemente secreta, transar con el Ministro lagos y poner termino al paro 
medico en los momentos m~s cruciales del movimiento civil en pro de la libertad 
de la Patria. Un cargo honor[fico en esas condiciones no 10 puedo aceptar. 
En nuestro Regional las cosas tampoco est~n bien. La unidad y pujanza que 10 
caracterizaron se han trizado. Por otro lado, las autoridades competentes 
de Gobierno tadavia no se pronuncian ni a favor ni en contra de los tres 
candidatos que les fueron presentados hace varios meses para llenar las 
vacantes dejadas por los Drs. Gonzalo Garcia Valenzuela, Walda Vidal y 
Jorge Alvayay. En esa forma ya no me sienta representante de la mayoria del 
Consejo Regional. 
A todo 10 anterior debo agregar razones de indole personal, que tambi;n han 
influido en mi animo para renunciar. 
La movilizacion a Santiago se ha hecho m~s dificil. 
Ello me complica para el cumplimiento de otra funciones que debe realizar un 
consejero general aparte de asistir regularmente a las sesiones ordinarias 
del Consejo. si a eso se une la indisciplina de los consejeros, que llegar 
atrasados a las reuniones a que no concurren a dar el quorum necesario, puede 
Ud. imaginar el tiempo precioso que pierdo sin trato alguno. 
;remialmente me estoy perjudicando sin finalidad util alguna. Las bases ya no 
:olaboran como 10 hici~ron tiempo atras pero nos critican por falta de informa-
:ion. Por rna parte nada puedo hacer para evitarlo. No puedo seguir haciendo de 
'colchon" entre las autoridades de Salud y los Capitulos y tampoco puedo decir 
>Gblicamente 10 que ha ocurrido en el Ministerio de Salud durante casi un a~o 
~n nuestra presencia. 
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Cientificamente me he perjudicado. Ha llegado el momenta de reclamar para mi 
el derecho de volver a los libros para renovar mis conocimientos tecnicos. 
La grave cris~s producida en la Escuela de Medicina de Valparaiso me obliga a 
preocuparme mas de ese aspecto ya que Ie curso que tendremos que dictar en 1975 
nos va a producir serios dolores de cabeza. 
'" -v Estos ultimos anos de intensa actividad gremial han significado por m~ un 
fuerte impacto economica, que afronte gustoso pero que no puedo seguir aceptando 
ahora por una causa esteril. Al abandono de mi trabajo los dias martes de cada 
semana debe agregar la reducci6n de mis labores para asistir a las reuniones 
del Consejo Regional los dias jueves. Por desgracia estas sesiones han sido 
fijadas a una hora tal que me veo obligado a cerrar mi consulta cuando ajluyen 
los pacientes en demanda de atenci6n. 
,v 
Senor Presidente, ha sido un decisivo partidario de un sana gremialismo pero, 
por desgracia, todav{a este no se ha podido liberar de la politizacion de que 
fue objeto desde hace muchos atlos. Despues de una uni;n ferrea motivada por el 
intento marxista para sojuzgar a esta larga y querida franja libre de tierra 
en el mundo, vemos aparecer de nuevo la practica de las componendas egoistas 
y de olIos metodos tendientes a que "las cosas cambien para que puedan seguir 
como estaban". 
El sana nacionalismo que debe inspirar a todo chileno para engrandecer a su 
Patria en 10 moral y material, libre de las malelicas influencias e ideologias 
for~neas, esta renido con el personalismo y la ambici~n de honores y poder. Por 
eso no me cuesta en absoluto dar el paso que Ie comunico al comienzo de esta 
carta. Por ahora deseo un descanso para reponerme de la fatiga que me esta 
limitando para muchas cosas. Ello me permitir;, ademas, meditar con m~s 
tranquilidad acerca del pasado, del presente y del futuro y recuperarme 
espiritual y fisicamente para estar en condiciones de asumir cualquiera nueva 
contingencia 0 responsabilidad que la Divina Providencia quiera ponerme delante 
y mientras seo util y necesario. 
Agradezco sinceramente la confianza y la amistad con que fui distinguido. Guardo 
muy buenos recuerdos de aquellos con quienes me toco compartir el trabajo 
gremial y mas de alguno amocion ha quedado gravada para siempre en mi memoria. 
No quiero terminar estas lineas sin dejar constancia de me gratitud por la 
lealiad de que goce de parte del personal del Consejo Regional encabezado 
por la inolvidable Ivonne Cifuentes. Para ellos las expresiones de mi car~no. 
Sin otro particular, 10 saluda cordialmente su afmo, colego y amigo. 
Dr. E. Mundt 
Appendix Q :Memo of the Regional Council of Valparaiso 
to the General Council criticizing the 
involvement of certain doctors in the 
cen6uring of the Executive Committee of 
the Colegio Medico,presided by H.Salvestrini 
in 1975. 
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"medio '-lue no a.a por OOOCUJ."1I0, como tla1m1aao r .. _JU,lL&&rlo 
·ouando de il.Cuardo al dlcttiJ,.aTl del ';0111810 MoJ.ioo hay. aido 
·.t1par~o a~n oauau. JUlltltioaau.. 0 OUilnUO 10 n.ya heahO ODe-
"d tlo1ando ordanea dal Co 1.,,10 M~J.looh. 
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CULt. GIl) Mc.UICU I" t :HIL I 
\_~IN.L... I .. , R£: •• I' .NA, 
VAL t'AHAI~0 
\I ,.. I, l' A H A , '. 
5.- Por .stao o1rcunstunc1uB proponem08 8 • • om.ta a .umario per 
[alta. gr~v •• al COd1go d. ~tioa a loa nr •• RaAl ~tade i. 
Y Lui. Govov1oh' ~. 
5 d. Mayo d~ 1975 
D".JORGb: s.GUIRiU: .roLlO 
Prlla1danh 
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Appendix R:Memo for the meeting with the Minister of Health 
by the Regional Council of Valparaiso. 
7th April 1976. 
Hem~randum par4 la ~unlOO con ~l 
senor Hioialro de Salud a Ia cual 
aeiatira el Dr. Erneslo Mundt ~l 
dis 7.4.76. 
El Conaejo Re~ional Valparaiso-Acoocagua delCoiegio 
Medico de Chile, eoncleote d~ que ha aido tildado de "conflictivo", 
ba cOMiaionado al Dr. Erne.to Mundt Fluhmann, ex-repreaentante auro 
~o ~l Consejo General de la Orden 7 ex-presideote de dicho Consejo, 
para asietir a la r~uoion que tendra lugar el dia ~iercoles 7 de 
Abril de 1~76 con el aenor Kioistro de Salud y el senor Subsecretario 
c1e la GlislJ".a cartera con el encarg-o de Inanifestar 10 siguie-nte: 
1.- Despues del anhe-L:tdo pronUl1Ciar.1iento militar ,jeI 11 de Sepliell1bre 
de 1973 cste COllsejo ha nunlenido una invdri:!ble lillea de cola-
bor<:ocion para la recocstruccion uacio.1al y UnlI invari,3hle- actitud 
en contra de lodo 10 que tit:nda al re tOrl~O de 10 '-lue lan tcnazmente 
combatio ya sea en el terreno l'ragmatico CO.l.O en el ideologico. 
:?- £1 Coleb'io Medico laJ:ncntn GUC, cn la pIrlet ie-a, no cste clara la 
participncion estructurada de 106 colegios profesiomlles y solo 
se oroduzcan esporadicos y fortuitos eontactoB con la~ aUloridades 
de gobierno. 
La ciudadania civil, altalDeut.e caj)'...lcitada y organiz..da, lIO puede 
seguir subsistiendc en el vilcio. La construccion de U1& baslion 
civieo-mililar e. ineludible dado que los eomunistas or~anizaao~ 
si~uen operando a sus ancb,as en au intcnto de entorpecer e. resurgi-
miento del pais sobre las bases de una C'.u€va ir..stiluciOllalidad. 
3.- Este Coosejo ha tenido que enfreotar en estos dos ultllDo'; af,"Os 
diversos eonflictos a Divel del Servicio ~aciooal de Salud 
y de SE.F.M£!'\A. 
S.~.S. Los conflielo5 han derivado, fu.ndaRM:'ntalldente, de 1& caotica 
situacion hospitalaria, croniea par 10 delMs, que ha llevado a 
ciertos equipoa .edico& 4 la exasper4cion. Algunos fueron res~os 
coa\o el traslado de psiquiatria al Hospital del Salvador de PlaYA 
Ancha. Otro8 (ueron aometidoa a una auditoria por iniciativa d~ 
los propio& medicos tr&t~nte6 (Se adjunta anexo 1 ). 
EI ultimo de 10& conflietoa se debio II. III falta tOlal de ra,iio-
logia en el Hospital Dr. Gustavo Fricke de Vina del Mar 7 en el 
flosri tal Dr. Enrique Oeforllles de Valparaiso por desperfectos de 10 
apar'a tos. Los dos hospi tales t i ellen 1 as cuatrc especia lidades bas lca. 
y aehen impartir doeencia. El problewa lleva por 10 mencs un ano 
y aun no tiene solucion a1eeuada. ~ientras estos servicios ~e Rayos 
no podian trabajarmse les ofrecian placas de rayas vencidss a bajo 
pr~cio, que habian sobrado en el Hospital de Quilp~e. 
SE;;,~.ENA. Con el fin de ctar atencion al vasto sector de £:npleados 
Parliculares. Ellip}ea.los P'Ublicos y )'larina .~·.el"c'"tnte N.:tciCloal y de 
evilar conflictos sociales ",1 nuevos Gohieroo, el COlisejo Re~ioll'-ll 
resiono en cierto mono a los me1ico& a inscribirse en la lista de 
) l) ( • 
1. Provincia. 
La u1ti~~ vez 1a auloridad maxima provincial pidiO una 
mision que esludi..lrd el problema y propusiera sol ucioues. Se 
rmO dicha <"OmisioD a (livel de Sercnena-Cole!;io "sedico-e<loco 
IIlercial de Curico con la asisLeneia de un Delegado ¥.ilitar. 
adjunta el anexo 2 en que aparecen las conclusiones y la 
spuest.a fi0.&1 del senor Vicepresidenle Ejeculivo de SI::12!'1t:1~.~, 
e hab1an por 151 mismas. (Ver aoexo 2 ). 
Despues de un corto periodo de relativa c~llna el conflicto 
ha re<l~udi:Gado. Se aJjuota eo e 1 lAnexa 2 oolas de 1 ~aflCO Caloer-
a1 de Curieo y la cGlrtol. oe l~ operacioll cofttaule en la cual 
subrayaDon con roja las veces que e I Banco pago mab dt: 10 
e teoia disponible con cl fin de evi t<lr eferve5ceoci'Js. 
El segundo conflicto con SE~~_NA se produja reciente~ente a 
i L. de la foraa eo extremo descortes en que se procedi 0 a 
ducar 10s. cont.ratos a "art os meri lories me1icos que lrabaj~roo 
; el reordena~i~nto de SER~ENA de Valparaiso despucs del 11 de 
'r-liembre y al simultaneo nombramiento de una p~rsona total-
n!.e dcsca Iif ieada en un car~o de taBLe. respoc:sabil iddd co~o 
de Presidente de la Comision de ~~dicina Preventiva, a pesar 
. las oportunas y reiteradas advertencias hechas A las allas 
ttoritlades de 111. iHstilucion. Este nocr.tramiento pr'odujo conster-
tcion eo el gre~io m~dico de la jurisdiccion y serios proble~s 
Iternos en SE:V"E~A, como era de preyer. 
- El Consejo l<egional Valparai..,o-Aconcagua esta conciente de que 
III. situacion economica del ~dico es actualmente muy dificil, 
lrticularceote la de los medicos JoVeDe6 y de los juoilados y que 
.la situacion debe ser considerada II. 111. brevedad posible. Sin 
iliar~o estima que, simultaneamente, se ~be ir a una reeslructu-
Icion de III. politica pre,-isional y de sAlud, 'T& que el sistema 
.~ente es llIuy oneroso, en extreDO ineflciente, anticuac\o, 
Icapa~ de ad.,ptarse al progre.:.o lee Dol ogi co, deshuma nizado 'T 
I desacuerdo con el progreso social y cultural que ha exr~ri­
~r.t.a!io el pueblo de Chile. Ad€oMS lilJti La excesivdwente l.a p.srti-
,~~cioo de la iDici~tiva y car-~cidad creadora del sector privado. 
f..stima el Consejo r.e~i()nal \'"alpal·'l:so-Aconc.'tgua que es 1a SUI&A 
! los dos r.ctores enuG~iados en el pirrafo precedente la que 
;ta estimulando la fu~ de medicos hacia el extranjcro • 
. - Este COI~ejo Regional ve con preocu?~ci6n el confusionis~o 
que actualmente reina por la contradiccion elltre 1a economia 
)cial de illercado que se Vii iwplantanJo p3:..11at.in.);:I\?{J:.e y la 
'i~~tacion que se Ie pretenJer1a dar a la s31ud, enc~~drlDdQla 
-r.tro de un marco mOllopol ico (It,.} est ... do sin una ven!adera rt:gio-
Ili.l..dCioo y sin nirlguna p:lrticipacioD :jel .. ector p.:-i\.'ado tanto 
~ofesional COIIIO dE' los usuarios. A eale Con .. <;ejo Ite~iolnl no Ie 
.be la menor rlurl.t de 1a tarea cl'ln,jestin~ de los cOlllunif't::lo ea 
~ocurilr el eslalismo cotTIO una c,lbecera fie plata para sus propo-
i'_~ 
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- El C:onsejo RE-~i on.l Valparil{so-Aconcagull concuerda plenamf"ote 
coo las lineas directrices contenidas eo 18 Decl~racibo de 
incipios de Ia H. Junta de Gobierno y en e1 discurso del 
neral sepor Guslavo l~i~b 8 la Convencibn ~dica de Junio 1974. 
n e~b3rgo, reconoce que .u raalizacibn es asunto d~ gobierpo 
y complejo a 10 cual el grerc.io a:.edico debe aportar su expe-
encia en aqueDoa at;peclos q'..lE Ie son espcc-ifieos. Por ti.l i:Jctivo 
deci(lirio reaIizar unH Convencibn en 6U jurisdiecioc ell 
emplazo de Ia que deberia babcrse r~ali:ado haec ex~cta~cnLe 
, a;;o atr3s a nivel nacional. Para. c!:>Ut c:o.Ivencion desea invi t.ar 
sel.or Minislro y al senor Subsecretario de Salud. 
------------.... ............. _ .... 
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Appendix S. 
Report by Ernesto Mundt condemning 
the action of Raul Hurtado to remove 
Salvestrini's Executive Committee. 
510. 
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IQS HECHQ8. 
1.- Dr,Hurta.d9 (l'r .. ldenh OoJUejo lhglonal Santl .. go) llamO d LWlU 
l!1 a Serena T Taldl Tl .. d10lendo qlle no habr! .. OonTlIllolon. xsto 10 
hao! .. £~ hor .. s antes da 1 .. a .. 16n eaparea en que ae aoordo an el 
Oonaajo a.neral 1 .. poatergaolon de d10ha OonTono16n T de 10 olal 
no qlled6 oonatanol .. en al ColegI0 porqno la 01nta ~agnetot6nlo .. 
til' retlrad .. par algll1an. 
£.- Dr.Herrar .. (Consejero General por Santlago) pregWlt .. aTer Z~ del 
" a.r 75 en Wla rellll16n lntorlUll qlle Ollal era 1 .. - ropru e.nta.T1l1-
dad da loa dem.U Con4lljOll Re91onallll, T agr.gO qua at el ConseJo 
Itcaglonal tOllUl.ba Wla r.aollloLSn ell .. BOlo representaba al ro par 
oiento da los mMlOOIl de Ohl1e. 
Lo primoro oonlltltllTe W1 .. b\UO 1 Wl atropello a laa IIlU elementa-
les norJLA.8 de hl0. grem1al T, 10 seglllldo, ea nn .. damoatrao16n m1.a de 
1 .. propotenola do 1.a OUlAl"111 .. a.pltallnaa qllo ~ran al ral!to d.l 
pala oomo oolonlaa aubalt.rnaa. 
LA AUTORIDAD l<!ORAL Dn DR.HURTADO Y DJ: SUS C(lNSVlIR(J3 
PARA PROOEDXR CO)«) r..o HIODROX.-
1.- Con I!WJt1To del paro V"er.Ual de Ootubre 19'FZ T 1~3 al Con.uJo Re-
glonal Santlago ae l!WJatr6 atampre Taol1ante T d6bl1, slend?lr1nal-
menta, IIObrepaaado par al18 ~asas oomo 10 demostr6 180 "t'Otao16n de 
Septlembre da 19715 qne apoyo .1 para en m.U de Wl eo~, I.Repr .. en-
tabs. al OonaeJo 0 aa..a baa .. 1'. 
2.- Card. 180 Wesa D1reotiTa e1 8 de Septiembr. del 13 par 01 ~aJo 
toroUo del paro. tr_ando oon .1 Iol1nhtro laeoll an oontra d. la 
Tollllltad aprea. de 1. ~r!a de 10. OonaeJOII R.gIonal .. T del 
propI0 Oonoe;o Ree10nal Sant1~ al olal r'prellentaba, .1 Oonaejo 
Reg10nal Sa.utl~ dUlOrO largo t1empa en re.nOTar la repreaontao1on 
an el Con •• Jo General T .o1ame.nt. remoTI6 al Dr.Ruban ~oufta 1 al 
Dr.Xdgardo Cru&, T no tooo al Dr.Rana MerIno, qlle era el Vloapro-
aldento de aqllel1a Meaa ohulloa I.Repreaentaba a SI18 baalll1'. 
3.- Vuelto al Dr.Aouna al Conllejo Goneral en repr68nta016n de Punta 
ArOll.J.S, el Dr.Hurtado partlolpO en oonTeraaolonoa para oonTenoer 
• 10. reprasentant •• dal extrema Sur de la InoonTe.nIe.nola ~e diona 
deaIg.oaoi6n T lell antrego loa anteoedentes que obraban en all poder 
T en Tirtud d. loa oualea S~tIago le hab!a pedido 1. ren~oia. 
Cllando 01 RegIonal de Valparaiso pIdlci a Santlagp llll aumar10 al Dr. 
Aoufta par graTos ralt .. a 1. 'tIoa gram1a.l, aoompailando 01 libelo 
aouaator10 oorresyond1e.nte, 81 ConseJo Regional Santiago 10 absol-
Tlei par laa m1.eJIIB.A OaUJIa.l! par la.l! euues aJltea 1. habra pe:Udo 1 .. 
renuno1a 1 per la.a OUal68 hab! .. part.Iolpa.d.o e.n oonT£ra .. olollu oon 
loa COnll8j6roa de punta Ar&llas par.a que reoonaideraran la deaIgna-
016n del D:-.Aouna.l. Ea poslble que :lea .as! de ohueo8. la .lIental1dad 
de toda la baae med10a de Sant1ago que el ConssJo Regional Sant1a-
go pret end e reprell ent ar? 
5 11 . 
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-4..- Dupu'. del 11 de Septlembre del '13 el Conae30 Reglonal Santlago 
termln& por Intervenlr 1 au.pender la aotlvldad oapltular 1 no la 
ha re.tableoldo hallt ... 1 ... teoha d,tlene oontaot.o oon laa bue. a laa 
ouale. pretenc!e repreaentar't. 
0.- Deapuea del 11 de Septlembre d.l 73 el presldente d.l Oon.eJo Ge-
neral tuvo que dlsponer que todo. loa aallnto' del Region .. l Santl .. -
go deb!an •• r reauiltoa por '1. La verdad •• que loll Coleglado. 
de Santlago llevaban eue problemas a la Seoretar!a del Consejo Ge-
neral porque en el Reglonal SantIago penaban las anilliAa. l,Manten!a 
un S.rvioio ... deouado parA 1 .. baa •• que pretend!a r.preaentar? 
6.- Xl Oap!tulo del Hospital 10" 1.Aguirre pre8id~ por el Dr.Arab, 
oomenzO a atender paoiente. de S.rmana. Rioieron un tondo oom6.n 
a ben.tlolo del IIospital pero en torm.: totument. 11egal porque 
1 .. Orden .. 1 Program.a.a no la. tirlUlban loa .Iledloos que hab!an da-
do 1 .. pre.taolone. alno que toda. laa oobraba el Dr. Arab. rUeron 
mu~ho. mlllon .. de 'SOUdOD. ]:ato oonstltu!a un tlagrant. atropello 
a la8 dl.p08iolone8 lagal •• vigent .. que Impoalbilitaba .1 oontrol 
&tl00 que, por le1 u oompetenoia 1 obligao16n d.l Colegio Medloo. 
A puar de 101.8 IIllUtlpl .. advart.nolA1! de la Co.lllaion de Kedioina 
de Libre 11eoo16n 1& lrragulerldad. algul6, In)tivo por el 0\Ul dl-
eha Comision tuvo que inatrulr a la Inapeotor!a M&dloa en el .en-
tido de no segulr autorizando el pago. 
11 .. unto tue pue.to en oonoo1m1ento del ConseJo Regional Santl ... -
go, pruldlc!o por el Dr.Ra61 Rurtado Xdwarc!s pero &ate no tom -
nlnguaa m641da 1 •• deja atropeller por el Dr.Drozoo, Vloerreotor 
de la Sede Norte. 
"All! oumple el Regional SantIago oon IIU 0 bl1gaolon de oauteler 101. 
itloa protealona.l ~ el oumpl1mlento de laa dlapo.lolonslI 1813:uee 
vigent .. ? 
7.- 11 prellupueeto del 001egl0 M&dioo de Chile arroj6 para Dloi.mbr. 
1073, un detlolt c!e aprolCim.adam8.nta -4. mlllonell de eaoudo8. RevlaR.-
da laa ouent...a de 10' oolegiados de! pals, ee oomprob6 que ae adell-
daban al Colegio ma. de :5 mlllones de eaoudos no reaju8tad08 en 
cuat .... atrasadaa deade hao!a m.uohoe alloB. De eata oltra, maa de 
2.5 mlllone. oorreBpondian a oua ta8 del Reglonal SantIago, que seclt 
gu!a manteniendo un oontador irreaponaable a oargo de au oontabili-
dac!, 8in to:nar .Iledida8. No .. de axtraliar que oon esta lenldad de 
10. r.preaentante. de laa ba.au m.edioas de Santiago haran .ido v!o-
tlma.e de un deataloo en au Teaorer!a. 
Toda uta aituaoion tinanoiera oblige) a la Mella Direotlva de a.quel 
entonoellJd·~r·t5naeJo General un 1I.0uerdo que oonte.mplaba SITer .. 1I m6-
<11du para r60uperar los dilleros adeuda<1o •• 
8.- Para. realizer oonatruooionell en el Club de Campo de Santiago el 
londo de Solldarldad Grem.1isl presto dinero sln re~Juate, en olroUll6 
tanolaa <18 ~ue todos loB otroa pr~stamoB eran oon reajuate.inolu&o, 
el que liIe otorgo a OonoepolOn para la termlnaoi6n de au Cda del 
M~dloo. l:ato oonatituye un verdad.ro robo a loll lI.edioo. de todo 
Chl1e a.1"11iadOI! al londo pueato que 10. dinero., oolooadoll en ouen-
tAa d. &borro reaJustablea, permlte.n el reaJuate adeouado d.e laB 
auota:l IIl)rtuoris.s. 
~Xs de extranar que el Tesorero de ls aotual ~68a Direotlva ou.a-
tlonada por 81 Consejo Regional Santiago, eet' pldl~ndo una a.udi-
tor!a oentable, que nunoa 8e ha.b!a retLllzado antes. 
Xat..ndo pendl&nte 1'> 1euda del Club de C..Lnpl) a1 Fondo, el Consejo 
Reglon;,l S1l.11tl:i.</:o acordo, .in O;>rl&ulta a SliS bR.BeS unu Quot&. ex-
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trAOrdlnarla de );0.30.000.- para la compra. da 10 heotarea. &dTaoe.o.-
tea al Club de C~po. ~ negool0 debra haoar.& rapldamenta. 
Xl dInero tue reoolectado pero al negool0 no estaba ,eguro parque 
no exl.t!a nlnguna eaorltura de prome.a de oompra-yentaa. El vende-
dor dl0 pie atru J a;laUi au pronunolamle.o.to haata .u retorno da Xap«ffa y &h! quado el dInero 45 loa medloo. da Santiago,deavalori-
d.ndfJae an upera de una postbla oper~oion a tuturo. 
l~{ oautela el OonaeJo Regional Santl~o loa lnterasa. de sus pro-
piaa baaos que dioe repreaentar , T laal ~i.pona al OoneeJo Regio-
nal Bantiago, presidido par el Dr.Hurtado ~warda, de loa tondos 
pravlslonales de loa »~~iooa de todoa loa Regionalea del paia? 
La Oonvenolon citada para. 108 draa 2~, 2~ T 26 de AbrIl de 197~,aa­
g6.n aouerdo X" .~6 del Ooneejo General, d. teoha l~,'.n;, tenia oa-
rioter inforlllJltlva, 9uedando a orlterio c1e la propla OonTanoi6n el 
darle 0 no darle oaraotar reaolutlvo. 
LPorqa' al Regional SantIago pretendl0 eTltar que loa dem~ RegIo-
nal .. del pa!a pudI .. e. gor;ar da aata ooal1on para tenar par 10 me-
noa una informaoion opartuna. aobra mataria.a de tan alto intaria, 00-
mo las que se iban a tratar? 
XB evldante que hubo una maniobra del ConseJo Raglonal Santl~ an 
.. te aentido porque de otro modo no ae entlenda que .1 Dr.RaU Hur-
tado haTa oomunioado la auspenaIon d6 la ConTeJlo16n a Barana T Yal-
divia 2( horaa antea de que aa tomara el aouerdo an el OonaeJo Ge-
neral. 
~sta geation del Dr.RaUl Hurt&do oonstltuTe una manlobra. que a.tenta 
oontra al r€.speto mutua T que esta daeproTiata da la weI_ental 
'tioa. grem1a1. Los demS.. Regionales dal pa!e, e.o. detenaa da sua le-
g!ti£Os prarrogativ~a T del preatigl0 c1e todo el gr~ no la pua-
~.en tolerar. 
Loa dew anteoedentes w arriba upueetoa demueatran, una Tas .mAs. 
que Ill. 8.truotura de nuestro Oolegio, permita qua oamarillas lrra.-
ponaables .a apoderea del poder gramlal para llever ague. a. aus moli-
no. oon el mas protundo d8spraolo par las baees que ellaa dioen re-
preaentar. A esta verguenz~ debemoa daolr I BASTA t 
DR. mNESTO MUNDT l'LUHl.I ANN 
ax-PreBldf;nte 
OolegI0 Medloo de Chile 
Con!leJo General. 
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Appendix T. 
Letter from the President of the 
Regional Council of Valparaiso, 
Jorge Aguirre to Ernesto Mundt, 
the new President of the Colegio 
Medico,criticizing the methods 
used to bring down the old 
Executive Committee of the Colagio 
Medico. 
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MEDICO DE CHILE 
EJO REGIONAL 
~ISO·ACONCAGUA 
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,PARA ISO 
Seflor 
Dr. Ernesto Medina 
Preaidente 
Consejo General 
Colegio Medico de Chile 
SANTIAGO 
~r.Presidente: 
REF: Censura Mesa Directiva Consejo 
General. 
N°. 894 
VALPARAISO, 25 de Agosto de 1975.-
515. 
La Mesa Directiva del Colegio Medico de -Chile 
que Ud. preside se hizo cargo de su mandato, existiendo aerios 
problemas a nivel gremial que habian causado polemica y divi-
ai6n que, por 10 tanto, debian ser encarados con decisi6n para 
conssguir una soluci6n pronta y satisfactoria para todos. 
Al asumir, hizo un llamado a la ooncordia y uni-
dad que, obviamente, tenia que materializarS8 en hechos concre-
toa. 
Eate Consejo Regional ha 8aperado pacientemente a 
que eaoa hechoa se materializaran pero debe reoonocer que ello 
no aolo no ae produoe sino que nuevos acontecimientos se han ve-
nido a sumar, que contradicen las palabraa expresadas por Ud. al 
oomienzo. 
Convenci6n. La primera condici6n que puso nuestro Regional para 
aceptar por cierto el deseo de concordia y unidad expresado por 
Ud. y la nueva Meaa Directiva, era la pronta convocatoria a una 
convenci6n para tratar, entre otraa cosas, la reestructuraci6n 
del Colegio Medico y la implamentaci6n de la nueva Politica de 
Salud como temas fundamentalea. En cambio se nos ofreci6 la OpClr'-
tunidad de una reuni6n exclusi~a de Presidentes y solo con carac-
ter informativo. 
Z;CO DE CHILE 
SEJO ItEGIONAL 
fAISO·ACONCAGUA 
• 111111 - TIiLIl'O"O 1121 
LPARAISO 
/2/ 516. 
Debe Ud. camprender que, si el pais inici6 una 
nueva era a partir del 11 de Septiembre 1913 porque eataba can-
sado de laa antiguaa eatructuraa y practicaa que 10 tenian poa-
trado, los mediooa de Ch1l.e tambien eatamos canaadoa de una. or-
ganizaoi6n gramial basada en el ya gaatado centraliamo paterna-
liata que noa reaulta funcionalmente fruatrante y econ6micamen-
te oneroeo ain provecho proporcional· para loa medicoa de cada 
region. 
Fondo de Solidaridad y CODEME. La Meaa Directiva anterior denun-
c16 irregularidades inioiadas en 1972 en el m~ejo de los fondos 
del Col.agio Medico que a:feot~ al Fondo de Solidadidad Granial 
y problemas que dicen relaci6n con la Cooperativa de Medicos 
CODEME. En diCha denunoia, que todoa loa medicos de Chile tenia-
mos el. derecho a oonocer, aparece involucrado el Consejo Regio-
nal Santiago. Nosotros hanos exigi do una auditor!a contable pa-
ra eaclarecer loa hechoa hace ya baatante tiempo y todavia no 
la hamoa podido conocer. 
Alegar que el Club de Campo, construido con dine-
ros del ~ondo de 3011daridad, 8S de todos loa medicos del pais, 
no paaa de ser una ridicula diaculpa parque, ai resulta que to-
ioa hanoa aportado parte de nuestroa fondoa previaionalea a au 
~reaci6n, son aolo loa colegiados de Santiago loa que puedan dia-
t"rutartrea~ente de aus oeneficios. 
No deja de sar sugestivo que la oenaura a la Mesa 
lue hizo la mencionada denuncia, partiO en eaa miama epoca y del 
Liamo CQnsejo Regional que aparece involucrado en ~os heChos de-
lunciados. 
La nueva Mesa Directiva que Ud. preside es, indu-
ablamente, el f'ruto de la maniobra realizada por 81 Consejo Re-
·ional Santiago para derribar a 1s. anterior. Sin embargo, al asu-
ir aua tunoiones, autamaticamente ae ha tranaformado en repre-
entanta de loa medicoa inacritos en todoa los Regionales del -
aia y, par 10 tanto, debe velar por loa interesea de todoa elloa 
in diacriminacionee y rendir1ea cuenta. En el caso concreto que 
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comentamoa, la Unica forma de dar aatiafacci6n ea una auditoria 
contable con la firma de un auditor reapoDDble y de indiacuti-
do preatigio profeaio~. No hacerlo aa! es dar lugar a la aoa-
pecha de que la actuar"Meaa Directi va, elegida en las circuns-
tancias ya refer~das, desaa acallar loa hechoa para que paulati-
namante ae olviden, favoreciendo con ella al Conaejo Regional 
que la llev6 al poder. 
Diatribuci6n a nivel nacional del folleto impreso titulado "Co-
le io M~dico de Chile- Conae"o General dantia 0 in-
forman aloe colegiadoe de todo el pa s sobre: 
.,,_3. 
-Libelo de la ex-Mesa Dir~ctiva del Consejo Gene-
r.al.: .# 
-Respuestadel Consejo Regional Santiago 
-Club de Ca:mpo 
-Situaci6n de Tesorer!a 
-Censura a la ax-Mesa ~irectiva del Colegio Medico 
" de Ohile. 
Santiago, Julio de 1975. 
Dicho documanto impreso contradice abiertamente 
91 llamado a la concordia y unidad que Ud. hizo al asumir el 
cargo de Presidente del Colegio Medico de Chile. Con el ae rea-
bre'la polamica que culmin6 oon la renuncia de la Mesa anterior. 
Contiene ese escrito falcedadea y acalla otroa 
hechoa que aalieron a la luz en aquella reuni6n que reamplaz6 
a la fruatrada Convenoi6n de Abril de este afto, aobre loa que 
no nos extanderamos por el momenta pero constan en actas. Tam-
poco dice que todas las acuaaciones contra 1a Meaa preaidida 
por el Dr.Salveatrini fueron contestad.a, refutadaa ~ aclara-
daa, una a una, por los mismos acusadoe en la citada reuni6n 
del mes de Abril. 
Llama profundamente la atenci6n que, siendo un 
documento del cual participa e1 Consejo General, no lleve an-
ninguna parte 1a firma de eu PresidElllte y que tampoco figu.-re 
e1 pie de imprenta qua deber!a 11evar. 
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Cabe solo dos posibilidades: 0 el Consejo General 
estuvo Lnvolucrado en su publicacion y en tal caso seria, por su 
parte, un documento apOorifo, 0 e1 Conaejo General fue sorpren-
iido por el Conaejo Regional Santiago en una maniobra de muy ba-
ja oalidad moral. Lo pr1unero ser:!a una accion en extremo grave 
r censurable y 10 segundo habria obligado a la aotual Mesa Direc-
tiva a protestar de inmediato, Lncoar el sumario correspondien-
t e y comunicar con urgenoia tal irregularidad a todos los Regio-
[lales del ~is. Ell0 no ha ocurrido por 10 cual nos sentimos atin 
~oreedores a una explicacion sobre tan grave materia que despres-
tigia a nuestro gremio y, tambien, sobre e1 origen de los fondos 
ampleadoa en la ±mpresion del citado Q infeliz -libelo. 
I!edicina Curativa SERMENA. El dia 4 de b At Julio de este ano se 
?romulg6 e1 decreto-ley 1087, modificatorio de la Ley 16781 de 
lERMENA y al dia siguiente 1a prensa puso en boca del 3ub-secre-
tario de Salud declaraciones tan antojadieas que crearon .serias 
no1estias, confusion y alarma entre los beneficiarios de dicha 
~ey. Dirigentes gremiales que antes del 11 de Septiembre, junto 
L 1a Unidad Popular, nos atacab.an arteramente, no perdieron la 
)casion para vo1ver a 1a oarga en forma pdblica contra nosotros. 
Posteriormente el Ministro de 3alud, en una acti tud que no logra-
lOS entender, en vez de aclarar el verdaderu alcance del citado 
lecreto, aparece en la prensa amenazando a los medicos que adop-
;aren una actitud precisamente acorde con las declaraciones atri-
)uidas al Subsecretario y no desmentidas por est •• 
Ignoramos qua informaciones habra reoibido el Mi-
Listro para haber tomado tan insOlita, hos~l _e inexplicable ac-
;itud hacia nuestro gremiO. 
Haata eate momenta la Mesa que Ud. preside no ha 
~ontestado en forma publica - respetuosa pero firme- a estas pU-
~licas daclaraciones conDra nosotroa. Debemos recordarle una vez 
laS, seffor Presidente, que el Consejo General y su Mesa Directi-
'a repreaentan legalmente a todos los medicos de Chile. Lamenta-
lOS tener que decirle que con su silencio ante este retorno de 
.os ataques a nuestro gremiO, nosotros no nos sentimos debidamen-
;e representados porque a 10 menoa en nuestro Regional, hay unos 
iOO medicos inacritos en la lista de Libre Eleccion atendiendo, 
LO por imposicion ni amenazas sino ~ libremente, a 108 benefi-
~"'T ., 'II~ 
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nunciaa de parte de SERMENA ni de sus imponentes 9 Nosotros, por 
10 tanto, tenemoa derecho a aaber enete Regional hacia donde 
iban dirigidas las amenazaa del aenor Ministro y loa ataquea del 
Se~or Mujica, de la Directiva de CEPCH, apareoidoa en la prenaa 
y que Ud. debe oonocer. 
politica de 3alud.Durante mas de veinte aftos la 3alud en Chile 
~ue conducida en forma centraliata y burocratica hacia 1a inefi-
ciencia tecnica y la quiebra econ6mica con 1a consecuentIlL~dea­
moralizaci6n de los medicos y el deterioro de su imagen ante la 
comunidad. Esta situaci6n lleg6 a su cuspide durante e1 Gobierno 
de la Unidad Popular hasta tal punta que provoc6 la reacci6n de 
la inmensa mayoria de nueatroa col~giadoa en la forma que la his~ 
t6ria no podra silenciar. 
Una nueva politica de Salud fue del~a en dos 
Convenciones despues del 11 de 3eptiembre 1973 y la Meaa Direc-
tiva anterior, manteniendoae ~iel a dichos acuerdos, colabor6 con 
el Ministerio de Salud en un proyecto que, finalmente, cristali-
z6 en forma legal al ser publicados en el Diario Oficial los 
".Programas Minieteriales 1975". 
Una de las materias que queriamos tratar en la 
frustrada Convenci6n de Abril era la implementaci6n de eeta 
nueva Politica de Salud. Era menester conocer la opini6n, ex-
periencia y sugerenciaa de todos los Regionales, verdaderos co-
nocedoree de la realidad urbana y rural que se vive en cada re-
gi6n. 
Comprendera Ud. que los medicos queremos volver 
a ser partioipantes activ~s de nuestro .. ~quehacer para dignifi-
carlo y ponerlo eficazmente al eervicio de la comunidad. y. no 
seguir siendo meros ejecutores de te6ricaa eluoubaciones de 
escritorio para cargar despu9s con 1a responsabi1idad del ~ra­
caso. 
3entimos 1a necesidad imperiosa de prepararnos 
para e1 cambio y para afrontar en 1a mejor forma posible e1 
periodo de transici6n. 
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Han pasado los meses y 10 Unico que se observa 
Ion reducciones presupuestariaa angustiosas - sin objetar con 
tlloa au imperiosa necesidad - pero sin que se vislumbre un ho-
'izonte que augure una compansaci6n qua haga mas eficaz nuestro 
iervicio al pais. 
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En contraste con la tan criticada Mesa Directiva 
~terior, la actual mantiene silencio, favoreciendo con ello el 
iesconcierto y paralizando iniciativas qua, por 10 menos en nues-
tro Regional, no han dejado de s~g~ pero que no prosperan por-
que no se sabe cuales son las verdaderas reglas del juego. 
Tenemos serias dudas acerca de cual es la Politi-
ca de Salud que, en verdad, se esta gestando a n1vel ministe-
rial. Desconfiamos de los mandos medios y asesores que operan 
en circulos de Ministerio de Salud. 3abemos en forma documenta-
da que hay personas que colaboraron directamente con la Unidad 
Popular y que ahora aparecen proclives al actual Gobierno. No se-
ria de axtranar, conociendo sus tac~ictis y procedimientos, que 
esten esperando pacientemente su hora para horadar las iniciati-
vas tendientes a construir un Chile nuevo. Esta situaci6n se dejo 
antrever en la reci8nte reunion de Papudo sobre regionalizacion 
docente-asistencial de la 5a.Regi6n. Con razon estamos profunda-
mente inquietos y preocupados. 
Los problemas son dificiles y complejos y diferen-
tea a 10 largo del pais. Conciante de ello, nuestro Regional apo-
ya al acjual Gobierno y eeta dispuesto a colaborarle en la re-
construccion nacional pero en al bien entendido que tiene el de-
recho reconocido por la propia Junta de Gobierno a la critica 
honesta y constructiva en todas aquellas materias que, tecnica 
y profesionaImente, Ie son especificas y en las cualea tiene ex-
periencia acumulada. 
Lamentamos tener que decirle Gon absoluta franque-
za que no nos sentimos representados por la actual Directiva del 
Colegio Medico de Chile. Un Conaejo General en el cual a1gue ,lle-
vando la voz cantante y sonante los mismos que nos traicionaron 
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antes del 11 de Septiembre 1973., en un acto que favorecia el 
fracaso del nro gremial y que habtia servido para ganar tiempo 
para consumar el siniestro "plan Z", Y una Mesa Directiva que 
calla y otorga no nos puede satisfacer. 
Ante toda esta realidad que est~os exponiendo, 
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nos permitimos sugerirle que, en un acto patri6tico y generoso, 
La Mesa Directiva de pronta cabida a una reestructuDa y luego 
abdique, entregando el mando a un nuevo Conse.jo Gen~al que,real-
mente, represente ~l pensamiento de todos los Regionales del 
pais y no solo a uno que, por ser el mas grande, cree poder igno-
rar la voluntad de todos los demas, tal como 10 expresara el Dr. 
Mario Herrera Moore en una de las reuniones sostenidas en el mes 
de Abril de este ano en la fecha de la frustrada convenci6n. 
Estamos ciertos que el Poder Ejecutivo, al ver a 
un gremio como el nuestro con la sincera voluntad de darle una 
nueva organizaci6n mas acorde con el espiritu y la organizaci6n 
del Chile nuevo que esta naciendo, no tendra inconvenientes en 
estudiar y otorgar las reformas correspondientes a nuestra ley. 
Sin otro particular, 10 saluda atentamente. 
c/c. Consejos Regionales 
Presidente 9apitulos 
Drs.Darwin Arriagada 
Oscar Avendano Montt 
DR.ITORGE AGUIRRE JULIO 
Presidente 
INTERVIEW METHODOLOGY 
Interviewees :4 groups of intreviewees were identified: 
1. Principal actors 
These included all former Colegio Medico Presidents 
and Government health figures covering the period 
of my study and before. From these interviews, 
information on the history and structure of the 
Colegio Medico and the Chilean health service was 
obtained,as well as the politics of the actual 
period under review. 
2. Main political groups among the profession 
I managed to obtain a sample of doctors from the 
five main political groupings which were active 
inside the Colegio Medico. These doctors came from 
the National,Christian Democrat,Radical.Communist 
and Socialist parties. 
3. Doctors from the Regional Council of Valparaiso 
The aim of interviewing a sample of doctors from 
one Region was to determine in what manner the 
Regional Council of Valparaiso related to the 
Colegio Medico as a whole. Interviews were 
conducted with 15 doctors. 
4. Doctors from the Capitulo Barros Luco,Santiago 
The aim of interviewing doctors at the hospital 
level was to determine their opinions,concerns 
and activities and to assess in what way these 
related to the position being adopted by the 
Colegio Medico. Co-operation to carry out this 
study was obtained from the Barros Luco capitulo. 
The carrying out of interviews 
Questionnaires were rarely used. On 
the few occasions this approach was used,it proved 
to be unsuccessful. For example~40 questionnaires 
were delivered to doctors in the Hospital Barros Luco; 
not one was filled in_ Doctors,quite understandably 
were unwilling to write down their opinions on paper 
for fear of reprisals from the authorities. 
All interviews were structured in an 
lopen endB.d' fashion. Due to the delicate nature of 
the Chilean political environmen~.interviewees were 
at best cautious.and at worst reluctant to speak at 
all and this method of informal,open ended questioning 
encouraged interviewees to relax . 
Most interviews were conducted over at 
issues in a general fashion. A second meeting was 
usually arranged some months later. At this, 
questioning was more detailed. It was also 
important at this interview to verify the accuracy 
of the interviewee's story from the first interview. 
It was somBtimes necessary to organize a 
third or even fourth meeting in order to check one 
interviewee's story against another's. 
A tape recorder was normally used at 
all interviews unless the interviewee specifically 
objected . 
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SOU R C E S 
NOTES ON SOURCES 
Unpublished sourceS0n the Colegio Medico de Chile 
The major source for this thesis is 
the minutes of the meetings of the governing body 
of the Colegio Medico,the Consejo General(General 
Council)from 1970 until 1980. These minutes are 
verbatim accounts of meetings which were held every 
week. They are not summaries of what was said,but 
textual accounts. 
Another source is the minutes of the 
meetings of the Regional Council of Valparaiso from 
1970 to 1980. During the Popular Unity period it 
became the most important Regional Council . Having 
both these sources it was possible to determine what 
went on in the most detailed fashion,not only within 
the General Council and the Regional Council of 
Valparaiso but within other Regional Councils as 
well. The minutes of the General Council are by far 
the most important source. All the activities of the 
other Regional Councils were discussed there. The 
General Council provided a global picture of Colegio 
Medico activities. 
Both these sources were found at the 
archive of the Regional Council of Valparaiso. Apart 
from the minutes,this archive included all correspond-
ance between the Regional Council and the General 
Council, and correspondance to the Regional Council, 
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reports,and other documents which the General Council 
had sent to the Regional Council archive. 
Access to this material was not 
easy. The General Council in Santiago refused to 
grant me permission to read the Colegio Medico minutes. 
Even basic iata such as election results(pre-1973) 
was not made available to me. Some General Councillors 
such as Raul Donckaster tried to get this unpublished 
material on my behalf, but failed. The 4 man Executive 
Committee of the Colegio M~dico unanimously turned 
down my request to see their sources. 
The Regional Council of Valparaiso 
although unaware of the difficultues I had encountered 
in Santiago was more forthcoming. Its President,Hernan 
Krause kindly granted me permission to consult the 
minutes of this Regional Council. Once installed in 
their offices in Vina del Mar,I was able to read the 
minutes of the General Council which had been sent 
every week since 1964 when the painstaking recording 
of meetings of the General Council was begun. I am 
grateful to all the staff at the Regional Council for 
their help and especially the Permanent Secretary 
whose kindness was qui~e unforgettable. 
These minutes,reports and correspond-
ance were photocopied by me and then microfilmed. 
This material will eventually be housed in a University 
524. 
Publi shed source s on the Col egi 0 Hedi co de ,Chile 
The Colegio Hedico de Chile is 
responsible for three publications: 
Vida Hedica (1952-monthly) -the Colegio Hedico's 
professional magazine. 
Cuadernos Hedico Sociales (1960- monthly)- a journal 
of high quality on the social environment of health 
care in Chile. 
Revista Hedica de Chile ( monthly)- Chile's scientific 
medical journal. 
Vida Hedica is most useful for examining the political 
behaviour of the profession. It never publishes the 
minutes of General Council meetings but it does record 
the conclusions of each meeting. 
Chilean News~a~ers and Journals 
El Hercurio (Santiago) 1964-1980 
El Hercurio (Valparaiso) 1970-1973 
El Hercurio (Antofagasta)1970-1973 
El Siglo 1970-1973 
La Nacion 1970-1973 
Las Noticias de la Ultima Hora 1970-1973 
La Prensa 1970-1973 
La Tercera de la Hora 
Clarin 1970-1973 
Puro Chile 1970-1973 
1970-1980 
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\veekly Journals 
Ercilla 
Que Pasa? 
Chile Hoy 
Punto Final 
Monthly Journals 
Mensa.je 
1970-1980 
1970-1980 
1970-1980 
1970-1973 
1 970-1 980 
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I N T E R V lEW S 
Interviews conducted in Chile: 
October 1979 to August 1980. 
1. D~.J.Jim~n~z,P~~~id~nt ot th~ A~~ociation 
ot th~ Capitulo~,1978-p~~~~nt. 
2. D~.c.Villa~~o~l,P~~~id~nt ot th~ Col~gio 
~edico,1965-67;1969-73,Con~~j~~o,1973-80. 
3. D~.Y.V~ntu~ini,Con~~j~~o R~gional, 
Santiago Council,1970-79. 
4. D~.W.lno~t~oza,P~~~id~nt ot Tc~cCH,1962. 
5. D~.J.7~ll~z,Con~~j~~o R~gional,Santiago 
Council,1964. 
6. D~.R.~~~ino,P~~~id~nt ot th~ A~~ociation 
ot th~ Capitulo~,1971-73 ,Con~~j~~o 
y~n~~al to~ th~ R~gional Council ot 
Santiago,1973-75,Di~~cto~ y~n~~al ot th~ 
S~~vicio Nacional d~ Salud,1975-78. 
7. D~.P.Silva,Di~~cto~ y~n~~al ot th~ 
S~~vicio Nacional d~ Salud,1966-70, 
Con~~j~~o y~n~~al,1970-73 to~ th~ 
R~gional Council ot La S~~~na. 
8. D~.c.~~dina,P~~~id~nt ot th~ Col~gio ~edico, 
1975-79. 
9. D~.H.Salv~~t~ini,P~~~id~nt ot th~ Col~gio 
~edico,1973-75. 
10.D~;O.A~taza,Con~~j~~o y~n~~al,1972-73, 
S~c~~ta~y y~n~~al ot th~ Col~gio ~edico, 
1973-75,Con~~j~~o y~n~~al 1975-p~~~~nt. 
11.D~.D.A~~iagada,Con~~j~~o y~n~~al 1972-73, 
Di~~cto~ y~n~~al ot th~ S~~vicio Nacional 
d~ Salud,1973-75. 
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13. D~.Shu~t~~,Di~~cto~ y~n~~ae ot th~ S~~vicio 
Nacionae d~ Saeud,1979-p~~~~nt. 
14. D~.~.R~qu~na,J~t~ 7~cnico d~e S~~vicio 
Nacional d~ Salud,1970-73. 
15. D~.Aem~yda. 
16. D~.J.Aevayay,int~~vi~w~ conduct~d ~n Vina 
d~e ~a~,in th~ wint~~ ot 1980. 
17. D~.y.Aeva~~z. 
18. D~.J.V~n~zian.Con~~j~~o R~gionae to~ 
Vaepa~ai~o,1971-p~~~~nt. 
19. D~.A.Co~ta,Con~~j~~o R~gionae to~ Vaepa~ai~o, 
1970-73. 
20. D~.[.C~uz ~~na,S~c~~ta~y y~n~~ae ot th~ 
Coe~gio ~edico,1971-73;Und~~-S~c~~ta~y ot 
H~aeth,1976-79. 
21. D~.J.~ontt,P~~~id~nt ot th~ young Docto~~' 
A~~ociation 1979-p~~~~nt. 
22. D~.J.V~ga,m~m~~~ ot th~ young Docto~~' 
A~~ociation. 
23. D~.A.Yoic,S~c~~ta~y y~n~~ae ot r[~[CH, 
[dito~ ot th~ R~vi~ta ~~dica d~ Chie~. 
24. S~.J.A~itzia,H~ad ot S[R~[NA,1979- p~~~~nt. 
25. D~.J.lntant~,P~~man~nt S~c~~ta~y ot th~ 
Con~~jo R~gionae,1978-p~~~~nt. 
26. D~.W.Sti~he,m~m~~~ ot th~ Young Docto~~' 
A~~ociation. 
27. D~.r.Qu~~n~y,D~e~gat~ to th~ yov~~nm~nt on 
th~ S~~vicio Nacionae d~ Saeud,1976-79. 
28. S~a.Pu~a O~tiz,Socioeogi~t in th~ ~ini~ty 
ot H~aeth. 
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31. D~.R.Acuna,P~e~ident ot the Coeegio ~edico, 
1973;Con~eje~o gene~ae 1973- p~e~ent. 
32. D~.O.Roman,Con~eje~o gene~ae 1970-73. 
33. D~.Cohen. 
34. D~.A~co~a,Con~eje~o de Con~ejo Regionae de 
Vaepa~ai~o,1971-73. 
35. S~.L.Viea~in,P~e~ident ot the 7~ucke~~' 
Union. 
36. D~.Pat~i,P~e~ident ot the Depa~tment ot 
pugeic Heaeth ot the Coeeqio ~edico de 
Chiee. 
39. D~.~.Ipinza,London 1979,Santiago 1980. 
40. D~.Zapata.Sec~eta~y gene~ae ot the Coeegio ~edico 
1968-70. 
41. D~.9aego,Con~eje~o gene~ae,1971-72. 
42. D~a.Cecieia Aggaea. 
43. D~.Diaz,Capitueo Ba~~o~ Luco,Santiago. 
44. D~.7onio Intante. 
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